THE CHALLENGES OF GROWING WITH COMPLEXITY

MID-TERM EVALUATION
OF THE
RIGHTS AND RESOURCES INITIATIVE

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CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABT	Autoridad de Bosques y Tierra, Bolivia
ACICAFOC	Coordinating Association of Indigenous and Agroforestry Communities of Central America (Partner)
ADEMAF	Agency for the Development of Macro-Regions and Border Areas, Bolivia (from Spanish)
AFIR	National Indigenous Forestry Association, Bolvia (from Spanish)
AIDESEP	The Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest (from Spanish)
ATEM	Alternate Tenure and Enterprise Model
CAFT	Coopérative Agro Forestière de la Trinationale
CAN	Andean Community of Nations
CCMSS	Consejo Civil Mexicano para la Silvicultura Sostenible
CEADES	Collective of Applied Studies to Social Development, Bolivia (from Spainish)
CEDLA	Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario
CEJIS	Center for Legal Studies and Social Research, Bolivia (from Spainish)
CFB	Camara Forestal de Bolivia
CFO	Chief Finance Officer
CFV	Certificación Forestal Voluntaria, Bolivia
CIDOB	Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (from Spanish)
CIFOR	Center for International Forestry Research
CIPCA	Center for Campesino Research and Promotion (from Spanish)
COICA	Coordination of the Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin
COMIFAC	Convergence plan of the Central African Forest Commission
CONAFOR	Comisión Nacional Forestal, Mexico
CSAG	Civil Society Advisory Group, to ITTO
DAR	Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales
DFID	Department for International Development, UK
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOBONA	Gestión Social en Ecosistemas Forestales Andinos
EFC	Community Forestry Enterprises, Bolivia
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (of UN)
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FECOFUN	Federation of Community Forest Users, Nepal (Partner)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FENAFER	Fédération Nationale des Femmes Rurales, Mali
FIP	Forestry Investment Program
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
FPCD	Foundation for People and Community Development (Partner)
FPP	Forest Peoples Programme (Partner)
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
FT	Forest Trends (Partner)
GACF	Global Alliance of Community Forestry
GEF	Global Environment Facility

GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GRAADECOM	Research Group for Action and Assistance for Community Development (from the French)
HCC	Haut Conseil des collectivities, Mali
HIMAWANTI	Himalayan Grassroots Women's Natural Resources Management Association
IBA	Institutional and Business Arrangements (of RRI)
IBC	Instituto del Bien Comun
IC	Intercooperation (now merged with HELVETAS)
ICIMOD	International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
ICRAF	World Agroforestry Centre (Partner)
IFRI	International Forestry Resources and Institutions (Partner)
IIRSA	Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America
ILO	International Labor Organization (of UN)
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPHAE	Instituto de Pre-Historia, Antropologia, e Ecologia
ITTO	International Tropical Timber Council
IM	Independent Monitor (of RRI)
INRA	National Institute of Agrarian Reform, Bolivia (from Spanish)
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
IP	Indigenous Peoples
LA	Latin America
Lao PDR	Lao People's Democratic Republic
LC	Local Conventions, Mali (also CL)
LIDEMA	Liga de Defensa del Medio Ambiente, Bolivia
LFP	Livelihood and Forestry Programme, Nepal
LLS	Landscape Livelihood Strategies
LOA	Loi d'Orientation Agricole (new agriculture orientation law)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MINEP	Ministry of Environment and Protection of Nature, Cameroon
MFSC	Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation, Nepal
MINFOF	Ministry of Forest and Wildlife, Cameroon (from French)
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
NFTP	Non Timber Forest Products
NGO	Non Government Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NSCFP	Nepal Swiss Community Forestry Project
OFC	Community Forestry Organizations, Bolivia
PA	Protected Area
PES	Payment for Environment Services
PKU	Peking University
PPFP	Permanent Production Forest Land, Bolivia
PRISMA	Salvadoran Research Program on Development and Environment (Partner)
PROCYMAF	Provision of Community Forestry project, World Bank

PROFOR	Program on Forests
RCA	Central African Republic
RDI	Rural Development Institute (Landesa)
RECOFTC	The Center for People and Forests (Partner)
REDD	Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
REFACOF	African Women's Network for Community Management of Forests (translation from French)
R-PP	Readiness Preparation Proposal (for REDD)
RRG	Rights and Resources Group
RRI	Rights and Resources Initiative
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SE	Sahel Eco
SFA	State Forestry Administration (Government of China)
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SRM	Strategic Response Mechanism
TCO	Indigenous Territories Bolivia (*Territorios Comunales de Origen*)
TEBTEBBA	Foundation (Indigenous Peoples' International Centre for Policy Research and Education, Partner)
TIPNIS	Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure, Bolivia
TMI	The Mountain Institute
UFA	Units of Managed Forests, Cameroon
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
VPA	Volunteer Partnership Agreement
WRI	World Resources Institute
WWF	Worldwide fund for Nature; World Wildlife Fund

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI)[1] was established in 2005 as a coalition of organizational partners to promote local people's rights over forest resources and reduce poverty. It has been led by an active secretariat, established as the Rights and Resources Group (RRG), and guided by a prominent Board that included Partner and independent members. In January 2008, a Framework Proposal developed in coordination with partners and donors was adopted to provide strategic direction and enable common funding and reporting for a five-year period through 2012. A pool of European Bilateral donors and US Foundations has generously funded this proposal with approximately $27 million of committed funds to date.[2]

This mid-term evaluation (MTE) is mandated by the RRI Framework agreement. The research has been carried out over the period of March to July, 2011, by an independent international team of The Mountain Institute (TMI) recruited through a competitive process.[3] The results of the MTE are based on over 110 interviews, email responses and questionnaires. The team conducted face to face interviews in Nepal, China, Thailand, UK, Norway, Cameroon, Mali, Bolivia, Peru and Washington, DC.

RRI programs consist of both *global programs* led by RRG, and *regional and country programs* carried out by RRI Partners and Collaborators developed through an annual strategic planning process that includes country and regional level meetings as well as Partner and Board meetings. The resulting Board approved strategies and activities are funded by the framework funds supplied by RRG or as existing resources of Partners and Collaborators. Global programs include thematic and analytic work on: tracking forest tenure, rights and climate, realizing rights, and alternative tenure and enterprise models (ATEMs) along with flexible strategic response mechanism (SRM) grants. Global and regional networks of forestry officials, policy groups, and grassroots groups[4] are provided support through the global program. RRG also supports the RRI Coalition through communications and outreach, coordination, and administrative and financial services.

The RRI Coalition of Partners has grown and modified since its establishment. It currently consists of 14 diverse international, regional and community organizational members[5] with a common commitment to:

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[1] www.rightsandresources.org
[2] US $ 24,258,000 reported in 2011 Governance Meeting documents, later updated to $27 million. Donors include DFID (UK); The Ford Foundation; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland; Norad, Sida, and SDC. These figures assume only income active 2008 – 20013 raised within the Framework Proposal. It excludes project-restricted grants and contracts raised with independent proposals.
[3] Gabriel Campbell (team leader - US), Kirsten Ewers Andersen (Denmark), Marlene Buchy (France), Bob Davis (US), Jorge Recharte (Peru). See Annex 9 for short biographies of team members.
[4] MegaFlorestais, ITTO-CSAG, IAG-CLIMATE CHANGE AND RIGHTS, GACF.
[5] ACICAFOC, CED, Civic Response, FECOFUN, HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation, IFRI, Forest Peoples Programme, Forest Trends, FPCD, PRISMA, RECOFTC, TEBTEBBA, The Samdhana Institute, World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF); previously included CIFOR and IUCN. See Annex 10 and http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/doc_2457.pdf

RRI Mid-Term Evaluation: Final November 2011   **The Mountain Institute**

> *"reducing poverty and enhancing well-being by strengthening tenure reform and democratic governance and development in forest areas of developing countries".*[6]

The RRI Board includes representatives from Partner organizations as well as independent members. Regionally and at the selected country level, both Partners and other cooperating agencies, or Collaborators, plan and implement annual programs. Partners currently also participate in planning global programs led by RRG. At the country and regional level, there are more active Collaborators (typically 3-5 per country) than Partners carrying out these activities funded through RRG and altogether RRG has 156 signed agreements for program activities in 2011.[7]

RRI's 2011 budget is $7.5 million. Levels of initial funding commitments to programs resulted in an expenditure of $3.75 million in 2008. Expenditure grew to $4.7 million in 2009 and $7.27 million in 2010. The committed budget for the Framework period is approximately $27 million. In 2011 59% is budgeted for Partners and Collaborators, while 41% is budgeted for direct implementation by RRG.

The primary evaluation criteria of *relevance, effectiveness, efficiency,* and *sustainability* were used to structure the MTE assessment and report the evaluation results. Within each criterion, the MTE identified *accomplishments; issues and trade-offs,* and *future alternatives.* The team's initial findings were presented to RRG on June 27, 2011 and preliminary feedback received. A first draft was then sent on July 30, 2011 to RRG. Comments and factual corrections were received on September 15, and used as a basis for this final version of the report.

The TMI MTE team found that the **RRI is widely acclaimed for its critically important *relevance* to local, regional and global policy agendas for forest tenure reforms, increasing development opportunities, addressing tenure issues in climate change responses, and improving governance.** While other organizations are also championing the importance of securing forest tenure rights as part of their work, RRI's strategic and relentless catalytic focus on these rights appears **unique** and highly appreciated.[8] RRI is acknowledged as a key **knowledge leader in this field**.

In addition, **RRI's ability to respond flexibly** to the fast changing global and national drivers of forest management rights and use – including REDD and carbon rights and trading debates, large scale forest land acquisitions and conversions, and rapid increases in demand by emerging growth economies – has enabled RRI to **stay highly relevant**. For example, RRI has played an important role in bringing local forest tenure perspectives into climate change dialogues through convening

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[6] Rights and Resources Initiative Logical Framework 2008 – 2012 (Sep 26/10). Annex 11.
[7] As of January 2011, Governance Meeting Documents
[8] RRI is planning a study of RRI's role vis-a-vis other organizations working in this field. The outcome of this study will be an important complement to this evaluation.

civil society and government actors at key moments in the inter-governmental Conference of Parties and the REDD Partnership processes with effective analytic and communications support. However, as discussed later, this flexibility also has trade-offs that have curtailed RRI's ability to follow through with some of their on-going global and country initiatives.

Evaluating RRI's *effectiveness* is a difficult task due to the complexity and diversity of national forest use contexts and the varied government, industrial, and local players that influence them. Forest tenures are contested and ambiguous in much of the world. RRI's theory of change relies on convictions that tenure rights of the poor can be increased and strengthened through synergistic combinations of strategically chosen studies, interactions, and advocacy that enable an array of global and local actors to influence policy and investment actions at global and national levels.

The assumption that different kinds of RRI program actions can influence policy environments is strongly affirmed by the MTE. However, the understanding that different program elements interact to form strategic and synergistic wholes was not widely shared by interviewees and is only partially confirmed. While Partners and Collaborators emphasized RRI's important role in spearheading policy impact in the countries concerned and were able to identify new levels of awareness and lines of policy influence related to RRI activity, they were unable to trace specific policy outcomes at the legislative level back to identifiable synergies fostered by RRI as a coalition of Partners. This resulted in the MTE's hope of providing documented maps of synergistic causal pathways to policy change being infeasible.

But lack of such specific causal maps does not diminish **RRI's demonstrable impacts**. Partners, Collaborators, and independent observers were able to identify a number of **specific accomplishments**, including:

- **New awareness, greater understanding, support and conditions for forest tenure reform** among an array of actors in countries visited by the MTE, including China, Cameroon and Mali, and Bolivia – and among global agencies including Partners and donors;
- **Reorientations** of global network and dialogue agendas such as ITTO and UNREDD to acknowledge the centrality of local tenures, Indigenous Peoples, and rights to sustainably manage forest resources;
- Creation of influential and admired **knowledge products** such as RRI publications on issues related to forest tenure, community governance, climate change, REDD; conservation and poverty reduction linkages; and potentials for small scale forest enterprise development and improved livelihoods;[9]

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[9] See impressive list of substantive publications by RRI at www.rightsandresources.org

- Contribution to **halting or modifying regressive legislation** (e.g. Nepal) **and exploitative industrial investments** (e.g. China).
- Contributions bringing major global forest administrations together in informal meetings through MegaFlorestais

The scientific and relatively neutral platforms provided by RRI support to governments, country level coalitions and global networks, **provided productive open spaces** for opposing organizations and perspectives to interact and discuss sensitive issues, particularly in large international workshops organized and co-funded by RRI.[10] Participants and observers are convinced that this approach **widened and deepened understanding** of pro-poor forest tenure and management issues.[11] It gave **credibility and legitimacy** to this reform agenda, increased the **capacity, confidence, confidence, and legitimacy** of advocates for change, and increased the **access** of academics and civil society to government policy makers.

In this sense, RRI's theory of change is validated by the on-going increase in support for tenure reform and the livelihoods of forest users. While not easily perceived from the level of a country or single organization, from an overall perspective, the MTE team thus did find good merit – and results – in the programmatic strategy of **combining global analyses and support for global networks and dialogues with country level programs**, even if they are difficult to pin down or measure and come with fairly high transactional costs.

A number of **trade-offs** faced by RRI in its effort to help reform forest tenure globally and in a number of countries in all Africa, Asia and Latin America stem from **issues of uncertainty and complexity**. Forest tenure regimes – including the spectrum of *de jure* and *de facto* systems within even one country – are complex and subject to constantly changing economic, social and political dynamics.[12] The legal systems are likewise overlaid with contradictory laws and regulations that are manipulated by those with power and influence.[13] The global and local landscapes – often with contradictory demands for economic growth, conservation, indigenous rights, and local livelihoods – can leave even RRI Partners on different sides of a particular issue, let alone other stakeholders.[14]

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[10] The international conferences in Brazil 2007, China 2007 and 2009, Yaoundé 2009, and Indonesia 2011, are particularly highlighted by stakeholders for their seminal contributions. The successful Indonesia conference in July 2011 fell out of the time period of this MTE, but is clearly another important example.

[11] While widely appreciated, especially by government officials and some donors, this "neutral" position is strongly challenged by some groups and individuals who think that a reform agenda needs to have stronger advocacy on contested issues such as: REDD, carbon trading and community rights; Indigenous Peoples' collective rights; individual vs. collective community rights; corruption; etc.

[12] *From Exclusion to Ownership? Challenges and Opportunities in Advancing Forest Tenure Reform,* William D. Sunderlin, Jeffrey Hatcher and Megan Liddle, RRI: 2008. *Communal Tenure and the Governance of Common Property Resources in Asia: Lessons of Experiences in Selected Countries*, Kirsten Ewers Andersen. FAO: April 2011

[13] *What Rights? Measuring the Depth of Indigenous Peoples and Community Forest Tenure: Preliminary Finds from a Legal Analysis of 33 Forest Tenure Regimes in 15 Countries,* Fernanda Almeida and Jeffrey Hatcher, RRI: July 2011.

[14] *Local Rights and Tenure for Forests: Opportunity or Threat for Conservation?* Jeffrey Sayer, Jeffrey McNeely, Stewart Maginnis, Into Boedhihartono, Gill Shepherd, Bob Fisher - IUCN, Rights and Resources Initiative.

RRI has taken on an **ambitious agenda** to try and find the strategic points at which these complex dynamics can be influenced in favor of local peoples' rights and livelihoods and the climate for pro-poor community and private investment improved. The task is enormous and tricky. RRI has tried to deal with this daunting challenge by "being strategic" and "nimble" – designing its program to respond to "windows of opportunity" using the Strategic Response Mechanism (SRM) where warranted. As a consequence, country and regional activities with RRI funding (or co-funding) are purposively kept within the limits of *annual* planning cycles in which threats and opportunities are reassessed on an annual basis and agreements (subcontracts) made for less than a year at a time.[15] Likewise, at the global level, RRG has, with input from Partners, responded to the scale of the agenda by "strategically" shifting resources and priorities between different global programs, dropping some and adding others. For example, rights and climate have taken a disproportionate amount of the resources over 2008 – 2011 in response to the massive global attention to climate change and carbon trading. The initial theme on conflicts was never directly addressed and the job of tracking tenure has had to be taken up directly as a full fledged program activity.[16]

This **short term strategic approach** to shift attention annually to the most pressing opportunities diagnosed by the RRI planning teams, and RRG, is made even shorter by pre-approving a funding basket for the Strategic Response Mechanism that is then specifically allocated during the year. **RRI is appreciated** for this flexible and non-bureaucratic approach and is credited with making critical differences in, for example, timely support for forestry policy planning in Cameroon and preparing required documentation to register pending land claims and implement measures to safeguard indigenous territorial rights that are threatened by new governmental policies (New Forestry law and development projects) in Peru, which would otherwise have been lacking.

However, Partners and Collaborators also expressed disadvantages of this annual planning frame approach. They characterize many of the key issues related to tenure reform as ones that require a longer-term commitment to research, advocacy, and demonstration.[17] **Realizing rights, in the sense of helping Indigenous Peoples and local communities secure existing rights and providing them with supporting skills, technologies, and regulatory environments are identified by many as equally – if not more – important than initial creation of rights.** Given

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[15] Contracts are signed for a year, but as is discussed later, the calendar for approval and operational delays result in less than 12 months effective program periods.

[16] RRI had originally hoped that CIFOR or FAO databases could provide this information.

[17] As noted in RRI's recent publication, "the transition from FLC [forest adding countries] to FAC [forest losing countries] does not occur, and should not be expected to occur, overnight; the same could be said about the reform of governance, tenure, and rights." *The Greener Side of REDD+*, H. Gregersen, H. Lakany, L. Bailey and A. White, July 2011, p. 6. http://www.rightsandresources.org/publication_details.php?publicationID=2431. In her closing address to the July 2011 Indonesia conference, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, from partner TEBTEBBA, also made a point of the long term nature of forest tenure reform. *Learning from Different Levels: Lessons on How to Make Progress and What Needs to be Done to Advance Tenure Reform,* Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, International Conference on Forest Tenure, Governance and Enterprises 11-15 July, Lombok, Indonesia

RRI Mid-Term Evaluation: Final November 2011   The Mountain Institute

the limited resources with which RRI operates, short-term catalytic interventions may be all that is possible. RRI's strategy is partly built on stimulating and helping partners leverage additional funding. However this has had mixed success with the result that a number of RRI's critical forest reform and investment initiatives are **inadequately supported** at both the global and country level – **without the critical mass of resources** required for sustained effectiveness.[18]

The resources that have been devoted to providing communications support for RRI are highly rated with regard to knowledge management through email information, the web database, printed copies, and timely responsiveness. The use of news media through Burness Communications, for those who knew of it, was also considered a highly valued innovation. The web database is used mostly by Partners and Collaborators and less by governments.

However, a similar concerning inadequate resources and follow through was also encountered with regard to communications. RRI, and its messages, have limited visibility among non-RRI related organizations and individuals and at local and provincial levels. There is a **large potential for increasing the audience for RRI's work** through expanding the resources RRG and RRI Partners and Collaborators devote to reaching wider audiences in local languages and using easily communicated formats and media, including the news media. Most respondents agreed that reaching more politicians, more grassroots organizations, and more government officials would make a major difference in the degree to which forest tenure reforms are achieved. The same organizations further indicated that a stronger RRI/RRG *presence in country* i.e. RRG representative, would contribute both to spread of impact as well as to forging more day-to-day interaction among Partners in the country concerned.

On the organizational side, RRI is judged to be an **open and exemplary learning organization**. Staff in the RRG Secretariat and Partners and Collaborators met in the countries are **highly competent and deeply committed** to the RRI mission. RRG has demonstrated willingness to adapt its management structure to try and balance diverse Partners and Collaborators, donors, programs and outside demands. The Coalition has demonstrated admirable open planning processes and instituted strong monitoring and evaluation systems, including two processes of internal assessment validated by an annual independent monitor.

The diverse nature of the Coalition of Partners, with both large international semi-governmental and non-governmental research and advocacy organizations along side much smaller country and grassroots advocacy organizations has led to **some fruitful synergies and action**. However, it has also led to **divergent expectations**

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[18] While Annual Work Planning documents would not capture budgets used by Partners and Collaborators for non-RRI activities, it is noteworthy that funds directly committed by Partners and Collaborators amounted to around 10% of the requested budget for Regional and Country Activities in 2011 (Governance Meeting Documents). If global programs are included, the figure is closer to 5%.

RRI Mid-Term Evaluation: Final November 2011   **The Mountain Institute**

and a certain amount of tensions.[19] These include issues related to governance (is RRG "first among equals" in decision making?), funding (expectations for Partner co-funding without long term projects can be unrealistic), differences in advocacy stances (e.g. radical vs. moderate), etc. Two large international partners have left the formal Partner status, though they continue to collaborate, and new Partners and Collaborators have joined the RRI Coalition and its programs.[20] Some complain that selection procedures are not as transparent as they would like, and there is widespread ambivalence on expansion of the number of Partners and Collaborators further, in part because some see RRG more as a funding agency than fellow Partner. To their credit, RRI has directly addressed these issues by reviewing its MOU format with Partners and it is noteworthy that the format remained basically the same after the open review.

The RRG Secretariat has also had to grow, but relatively less than the size of its program portfolio. This adds strain to the already **overloaded RRG workload** and raises questions on the **optimal use of highly qualified staff**. Professional staff is tasked with developing and administering the 156 new contracts in 2010 and 121 new contracts to-date in 2011 without adequate administrative support. The finance staff is likewise overloaded with cumbersome donor and government requirements. These issues can also be a source of tension with contracted Partners and Collaborators who tend to view this part of RRG's administrative mandate as more characteristic of donor bureaucracy than "doing development differently".[21]

The ambiguity of RRG's role as both a proactive implementer on its own behalf as well as a facilitative secretariat for a diverse coalition of Partners and Collaborators has resulted in a hybrid organizational structure: implementing leader – secretariat. It is a tribute to RRG management that this works as well as it does. But it is evident that this has come with a fairly high managerial burden. It is not clear this is sustainable, especially given the key role of founding management members and longer term questions of succession. Continuing reflection on the alternatives for the RRG and RRI Coalition (including the Collaborators) structures in relation to programmatic priorities (see below) will be an important task in preparation for planning a follow-on phase.

The dilemma facing RRI thus is: to grow or to focus?

The RRI is a **unique and effective source of support** to policy makers and civil society in **promoting an agenda of forest tenure and governance reform in favor of livelihoods for the poor**. Both global initiatives and country and regional programs have demonstrated positive results for this effort. The management, board, Partners, and donors are to be strongly commended for creating a unique,

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[19] Doris Capistrano, *Report on the Mid-term Review of the Multilateral memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation on The Rights and Resources Initiative.* RRI document. 2010.
[20] IUCN and CIFOR have changed their status from formal Partner to Collaborator in various initiatives.
[21] RRI is generally acknowledged as living up to their claim to "do development differently"; but most acknowledge that as soon as agreements are signed, traditional bureaucratic relations prevail.

RRI Mid-Term Evaluation: Final November 2011   **The Mountain Institute**

flexible and diverse organization that has **filled a void in the development landscape** for livelihoods and forest tenure reform.

Everyone questioned for the MTE was in agreement that **RRI is fulfilling an essential role** in fostering rethinking in governments and increasing local people's rights to forests. They were in agreement that **without RRI, this agenda would be badly diminished to the detriment of people and forests throughout the world**. Stakeholders would sorely miss the insightful analyses and convening, coalition building roles currently carried out so effectively by RRG.

However, **RRI seems to have taken on more than is possible with the resources at its disposal and the complexity of the challenges it is addressing.** This ends up leaving some initiatives underfunded or without the long-term follow-up of initial catalyzing activities by RRG and the RRI Coalition that is often necessary for sustainable change. **Either RRI needs to continue to grow and strategically select programs that can be effectively supported through more and/or longer term resources, or it needs to acknowledge the limitations of its resources, approach and organizational set-up to restructure and strategically focus on its most promising initiatives.**

The MTE has identified a number of future alternatives roughly grouped under the expansion or focusing option. However, these options are not mutually exclusive; many would argue for more focused expansion.

RRI FUTURE ALTERNATIVES

1. Strategic Growth Option

Global Programs

1.1 Determine the adequate level of funding and human resources required to have identifiable impact for each analytic/research and action theme and focus on those for which funding is available and opportunities for impact discernable;

1.2 Incorporate more empirical research to generate new primary data on key strategic issues to move RRI's agenda forward in areas of current gaps e.g. poverty impacts associated with forest tenure change and investments, gender and social inclusion opportunities, conservation and impacts on tenure rights, integrating issues of Indigenous Peoples and other local forest communities, and the issues of FLEGT and curtailing land/forest concessions at the expense of local communities, etc.;

1.3 Determine whether selected global programs require pilot demonstrations of the viability of new approaches and policies and work with appropriate Partners/Collaborators at country level to set up longer term projects with

appropriate monitoring e.g. combined co-generation energy and forest product processing with more private sector collaboration;[22]

1.4 Increase communication and outreach support in the countries concerned to reach wider audiences through use of more news and alternative media outlets, policy briefs, translation of key messages, etc. both from RRG and incorporated in each agreement/contract;

1.5 Develop strategies to reach underserved government, political, provincial and grassroots audiences;

1.6 Continue strategic response mechanism and continue to clarify with Board and Partners the selection criteria and process, including potential for using these in non-selected countries;

1.7 Develop more in-depth collaborations with appropriate research and analytic organizations, particularly with Partners that have proven their ability to deliver and cover their real costs as well as with development banks and donors working on the same objectives;

Regional and Country Programs

1.8 Develop focused research and advocacy strategies that work on "realizing" (supporting implementation, securing, following through) rights to increase actual livelihood results for selected countries (global programs can be used to reach wider net of countries);

1.9 Combine annual cycle planning and agreements with multi-year agreements (with annual reviews) with Partners and Collaborators to enable more sustained efforts and more potential for co-financing;

1.10 Enlarge or contract number of Coalition members through a) changing partnership into membership organization, b) using Partners to incorporate more Collaborators (not considered very viable), or c) increasing the number of Partners and select fewer country Collaborators and give them the responsibility of serving a wider constituency and increasing synergies with other development actors working on the same in the country (e.g. World Bank/PROFOR in China, LFP/DFID and SDC/IC in Nepal);

1.11 Expand administrative capacity for grant administration if grant programs are continued and free up coordinator/facilitator time for professional contributions OR expand size of grants while decreasing number of grants;

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[22] Suggested by Board member Don Roberts. He estimated financing requirements at $5-$10 million and noted that since the private sector is risk-adverse, pilots need public co-financing. RRI is demonstrating the value of pilot projects through its current work with RDI/Landesa on grievances and women's rights in China.

1.12 Devote more resources to assisting Partners and Collaborators to obtain their own in-country funding;

1.13 Consider either country level facilitators or out-posted program officers in selected key countries where more presence is requested e.g. China, Bolivia, and perhaps others?

1.14 Expand efforts to keep articulating, reinforcing and contextualizing RRI's selected strategy and messages so they are understood locally.

2. Strategic Focus Option

2.1 Consider radical alternatives of: a) dissolving "partnership" and operating as a separate NGO (RRG) with prior Partners still playing key roles on Board and through work agreements; or b) merging Partners with Collaborators in expanded partnership or association; c) empowering the partnership through such actions as the "Partner assembly" recommended by the IM; or d) retaining more focused version of existing structure;

2.2 Focus primarily either on a) selected global analytic and knowledge dissemination and advocacy actions, or b) on supporting country and regional Collaborators (including Partners if kept) in their efforts to ensure forest tenures for the poor and associated livelihoods are at the center of their efforts;[23]

2.3 Either continue to strategically focus on short term interventions to help usher in new tenure reforms *or* consider strategically how it might be possible to support the longer haul process of deepening and securing tenure – perhaps by selecting one or two key drivers such as enterprise, climate change, energy, or food security?

2.4 Develop co-funding agreements with long-term Partners or agreements with donors that allow sub-grants to be streamlined and employ grant administrators;

3. Strategic Planning and Monitoring

3.1 Review strategic outcomes to make them more realistic and measurable;

3.2 Review trade-offs of time vs. efficiency and, while maintaining the outstanding learning and self-reflective attitude, reduce the transactions costs of these activities unless RRG decides to become more a facilitator than actor.

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[23] This differs from the IM's recommendation that RRG should play both the role of facilitator and implementator in "nearly perfect balance". This MTE believes that is only an alternative in the growth option.

INTRODUCTION

In response to a request for proposals, an international team of The Mountain Institute[24] was selected in January 2011 to conduct the Mid-Term Evaluation of the Rights and Resources Initiative. Team members are senior social scientists from Denmark, France, Peru and USA with extensive international experience in issues of natural resource management and program evaluation.

The terms of reference for the MTE were developed by RRG, approved by the Board and jointly finalized by TMI and RRG in March, 2011. The primary focus of the MTE is the Framework Proposal of 2008 – 2012, but as RRI commenced work in 2006 – and built on activities of its Partners and senior staff that predate this period – the evaluation takes account of this longer time horizon. In addition, the evaluation has had to accommodate the on-going refinement and modification of this Framework, its programs, outcomes, and indicators.

The RRI also has also been commissioning an annual Independent Monitoring (IM) assessment since 2008. The latest of these, conducted for 2010,[25] used the recently refined Logical Framework and Strategic Objectives and the design and implementation of an internal monitoring system (as part of planning process) as the basis for its evaluation.[26] While there was thus some overlap with the TOR of this MTE, the TMI team conducted our evaluation independently and adopted a somewhat different methodology.

Methodology

The methodology adopted by the MTE uses the classic evaluation criteria of *relevance, effectiveness, efficiency,* and *sustainability* to assess accomplishments, issues and trade-offs, and future alternatives. The resulting matrix was used to structure interviews with over 120 Partners, Collaborators, Board members, policy makers, staff and independent experts.[27]

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[24] The Mountain Institute is an international NGO based in Washington DC and West Virginia, USA with offices and programs in the Himalaya, Andes, and Appalachia. www.mountain.org Team members included J. Gabriel Campbell (team leader), Kirsten Ewers Andersen, Marlene Buchy, Robert Davis and Jorge Recharte. See Annex 9 for short biographies. The country reports were prepared by separate team members (see credits on each Annex). The overall draft was prepared by the team leader with the organizational section provided by Bob Davis and input from team members.

[25] Rights and Resources Initiative 2010 Independent Monitor's Report, Kevin Murray Strategic Consulting, Boston, MA. January 2011.

[26] Annex 11.

[27] Annex 1 provides the list of persons interviewed or consulted.

Table 1: **RRI MID-TERM EVALUATION FINDINGS MATRIX**

RRI MTE Structure	*Relevance* Purpose; Assumptions; Context	*Effectiveness* Global and Regional/Country Prog. Strategies; and Outcomes	*Efficiency* Organizational Management	*Sustainability* Of Initiative and Impact
Accomplishments				
Issues; Trade-offs				
Future Alternatives				

Team members visited Nepal, China, Laos and Thailand in Asia; Cameroon and Mali in Africa; and Peru and Bolivia in Latin America. In addition, interviews were conducted in Washington, DC, by email and by telephone. A small questionnaire was also circulated to confirm findings obtained by interviews.[28] The team held a four-day internal workshop in June followed by a workshop with RRG to present initial findings for feedback and identify gaps.

As described by one of the initial promoters and previous Board Chair, the RRI has deep roots and shared interests in a rights-based approach and poverty alleviation.[29] The founding groups had identified the "need and opportunity to advance pro-poor forest tenure, policy and market reforms globally" based on over five years of prior collaboration.[30] To address this need in the Rights and Resources Initiative[31] a coalition of Partners came together in 2005 together with an initial coordinating mechanism (later RRG) with core senior staff from one of the Partners (Forest Trends). In 2007 a formal Memorandum of Understanding was agreed that was signed by the expanding number of Partners. This MOU was recently collaboratively reviewed after the agreed term of three years; the new revised MOU will be reviewed again in five years.[32]

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[28] Depending on the question, there are between 9 and 16 written questionnaire responses out of about 25 sent to Partners and Collaborators. This is inadequate a sample for statistical validity; however we have used them to help reinforce our 120 interview conclusions and find that though quantitatively small, the questionnaire results map to the larger number of interviews. We thus plan to use them for graphic illustrative purposes.
[29] Doris Capistrano, *Report on the Mid-Term Review of the Multilateral memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation on the Rights and Resources Initiative.* RRI: 2010. See also: *Who Conserves the World's Forests*? Augusta Molnar, Sara J. Scherr, Arvind Khare, Forest Trends.
[30] The mission statement is as follows: "The mission of the Rights and Resources Initiative is to support local communities' and Indigenous Peoples' struggles against poverty and marginalization by promoting greater global commitment and action towards policy, market and legal reforms that secure their rights to own, control and benefit from natural resources, especially land and forests."
[31] Initial Partners in this group included IUCN, CIFOR, Forest Trends, ACICAFOC, FPCD, and RECOFTC.
[32] FPP, World Agroforestry Center (ICRAF), Intercooperation, Civic Response, FECOFUN, Samdhana Institute, and more recently IFRI, PRISMA, CED and Tebtebba have joined while IUCN and CIFOR left but have remained as Collaborators. Intercooperation has merged with Helvetas (now HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation) and remains a Partner.

As the language used by RRI to describe its work has continued to evolve and be refined, the MTE has had to enlarge our understanding of the TOR to take into account the organizational and programmatic realities present. The RRI understands itself **in terms of its partnership** as "a strategic coalition of fourteen international, regional and community organizations that pro-actively engage governments, social movements, international organizations and donors to consider greater global commitment and action pro-poor tenure, policy and market reforms related to development and conservation."[33] Its stated value proposition "is that with a limited incremental investment by donors and organizations in collective coherence, strategic planning and coordination, these existing organizations can dramatically increase their impacts in favor of the world's poor". For this purpose the RRI has developed country and regional programs. However, these programs are implemented as much by non-partner Collaborators as they are by Partners. And global programs are RRG's responsibility for direct leadership and shared implementation.

RRI has increasingly diversified program responsibilities to Collaborators. In many countries, Collaborators, of which there are well over 100, play a more important role in achieving outcomes than do Partners. The proactive role of RRG itself in both somewhat independent global programs and in support to country and regional programs, places it at the center of RRI's work as a separate implementing organization in addition to serving as a coordinating Secretariat. In addition, as the conduit of much of the funding to Partners and Collaborators, RRG also serves as a subcontractor and is misperceived by some recipients as a "donor".

RRI's relevance is therefore far greater than value addition to Partners. This MTE has taken these existing organizational realities as the most appropriate basis for the evaluation with corresponding attention to the outcomes of both Collaborator and RRG efforts.

The MTE has found that the Strategic Outcomes and Indicators developed by RRI in various versions of the logical framework are overly ambitious and the indicators ambiguous. The initial targets for global action of doubling community forest tenure and reducing by half the poverty in forest areas are problematic to measure and trace, even using nuanced approaches of outcome mapping.[34] The time required for forest tenure reforms to be adopted and implemented and for resultant livelihood improvements to be measurable exceeds the timeframe of a five year project. Furthermore, the specific Strategic Outcome Indicators[35], as also assessed by the Independent Monitor in some detail, proved difficult to verify and count, whereas the general outcomes of which they are intended to be indicators are widely considered as RRI successes.

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[33] TOR for MTE of RRI. There are now 14 Partners – see Annex 10.
[34] Sarah Earl, Fred Carden, Terry Smutylo, Michael Quinn Patten, *Outcome Mapping: Building Learning and Reflection into Development Programs*, IDRC, 2002
[35] See Annex 11, Logical Framework

As the RRI has instituted exemplary systems of both internal assessments of program impact and contribution to strategic outcomes,[36] and an annual Independent Monitoring by an independent group,[37] this MTE agreed with the RRG guidance to "step back and look at the big picture". In the many cases where findings are similar to those emerging from these other exercises, we consider this as independent confirmation of their validity, and increase in the confidence with which they can be used to help chart future directions.

Acknowledgements

The MTE team acknowledges the generous, open, and thoughtful support provided at all times by the RRG management and staff through our contacts for the evaluation, Deborah Barry and Jenna DiPaolo, as well as directly. Andy White, Arvind Khare, Augusta Molnar, Jeffrey Hatcher, James-Christopher Miller, Nayna Jhaveri, Solange Bandiaky-Badji, Omaira Bolaños, Marina France, Naomi Basik, Lopaka Purdy and others all went out of their way to provide time, insight and help with establishing contacts and collecting materials. The team is also very grateful to all the Board Members, Partner and Collaborator Representatives, and other experts, listed in Annex 1 who provided us with their thoughtful and frank assessments. We also thank the colleagues and staff of TMI who provided us with support, including previous colleagues Nandita Jain and Jane Pratt, and the Management who encouraged us to devote extra time beyond that available to follow our passion for this assignment. The team leader gratefully acknowledges the privilege of working with an exceptionally experienced and good natured team who worked vastly more days than they were paid because of their professional commitment to improving the livelihoods of poor forest dwelling peoples.

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[36] *Monitoring Data Reports,* 2010 (for each Strategic Objective), by RRG senior management authors.

[37] *Rights and Resources Initiative: 2010 Independent Monitor's Report,* Kevin Murray Strategic Consulting, January 2011.

RELEVANCE

Focus on Forest Tenure Rights and Policies

The Rights and Resources Initiative is widely praised for its relevance to national and global agendas for forest tenures, climate change, ecosystem conservation, poverty reduction, improved governance and the rights of indigenous and marginalized forest dwellers. RRI's pioneering role and relentless focus on policy level changes for reforming forest tenures in favor of the indigenous and poor occupies a relatively unique, and highly appreciated, niche within the wide array of development actors. Many organizations are, like RRI, dealing with issues of climate change, conservation and the markets, livelihood improvements and natural resource governance systems. However, it is the rights approach to forest resources that draws together RRI Partners and Collaborators around a common interest – and it is that common focus that provides RRI with the responsibility and ability to influence the most pressing development issues affecting the world's forests and the millions living amongst them.[38]

As extensively documented by RRI,[39] the forest tenure reform agenda is operating at vastly different stages between continents, and within continents, between countries and even provinces. Latin America, led by the examples of Mexico, Bolivia, and Brazil, has legislatively secured forest tenure rights for local communities and indigenous peoples over the largest areas of forest. In Asia, China has accelerated a forest tenure reform started in 1982 that has provided increased individual tenure security to millions of households and Nepal hill community forestry provides one of the most widely acclaimed examples of reversing deforestation through changes in forest tenure and supporting programs. Africa has promising potentials for supporting community and individual rights over forests and trees in the Sahel and Western African countries, but in general has the least amount of its forests under pro-poor management reforms, and along with Indonesia the most under central concessions.[40]

Even where forest tenure reforms have provided increased rights for indigenous and other local forest dwelling communities, there remain pressing problems in implementing and securing these rights against a variety of state and private sector

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[38] RRI often cites the rough figure of 1 billion people falling into this category. Counting all those who live downstream of forests – including the ecosystem services they provide or their ability to increase global warming when destroyed – the figure would be higher. More narrow definitions, particularly those focused on indigenous peoples living in and near forests, result in several hundred millions (According to Victoria Tauli-Corpuz in her recent address to the Indonesia conference, this figure is over 200 million. See earlier ref.) Either way, the scope for livelihood and ecosystem impact is enormous.

[39] See publications listed in www.rightsandresources.org e.g. *From Exclusion to Ownership? Challenges and Opportunities in Advancing Forest Tenure Reform,* William D. Sunderlin, Jeffrey Hatcher and Megan Liddle, RRI: 2008. Rights and Resources Initiative. 2010. *The End of the Hinterland: Forests, Conflict, and Climate Change.* Washington, DC: Rights and Resources Initiative. *Who Owns the World's Forests?* Andy White, Alejandra Martin, Forest Trends 2002

[40] *Large Acquisitions of Rights on Forest Lands for Tropical Timber Concessions and Commercial Wood Plantations,* Augusta Molnar, Keith Barney, Michael DeVito, Alain Karsenty, Dominic Elson, Margarita Benavides, Pedro Tipula, Carlos Soria, Phil Shearman and Marina France, RRI: 2011.

threats and taking positive advantage of potential opportunities. Issues of forest tenure are central to the new forces emerging from the climate change agenda, the rapid economic growth in the large BRIC economies, the increasing global demand for energy and food, and the growth in conservation and tourism sectors worldwide. Land grabs for industrial agriculture, forest conversions to palm oil or soy, excluding or reducing indigenous or local peoples' rights in expanding protected areas or awarding industrial logging concessions to private or parastatal entities are expanding as threats.[41] Up until recently, the parameters being discussed for REDD carbon trading eligibility also threatened to reduce effective community rights in forests – thereby increasing investment risk and decreasing the potential for improving the livelihoods of the poor.[42] RRI's work has contributed to this important shift in thinking.

It is RRI's recognition that rights to forest tenure are critical to reducing these threats and increasing the opportunities for the new demands on forests to benefit local people and national economies that gives its mission continuing priority and relevance for development and the global environment. This central message is well understood by its donors, Partners and Collaborators and, through RRI's efforts, increasingly by traditionally resisting governments.[43]

Flexible Strategy

To maintain its relevance within this rapidly changing economic and political environment, RRI (or more precisely, RRG with mixed support from RRI Partners) has purposively adopted a short-turn-around highly flexible program strategy. Both global analytic initiatives and country and regional programs are decided, at least theoretically, on annual assessments of opportunities for influencing policy. The short-term flexibility this enables is further enhanced though setting aside relatively substantial budget for unprogrammed strategic responses that emerge during the year.

This flexible programmatic approach has enabled RRI to change its programs to respond to changing environments. For example, since 2008 RRI allocated more RRG resources to the climate change issues that have dominated the global agenda over the last three years, with large potential for either negative or positive impacts on indigenous peoples and forest-based livelihoods.[44] It has also enabled RRI to change collaborating organizations and work programs, as well as countries in which it is more active, on an annual basis. In China, for example, work on climate change was dropped. In Peru, the attention focused on Indigenous Peoples by the

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[41] Ibid. Also: RRI newsletters and publications. e.g. Pushback: Local Power Global Realignment. RRI: 2011.
[42] REDD-MONITOR: Interview with Andy White May 24, 2011.
http://www.rightsandresources.org/blog.php?id=709 See also Munden Report: *REDD and Forest Carbon: Market Based Critique and Recommendations*, March 2011. RRI.
[43] Press release of July 15 from Lombok: *At Global Forum, Indonesian Government Agrees to Expand Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Forest Communities.*
http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/doc_2519.pdf
[44] In the 2011 Priority 1 budget presented to the Board, Rights and Climate was 4-5 times larger than the other thematic programs or 59.7% of the total for thematic programs excluding Coordination and TA.

massacre at Bagua which led RRI to provide a timely grant to and Indigenous organization AIDESEP while they lobbied for legislative change. In Nepal, support was provided to the federation of community forestry groups FECOFUN to lobby against draft legislation that would have reduced rights of decision making and increased barriers to community management of forests.[45] In Cameroon, timely information could be provided in response to an announcement by the President requesting input into forest policy issues in six months.

As these examples show, it is widely agreed that RRI's approach has enabled it to "be at the right place at the right time" to have real influence. However, as discussed later, this flexibility also has trade-offs that curtailed RRI's ability to follow through with some of their on-going global and country initiatives.

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[45] This has now been withdrawn. See Kantipur article of July 9, 2011:
http://www.ekantipur.com/2011/07/09/national/forest-act-forest-ministry-withdraws-amendment-bill/337055.html

EFFECTIVENESS: ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Overall Goals of Tenure Reform and Poverty Reduction

As set out in its Logical Framework, RRI's overall development objective or goal is to
> *Contribute to reducing poverty and enhancing well-being by strengthening tenure reform and democratic governance and development in forest areas of development countries.*

The initial targets to which RRI hopes to contribute, although not hold itself fully responsible, include doubling the area of non-state forest tenure and reducing the rate of poverty of forest dwellers by half. RRI conducted a path-breaking study[46] analyzing secondary data on government administered forest areas in 40 countries vis-à-vis community or individually owned or used forests that showed significant progress at these gross levels of measurement. This was further increased by 15 countries in a study prepared for ITTO and published as an ITTO tenure status study which considerably deepened the understanding of forest trends and challenges in 2009[47]. Current work on tracking tenure is further refining these results through methodological improvements.[48]

Overall, there have been both encouraging evidence of trends of increase in community and individual forest tenure.[49] However, RRI has also found that progress has been slow, and the barriers to tenure reform remain high.

RRI's evidence of gross level progress in forest tenure reforms, based on specific country examples are convincing to the MTE team.[50] In addition, the MTE agrees with the judgment of the majority of experts interviewed that RRI has provided an important positive contribution to these improvements, and will be citing specific examples below.

It is at the level of more rigorous assessment of tenure changes and RRI's contribution that complexity overwhelms the possibility of more exact measurement. As RRI's newly separated global program on tenure analysis has recognized, forest tenures are diverse, complex and usually both ambiguous and contested.[51] RRI, to its credit, has started unpacking the complex bundles of rights, both *de facto* and *de*

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[46] *From Exclusion to Ownership*, RRI 2008
[47] *Tropical Forest Tenure Assessment*, RRI 2009
[48] *What Rights? Measuring the Depth of Indigenous Peoples and Community Forest Tenure: Preliminary Finds from a Legal Analysis of 33 Forest Tenure Regimes in 15 Countries,* Fernanda Almeida and Jeffrey Hatcher, RRI: July 2011.
[49] The area of public forest land administered by government decreased from 2.6 billion hectares (76% of the global forest estate) to 2.3 billion hectares (66%). The area of forest designated for use by communities and indigenous groups increased from 70 million hectares (2% of the global forest estate) to 110 million hectares (3%). The area of privately owned community and indigenous forest land increased from 369 million hectares (11% of the global forest estate) to 466 million hectares (13%). The area of forest land owned by individuals and firms increased from 403 million hectares (12% of the global forest estate) to 641 million hectares (18%). http://www.rightsandresources.org/pages.php?id=229
[50] Ibid.
[51] See *What Rights?* 2011 cited above.

jure, that constitute forest tenure within different countries, and even regions within those countries. Unfortunately, even these are difficult to aggregate even if there were any reliable data sets that incorporate meaningful tenure criteria – which there are not. At very gross levels of aggregation, such as those used in RRI's studies the results are revealing and motivating. However, these levels do not allow very meaningful tracking of change over time, or the difference between statutory change and actual implementation. Often, there are contradictory overlays of legislation and regulation that are contested, manipulated or contradicted locally.

Secondary global datasets that would enable changes in the level of poverty among forest dwelling populations to be measured and correlated with RRI work has also been somewhat elusive. Some pioneering studies by RRI and associates have demonstrated empirical associations between forest tenure and poverty reduction. These include a multi-country analysis of spatial association between poverty and forests[52] and use of the datasets developed by Elinor Ostrom and Partner IFRI to examine social and ecological synergy.[53] There are also studies cited in *Tropical Forest Tenure Assessment* and RRI's publication on Mexico that show evidence that supports the assumption that increased forest tenure correlates with decreased poverty (in the broader senses of poverty) and livelihood security.[54] Perhaps one of the best independent studies of this topic comes from Nepal, where improved community forestry governance was shown to have contributed 25% of the reduction in poverty from 65% to 28% in five districts from 2003 – 2008.[55]

However, there remains a lack of clear criteria and data sets on which poverty change among forest populations could be measured over time. This has presented a methodological challenge to assessing RRI's contribution to poverty reduction. It is also noteworthy that in the questionnaire responses received by the MTE team and in interviews, approximately a third were not convinced that increased forest tenure necessarily correlated with improved livelihoods. Respondents cited the vulnerability that can be associated with having assets that can be taken away through sale or other capture, as well as the limited income streams from forests in comparison to agriculture or off-farm incomes as constraints to this theory. They cited the need for forest tenure reform to be accompanied by better governance, accessible markets, increased awareness, and legal redress – a conclusion recognized by RRI as part of the complexity within which they work.

For these reasons, the MTE agrees with RRI's changes in the quantitative goal level indicator of doubling pro-poor forest tenure into a process oriented indicator as follows: "Track and disseminate global progress on statutory tenure reform in

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[52] *Poverty and Forests: Multi-country analysis of spatial association and proposed policy solutions,* William D. Sunderlin, Sonya Dewi, Atie Puntodewo - CIFOR, World Agroforestry Centre, Rights and Resources
[53] *Social and Ecological Synergy: Local Rulemaking, Forest Livelihoods, and Biodiversity Conservation*, Lauren Persha, Arun Agrawal, Ashwini Chhatre 25 March 2011 VOL 331 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org
[54] *Sustainable Forest Management as a Strategy to Combat Climate Change: Lessons from Mexican Communities. Deborah Barry, David Bray, Sergio Madrid, Ivan Zuniga,* RRI – CCMSS, 2010
[55] *Community Forestry for Poverty Alleviation: How UK AID has increased household incomes in Nepal's middle Hills. Household Economic Impact Study 2003 – 2008.* Livelihoods and Forestry Program, Nepal 2009.

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development countries." It is understandable that the poverty reduction indicator has been virtually dropped in the latest logical framework outcomes given the difficulty of assessing it. However the substitution of: "Mobilize a global effort through the creation of a coalition" loses the results orientation of the original and the importance of poverty and livelihoods to the RRI mission.[56]

This second indicator on mobilizing a coalition does reveal the importance that RRI attaches to this process of seeking contribution to the larger goals of tenure reform and poverty reduction. This RRI theory of change underlies their choice of more direct strategic outcomes and how that is translated into their programs.

## Theory of Change, Programs and Strategic Outcomes

As understood by the MTE team and tested with RRG management, RRI's theory of change can be stated as follows:

> *Forest tenure rights of the poor can be increased through the synergistic combination of strategically chosen studies, interactions, and advocacy that enable an array of global and local actors to influence policy and investment actions at global and national levels.*

This theory of change forms the basis for the programmatic strategy employed by RRI to include both global initiatives and country and regional programs; both analytic and knowledge sharing events and advocacy actions.

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[56] Logical Framework. Annex 11.

RRI Theory of Change

Currently[57] the global programs designed to implement this theory of change include:

Strategic global analysis and action programs on:
- Tenure Analysis
- Rights and Climate
- Realizing Rights, and
- ATEMS (Alternative Tenure and Enterprise Models)

The global programs also include Networking Support to:
- MegaFlorestais[58]
- Global Alliance for Community Forestry (GACF),
- ITTO-Civil Society Advisory Group[59], and
- Independent Advisory Group on Forests, Livelihoods, and Climate Change (with formalized link to the UN REDD Policy Board).
- Other networks and facilitating representation in global/regional meetings.

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[57] Rights and Resources Initiative Governance Meeting: RRI Program Strategies, Work Plan & Budgets 2011
[58] Senior forestry officials meeting under Chatham House rule of informality from 12 "mega" forestry countries, with South Sudan and Australia also planning to attend in 2011.
[59] International Tropical Timber Organization.

RRI Mid-Term Evaluation: Final November 2011   **The Mountain Institute**

In addition there are three support programs:
- Communications and Outreach
- Operations and
- Coalition Coordination.

The Country and Regional Initiatives operate regionally in Africa, Asia and Latin America and in selected "Tier 1" and "Tier 2" countries. [60]

Region	Tier 1	Tier 2
Africa	Cameroon Liberia Mali	Burkina Faso Ghana
Asia	China Indonesia Nepal	India Laos Thailand
Latin America	Bolivia Guatemala	Nicaragua Panama Peru Colombia

The congruence between programmatic scope and theory of change reflects a consistency in strategy that relies on RRI's notion of *synergy*. RRI assumes that, so long as the programs are strategically selected, this kind of combination of global and national programs is required to reinforce each other in order to influence policy through networks and coalitions of civil society organizations: that both are generally needed in order to produce results.

This theory of change directly energizes the first Strategic Outcome identified in RRI's recent logical framework:

SO 1. Complementary global, national, regional and local organizations effectively synergize to achieve significant breakthroughs in tenure reform processes.

Effective achievement of this outcome rests on the assumption that a variety of activities at global and national levels can interact to improve the conditions for forest tenure policy reform. This assumption and outcome was confirmed by MTE findings, although we substitute the more modest "improved conditions for policy reform" for the overly ambitious "significant breakthroughs". As discussed, the latter are difficult to identify in the complex, slow moving landscapes of forest tenure reform.[61]

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[60] From the Framework Proposal. There are some changes and inconsistencies between various lists, and the level of activity between countries varies widely. In older documents, Brazil, DR Congo and Philippines are also listed as Tier 2 countries. The MTE was informed subsequently that the list evolves with annual planning.
[61] Note congruence of the 2011 Independent Monitor report with this, and a number of other findings.

Effective international conferences sponsored by RRI have been the most successful vehicle for improving forest tenure policy environments. For example the conferences in China in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010 are credited with "saving" and "securing" forest tenure reform in that country by marshalling evidence and political support.[62] The Brazil conference in 2007, the Yaoundé, Cameroon conference in 2009 and in the recent conference in Indonesia in 2011 fruitfully brought together significant government and non-government actors.   These conferences were assessed by participants to have provided major gains in understanding and support for tenure reform among policy makers. The progress in Indonesia was particularly remarkable given the entrenched resistance in official and industrial circles and benefited from previous groundwork by RRG, RRI Partners active in the region, and internal political processes.[63]

The conditions for tenure reform were also strongly enhanced by a number of joint actions in selected regions and countries.[64] Collaborations between parliamentarians in Mali and Cameroon, as well as in Nepal and Bolivia with civil society gave voice to forest tenure reform issues at the political level.   And even if breakthroughs were not achieved, backsliding was likely prevented.[65]   The combination of rigorous studies on legal status and economic performance carried out by Landesa-RDI and Peking University are gratefully acknowledged by the State Forest Administration for their usefulness in supporting forest tenure reform with the Central Government.[66] The stakeholder mapping, GIS data bases, and studies of site-specific community rules carried out in Bolivia have influenced the conditions for forest policy reform – although the actual reforms are still contradicted by other regulations and industrial interests. The clear analyses and case studies of ATEMS in Africa, along with the critique of the concessions system, have influenced the dialogue on forest tenure and provided ammunition for those aiming to make concessions more pro-poor.[67]

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[62] Interviews with senior State Forestry Administration staff.
[63] See RRI website for news articles, keynote speeches and presentations.
[64] As part of the IM's TOR, this MTE leaves it to the IM to verify the count of "new value-added joint actions", for which RRI has given a target of 20. The IM also gives an account of accomplishments in Guatemala.
[65] See country reports in Annexes.
[66] *China's Forestland Tenure Reforms: Implications for REDD+,* Li Ping, RDI; Forests and Incomes in China, Eugenia Katsigris, Jintao Xu, Andy White, Xiaojun Yang, Weng Qian 2010
[67] *Large Acquisitions of Rights on Forest Lands for Tropical Timber Concessions and Commercial Wood Plantations,* Augusta Molnar, Keith Barney, Michael DeVito, Alain Karsenty, Dominic Elson, Margarita Benavides, Pedro Tipula, Carlos Soria, Phil Shearman and Marina France, RRI: 2011. Molnar, A, P. Mbile, S. Bandiaky, R. Kozak, K. Canby and M. France. *Small Scale, Large Impacts: Transforming Central and West African Forest Industry and Trade to Improve Sustainable Development, Growth and Governance.* Washington, DC: 2010. *Community-Based Forest Management: The Extent and Potential Scope of Community and Smallholder Forest Management and Enterprises,* Augusta Molnar, Marina France, Lopaka Purdy, and Jonathan Karver, 2011. *Community-Based Forest Enterprises in Tropical Forest Countries: Status and Potential,* Augusta Molnar, Megan Liddle, Carina Bracer, Arvind Khare, Andy White, Justin Bull - ITTO, Rights and Resources, Forest Trends. *A Case Study on Large-Scale Forestland Acquisition in China: The Stora Enso Plantation Project in Hepu County, Guangxi Province,* Li Ping, Robin Nielsen, Rural Development Institute 2010. *China's Forest Tenure Reforms: Impacts and Implications for Choice, Conservation and Climate Change,* Jintao Xu, Andy White, Uma Lele, Peking University, RRI 2010.

However it was not clear that RRI actions always required synergy between them to be effective, or that Partners and Collaborators necessarily worked proactively with each other at country and regional levels. Partners and Collaborators rarely were able to trace global or regional program impacts on local results, although those who were aware of them often appreciated them highly for helping with their own understanding. Likewise, once planning exercises were completed and agreements signed with RRG, work with in-country or regional Collaborators tended to decrease. MTE questionnaire responses found that there was more regular communication between Collaborators and the RRG than between Coalition Partners and Collaborators within countries or regions.

SO 2. A select set of strategic networks are better-informed, more active and effective in promoting reform nationally, regionally and/or globally.

RRI is lauded for its success in enlarging the role of civil society advisory groups in the inter-governmental processes of ITTO and UN-REDD, and indirectly FCPF. While not widely known, those who were involved and aware of these roles credit RRI with having influenced these organizations to ensure that local tenure rights are considered as important and legitimate factors in forest policy dialogues. Key representatives of these networks consider RRI to be an "effective strategic partner" in advancing community rights, particularly though co-hosted conferences. With these networks, synergy between RRG's global analytic products and those of RRI's Partners and Collaborators, along with their credible advocacy does appear to be working as planned.

For example, along with RRI's timely dialogues and interactions, and the activities of other organizations working for indigenous rights and local livelihoods with regard to carbon trading and REDD+, the awareness of risks to local people and private investment in current models are becoming widespread. RRI is making an important contribution to widening the understanding of the needs to modify REDD to better accommodate local needs for local tenure security over carbon values as well as for the sake of increasing the value of any investments.[68] These modifications have yet to come to fruition; however the path has been prepared through better information and advocacy and likely some wrong paths have been averted.

The RRI established MegaFlorestais, an informal network of senior foresters from countries with large (or mega) forest areas, has, at least by the reckoning of direct participants, also been successful in increasing conditions for successful forest tenure reform. Composed of 12 countries: Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, China, DRC,

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[68] REDD-MONITOR: Interview with Andy White May 24, 2011.
http://www.rightsandresources.org/blog.php?id=709; *The Greener Side of REDD+: Lessons for REDD+ from Countries where Forest Area is Increasing*, Hans Gregersen, Hosny El Lakany, Luke Bailey, and Andy White. RRI: 2011. *Securing Tenure Rights and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD): Costs and Lessons Learned.* Jeffrey Hatcher - World Bank, Rights and Resources. Rights and Resources Initiative. *The End of the Hinterland: Forests, Conflict, and Climate Change.* Washington, DC: Rights and Resources Initiative. 2010.

Finland, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Russia, and the USA. MegaFlorestais has provided a forum using Chatham House rules that enable off the record, informal exchange of ideas. Given the conservative and closed traditions of many forest services that have to live in political and economic environments full of pressures and temptations, this kind of opportunity for frank discussion between different countries is highly valued. In addition, by convening this network, RRG obtains direct access to senior government policy makers and ensures that the RRI agenda if fairly and fully presented. The impetus for – and success of – the RRI facilitated Indonesia conference just concluded in July 2011 likely stems from their experience with both MegaFlorestais and ITTO as well as internal inter-agency dynamics in Indonesia.[69]

If the MegaFlorestais network is in fact as successful as it would appear to be, it would also appear suitable for self-financing as all of its participating countries and organizations are financially well off. It also raises the question of whether it should be replicated among smaller developing countries such as Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.

The Global Alliance for Community Forestry (GACF) is, like the regional network of African women (REFACOF),[70] composed of mainly community based NGOs. By forming more grassroots oriented networks at the global and regional level, RRI has provided opportunities for advocacy groups to learn from each other. This is highly appreciated by the participants and has no doubt helped to spread new ideas and build confidence for more effective advocacy.

As the most visible programmatic arena in which a gendered approach to forest tenure rights is taken and issues of the social exclusion of women are addressed,[71] REFACOF is appreciated in Africa for filling this major gap. Although young, the network is changing the understanding of women's role in forestry and legislation in Mali and Cameroon. The small program started to address women's legal grievances in Chongqing China is another example along with the planned Asia gender and forest tenure/governance publication and the panel organized for the recent Lombok conference.

SO 3. Key strategic actors at the global level are committed and engaged in promoting major reforms in existing tenure, regulatory and governance arrangements.

In its logical framework, RRI defines these key strategic actors as inter-governmental and multilateral institutions (multilateral banks, ITTO-CSAG, and other UN institutions). The indicator of success is that they alter their position and actively support tenure and related reforms in their narrative and portfolios. In their internal monitoring reports and in the Independent Monitor reports, attention has been given

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[69] International Conference on Forest Tenure, Governance and Enterprises 11-15 July, Lombok, Indonesia, 2011
[70] Africa Women's Network for Community Management of Forests established during the 2009 Yaoundé conference.
[71] Some of RRI's Partners have strong programs in gender, although not directly related to RRI work e.g. FECOFUN and HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation in Nepal.

to describing how the two advisory groups to ITTO and UN-REDD were successfully supported by RRI to increase their effectiveness among members on the global stage. Our MTE findings support these results.[72]

In addition to the ITTO-CSAG and UN-REDD networks discussed by RRG and the IM, this strategic outcome also includes institutions such as The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Bank, UNDP, IPCC, and FAO. These institutions are so large and diverse, with such marked differences over time and with each different regional vice-president and country director, that it is not possible to attribute commitment and engagement to forest tenure reform as a whole without the "careful ongoing analysis" and "documentation of demonstrable shifts" that RRI identified as the source of verification. The preliminary observations given below are thus based on a limited set of interviews, and the MTE team's own knowledge of some parts of these multifaceted organizations.

In some countries in Asia such as Nepal and India, the World Bank, UNDP and FAO have been active in promoting community forestry, social forestry and joint forest management, eco-development, participatory watershed development and other forms of co-management in ways that gave increased management responsibilities and benefits to local people. With selective individuals in these organizations, RRI's analytic work has clearly had a positive influence on their attention to forest tenure reform. However, major changes in their position with regard to forest tenure reform remain an unfinished task, and their lack of inclusion in projects considered a major limitation. The recent Independent Evaluation Group's evaluation of the Bank's experience with these projects in India concluded that externalities arising from "insecure property rights" were a key factor in reducing project success. Although RRI was not cited in the references, the evaluation concluded that, "***Community management of forests will not be sustainable in the long term unless communities enjoy secure tenure and access rights; India has not yet offered sufficient guarantees to forest communities***" (emphasis in original).[73]

The wider global status of World Bank commitment to tenure reform after RRI's appearance needs to await the outcome of the current Independent Evaluation Group's forest sector evaluation. Interviews with various staff and consultants indicate that, with some important exceptions supported by personal connections with RRG staff, the Bank's current engagement with forestry is mainly through climate change initiatives, FIP, FCPF and PROFOR.[74] It is encouraging that the "Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) of the FCPF specifies tenure reform

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[72] As they are described in some detail in the IM report, pgs. 34 – 39, we do not repeat those details here.

[73] Project Performance Assessment Report India: A Cluster Assessment of Forestry and Watershed Development Activities, Report No 61065, Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank: June 30, 2011.pps. xvi – xvii. An earlier study of the World Bank's forestry sector GEF projects, found attention paid to participation but not much on community incentives and social sustainability. J. Gabriel Campbell and Alejandra Martin, *Financing the Global Benefits of Forests: The Bank's GEF Portfolio and the 1991 Forest Strategy*. The World Bank. 2000

[74] It has been disappointing how few Bank members have read RRI's publications or are aware of their work. RRG reports that they have selected the FAO this year and expect to have data to demonstrate where RRI has had influence.

requirements and that the FIP has similar provisions in its "Dedicated grant mechanism" for Indigenous Peoples.

SO 4. Changes in tenure legislation and regulatory or policy framework in favor of local communities in a subset of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

RRI defines this strategic outcome in terms of "structural tenure reforms (legal, regulatory, policy) [that] are adopted or advanced" and sets a target of six countries.

Systematic MTE efforts to identify specific legislation on forest tenure reform that has been enacted in the last three years with some RRI contribution identified two likely cases: the Federal Program of Family and Community Forests in Brazil and the recent legislation on indigenous rights in Peru.[75] In both cases a large constellation of organizations and forces were also influential, but many observers agree that the RRI supported conference in Brazil and the grant to the indigenous organization AIDESEP in Peru were timely and effective. Beyond such legislative changes, in each of the countries that the MTE visited, local Collaborators and experts identified significant advances in the conditions for regulatory and policy change in favor of increased local forest tenure rights. Perhaps more importantly, in most of the countries collaborating organizations (including Partners) were able to point to successes (as well as failures) in implementing and securing existing rights for indigenous people and local communities. While not directly captured in the wording of the strategic outcome, the MTE finds that these implementation outcomes – as opposed to statutory results – are in fact the ones considered most critical by the implementing organizations within each country. Improvements in the actual forest security and livelihoods of forest dwelling peoples are, after all, the impacts sought by the RRI.

In China, RRI's work helped the State Forestry Administration widen the constituency and facilitate political support for the policy reform agenda within the Provinces, Counties and Townships that are the ones actually responsible for registering and defending the rights of individuals and communities to forest lands.[76] In Bolivia, RRI's work is helping to frame the debate on new legislative initiatives in areas that will impinge on forest tenure. On the grassroots level, RRI's work has demonstrably helped enable organizations to support indigenous peoples and local forest communities register and defend their rights – as well as develop nascent forest enterprises. In Nepal, RRI assisted in halting new legislation that would have reduced forest tenure rights in community forests without prior consultation. It is also supporting innovative governance and implementation through its grassroots partners. In Mali and Cameroon, RRI's work has provided new information and perspectives on current forest, decentralization and land rights legislation discussions as well as worked with implementing organizations to improve land

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[75] See IM report for Brazil case; Annex 8 for Peru.
[76] The SFA's high regard for RRI was demonstrated by their request to have RRG conduct a national policy review of China's forest tenure reform efforts conveyed to the MTE team in a meeting with senior officials.

rights and productivity.[77] In Indonesia, the government has announced an enhanced new effort to expand substantially the implementation of community rights to forests as a direct result of the recent RRI facilitated conference. [78]

SO 5. More equitable forest governance, enterprise and conservation models are identified and disseminated and/or more broadly supported as a viable approach to support social and economic development.

RRI is generally credited with having made some initial important contributions to identifying and disseminating governance and enterprise models.[79] These include studies that support the viability of small-scale forest harvesting and processing enterprises in Africa, China and Mexico and the importance of these models for rural livelihoods.[80] They have also critically examined the government concessions approach predominant in Africa and Indonesia and shown how these generally leave both the forests and the local people worse off than with community management.[81] There have also been valuable analyses of market drivers.[82]

However, the MTE did not find evidence that these models have yet led "to an increase in community access to resources and markets". Given the relatively small amount of resources allocated to researching these models globally or regionally, and the vastness of the subject, the MTE finds that the needed critical mass of investment has not been invested by RRI in programs needed to support this outcome.[83] In addition, the necessary involvement of private sector stakeholders is lacking.

The RRI has also provided a platform for the discussion of the issues – sometimes contentious – around tenure, community access and conservation. Some studies have highlighted the potential for mutually supportive roles of greater community tenure and conservation, while others have pointed to the conflicts between the two approaches.[84] However, as with enterprise studies and actions, this component has

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[77] See Country Annexes for more detail

[78] RRI Press releases. www.rightsandresources.org

[79] *Community-Based Forest Enterprises in Tropical Forest Countries: Status and Potential,* Augusta Molnar, Megan Liddle, Carina Bracer, Arvind Khare, Andy White, Justin Bull - ITTO, Rights and Resources, Forest Trends. *Small and Medium Forest Enterprises: Instruments of Change in the Developing World*, Robert Kozak - University of British Columbia, Rights and Resources.

[80] Molnar, A., P. Mbile, S. Bandiaky, R. Kozak, K. Canby and M. France. *Small Scale, Large Impacts: Transforming Central and West African Forest Industry and Trade to Improve Sustainable Development, Growth and Governance.* Washington, DC: 2010. *Forests and Incomes in China.* Eugenia Katsigris, Jintao Xu, Andy White, Xiaojun Wang, Weng Qian, 2010. *Sustainable Forest Management as a Strategy to Combat Climate Change: Lessons from Mexican Communities. Deborah Barry, David. Bray, Sergio Madrid and Ivan Zuniga,* 2010.

[81] *Large Acquisitions of Rights on Forest Lands for Tropical Timber Concessions and Commercial Wood Plantations,* Augusta Molnar, Keith Barney, Michael DeVito, Alain Karsenty, Dominic Elson, Margarita Benavides, Pedro Tipula, Carlos Soria, Phil Shearman and Marina France, RRI: 2011

[82] *Convergence of food, fuel and fibre markets: driving change in the world's forests.* Don Roberts, Andy White, Sten Nilsson - CIBC World Markets Inc., Rights and Resources, IIASA

[83] RRG internal SO monitoring and the resultant IM discussion centers around FECOFUN's success in blocking new regressive legislation in Nepal. Our MTE did not find this particularly relevant to this SO.

[84] *Local Rights and Tenure for Forests: Opportunity or Threat for Conservation?* Jeffrey Sayer, Jeffrey McNeely, Stewart Maginnis, Into Boedhihartono, Gill Shepherd, Bob Fisher - IUCN, Rights and Resources. *Aborvitae 36:*

suffered from limited commitment of resources. It may also be that RRI finds community tenure and conservation to be an issue on which Partners and Collaborators are more divided.

Other Crosscutting Accomplishments

To summarize in ways that crosscut these strategic objectives, Partners, Collaborators and independent observers identified the following accomplishments:

- **New awareness, greater understanding, support and conditions for forest tenure reform** among an array of actors in countries visited by the MTE and among some global agencies;

- **Reorientations** of global networks and dialogue agendas to acknowledge the centrality of local tenures, Indigenous Peoples, and rights to sustainably manage forest resources;

- Creation of influential and admired **knowledge products** such as RRI publications on issues related to forest tenure, community governance, climate change, REDD; and potentials for small scale forest enterprise development and improved livelihoods; and

- Contribution to **halting or modifying regressive legislation and exploitative industrial investments**.

The MTE team confirmed the effectiveness of RRI's ability to help Partners, Collaborators, networks and governments **create open spaces** (especially through international conferences) that have been productively used to:

- Enable opposing organizations and perspectives to interact productively;

- Allow sensitive and contested issues to be subject to empirical policy scrutiny;

- Illuminate forest tenure complexities;

- Place forest tenure security and reform at the center of dialogues on climate change, renewable energy, food security, and poverty reduction;

Rights-based approaches to forest conservation, Gill Shepherd, Liz Alden Wily, Eugenia Ponce de Leon, Annalisa Savaresi Hartmann, Janis Bristol Alcorn, Bob Fisher, Gonzalo Oveido, Madhu Sarin, Arturo Santos, Julian Orozco, Evelyn Chaves, Marcus Colchester, Augusta Molnar, Andy White, Arvind Khare, William Sunderlin, Nii Ashie Kotey, Paulo de Tarso de Lara Pires, Thomas Greiber – IUCN. Conservation's engagement with human rights: "traction", "slippage", or avoidance? Janis Bristol Alcorn, Antoinette G. Royo. *Who Conserves the World's Forests?* Augusta Molnar, Sara J. Scherr, Arvind Khare - Forest Trends. *Conserving What and for Whom? Why Conservation Should Help Meet Basic Human Needs in the Tropics*, David Kaimowitz, Douglas Sheil.

- Provide credibility and legitimacy to forest tenure reform advocacy;

- Increase capacity of local civil society actors to engage in policy discussions; and

- Increase access of civil society, academic and government actors to each other.

To illustrate these accomplishments further, the following specific cases are extracted from the attached country annexes.

Example of concrete results: Cameroon[85]

The REFACOF[86] is a direct result of the Yaoundé, Cameroon International Tenure conference in 2009. The network exists now in 11 countries and the first activity at the Africa level was a strategic planning workshop that produced an Action Plan for 2011 targeting lobbying for the rights of women to access tenure and to tackle bureaucrats as well as cultural beliefs. The network is still young so the membership is not yet stabilized, but in Cameroon about 60 women are involved.

ICRAF has developed a tool/template for communities to lodge claims. This tool facilitates the process of registering land and resource claims at the local level. Another direct outcome of one RRI/ICRAF related activity has been the creation of a lobbying network in Kopongo for community leaders (*leaders d'opinion*) which empowers local people as information circulates more easily and local people are more able to control information. The coalition organized a national workshop on parliamentarians, traditional chiefs and opinion leaders in March 2010 which was attended by about 40 people with about half from elected representative bodies and local leaders.

The work of IUCN through its radio station and specifically the *Programme Environnement* (Environment Programme) is helping to disseminate information on policy matters and circulate information on rights. The radio also reaches remote IP communities.

Respondents consider that the coalition is now firmly established as one of the bodies speaking on rights and tenure issues and has gained some legitimacy at high levels; the RRI Coalition in Cameroon has made a written contribution for a change of the forestry law and is now preparing a proposal for land reform. The funding of the study 'Whose land is it? The status of customary land tenure in Cameroon' (Alden Wily 2011) is a concrete example of how quickly RRI can react to a locally identified need. When in January 2011, the President of Cameroon, P. Biya mentioned in a public address that tenure was a problem for the country and gave 6 months to his government's administration to sort the problem out, CED decided to

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[85] See Annex 3 on Cameroon by Marlene Buchy.
[86] The African Women's Network for Community Management of Forests.

grab the opportunity to fill the gap as they predicted that the relevant ministries would probably do nothing. The idea was to carry out some solid background work and place itself strategically for lobbying by starting this work in order to be able to make concrete propositions to the Ministry within the 6 months. The RRI Secretariat was very quick to react and within a short time the project was underway and its report is now published. As a result, CED feels in a strong position as the relevant ministries have indeed so far done very little on the reform. RRI also does give some legitimacy to this work and it is harder for the government to dismiss this input as just more of CED's advocacy. CED feels that at the Ministry, RRI is seen as an objective actor whilst CED is not to be trusted.

Some feel that RRI has helped to increase the place of local elected representatives within the negotiation process for the revision of tenure legislation. RRI takes all opportunities to bring key actors face to face for discussions/debates. Some communities are now more likely to feel they have a right to voice their concern and claim their rights; they seem to have adopted some of the language/jargon and they now know that the government has to take local populations into account during the revision of the forestry law. Local leaders also now understand the connections between the rights of communities and the forest law reform.

Example of Reforming Private Sector in China: Stora Enso[87]

An RRI sponsored study on large scale forest land acquisition in China by a multinational Finnish/Swedish private company, Stora Enso, conducted in 2009-2010 by RDI was instrumental in changing that company's policies vis-à-vis rural forest households and communities.[88] The study revealed irregularities and counter productive manipulations that undermined the reputation of a company that subscribes to corporate social responsibility and that was seeking FSC certification of its work. The study showed how individualization of forestland rights can provide foreign entities opportunities to invest in China's forestlands in ways that have a potential for social harm if such investments are not implemented with the highest concern for legal and social standards.

Under China's forest tenure reform, household land rights may by law be transferred to an outside entity only if the transfer is voluntary and with compensation as a result of consultation and negotiation. If the land is still under collective management, rights to land can only be acquired by an entity outside of the village if (1) the land is not suitable for household management; (2) the transfer terms are reached through bidding, an auction, or public negotiation process; (3) public notice is given to the members of the collective in advance of the transaction; and (4) the transaction is approved by two thirds of the villagers and the town-ship government. In this case

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[87] See Annex 4 on China by Kirsten Ewers Andersen
[88] Li Ping and Robin Nielsen A *Case Study on Large-Scale Forestland Acquisition in China. The Stora Enso Plantation Project in Hepu County, Guangxi Province* RDI and RRI 2010

Stora Enso had, through the willing connivance of local governments as middlemen, acquired forestland without adequate consultation or compensation.[89]

The results of the study were widely cited in the news and resulted in a major change in Stora Enso's policies. In addition to reviewing past purchases, the company is planning to source its forest product needs by directly buying timber from farmers – thus respecting their tenure rights and improving their livelihoods.

The positive outcome of the RRI support to the scrutiny of forest land acquisition in China is unavoidably linked to the fact that Stora Enso is a globally well known company with social corporate responsibility that cannot afford a bad reputation. Pursuing this kind of impact studies on forest land acquisition in neighboring countries such as Lao PDR or Cambodia may not yield the same positive outcome, but they are severely warranted. In Lao PDR and Cambodia forest land acquisition granted by the government or provincial authorities as concessions to Chinese and Vietnamese parastatal companies to grow rubber expropriates fallow and cultivated land as well as village communal land leaving farmers, in particular that of indigenous peoples in distress.

The goverment of Lao PDR needs Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) to ensure the country develops further and faster, and granting land concessions is one way to obtain such FDI. There are expectations of direct benefits for local communities : improved infrastructure, jobs and wages, and compensation for land lost. Already by 2008 well over 1 million ha of (forested) land (about 4 % of Laos' land area) have been given out in concessions. Large numbers of people have lost access to livelihood resources: upland rice, grazing land, NTFPs, wildlife, construction materials, and traditional medicines. There are implications for food security, nutrition, income, cultural practices, social relations and spiritual health. Land concession for a coconut plantation was used as a front to log primary forest on concession lands. Some ask where future generations of Lao citizens are to live and work when at present such huge amounts of land are handed over to foreign companies for such long periods.

There is at present (2011) several efforts by key stakeholders in Lao PDR to introduce modalities for community forestry in production forest areas and institutionalise communal tenure of land and forest. Several high level political persons in the National Assembly support this. This raises a number of opportunities for RRI to keep an eye open and get engaged and dig into the process, Lao PDR being currently a Tier 1country.

In Cambodia the forest tenure reform has been supported by donors and the country now has a full fledged progressive National Forest Program, 2010, which is in clear

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[89] With headquarters in Hepu County, the Chinese Beihai Forestry Investment Company was established in 2006 by the Beihai Municipal Government solely for the purpose of obtaining rights to forestland land that would then be transferred to Stora Enso. In the single middleman transactions, BHC leases land from a collective's administrative body. BHC then assigns the leased-in land rights to Stora Enso.

support of community forestry. Still, though, communities, particularly indigenous peoples in the eastern part are losing their land to Vietnamese and Chinese concessionaires whose main interest is logging. It has proven difficult to find the 2 mill ha set aside for community forestry development. In Cambodia as well as in Lao PDR a special entry point for RRI to combat illegal logging and promote fair tenure could be an engagement with FLEGT, possibly through Forest Trends that is already on board.

Example of Strategic Response Mechanism (SRM) Action: Peru[90]

There are approximately 7.7 million hectares of indigenous land not yet recognized and threatened by external interests. RRI's Strategic Response Mechanism was applied in Peru to support AIDESEP's[91] to initiate the registration of native community land claims (a process essential for future titling, if an agreement is reached with the government). The SRM helped AIDESEP to influence the debate process of approval of Forestry Law at the governmental level and in the consultation process implemented by the Agrarian commission, specifically to change the provision of the law that affected IPs tenure rights over forest resources. The SRM hosted workshops included discussions about the need to advance on the recognition of IP land rights before implementing REDD+ initiatives.

RRI support came to AIDESEP at a time when other international cooperation had withdrawn and it responded to a strategic need. RRI's grant was valued highly by AIDESEP because it allowed them to negotiate with the Ministry of Environment inclusion in the R-PP proposal of Peru one million dollars to support land titling of indigenous community lands by Amazonian regional governments. RRI support was also crucial to promote grassroots discussion groups of REDD and Forestry Law issues that have informed AIDESEP's policy incidence.

In addition, support from RRI or Forest People's Programme is helping develop relationships with AIDESEP's constituency. AIDESEP notes that the SRM grant received from RRI has resulted in the identification of 404 communities ('and that the number is still growing') that need to be titled.

IBC[92] and DAR[93] are two organizations with a history of cooperation with AIDESEP. AIDESEP assumed in the SRM that technical cooperation from both organizations would somehow follow to support its tasks, but the steps necessary were not taken at the time – although this gap is being closed recently by AIDESEP in July, 2011. Also, the design of the SRM assumed that it was possible to quickly close the titling gap when in fact there are complex on the ground technical and political issues concerning this process. Reiterating the recommendation captured in the interviews,

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[90] See Annex 8 on Peru, Jorge Recharte.
[91] The Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest (Spanish: Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana - AIDESEP)
[92] Instituto del Bien Común, a research organization that works with Indigenous Peoples.
[93] Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales.

investing in AIDESEP's need was important in principle, but it required more careful analysis of the institutional context, of it partnerships and AIDESEP's technical needs to be optimally effective.

EFFECTIVENESS: ISSUES AND TRADE-OFFS

In taking on the ambitious task of forest tenure reform and poverty reduction, RRI has had to make a number of strategic programmatic and organizational trade-offs during design and implementation. Each of these has had costs and benefits associated with the strategic decisions made that raise issues of effectiveness and efficiency, and provide the basis for considering future alternatives. For example, some of the key trade-offs RRI are exemplified in the following table.

Table 2: Key RRI Trade-offs

Trade-off	Option taken/emphasized by RRI
Monitoring forest tenure policy reform goal vs. Poverty reduction in forest areas	Forest tenure policy reform
Creating new rights vs. securing existing rights	Creating new statutory rights to secure existing customary rights
Strategic short term windows of opportunity vs. long haul research, advocacy and capacity building	Strategic short term windows of opportunity
Facilitating secretariat for partnership vs. RRG as implementing leader	Attempted balance of both strategies
Global analytic and advocacy vs. supporting country and regional advocacy and action	Attempted balance of both strategies to "create synergy"
Secondary synthesis vs. primary research	Mostly secondary synthesis and analysis
Neutral platform vs. committed positions on contested issues	Neutral platform with shared commitment to local forest tenure rights
Focus on few well-resourced global programs vs. maintain wider portfolio	Uneven emphasis on climate and rights with ATEMS and Realizing rights under-resourced
Focused RRI-budgeted communications of results vs. reaching broader audience with RRI budgeted communications	In general, focused communications to Partners and Collaborators with limited, but increasing, wider media placements
Work only with/through Partners vs. identifying larger array of Collaborators and networks	Worked with wider array of Collaborators and networks
Annual program and budget planning with country Partners and Collaborators vs. multi-year commitments	Annual planning and budgeting

This list is by no means exhaustive, and necessarily over-simplifies the strategic and programmatic choices made by RRG and RRI as a Coalition.

As documented under the accomplishments, the cluster of trade-offs related to strategic short term interventions focused on creating new statutory rights as opposed to promoting the implementation of existing rights have brought a number of accomplishments. This strategy is vigorously defended by RRG and some donors as one of RRI's unique virtues. It is also heavily criticized by some Partners as reducing the effectiveness of RRI's ability to resolve rights to forest tenure and livelihood issues in their countries of operation.

The choices made by RRI are complicated by the diversity of forest tenure rights globally and in the selected countries; as well as by the social, economic and political complexity and volatility of many of countries in which RRI works.[94] The legal systems dealing with land, forests, and property rights are frequently layers of new legislation that overlap existing older legislation. Often there are major contradictions between the laws and the different Ministries from which they stem.[95] The administrative regulations formulated to translate these laws into implementable form are themselves often contradictory, and themselves overlaid by decrees that provide further ambiguity. Perhaps most importantly, this *de jure* world of legal policy is often not widely known or implemented in practice.

Actual ground realities for socially marginalized Indigenous Peoples and forest dwelling communities often reflect continuing customary forest management practices mixed with the changing dynamics of market forces, conflicts, and the self-interest of powerful state actors – especially the forest departments.[96] In China and Bolivia, the MTE found that the disconnect between new legal opportunities for increased tenure rights and their actual implementation were sources of major concern to research and advocacy organizations. Corrupt officials, gullible new rights owners, burgeoning market demands for land and timber, and the lack of legal redress all pose threats to poor local forest users seeking better livelihoods.

These threats and existing complexity present challenges to pushing effective forest rights reform agendas. RRI Partners and Collaborators engaged in this agenda, whether from research, development implementation or advocacy perspectives tend to see the need for long term commitments to realizing rights with increased security and prosperity. They agreed that there are almost always needs for improved new policies, but they expressed the view that support for implementation of existing policy is essential if real results are to be obtained. Registering rights, empowering people to defend them, enabling communities and households to take advantage of economic opportunities derived from these rights through improved skills,

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[94] *What Rights? Measuring the Depth of Indigenous Peoples and Community Forest Tenure: Preliminary Finds from a Legal Analysis of 33 Forest Tenure Regimes in 15 Countries,* Fernanda Almeida and Jeffrey Hatcher, RRI: July 2011.

[95] See Annexes – on country reports as well as RRI internal monitoring reports on country program progress.

[96] *Border Landscapes: The Politics of Akha Land Use in China and Thailand*, by Janet Sturgeon, provides a comprehensive and insightful study of how one ethnic group with historically similar forest and land use strategies, have been at the mercy of wars, opium and tea markets, and dramatically different governance and rights regimes. The result is that the Akha in China are relatively well-off, though still vulnerable, while the Akha of Thailand live in relative poverty and insecurity. The University of Washington Press. 2005.

technologies, and regulatory environments are critical to translating rights into better livelihoods.

By placing their strategic emphasis on short-term interventions aimed at creating new rights, with annual plans and frequent changes in implementing Partners and Collaborators, has RRI missed opportunities for increased results on the ground? The MTE concludes that this is indeed an issue that needs to be re-considered to increase future effectiveness.

For example, in Bolivia, the closer the MTE team got to organizations working on the forest frontier in Santa Cruz and Riberalto (IPHAE and CEDLA) the more acute was the expressed need to support indigenous groups and *campesinos* to secure their forest rights against traditional rubber industry '*padrones*' and new Brazilian soy enterprises and have the capabilities, technologies and markets to use them for improved livelihoods. In Peru, the potential for follow through to support the engagement of AIDESEP with the other indigenous organization with powerful sway in the country's policy world was identified as a gap. In China, as reported to the MTE team and as the RRI supported Stora Enso case shows, the biggest concern was the divergence between policy and implementation at the local level. The same was true for Mali and Cameroon. In Nepal, there was concern expressed that supporting political action advocacy (such as FECOFUN's caravan) alienates the forest bureaucracy and can prove counterproductive. Supporting the existing actors to proactively engage government officials in less contentious ways and conducting longer term empirical research on key issues, could be effective alternative.

Taking a shorter "window of strategic opportunity" approach also appears to have had implications for the breadth of reach of RRI communications. While the website and publications were highly valued by the Partners and Collaborators who were directly associated with RRI (or on its email list), the MTE team is concerned about its lack of ability to reach a wider audience, in particular downwards to local authorities. The RRI and some of its key messages had limited visibility outside of the RRI network. The use of media professionals, Burness Communications, has demonstrated that it is possible to reach a wider audience by generating newsworthy stories. This was recently put to effective use in Indonesia. Some of these had caught the attention of policy makers and implementers who generally do not visit the RRI web site and read its publications.[97] Currently limited resources are built into the contractual agreements with Partners and Collaborators to encourage wider publicity through local language media, although some organizations expressed a willingness to take up this task – an alternative that would be less costly than hiring a specialized firm to work globally.

As a consequence of the strategic choice to shift a significant amount of resources to the highly topical and pertinent theme of climate and rights, the other global

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[97] The new RRI website is well crafted and the publications highly appreciated by those who read. Unfortunately, policy makers and implementers read very little, regardless if it is as well written as RRI publications.

programs in realizing rights and ATEMS were relatively neglected.[98] While the small initiatives undertaken with the limited resources (both staff time and funding) available were appreciated by those involved, they were described by one collaborator as "peanuts". The implications of smaller resources being provided to realizing rights in the broader sense has been described above.

Given the magnitude and importance of forest enterprises and the private sector as either a barrier to securing forest rights and access or as a positive source of economic opportunities, most people interviewed felt that RRI had given it inadequate attention. The lack of private sector stakeholders among Collaborators or as participants in dialogues and conferences is also a potential causality of the relative neglect of this theme, and a potential source of reduced effectiveness. Not only the roundwood using forest industry (e.g. logging companies, pulp and veneer companies, etc.), but also the many commercial sectors that use other forest products (e.g. medicinal plants, essential oils, resin, Brazil nuts, wild food products, eco-tourism, etc.) are critical to transforming better forest tenure rights into better livelihoods.

Since ATEMS is also mandated with addressing issues of tenure rights and ecosystem conservation, its relative lack of resources has also resulted in relative neglect of this topic beyond some initial publications. While a sensitive issue among some Partners and powerful international development organizations, the conservation movement has been criticized for championed biodiversity conservation at the expense of forest tenure rights. [99]

This debate over "tiger first" or "people first" continues to rage worldwide, with increasing polarization of positions and strident advocacy from Indigenous Peoples whose rights have been recognized, but not safeguarded, through ILO 169 and UNDRIP. These are contested and emotionally charged issues, with important lacunae in relation to local forest dwellers or migrant Indigenous Peoples and potential contradictions with other international conventions providing human rights as equal citizens of a nation. These issues have been only lightly addressed so far by RRI despite their importance to the forest rights reform agenda and the livelihoods of Indigenous Peoples.

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[98] 60% of the substantive theme budget is devoted to this topic. The topic of conflict, though in the initial logframe, has purposively not been directly addressed. Tracking tenure has now been added at an additional separate global theme, although earlier analytic efforts were on this subject.

[99] *Local Rights and Tenure for Forests: Opportunity or Threat for Conservation?* Jeffrey Sayer, Jeffrey McNeely, Stewart Maginnis, Into Boedhihartono, Gill Shepherd, Bob Fisher - IUCN, Rights and Resources. *Aborvitae 36: Rights-based approaches to forest conservation*, Gill Shepherd, Liz Alden Wily, Eugenia Ponce de Leon, Annalisa Savaresi Hartmann, Janis Bristol Alcorn, Bob Fisher, Gonzalo Oveido, Madhu Sarin, Arturo Santos, Julian Orozco, Evelyn Chaves, Marcus Colchester, Augusta Molnar, Andy White, Arvind Khare, William Sunderlin, Nii Ashie Kotey, Paulo de Tarso de Lara Pires, Thomas Greiber – IUCN. Conservation's engagement with human rights: "traction", "slippage", or avoidance? Janis Bristol Alcorn, Antoinette G. Royo. *Who Conserves the World's Forests?* Augusta Molnar, Sara J. Scherr, Arvind Khare - Forest Trends, 2004. *Conserving What and for Whom? Why Conservation Should Help Meet Basic Human Needs in the Tropics*, David Kaimowitz, Douglas Sheil. BIOTROPICA 39(5): 567–574, 2007

EFFICIENCY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMMENT[100]

Structure: RRI, RRG, and Questions of Boundaries and Brands

The Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI) is a coalition of organizational Partners committed to the core goals of increasing the forest area under local ownership and administration while reducing poverty in the forested areas of the world. The Coalition is supported by an active secretariat, the Rights and Resources Group (RRG).   Since its creation, the partnership has changed only modestly in composition. The coalition has grown from the original six to 14 members with all but two of the original still members. Two founding Partners left the partnership in June 2010. In many ways this represents a healthy, stable coalition, with reasonable turnover.   If there is any question about the coalition membership, it might be whether this stability indicates a lack of growth and interest in the coalition, or a lack of inclusion and openness to new members.   Still, the Secretariat has done a remarkable job of keeping the partnership active and involved, and should be commended for the interest and dynamism of the RRI Partners as they participate in RRI. As the Secretariat and coordinating mechanism of the RRI Coalition and the Framework Agreement, RRG is key to overall Coalition effectiveness and efficiency. Unless otherwise indicated, the following comments apply to RRG in its role as Secretariat for RRI and the Framework Agreement.

RRG has recently gone through a restructuring to address a critical issue of staff overwork, and this organizational change is very much at the forefront of staff awareness at all levels. RRG has gone from a regional/geographic structure reflecting the founders' interests and expertise (Asia, Latin America, Africa), to a structure that reflects the functional and thematic nature of the organization's work (Regional/Country Programs, Global Programs, Strategic Outreach & Coalition Development, and Finance & Administration).   Staff are still settling in with this structural change, seeing if it will solve the problems it was designed to address, but they are generally positive at this point, feeling that things "are better" since the change was implemented early in 2011. However, it clearly remains to be seen if this is a permanent improvement, or if it's only a temporary reprieve to the overwork and burnout issues that it was meant to address. Interestingly, one of the members of senior management observed that since the change *"everyone is working harder and later."*

This restructuring also raises a deeper question about whether it was at its core a response to a fundamental, but not well recognized (or well embraced) change in the nature of RRG's work from a strategic, learning, analytical structure that integrates theory and practice, to one that spends much of its time and resources planning, designing, disbursing and monitoring grants and contracts? Interviews with staff and an assessment of institutional resource allocation seems to support the argument that the increasing grant management function of RRG may be driving its stress and the reorganization of the Secretariat's work.

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[100] Bob Davis prepared this analysis of Efficiency and Organizational Assessment.

Finally, while the differentiation between RRI and RRG is quite compelling and important to senior management, there is almost universal confusion, even at times among that same senior management, when using the RRI and RRG designations. Most other staff, Partners, and Collaborators indicated even more confusion about when to use the two designations. And to the world beyond RRI, this differentiation is almost completely lost. While this may seem like an insignificant matter, it is indicative of some organizational confusion, and in terms of brand development, this confusion is not helpful.[101] In addition, in the field survey responses, the question was raised about whether this confusion also may lead to some manipulation in decision making and priority setting by the Secretariat. It was felt that sometimes the Secretariat may be making decisions and setting resource priorities that many understand to be the responsibility of the Coalition. While this may not in fact be the case, it is the perception, and seems to be the result of a somewhat complicated organizational structure. Fortunately, the Secretariat has created a communications position and hired a good communications staff who seems aware of these issues and is addressing them, starting with the RRI website.

Management & Staff

In many ways, RRG's management and operation models the participatory approaches that are at the core of the Coalition as well as the community forestry sector out of which it has grown. The MTE was impressed with how issues and decisions are openly discussed and evaluated throughout RRG. In RRG, everyone appears to have a voice and openly expresses opinions. This is a credit to management. Group decision-making and intense organizational introspection are common among start-up organizations that are still establishing systems and creating organizational culture, and this can make for the very lively and creative work environment that one encounters at RRG.

But as is often the case in highly participatory processes, decisions take time and can come at the cost of efficiency, slowing processes and implementation as decisions are made, unmade, and remade. This seems to be the case with RRG, to the point where it isn't quite as nimble and decisive as it sometimes portrays. In particular, the Secretariat seems to have reached a point where this intense, time consuming decision-making process sometimes has a negative impact on morale, and appears to have contributed to the need for the organizational restructuring. The result of this restructuring may be a more formal, hierarchical secretariat; the hope is that it is also a more efficient, less stressed organization and staff.

On the other hand, this organization (and in particular the Secretariat) has a closely knit, passionate, dedicated and hard working group of founders who are still with the organization and clearly still set much of the organizational agenda. Such founding

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[101] The RRG's official legal name is "Rights and Resources Institute, Inc.". To allow distinguishing between the Initiative as a whole (RRI), and the Secretariat, the Secretariat operates ("dba" - does business as) Rights and Resources Group. In the 2010 Independent Auditor's Report,

groups are common at the conception and early stages of organizations, and RRI is fortunate to have such a talented founding team. The challenge, particularly as organization grows and matures, is how to open up this founding team to new participants, approaches and perspectives. While Andy, Arvind, and Augusta and Deborah are <u>highly respected</u> and have built an organization based on many participatory principles and processes, this is an informal but powerful group within the formal organizational management, and its authority raises questions about organizational decision-making, management, and growth.

The responsibilities of what would be called middle management are important management issues for the Secretariat. In RRG, these issues seem to revolve around the Program Coordinators and Facilitators in the Country and Regional program.

- o Program Coordinators: This is a highly educated staff (all PhDs) who were attracted to the organization because of its analytical and publication work, but who spend most of their time managing the planning, distribution, and monitoring of the grants/contracts program. There is a significant issue of "fit" with this staff. They are generally over-qualified and under-trained for the work they are being expected to perform. Meanwhile, the 20% of their time that is allocated for analysis and writing does not happen because of the demands of their other responsibilities. While they generally like the new structure, they have lost some connection to senior management, as well as to the more strategic and analytical Global Programs. This is the staff that is going to require closer attention by senior management in order to assure that the right people with the right training are managing the growing grants/contracting function of the Secretariat.'
  Facilitators: Even more complex is the role of the Facilitators in the Country and Regional Programs. These are Secretariat staff that are posted in Partner organizations and appear to have a confused dual reporting relationship with RRG and their host organization. With responsibilities to both organizations they can get caught between conflicting expectations. They also are posted in large, complex geographic regions, sometimes not in RRI priority areas or key populations groups, and so are of limited use to RRG in executing its programs. No one in the Secretariat, including the Facilitators, is satisfied with their role and performance. Defining, recruiting and posting this position more strategically, with further clarification of reporting relations and institutional affiliations, is in order.

Organizational Learning & Internal Communications

Among the strengths of RRG is the open flow of information and an emphasis on learning, both formally through ongoing organizational assessment and monitoring and evaluation, and informally through an institutional culture that values discussion, the open sharing of information, and participation. The organization is to be commended for this. Regular evaluations, emphasis on M&E, tracking of strategic outcomes, the creation of an internal monitor, and special Board attention to organizational issues (e.g. Capistrano's MOU review; Hudson on the contracting system) are all signs of a responsible organization looking closely at performance. The results and recommendations of these assessments are widely shared and responded to. The Secretariat has not always implemented suggested changes, but in the case of the independent monitor's report, where recommendations are not implemented, senior management has made clear why not in written responses. And in many other cases, RRG has made important changes based on these recommendations; including changes to its M&E systems, communications staffing, and the Memorandum of Understanding format.

One issue that emerged related to internal communications concerned the risk of "siloing" or isolation within the new Secretariat structure, particularly between the Country/Regional Program and Global Program. A number of staff mentioned the importance of information sharing between these two programs, but there is not a functional, ongoing mechanism to allow for this key information exchange between these programs. Staff mentioned that a regular staff meeting did not seem to be addressing this need. The existing meeting structure did not seem to be dynamic, interesting, engaging enough to hold staff interest and keep them coming back for regular exchanges of information. RRG and its personnel are more than sufficiently creative, flexible, and inclusive to come up with an effective mechanism for information sharing across programs that will work for staff and prevent a "siloing effect" between these key program areas.

Governance

RRG has a strong, knowledgeable, and active Board; and there is a well developed consultative mechanism in the Coalition to identify and achieve agreement on RRI goals, objectives, and activities. There is easy access to information and documents. RRI and the Secretariat maintains an active and regular schedule of organizational and governance meetings with the RRG Board, Coalition Partners and Collaborators, and donors. In many ways, this organization is a model of openness, inclusion, and participatory governance; it "walks its talk" when it comes to governance.

There are a few areas related to governance that emerged during the MTE which RRI may want to address:

- o Having coalition members, some of whom benefit from RRI grants or contracts, as board members responsible for organizational governance and decisions on budgets and disbursement of resources

does create a potential conflict of interest. While this may go against what Coalition members proposed and agreed in the MOU, it is a concern that was raised during MTE interviews with Partners and Collaborators.

- o During interviews, questions were raised about the selection process for new Partners. The MTE was not able to ascertain if this was due to lack of awareness and understanding of the selection criteria set out in Board documents and in the MOU/IBA, or if it was a question on how the criteria were being applied and selections made.   Further clarification of this issue with Partners and Collaborators is suggested.
- o The MTE team consistently encountered confusion and ambiguity around the RRI and RRG designations. At the most basic level, it would be useful to have a schematic or organization chart that shows the entire organization and how RRI and RRG are related, and where and how they are integrated and differentiated.   In terms of governance, the issue relates to how decisions are made for RRI and whether the ambiguity around RRI and RRG allows the Secretariat to sometime make decisions, particularly around publications, agreements, and resource allocation for RRI without consultation.

Organizational Sustainability

As senior management correctly questions, what do we mean by sustainability? Do we mean sustainability of the network, the Secretariat, the commitment of Partners and Collaborators to the core objectives, the mission and agenda or something even broader? It isn't within the scope of the MTE to address all of these questions, but the following are some of the sustainability questions and issues the evaluators encountered or raised during their assessment:

- o RRI is well funded, and RRG senior management has done an excellent job of securing resources for the organization.   A key question to address is whether current donors will renew, reduce, or even expand grants in the future. Can RRI and the Secretariat start to diversify the funding now? RRG's highly gifted staff is an organizational asset that could bring contract and consultancy revenues to the organization. Private sector partnerships are another area along with in-country donors that have not been widely explored as potential funding sources. With significant funding, but few long term funding commitments, RRI is at a critical stage to start looking to new funding sources in order to build on the success of its founding staff.
- o Looking to the future, senior Secretariat management is already talking about succession planning and recruiting staff that will be able to carry the organization forward beyond the "founding generation". This is an important indicator of an organization thinking about and planning for its future. However, the questions about the future and the shape of the organization have not clearly been addressed. Certainly RRI will

have to address these key sustainability questions during this latter phase of the framework period.

- o Another key asset of the organization that will serve it well as it looks to the future is the learning culture that has been established at RRG. This is an organization that values learning, knows how to learn, that is strategic and adaptive. These are critical skills in organizational sustainability.

- o However, RRG staff still seems to be overworked and subject to "burnout" in spite of the recent restructuring that was intended in large part to address just this problem of organizational stress. It is not uncommon as organizations change, to take on new work and projects without considering the need to cease or phase out less important work or projects. The evaluators wonder if RRG simply has taken on more than it can reasonably manage, and whether the organization needs to scale back some of its work in order not to exhaust its highly dedicated but small Secretariat staff.

- o In thinking about core competencies and value that RRI/G brings to its work; Partners, Collaborators, and donors agreed that the collaborative effort that RRI brings to issues of forest tenure and governance, and the analytical support it brings to these issues are the key factors that are unique to the organization and that would be lost if RRI did not exist.

- o One area of sustainability the MTE could not investigate thoroughly, but which the Board and senior management need to be aware of is whether a Board is being developed that can carry the organization forward beyond the vision and hard work of the founding staff. Is the Board of a size, composition, and does it have a structure and governance mechanisms (such as committees) that will help to sustain the organization in the future, or is this even a concern or objective? There seems to be some ambivalence about this among senior staff, who are mostly made up of organizational founders. It isn't clear what they see surviving beyond their own tenure in the organization. If some sort of organization is to survive, then it may well be up to the Board to determine what and how this will happen.

Finance/Accounting

Non-profit accounting in the U.S. is complex and time consuming, particularly for organizations like RRI with multiple donors that have different accounting requirements, different fiscal year calendars, and different expectations around financial reporting. In a new and growing organization with a significant budget and growing contracting demands like RRI, this can increase the complexity and stress on accounting as the systems and staff tries to keep up with the growth and change. Finally, in a highly participatory coalition in which stakeholders are also part of organizational governance and donors are significantly involved in setting and monitoring organizational performance, the demands on financial systems and

accountability can be overwhelming. It is little wonder that the MTE had challenges in reaching finance staff, who, in addition to conducting their regular accounting and reporting responsibilities, were also trying to finalize the annual audit, install and bring on line a new and sophisticated fund accounting system, recruit and train new accounting staff, and move into a new office location. Taking this into account, the MTE did have observations and recommendations for RRI's finance and accounting system:

- New accounting staff was being recruited and trained during the MTE with significant expectation that this will go a long way to helping relieve the substantial stresses on the finance system. This was perhaps the central recommendation of the August 2010 report on RRI contracting. The evaluators wonder if the addition of this staff will be enough to turn around a system that is facing growing accounting, contracting, and financial reporting demands. In particular, the granting/contracting burden being put on the RRG; with accounting, monitoring, and reporting requirements flowing down from donors through RRG to contractors, places a tremendous demand on accounting staff, and be may be more than the current staff with one or two new recruits can maintain. Senior management must stay on top of this situation since the increased number of contract/grants being generated by this organization has the potential of overwhelming both accounting and the country/regional program staff. RRG may want to do benchmarking/best practice sharing with other non-profits with a similar mix of granting/contracting and program functions. The organization may also want to find a CFO level consultant who can assist the Director of Finance and other senior management in addressing ongoing finance systems issues, as well as advise senior management and the board on long term financing issues and opportunities. RRI is of a size and sophistication that it could use at least a part-time or consulting CFO to strengthen the Secretariat financial management and leadership.

- The one-year contract period for disbursing funds to Partners and Collaborators continues to be an issue for contract recipients, and RRG (and perhaps the donors) continues to insist that extending these contracts to multiple years would undermine the strategic partnering model and impact that is being sought through these contracts. Just as RRI holds some funds aside to invest in new and emerging opportunities, it might also create a pool of funds for a multi-year grant program to test the assumptions around the impacts and implications of such a change to its current one year contracting mechanism. This would be completely consistent with the learning culture of RRI and allow the Coalition to test a new approach without having to change the entire contracting mechanism.

- Other contracting and accounting feedback received from the field assessments during the MTE: 1) Fund recipients find the reporting requirements disproportionate in relation to the amount of funds received; 2) Contracts aren't fully covering the costs of the separate auditing requirement that come with RRI grants and require travel costs to attend meetings that can be difficult to find; 3) The regular reduction in proposal budgets has resulted in a pattern of Partners and Collaborators over-budgeting their costs in the expectations of getting less. These are all common concerns that are raised between donor/funding organizations and their funding recipients, leading us to the question: Is RRI becoming "just another funding organization" despite its intensions and statements to the contrary? Perhaps these three issues can be addressed separately, although RRG staff often states that they are based on donor requirements and so there is no option but to comply. In the end, this organization has some internal conflicts, disparate directions, and inconsistent processes and principles that it may have to resolve if it is to develop fully functional systems that better serve the organization and its stakeholders.

CONCLUSION, SUSTAINABILITY AND FUTURE OPTIONS

The mid-term evaluation of Rights and Resources Initiative finds that RRI is uniquely fulfilling an essential role in fostering forest tenure policy reform and local people's rights to forests. As synthesized in the Summary and analyzed briefly in the text and country annexes of this review, RRI has – in just a few short years – become an acknowledged knowledge leader in reform of forest tenure rights. The RRI Coalition of Partners and Collaborators has improved the conditions for legislative and regulatory reform in an array of countries. The RRI has built awareness and capacity among government, civil society and grassroots stakeholders and increased their voice and access to policy-making processes.

The RRI has influenced global networks and international bodies to provide greater support for forest tenure reform. They have contributed to clarifying and distilling global knowledge on the centrality of forest tenure to climate change, REDD policies, enterprise choices, and implications for livelihoods to general acclaim – and the particular appreciation of Partners and Collaborators. RRG has effectively communicated these results to a select number of interested stakeholders through its website, regular email communication, publications, and news releases.

RRI has helped to halt regressive legislation and exploitive industrial land grabs and provided positive alternatives in a respected manner. The RRI has increased the cooperation and effectiveness of civil society in advocating for the rights of indigenous peoples and poor forest dwelling communities.

While it is not methodologically possible to provide quantitative assessments of the numbers of people whose lives have improved through better tenure regimes or the millions of hectares of forest under more productive and sustainable management, the MTE confirms that, in its measured judgment, RRI has done more to foster these results on a global basis, and within selective countries, than any other organization. **As almost everyone one of the over one hundred twenty people interviewed stated, without RRI this agenda would be severely diminished to the detriment of people and forests worldwide**.

That these remarkable results have been accomplished with such a limited amount of budget and staff resources[102] is a tribute to the vision, strategic thinking, broad coalition of support, and hard work of the highly committed staff.

RRG has demonstrated in large part its ability to balance a diverse set of Partners and Collaborators; the complexities of different country, regional and global stakeholder agendas; and the demands of knowledge generation and credible advocacy. It has attracted high caliber staff, and with the exception of two major Partners that changed their status to Collaborators, has attracted and retained high quality Partners and Collaborators. It has operated as a relatively nimble strategic

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[102] This refers to staff supported by the RRI framework proposal. Except for seconded facilitators and some staff time in country agreements, this primarily refers to the staff of RRG, that currently number 18.

Coalition with direct leadership from RRG to flexibly adapt to new opportunities and threats on an annual basis. From an initial value proposition that was stated in terms of adding value to Partners, it evolved into an organization with direct leadership from RRG that works with a large number of Collaborators. This has enabled it to change its global focus to climate and rights in a way that was not even foreseen at the time of formation. It has enabled it to build on the progress made by many of its Partners and Collaborators over the years to give critical additional support and activate synergistic cooperation.

RRG has been successful in raising financial resources from donors that share its values and pooling them within a common framework to decrease separate reporting and accounting costs and increase flexibility. Financial overheads have been kept low, and a small number of staff has supported a large and diverse program of research, conferences, and grants with admirable efficiency, though not without stress.

In the process of achieving these accomplishments, RRI (and sometimes RRG as the main actor) has made some hard strategic choices. The paths not taken could have led to different outcomes or, arguably, increased the effectiveness of current outcomes. By following the path it has with the limited resources at its disposal, RRI has had to neglect, or give lesser attention to:

- Implementing and securing (realizing) existing rights;
- Livelihood improving enterprise models and involving private sector actors;
- Longer-term engagements in the often slow process of tenure reform;
- Controversial issues around Indigenous Peoples' rights vs. other community dwellers and global/national interests in conservation or carbon sequestration vs. rights to local management;
- Multi-year agreements and grants with Partners and Collaborators to enable longer engagement and more co-financing and buy-in;
- Making sure that in-country synergies were nurtured among Partners and Collaborators;
- In-depth empirical research;
- Enabling professional staff to contribute more substantively, and
- Focusing on building local capacity, national presence and a sustainable coalition.

Various Partners expressed their wish that these alternative paths could have been more adopted in the past or be considered as RRI plans for the future. RRG and RRI have until the end of 2012 to fulfill their existing program. The MTE team is confident that the current course will continue to yield the remarkable results it has so far. But since it is also the time when RRI as a Coalition and RRG as the Secretariat and leading actor within the Coalition need to develop their future pathway, the following future alternatives have been identified.

RRI as a Coalition, as an advocacy agenda, as a think tank, has been growing with the challenge of dealing with the complexity of forest resource tenures and livelihoods. It has done so by becoming more complex itself, but without adequate resources to do justice to its many diverse strategies and programs. Thus, this MTE sees the challenge for RRI as:

Expand or Focus?

This is not necessarily an either/or alternative: focused expansion may in fact be the optimal course.

RRI Future Alternatives

1. Strategic Growth Option

Global Programs

1.1 Determine the adequate level of funding and human resources required to have identifiable impact for each analytic/research and action theme and focus on those for which funding is available and opportunities for impact discernable;

1.2 Incorporate more empirical research to generate new primary data on key strategic issues to move RRI's agenda forward in areas of current gaps e.g. poverty impacts associated with forest tenure change and investments, gender and social inclusion opportunities, conservation and impacts on tenure rights, integrating issues of Indigenous Peoples and other local forest communities, etc.;

1.3 Determine whether selected global programs require pilot demonstrations of the viability of new approaches and policies and work with appropriate Partners/Collaborators at country level to set up longer term projects with appropriate monitoring e.g. combined co-generation energy and forest product processing with more private sector collaboration;[103]

1.4 Increase communication and outreach support in the countries concerned to reach wider audiences through use of more news and alternative media outlets, policy briefs, translation of key messages, etc. both from RRG and incorporated in each agreement/contract;

1.5 Develop strategies to reach underserved government, political, provincial and grassroots audiences;

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[103] Suggested by Board member Don Roberts. He estimated financing requirements at $5-$10 million and noted that since the private sector is risk-adverse, pilots need public co-financing. RRI is demonstrating the value of pilot projects through its current work with RDI/Landesa on grievances and women's rights in China..

1.6 Continue the strategic response mechanism and continue to clarify with Board and Partners the selection criteria and process, including potential for using these in non-selected countries;

1.7 Develop more in-depth collaborations with appropriate research and analytic organizations, particularly with Partners that have proven their ability to deliver and cover their real costs as well as with development banks and donors working on the same objectives;

Regional and Country Programs

1.8 Develop focused research and advocacy strategies that work on "realizing" (supporting implementation, securing, following through) rights to increase actual livelihood results for selected countries (global programs can be used to reach wider net of countries);

1.9 Combine annual cycle planning and agreements with multi-year agreements (with annual reviews) with Partners and Collaborators to enable more sustained efforts and more potential for co-financing;

1.10 Enlarge or contract number of coalition members through a) changing partnership into membership organization, b) using Partners to incorporate more Collaborators (not considered very viable), or c) increasing number of Partners and select fewer country Collaborators and give them the responsibility of serving a wider constituency and increasing synergies with other development actors working on the same in the country (e.g. World Bank/PROFOR in China, LFP/DFID and SDC/IC in Nepal);

1.11 Expand administrative capacity for grant administration if grant programs are continued and free up coordinator/facilitator time for professional contributions OR expand size of grants while decreasing number of grants;

1.12 Devote more resources to assisting Partners and Collaborators to obtain their own in-country funding;

1.13 Consider either country level facilitators or out-posted program officers in selected key countries where more presence is requested e.g. China, Bolivia, and perhaps others?

1.14 Expand efforts to keep articulating, reinforcing and contextualizing RRI's selected strategy and messages so they are understood locally.

2. **Strategic Focus Option**

2.1 Consider radical alternatives of: a) dissolving "partnership" and operating as a separate NGO (RRG) with prior Partners still playing key roles on Board and through work agreements; or b) merging Partners with Collaborators in expanded partnership or association; c) empowering the partnership through such actions as the "partner assembly" recommended by the IM; or d) retaining more focused version of existing structure;

2.2 Focus primarily either on a) selected global analytic and knowledge dissemination and advocacy actions, or b) on supporting country and regional Collaborators (including Partners if kept) in their efforts to ensure forest tenures for the poor and associated livelihoods are at the center of their efforts;[104]

2.3 Either continue to strategically focus on short term interventions to help usher in new tenure reforms *or* consider strategically how it might be possible to support the longer haul process of deepening and securing tenure – perhaps by selecting one or two key drivers such as enterprise, climate change, energy, or food security?

2.4 Develop co-funding agreements with long-term Partners or agreements with donors that allow sub-grants to be streamlined and employ grant administrators;

3. **Strategic Planning and Monitoring**

3. 1 Review strategic outcomes to make them more realistic and measurable;

3.2 Review trade-offs of time vs. efficiency and, while maintaining the outstanding learning and self-reflective attitude, reduce the transactions costs of these activities unless RRG decides to become more a facilitator than actor.

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[104] This differs from the IM's recommendation that RRG should play both the role of facilitator and implementator in "nearly perfect balance". This MTE believes that is only an alternative in the growth option.

Annex 1: Persons Interviewed by TMI MTE Team

RRG
Andy White
Arvind Khare
Deborah Barry
Augusta Molnar
Jeffrey Hatcher
James-Christopher Miller
Solange Bandiaky-Badji
Omaira Bolaños
Nayna Jhaveri
Jenna DiPaolo
Naomi Basik

RRI Board
John Hudson
Ghan Shyam Pandey
Don Roberts
Yam Malla

RRI Partners
RECOFT
James Bampton
Yam Malla
Sanjiv Ray
FECOFUN
Apsara Chapagain
Bhim Prakash Khadka
Bharati Pathak
Jog Raj Giri
Tulashi Prasad Adhikari
Forest Trends
Kirsten Canby
Michael Bennett
IFRI
Arun Agarwal
ICRAF
Xu Jianchu
Andreas Wilkes
Intercooperation
Jane Carter
Chris van Dam
Celestin Dembele

RRI Donors

DFID
    Penny Davies
Ford Foundation
    David Kaimowitz
    Peter Riggs
Norad
    Leif John Fosse
    Leif Tore Traedal
    Ingrid Buli
    Per Mogstad

Other Donors
World Bank
    Peter Jipp
    Navin Rai
World Bank/IEG:
    Lauren Kelly
    Andres Liebenthal
    Silke Heuser
    April Connelly
    Jouni Eerikainen, IFC

Networks
GACF
    Ghan Shyam Pandey
ITTO – GSAG
    Emmanuel ZeMeka
UNREDD
    Not Available July: _Charles McNeill
MegaFlorestais:
    Canadian Forester Not Available July

RRI Fellows
    Janis Alcorn
    Hans Gregerson

Nepal
    Bharat Pokharel, IC
    Bimala Rai-Paudyal , SDC
    Peter Branney, LFP
    Naya Sharma, Forest Action
    Dil Bahadur Khatri, Forest Action
    Apsara Chapagain, FECOFUN
    Ghan Shyam Pandey, GACF
    Bhim Prakash Khadka, FECOFUN
    Bharati Pathak FECOFUN

Jog Raj Giri FECOFUN
Tulashi Prasad Adhikari FECOFUN
Keshav Kanel, ex-MFSC
Ram Prasad Lamsal, MFSC

China

Li Ping, Landesa (previously RDI)
Li Shuxin, SFA
Michael Bennett, Forest Trends
Xu Jintao, Peking University
Hong Xing, SFA
Li Jinru, SFA
Li Jingyu, SFA
Huang Dong, SFA
Guo Yufu, SFA
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Annex 2: Bolivia Country Report[105]

BOLIVIA
Jorge Recharte

Context

The narrative of context has been reconstructed from those issues highlighted by the people interviewed during the MTE in Bolivia, both RRI Collaborators, partner and other actors. We have tried to reflect their perspective but the interpretation emerging from the interviews and all mistakes of fact are my responsibility.

RRI intervenes in Bolivia as a Tier 1 country, chosen because it is undergoing a process of land tenure reform in a political context that seemed to present a unique window of opportunity to advance RRI's objectives. The original four RRI strategic outcomes chosen for Bolivia aimed to a very high mark in the context of a political environment that favored the advancement of these objectives. However as noted by all Collaborators in the country the political environment is extremely complex and unpredictable. RRI strategic outcomes in Bolivia support the rights of both indigenous and *campesino* populations in the lowlands, focusing on the consolidation of land tenure and incorporation into Bolivian legislation of the notion that forests managed by communities and indigenous groups is the pathway to achieve sustainable forest management, reduce poverty and contribute to the broader current social, economic and environmental objectives of the nation. The strategic outcomes are:

- Community-based forest management positioned as a fundamental component of the national forest policy and promoted as integral form of sustainable management of natural resources

- Tenure rights of lowland community-based organizations and indigenous territories consolidated and expanded

- Structures of governance, autonomy and management of NNRR strengthened and vibrant in 3-5 TCOs.

- Community self-regulation system adjusted and incorporated into the national regulatory frameworks on natural resource management.

Through these strategic outcomes RRI is supporting an emerging coalition of Bolivian organizations to advance indigenous and *campesino* tenure rights in the approximately 54 million hectares of forests in the country. While these strategic objectives respond to needs of indigenous and *campesino* groups, there are significant challenges to achieve these policy outcomes in a politically unpredictable

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[105] Prepared by Jorge Recharte. Gabriel Campbell accompanied Jorge to Bolivia.

environment in the short framework of time provided to achive the outcomes (2010-2012). This brief presentation of context enquiries RRI's hypothesis that its interventions can be properly framed as short term, opportunistic ones to advance indigenous and other rural minority rights to forest tenure.

The following table presents a simplified contrast of the Bolivia and Peru context in order to highlight the fact that in spite of quite different extant political ideologies and discourses in the two countries similar powerful drivers of change affect forest use in both nations. Favorable political discourse In Bolivia does not necessarily seems to represent an easier context to advance forest policy reform. In Bolivia the center of political decision is defined by the interests of the demographic majority of the well organized Aymara and Quechua urban and rural populations in the highlands. These social groups have place value in forests as resources (timber, gas, oil, land for colonization). The government of President Morales reflects these views and thus it has set up agencies like ADEMAF to implement its vision in remote border areas of the Bolivian Amazonian region. Similarly the agency INRA is targeting for colonization 0.5 million hectares of forest land in Pando Department that is unsuited for agriculture. In Bolivia, like in Peru, indigenous and *campesinos* in the lowlands are marginal political actors. The marginal role of forestry in Bolivia is also reflected in the meager budget of the sector, again a situation very similar to Peru.

Key legislative processes affecting land rights in Bolivia

Following approval of the new Constitution of Bolivia, existing legislation like the Forestry Law and most other ones entered a process of revision for consistency with the Constitution. Thus, the forestry law could not be separated from other legislative norms that closely affected it like the Land Titling law (*Saneamiento de Tierras*) implemented through the Agrarian Reform Agency or the Autonomy and Decentralization Law (*Autonomías Indígenas*) which includes issues of indigenous autonomy amoung other forms, Mother Earth Law (*Ley Madre Tierra*)*, and* others like *Ley de Emergencia Ambiental, Ley de Deslindes, Ley Amazonia*. Each one of these initiatives is an open process demanding attention and is difficult to predict the results. For instance, the Mother Earth Law (*Ley de la Madre Tierra*) ended up as a set of most general environmental principles, but was initially perceived by some Collaborators as potentially relevant to the advancement of indigenous and community forest rights and practices. The Pacto de Unidad Indígena-Campesina, alliance of highland and lowland federations, tried to include in the Mother Earth Law the concept of binding referendums but failed to do so.

The current political process in Bolivia is part and parcel of a deep and complex history of power relationships in the country that explain many of the issues that Collaborators are dealing with as they try to influence national forestry policy. A radical agrarian reform (1950s) let to the development of urban-highland alliances and political institutions like the *sindicato*, agrarian reform followed by the reproduction of a thriving agrarian bourgeoisie in Santa Cruz (1960s-1970s) and

later on the colonization of Andean piedmont coca areas like the Chaparre by highland Quechua and Aymara small holders and the urban poor (1980s).

The liberalization of the Bolivian Economy in the latter half of the 1980s (Paz Estensoro Government) and the deepening of this process during the 1990s (Gonzalo Sanches de Lozada government in alliance with the Catarist indigenous movement) witnessed the emergence of social movements in the highlands and lowlands. A land mark of this story was CIDOB's "Marcha por la Vida" which represented the first massive public presence of forest lowland groups in Bolivian politics. Legislation enacted during Sanchez de Lozada's first term recognized for the first time collective land rights of lowland groups (*Ley INRA* for lowland areas, *Ley de Territorio Comunal de Origen* TCO or the *Ley de Participación Popular*). The breakdown of traditional political parties and the consolidation of social movements in the democratically elected government of Evo Morales (2005) followed these complex transformations.

The historical invisibility of lowland indigenous and *campesino* interests, the lack of knowledge in the highlands of forest issues in general, and even the cultural differences between lowlands and highlands, *Camba* and *Qolla* cultures, all these gaps are equally found in Evo Morales' attitudes and decisions affecting the lowlands.

Period	Lowland Bolivia	Lowland Peru
Pre-50	Highland-Lowland: 'empty' colonization frontier (54M has)	Highland-Lowlands: 'empty' colonization frontier (65M has)
50s – 80s	-Highland Agrarian Reform -Lowland: landed bourgeoisie (Sta Cruz) -Smallholder colonization -coca expansion/deforestation	-Highland Agrarian Reform -Lowland: smallholder colonization. -IP community titles --coca expansion/deforestation
90s – 2005	-neo liberal policies -Decentralization (TCO Ind. Territories/participation law) -gas/oil/coca/palm -Indigenous Social Movements	-neo liberal policies -Decentralization -IP claims (15M has) -gas/oil/coca/palm
2005 – present	-Radical Social reform -State control increasing(24M has production forest) -drivers: gas/oil/soy bean/IIRSA/Brazil -Central Government/IP conflicts	- neo liberal policies accented (24M has production forest) -Social violence (Bagua) -driver: gas/oil/palm/hydro/IIRSA/Brazil/US Free Trade Agreements -Central Government/IP conflicts - Indigenous Social Movements

RRI Collaborators in the lowlands (CEJIS, IPHAE) have a long institutional career supporting indigenous and *campesino* social movements. Cooperation with CEDLA in La Paz provides access to the political processes in the capital and the highlands.

In spite of the unique access that RRI Collaborators have had to government spheres, their capacity as technical organizations to influence policy is limited because of the complexity of power issues at play.

RRI has a set of strategic outcomes that seek to advance forest tenure rights and norms to position community forestry in the legislation in a policy environment that is particularly unpredictable.

Forestry sector in Bolivia

Bolivia has approximately 54 million hectares of forests, 5 million of these corresponding to indigenous territories (TCO) with near one million already under community management plans. Private ownership and small holder/workers associated with the *barraca* system in the 1990 represented about 4 million hectares and approximately 500 forest communities (16,000 families). There are approximately 60 TCO claims to some 20 million hectares of forests in the lowlands.

Overlapping with indigenous territories there are approximately 12 million hectares of Permanent Production Forest Land (TPFP). The Morales government is claiming back old timber concessions, thus opening opportunities for distribution to indigenous and community groups. Yet, regional power groups have tried to recover control of the titling process resulting in violent conflict with rural communities.

The Forestry Law of 1996 was the outcome of the previous twenty years of pressure by an emerging social movement of indigenous groups. Thus the 1996 law incorporated mechanisms to formally establish property and forest rights of indigenous and extractive communities, consolidating as a result communal property and collective management. However, legislation was also structured to promote industrial timber extraction/production (e.g. In the second half of the 1990s, nearly 3 million hectares of prime extractive forests were given to Bolivian timber companies in the border with Brazil in indigenous territories under *Plan Soberanía*). Indigenous and *campesino* communities had limited capacity to realize rights and thus timber companies manage to keep control of their forest management plans.

The expectation of the new Forestry legislation (called *Ley de Bosques*) is to further consolidate indigenous rights and provide the means to realize them. The position of indigenous groups is to secure their rights as cultures through recognition of their territory. RRI actions are in practice geared to support this process and to achieve these maximal goals.

The forestry sector has a marginal place in the national budget of Bolivia. Approximately $7 million dollars are assigned to the Bolivian office of forests, meager resources for the scope of work and the geographic scales involved.

Forest products represent a fraction of the value of soy beans in the Bolvian DGP and thus forest products do not attract sufficient investment. There is a persistent 'agrarist' vision of forests in Bolivia that translates for example in the fact that Morales government has identified 8 million hectares of forest to be dedicated to expansion of the agricultural frontier. These are forest lands that are destined to industrial agriculture expansion and will replace forest areas that have been depleted in the past. The implementation of the 1996 Agrarian Reform for the lowlands for *campesino* communities (descendants of the *barraca* system of latex collection) fomented the clear cutting the forest to obtain title to resources, a signal of the absence then of a vision of agroforestry, management alternatives that are now taking hold in Bolivia thanks to the work of organizations like IPHAE.

RRI is working in Bolivia with indigenous groups claiming rights to their *Territorios Comunales de Origen* (TCO) and with *campesino* communities dedicated to extraction of latex (*goma*) and Brazilian nut (*castaña*) and timber, strengthening their capacities to influence forest policy and promoting examples and models of best practices in local forestry management. RRI actions support processes of social change in the forestry sector that continue previous efforts by RRI Collaborators. For instance the inclusion of an strategic outcome to support community self-regulation systems in the management of forests has a connection to a rural social movement that succeeded to increase the area given to *campesino* families extracting Brazilian nuts from 50 hectares to 500 has per family [AZ] (Pacheco P. et. Al. 2009). Realizing this new right requires the improvement in community capacities, the documenting of best practices in self-regulation and policy incidence to register these in the new forestry legislation.

Collaborators emphasize that they operate locally in a demanding and sometimes violent context where powerful local stakeholders find ways to defend their interests.

It seems evident that once RRI strategic outcomes are achieved their consolidation into lasting results will require a longer time and further effort to be consolidated.

RRI Collaborators' core strategy is to build local capacities for policy incidence in community forestry, a process that again points to time horizons extending beyond the current RRI framework.

The advocacy role of RRI organizations, and other NGOS, is relevant to the extent that state agencies like the ABT that have the mandate to protect local rights and function as channel of local consultation to elaborate forest legislation or authorize forest management plans has minimal operational funds and it depends on fees collected from the timber companies (for instance the ABT of Pando has 5 people in office including the secretary to control millions of hectares) and support hundreds of communities.

RRI investments in Bolivia are highly relevant to the extent that with out these information and action by NGOs that are embedded in the indigenous social

movement few other stakeholders are in a position to support indigenous forest rights.

Effectiveness

As noted in the introductory section on context, the legislative process in Bolivia expresses the many changing relationships between social/power groups in Bolivia and it does seem to be quite unpredictable policy environment.

The initial strategy of RRI Collaborators was to insert in the Constitutional debate the social groups, the norms and the themes that were relevant to secure forest rights in the Forestry Law. A first major task was to rescue the law from industrial interests by expanding the debate to a broader definition of the forests, i.e. beyond the predominant economic/productive bias. The RRI group was influential proposing this broader approach in the "Ley del Bosque" [Forest Law], although other stakeholders outside the RRI group also claim paternity.

Debate of this law and of the Law of the Amazonia (*Ley de la Amazoní*a], notes an RRI partner, is an uphill battle because lowland groups are perceived in highland Bolivia as minorities that limit development of the nation. There is a sense of frustration among people interviewed with the challenges to influence policies to give land rights to forest people in the present context. This was also explained describing the Morales government as "plebiscitary", meaning that the interests of social movements count to the extent they have significant numbers of votes. Of course the number of indigenous votes in the lowlands is insignificant.

The Bolivian Constitution has created in fact unique opportunities to advance legislation in favor of indigenous land tenure rights and local uses; in theory there is even the opportunity to transform the vision and geopolitics of the Amazon based on recognition of the multiple dimensions of the forest, the right to free, fully informed consultation, the right to exercise claim to territories of origin, or the opportunity to define the indigenous territory as autonomy. However, achieving these maximalist forest governance goals in Bolivia will be possible only to the extent to which other complex social and legal reforms are successful.

The RRI strategy in Bolivia is to support a bottom up process of policy incidence. Again this seems to make sense to the extent that the government of Bolivia will likely respond only to social/political pressure coming from forest social movements.

RRI Collaborators are conducting a set of activities that seem to be in synergy:

CEDLA is mapping the status of TCOs, documenting the gaps and conflicts with other external users of forest resources in order to provide this information to CIDOB's grass roots to support their involvement.

Similarly, IPHAE is working with *campesino* communities that fought for years and changed the legislation to increase communal territories (to 500 hectares per family) and strengthen collective management of forest resources.

IPHAE has completed a draft version of a case study on community forest "self-regulation". The study has identified the diversity of management needs among these communities and the study will be right on time to inform the Forest Law. The documentation of IPHAE's experience developing management plans is key to find ways to change the legislation to allow communities to produce their own forest management plans, breaking away from their current dependence on timber companies that produce their management plans and capture the lion's share of forest products. In this sense RRI is supporting an aspect that few organizations are working on.

However, the challenges ahead for the sector, as noted by IPHAE staff, are significant: (1) to develop the capacity of communities to actively propose integrated management plans that incorporate traditional practices; and (2) to improve in significant ways the economic value that *campesinos* obtain form forests by improving their access to forest markets that support their way of life and culture. Reaching these goals requires developing local institutions for the management of common goods, a huge task in the social context of the *barraca* system in which patron-client relationships dominate social habits. Needless to say that this task is a long term processes.

Efficiency

RRI in Bolivia, as an intervention strategy (a group of organizations and key activities) that aims to influence forest policies, seems to be developing an effective mechanism to achieve the expected outcomes. The strategy of providing grass roots community forestry groups with information and tools to influence forest policy is a goal that requires that this intervention strategy remains in place over some time and probably requires expanding the coalition to reach lasting results.

The current group of RRI Collaborators in Bolivia is that of those that are implementing contracts (CEJIS, IPHAE, CEDLA). The role of RRI's partner (IC) is limited to convening Collaborators to prepare the annual work plan and have had limited access to details of work conducted so far. The organizational structure of RRI in Bolivia is informal and responds to the trust existing between Collaborators that have affinity of approaches.

CEJIS, CEDLA and IPHAE the core group of current RRI members appear to be communicating well among themselves and they express affinity and complementarity. Thus, CEDLA concentrates in information collection analysis while CEJIS/IPHAE on effective and timely use of the information with local groups who then develop their positions to influence policies as a social movement.

CEJIS's mission is the advocacy for indigenous peoples' rights. It has capacities in research and promotion of national legislation and social-political actions in support of indigenous groups. CEJIS' legitimacy stands on a long history working on human and citizen rights of indigenous Amazonian groups. IPHAE has been working for over fifteen years in the northern lowlands of Bolivia with *campesino* forest communities focused on the promotion of organizational and business models that favor local livelihoods and rights to forest resources. CEDLA is a recognized think tank and policy group that has the capacity and also the legitimacy to challenge the central government to advance community forestry and indigenous rights in the lowlands. Their research on economic trade-offs in the forest sector helps CEJIS, IPHAE and local grass roots develop positions.

Collaboration among existing contractors seem to be in synergy, but other groups that are described in the RRI documentation as Collaborators, yet are not implementing contracts (e.g LIDEMA), do not see themselves under the RRI umbrella. RRI is not recognized as a visible platform by other organizations in Bolivia (e.g. CIPCA) that are working on related issues. There is not much connection among these groups to RRI studies and technical resources. In the opinion of LIDEMA, an important environmental network, there is little articulation in general among NGOs competing for funds and visibility in Bolivia.

While CIDOB is the main platform of lowland indigenous organizations and partner to the group of Collaborators, there is consistent recognition that its representation is deficient to promote local agendas regarding community forest rights.

Outside the RRI network in Bolivia are other actors engaged in the promotion of community forestry, some following similar approaches (CIPCA) and others closely related work promoting community forestry or conservation through economic use of forest resources (e.g. CEADES, PUMA Foundation, WWF, CFV, CFB). Grass roots organizations dedicated to foster community forestry in Bolivia are emerging. For instance AFIN is an indigenous organization that gathers 70 Community Forestry Enterprises (EFC); there are the Community Forestry Organizations (OFC) and Regional Forestry Associations (AFIR). It was not clear from the interviews the degree of RRI inter-action with these organizations creating business opportunities for indigenous and campesino communities. The interrupted cooperation with CIFOR in Bolivia seems to be also a lost opportunity to leverage impact. In any case there doesn't seem to be actions in place or programmed to articulate efforts to a wider organizational network in support of RRI objectives.

The annual planning cycle of RRI and its flexibility to follow context and adjust actions as required is perceived as an asset. The linkage between national, regional and global actions that together help achieve RRI project outcomes is not clear to partner or Collaborators. CEJIS Riberalto and IPHAE Riberalto have fluent communication and cooperation beyond the RRI projects and CEDLA's visits to Riberalto to present data to local constituencies is also valued.

Coordination of RRI coalition in Bolivia still has to improve harmonizing schedules to improve interaction between CEJIS, IPHAE, CEDLA and IC. More communication among Directors of the organizations would also help. Collaborators perceive themselves as coalition taking form and their actual cooperation improving. On the other hand outside the group there is no knowledge of RRI and its resources (e.g. CIPCA Riberalto belongs with Collaborators to "Institutional Committee in Support of Land Titling" [Comisión de Apoyo Institucional al Saneamiento de Tierras] but does not know RRI resources).

Considering the development threats to Amazon forests and the complexity of politics in Bolivia, it seems necessary to expand the coalition to other groups in order to achieve strong and informed constituencies and networks and to share RRI strategic approaches with a wider set of committed organizations. Is this expansion limited by ideology or lack of common approaches with other organizations in Bolivia?

In summary, regarding the time framework for actions, the perception of Collaborators is that these are long term processes that require cooperation among themselves. Collaborators note that RRI is supporting processes in which they have been embarked for a long time and that will continue for the years ahead. One person said referring to RRI that *"es fácil subirse al caballo cuando ya esta criado"* [it is easy to ride the horse once the horse is already grown up] to mean, I belief, that the objective of strong networks should involve more of RRI (resources, presence, longer time horizons)

Sustainability

The group of RRI Collaborators is connected like no other one in Bolivia to Amazonian forest constituencies, to government and legislative spheres. However, even if new legislation incorporates element that strengthen local rights and tenure, Collaborators note that without economic success and access to markets that improve the local forest economy, existing socially and environmentally predatory patterns will be reproduced in Bolivia. Rural communities have to be articulated to markets that recognize the value of sustainable forest management in order to make this possible. This effort may require a huge change in the ways the nation perceives and invests in the Amazonian forest.

This goal is difficult to achieve in a continent that is rich in resources and subject to powerful drivers of change. Firstly, this is difficult because the forest economy of rural communities is based in a few forest products (e.g. castaña, goma, and few other products) which cannot yield the income needed by families. Secondly, transportation infrastructure is extremely poor through out the region. Thirdly, there is the difficulty of accessing fair price markets. The challenge is that opening roads in the Amazon will bring soil fertilizers at a competitive price and forest land use will change to soy bean or palm production. The point raised here is recognition of a 'Catch 22' situation where the Bolivian government would

need significant resources to counter drivers of change and these resources in Bolivia are gas and oil in the Amazon region. President Morales government has recently clashed with several Amazonian groups in the northern La Paz Department over plans to open gas an oil operations, and the construction of the trans Amazonian highway across indigenous territories in the nature preserve Parque Isiboro Secure (TIPNIS). These tensions will likely continue.

REDD schemes are perceived by Partners as not acceptable if they are mechanisms to rent cheaply forest land ("*no podemos vivir de alquiler*"). It is in this sense that an RRI collaborator, states that without long term economic strategies in Bolivian forests, improved policies supporting local rights and tenure risk being *"un tiro al aire"* [a gun shot into the air].

A larger effort to position community forestry is needed. Some people interviewed insisted on the fact that to obtain lasting and effective results in tenure reform is necessary to create public awareness of the relevance of forests for Bolivia and the potential of community forestry. Even though indigenous management practices and community forestry concepts have made it into the legislation, indigenous forest peoples and forest community issues have no visibility among voters and decision makers in the highlands.

The RRI format of high profile conferences that have international weight is seen as an effective mechanism to mobilize political will and resources in support of sustainable forest use in Bolivia. The 2007 RRI Community Forestry meeting in Rio Branco, Brazil was given as such an example in which Acre State was able to capitalize on the conference to build a vision of forests with people. Public awareness could also involve alliances with universities to create opportunities for young professionals to become specialists in community forestry.

Having former colleagues in the highest positions in government [CEJIS], RRI Collaborators were in the best of positions to influence policy, and have placed key issues in the agenda of the Ministry of Environment, have set up commissions on these topics at the *Autoridad de Bosque y Tierra* **ABT** [Land and Forest Authority], and have promoted forestry norms in favor of TCOs. However, all these advances are considered *letra muerta* [dead letter] if norms are not matched by funds in the national budget. The latter is possible to the extent that there is sufficient public support and political will.

Communication

We have noted above that there was only vague knowledge of RRI approaches, and technical resources outside the group of Partners and Collaborators. The products and actions of RRI in Bolivia need to be shared more widely. Of all Collaborators only one [CEDLA] was clearly using RRI information described as 'fresh and useful perspectives', 'bulletins are very practical' and the experience and technical support received from RRG staff is also highly valued.

Communication with RRG regional coordinator is also perceived as important by RRI Collaborators and partner to support the group in Bolivia and to improve links with regional and global actions.

Bolivian Collaborators have the capacity to strengthen indigenous and community constituencies and support social movements with technical information to advocate for forest tenure reforms. Yet, for the steps that follow reform, they consider that support could come from RRI. Thus, actions at the level of the South America region could complement national actions, for instance focusing on the promotion of social business responsibility in timber and non timber products. RRG and regional Partners have the capacity to contact or facilitate involvement of these stakeholders and they are well positioned to promote effective alliances.

Annex 3: Cameroon Country Report
Marlene Buchy

Introduction

This report is the result of a short evaluation carried out in Yaounde between the 15 and 18th of May 2011 and is part of a wider evaluation which included 5 other RRI countries; China and Nepal, Peru and Bolivia, and Mali. Thus this report can be a standalone case study but is part of a larger evaluation. The MTE was part of the RRI programme planning document.

The RRI coalition in Cameroon is made up of 5 core Partners: ICRAF, IUCN , CED, CAM ECO, and CAFT. The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the relevance, performance, effectiveness and sustainability of the RRI enterprise at the national, regional and global level. This report focuses on the national level of the RRI coalition in Cameroon and is based on background material as well as 15 interviews with various coalition Partners and actors currently involved in capacity building in the field of, and advocacy for, rights and resources in Cameroon. Unfortunately the relevant actors within the Ministry of Forests (MINEP) were not available for interviews. This means that the views of the bureaucracy are not fully represented in this report.

The Context

With 160,467km^2 of dense lowland forests covering the 466,326km^2 total land area of the country, Cameroon's forests play an important role in the national economy. The forestry sector generates 6 per cent of the GDP and employs 13,000 in the industrial sector, but estimates put the informal sector at 10 times the number of people involved in the formal sector (Karsenty 2007:21). The forest estate is divided into the permanent and non-permanent domain and exploited through a number of logging titles. The extractive model of forestry in Cameroon where the state and foreign logging companies take the lion's share of the benefits is also profoundly unequal and inequitable (Oyono et al. 2005). Formal participation of Cameroonians in the forestry sector has thus been minimal with the industry being dominated by European and Asian groups (Karsenty 2007). However, a growing number of Cameroonians are formally involved and benefitting from forests in two ways: 1) Community Forests, established through the Forestry Law of 1994, are areas within the Non-Permanent Forest Domain zoned for use by village communities. With technical assistance from the Ministry of forests' (MINEF) Community Forestry Unit, a village community seeking a forest title identifies a zone not exceeding 5,000 ha and drafts a simple management plan for approval by the Ministry. Proceeds from community forest management are used for community development projects; and 2) Council Forests which are areas zoned within the Permanent Forest Domain and managed according to an approved management plan. The objectives of the Council Forest, along with its final boundaries, are established during the official classification process. Once allocated, these forests become the property of a council; however, the commune, (which is the lowest

administrative unit in Cameroon) must abide by the management plan in order to retain title to the forest area (Bikie et al 2000).

The Forest Act of 1994 – seen by many as an innovative and progressive piece of legislation – first introduced the concept of sustainable forest management through forest management plans, the redistribution of forest taxes to communities and the concept of council and community forests (Cerutti et al 2008). However, many of the decrees needed to enact the law have never been written or voted on, thereby preventing the law from been implemented. It took almost six years before the first community forest licences were finally approved in 2000 (Djeumo 2001). In Cameroon, like many other countries colonised by France, the forests and all other land 'unoccupied' were declared state property, undermining customary rights and ignoring village based land use and management preceding European colonisation. With decolonisation most of the colonial laws remained, with from time to time new laws being added resulting in a complex web of rules and regulations often too complex to be workable. The only clear outcome is that rural communities and especially IP have been denied secure rights.

One of the characteristics of forest communities in the region is their ethnic diversity as indigenous peoples live alongside relatively more recently settled Bantu groups. About 40000 IP live in the forests using the forests as their main source of livelihood whilst Bantu groups are settled agriculturalists who at times provide seasonal employment to the IP. IP are more likely to be illiterate and extremely poor and less likely to be engaged in public political life and traditionally many IP groups have been excluded from the decision making process at the local level. Their ancestral customary rights are often ignored leaving these marginalised groups open to abuse by others (logging companies, forest department staff or even local agriculturists). One of the major issues in the field is that the law is either not known by IP and other rural community members (especially women) or misunderstood (by intent or default) by the field level foresters or wildlife guards who often punish local people and abuse the system (See Nkoumbele nd for details about the BaGieli). There is an enormous information/education work that needs to be done amongst all sections of society.

Because of their size and quality, tropical forests from the Congo basin have also recently attracted interests from potential investors as part of the carbon trading process. Cameroon is seeking support from the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility in relation to REDD related planning processes. A recent study on pilot REDD projects across the forest region (Freudenthal *et al* 2011) shows a number of problems related to tenure and rights issues. Apart from the fact that IP communities have largely been ignored in these pilots, it seems that no mechanisms to respect the rights of IP in the REDD planning have been developed, and that benefit sharing mechanisms are 'neither clearly defined ... and often attributed to the State' (2011:i). The debate about REDD + , about whether 'it will work', whether fair systems can be put in place in countries with a high level of corruption and weak civil society will continue for some time in Cameroon and elsewhere, but it is clear that in a context of unclear tenure

74

systems and weak rights, local custodians of the resources are at great risk of losing out once more.

One of the advantages perhaps for Cameroon is that in May 2010 it signed a Voluntary Partnership Agreement within the FLEGT EU framework. This VPA was preceded by a long negotiation process amongst forestry sector actors including civil society, the state and the industry (for more details see Buchy 2011) which resulted amongst other outcomes in official recognition that the law was unclear and insufficient and that legal reform was needed. The VPA also formalises the right of IP and local communities to negotiate directly with timber logging companies. This is positive and encouraging but one year on it seems little progress has been done on the reform.

So in short the Cameroonian context presents the following characteristics:
- The wealth created by forests for the State makes it harder for local forest communities to make full use of the resource for their own benefit as the forestry sector is organised to serve the benefit of industrial actors

The absence of clarity, inherited from colonisation and limited understanding of the legal tenure system is creating vulnerability for local populations and especially for IP with limited capacity and powers
- Government has largely ignored women's needs and rights.
- The current globally accepted strategy to deal with Climate Change through carbon trading will potentially generate huge sums of money, further jeopardising the chance of local people, and especially so IP and women, to benefit from the schemes as their insecure rights decreases their chance to claim a share of the proceeds
- The recent VPA negotiation process has strengthened civil society and has formally recognised the insufficiency of the legal framework which in theory opens up possibilities for improvements.

The Results

Is RRI work in Cameroon relevant?

The context analysis above highlights 3 areas of concerns
- Indigenous Peoples and women, their roles and rights, and strategies to develop sustainable livelihoods
- The clarification of the legal framework and the need to include provisions for the protection of Indigenous Peoples' rights in the law
- The need to build the capacity at all levels of resource management to understand and disseminate the law as well as the potential new issues posed by global governance approaches such as REDD+

The approach adopted by the RRI coalition in Cameroon has been to identify the issues and to roughly divide the remit of work focus amongst the Partners. In this approach each partner has become the lead in one area of activities and the

others bring support as and when necessary. Thus the areas of interventions are broadly divided as follows: ICRAF intervenes to support the capacity building of local leaders and decision makers, CamEco deals with tenure, women's tenure rights, and mapping issues, CAFT focuses on developing forestry enterprises, IUCN works on the inclusion of IP and communities in the management of boarder zones, CED focuses on Indigenous Peoples and REDD issues, FPP works in collaboration with CED on issues related to REDD, community rights mapping, and IPs, REFACOF Cameroon in collaboration with CamEco deals with women's tenure rights and participation in REDD+ national processes .

In 2010 ICRAF intervened in 3 different ways:

1) First, ICRAF supported work on research and documentation of rights and claims to rights of rural populations through for example the participatory mapping of rights and claims exercise. The aim of this exercise was to identify the neglected rights in the intervention zone as well as the emerging claims. There was also an attempt to analyse the impact of tenure systems on intervention areas. There was also some dissemination and information work to keep updating information about community rights in 3 locations; Lomie (South East), Kopongo (Edea) and Tinto (South West)

2) Secondly ICRAF also supported work in capacity-building through a series of training workshops focusing on simplified lobbying techniques for communities (how to reach out to decision makers and how to develop networking strategies) ;

3) And finally, ICRAF co- organised with IUCN and RRI support a national level workshop to discuss the strategy to influence the revision of the forestry law; this 2 day workshop brought together 40 actors, including parliamentarians, traditional chiefs, NGOs and International organisations.

For 2011 two sets of activities are planned; continued capacity building for parliamentarians for lobbying in the area of local rights and the sensitisation of local communities and actors to the REDD issues.

In Cameroon, one of IUCN's work foci is on building the capacity of IP to participate in the decision making processes related to tenure discussions. IUCN intervenes through research activities such as for example comparing legal decrees in different countries in the Congo basin and region of the Great Lakes. They also organise workshops to sensitise both decision makers and local populations and encourage IP representatives to attend national meetings; they also produce communication material on IP rights and networks. IUCN was also a key player with RRI in organising the tenure conference in 2009 in Yaounde.

IUCN was a founding member of the REFACOF. With RRI support IUCN has supported REFACOF in conducting an audit exercise to establish who is who and what are the themes and areas covered by the members of REFACOF in Cameroon. There has also been a REDD sensitisation workshop to train women to understand climate change issues organized and lef by REFACOF members (Cam Eco and Observatoire des cultures Baka et Bantu pour L'éducation,

l'Environnement et le développement). IUCN also plays a role in preparing the next Convergence plan of the Central African Forest Commission (COMIFAC) especially in trying to integrate REFACOF in the COMIFAC plan, the next phase of which is currently being negotiated by a variety of actors. Through its support to REFACOF, IUCN tries to influence which themes will be included in the Plan and one important objective is to encourage governments to consider gender sensitive legislation for NTFPs.

The Centre for Environment and Development (CED) is a major civil society actor in environmental scene in Cameroon. CED's work has focussed for many years on focusing on recognising and respecting community rights to NRM (such as forest, mining, oil sectors.). With the support of RRI the first step has been to evaluate and stimulate a discussion around the rights of communities in the forest zone and the discussions involved all the actors. CED has been actively involved in spearheading the NGO platform in the context of the VAP negotiations and has with RRI contributed to the proposal for the revision of the Forest Law. More recently CED, with RRI support, is mobilising resources to make concrete proposals for the Land tenure reform project announced by President P. Biya in January this year. This was partly done through the commissioning of a 'Whose Land is it?' report (see Alden Wily 2011) which focuses on taking stock of land tenure issues and proposal to the Government to move ahead.

CAFT is a cooperative of 4 communal forests covering 40000 ha. The focus is on enterprise development. They have been involved with RRI since 2005 and are working both at the strategic and the practical level. CAFT has been actively working towards amending the community forest convention which at the moment is signed with the MINFOF but is yet to be operational. To be workable, the convention also needs to include other natural resources such as water, NTFPs etc., all which are legislated under different laws and regulations which can be in contradiction with the forest law. The procedures to operate a community forest within the law are too complicated and costly for communities and CAFT is engaged in advocacy and negotiation work with the authorities to amend the texts. On a more practical level, they have organised visits to Yaounde's markets for villagers to see what the market possibilities for the forest products, wood or other items are.

CAFT is also working with RRI support in collaboration with the Observatoire des cultures Baka et Bantu pour L'Education, l'Environnement et le Développement (Observatory of Baka and Bantu cultures for education, environment and development). The role of this NGO is to facilitate the implementation of community forestry. The NGO is also involved in the REFACOF as one of the founder members and the focal point for Cameroon. This NGO came into contact with RRI through the work they did with CAFT.

Cam Eco (Cameroon Ecology) has been involved in the field of sustainable use of resources and especially forests in the context of community forests for the last decade. Over the years they have been working in building the capacity of community and local authorities for the management of their forests. In the

context of RRI Cam Eco has been leading innovative work in the participatory mapping of 6 UFA (Units of managed forests) which are gazetted as State property and officially out of reach for the surrounding communities. This work has been an opportunity to take stock of the situation. As the mapping is being consolidated the results will be presented at a workshop at the end of June where representatives from the Ministries of Forest, Planning and Management and of Territory and Tenure Affaires will be represented. The maps will show clearly that within the UFAs there are a lot of illegal activities occurring and they hope this information will give them leverage to negotiate increased community access to these areas, which at the moment the government claims are protected areas not open to exploitation. By inviting representatives of so many different ministries they hope the information will be shared widely within government. The work of FPP in collaboration with OKani and CED should be clearly stated in this report on issues related to REDD, mapping, and IP issues.

REFACOF Cameroon is a key Collaborator and has been focusing on issues related to women's tenure rights and forest governance in Cameroon for over two years. Please make sure their work in reflected here. REFACOF Cameroon and CED have commissioned a study on gender and forest and land tenure rights, organized a national workshop, and are involved in influencing the national REDD process to include a gender perspective in 2011.

In summary the RRI Cameroon coalition Partners together address land and tenure issues, lobby for IP and women's rights and work towards a more effective implementation of the community forestry related activities. Given the context of Cameroon and the current issues in the resources sector it seems that RRI work is very relevant, but some critics have asked whether what was done was enough and directed at the right targets?

Is RRI work in Cameroon effective?

If there is no doubt that RRI work is necessary and relevant, the next question is whether RRI Cameroon is achieving what it sets itself out to do? In this section we consider some of the results identified by respondents during the interviews as well as consider whether the strategy followed by the coalition is the best way to be effective.

There are a number of concrete results:
REFACOF is a direct result of the Yaoundé Tenure workshop in 2009. The network exists now in 11 countries and the first activity at the Africa level was a strategic planning workshop which produced an Action Plan for 2011 targeting lobbying for the rights of women to access tenure and to tackle bureaucrats as well as cultural beliefs. The network is still young so the membership is not yet stabilised but in Cameroon about 60 women are involved.

ICRAF has developed a tool/template for communities to lodge claims. This tool facilitates the process of registering land and resource claims at the local level. Another direct outcome of one RRI/ICRAF related activity has been the creation of a lobbying network in Kopongo for community leaders (*leaders d'opinion*)

which empowers local people as information circulates more easily and local people are more able to control information. The coalition organised a national workshop on parliamentarians, traditional chiefs and opinion leaders in March 2010 which was attended by about 40 people with about half from elected representative bodies and local leaders. The work of IUCN through its Radio station and specifically the *Programme Environnement* (Environment Programme) is helping to disseminate information on policy matters and circulate information on rights. The radio also reaches remote IP communities.

Respondents consider that the coalition is now firmly established as one of the bodies speaking on rights and tenure issues and has gained some legitimacy at high level; RRI Cameroon has made a written contribution for a change of the forestry law and is now preparing a proposal for land reform. The funding of the study 'Whose land is it? The status of customary land tenure in Cameroon' (Alden Wily 2011) is a concrete example of how quickly RRI can react to a locally identified need. When in January 2011, The President of Cameroon, P. Biya mentioned in a public address that tenure was a problem for the country and gave 6 months to his government's administration to sort the problem out, CED decided to grab the opportunity to fill the gap as they predicted that the relevant ministries would probably do nothing. The idea was to carry out some solid background work and place itself strategically for lobbying by starting this work in order to be able to make concrete propositions to the Ministry within the 6 months. RRI secretariat was very quick to react and within a short time the project was underway and its report is now published. As a result, CED feels in a strong position as the relevant ministries have indeed so far done very little on the reform. RRI also does give some legitimacy to this work and it is harder for the government to dismiss this input as just one more of CED's antics. CED feels that at the Ministry RRI is seen as an objective actor whilst CED is not to be trusted.

Some feel that RRI has helped to increase the place of local elected representatives within the negotiation process for the revision of tenure legislation. RRI takes all opportunities to bring all actors face to face for discussions/debates. Some communities are now more likely to feel they have a right to voice their concern and claim their rights; they seem to have adopted some of the language /jargon and they now know that the government has to take local populations into account during the revision of the forestry law. Local leaders also now understand the connections between the rights of communities and the forest law reform.

From an organisational perspective RRI offers coalition Partners some clear advantages in working together. An international organisation like ICRAF which has limited links to the field can access a wider network of grassroots organisations through the networks of its Partners. This also helps ICRAF to disseminate information about tree tenure in a context where everyone is only focusing on land tenure. At the same time ICRAF can offer grassroots organisations a voice at higher levels or even some visibility. RRI also brings some extra funding and collaboration can also reduce costs. One respondent gave the example of the recent REFACOF workshop which was a coalition effort:

one partner provided the rooms for 2 days free of charge, some Partners provided some human resource, one partner facilitated the process free of charge. This, it seems, in the Cameroonian context, is unheard of and is only possible because the coalition members share a vision and every partner feels implicated. So working as a coalition has been a positive learning experience for the Partners.

RRI also presents more added value because within the RRI and RRG there is a lot of knowledge/experience which can be shared at high level with bureaucrats (who will listen to RRI but not so easily to local organisations). RRI is considered neutral. For example, RRG members have met the General Secretary of forests in 2009 and pushed forward the idea that communities should be given some minimum tenure rights within the community forestry framework. This idea has apparently been well received and though progress is slow, the secretary has claimed that 'yes I think this is not a bad idea'. RRI Cameroon is also gradually gaining credibility as a group of professionals who collect valid field data which no one within the bureaucracy does.

But it seems the biggest achievement of RRI in Cameroon is to have put rights and tenure issues on the national development agenda. Prior to RRI no-one in Cameroon was openly talking about forestry or land tenure as these are sensitive, complex and long term issues. Some respondents go so far as saying that people (and this includes professionals) were not aware of the role of tenure and rights issues as a block to sustainable development. RRI has increased the capacity of its coalition members by sensitising them on these issues: for example, in the past people might have talked about conflicts between agriculturists and pastoralists or between IP and the forestry department, but without considering tenure and rights as a direct cause of the conflicts.

In conclusion, the interviews show a number of results:
- Land and forestry tenure issues have become central to the discussions on sustainable resource management in Cameroon; bureaucrats and politicians are starting to be sensitive to these issues;
- RRI has provided a space for the coalition Partners to learn to work differently and bring their forces together;
- RRI Cameroon has also helped in raising awareness and circulating information amongst rural and indigenous communities and women who are often marginalised but who depend highly on the forests for their livelihoods;

Does RRI have an impact?

By the very nature of the work undertaken by the coalition it is very difficult to measure tangible impact. As we know from the historical context in Cameroon, having more progressive laws does not always result in change on the ground, as the implementation of new policies is often very slow and under-resourced. Even in the ideal scenario where everything was suddenly perfect it would take some time for impacts to be visible. Unfortunately because no government official was available for interviews it is impossible to know whether they feel

there has been visible impact, or whether they would consider that their perspective on these issues has changed.

Respondents feel that being present in the field and sensitising communities about the law, and rights is already a positive change even though what change will result later on one cannot know. The fact that RRI will submit a proposal for the revision of the law which has also included the voices from below is a positive change even though one has not control of the impact. So despite being positive about the results so far, Partners are also cautious as they know that in Cameroon the Government says one thing and often does another. But the process of changing the forestry law is underway and so there is an opportunity for concrete change to be implemented.

Is RRI strategy sustainable?

During the interviews, respondents have raised a number of issues which in their minds might threaten the future RRI related work.

Increasing visibility and capitalising on results
A number of respondents feel that the coalition does not yet have enough visibility and it should take more advantage of its achievements to occupy the public space to promote the debate: why not for example publicise results from a study or a workshop's main outcomes in a newspaper? Why not support and organise a TV debate on these tenure/IP issues? Given the importance of these issues for the development of the country, RRI results needs to be more visible in the public space.

Can the coalition grasp the opportunity to raise its profile in the region as well? There are a number of political processes going on or being planned such as the 3 Basin Summit, the Yaounde Summit 10 ++ (a follow up on the 1999 conference which kick-started the conservation of forestry ecosystems), the FLEGT and REDD processes, all of which are important events where achievements should be disseminated.

Publicising the work of the coalition's achievements would also be an opportunity to attract attention to the coalition model as a different way of working. A number of respondents are also wondering about the possibility of scaling up, about whether the coalition is not a select group, a bit elitist?

A coalition stretched to its limits
Scaling up would also increase potential for more synergy as so much still needs doing. The departure of CIFOR from the coalition was heartfelt because CIFOR has some capacity to take on some tasks which were initially neglected after their departure. One of the strengths of the coalition is to connect very different kinds of organisations which intervene at different levels. Potentially this also becomes one of the weaknesses of the coalition as it is not just a matter of replacing one partner by another. The combination of international organisations with local ones is important as international organisations can raise the profile of an issue very quickly at the global level and have resources and skills to conduct

research of high calibre. On the other hand it is the local organisation which can do more of the national lobbying where international organisations might be considered as interfering in domestic affairs, and they also provide access to the field reality. Though larger organisations are considered to be better funded, they also feel the pressure of the current economic context. So perhaps more lobbying by RRI/RRG at the higher level of these global organisations is needed to ensure national programmes can stay on board as at headquarter level people do not always know or understand the relevance of what the country programmes local commitments are.

There is an advantage of keeping the coalition small as it allows a better reaction time and more flexibility but at the same time with limited means there is only so much small local national organisations can do and deliver. Local partners also recognise that they would be stronger if the group was bigger: they would have a bigger political clout but how to open the group is not clear.

Most respondents consider that the funding is too small in relation to the ambitious RRI aims and goals and can be stretched which is not healthy for smaller organisation who cannot have RRI as their only business. Short term funding in particular interferes with sustained interventions; if work can't be sustained, how can this be sustainable?

Some suggestions
The issue of where the funding is coming from is a recurrent theme and many think that RRI could do more to act as a leverage to secure more funds as it would be easier for small NGOs to access funds with RRG support. Others feel that RRI needs to think bigger and grow as the task is too big.

Very few Partners seem to know about the regional or the global programme showing that perhaps more consolidating work needs doing in this area. Though Partners value the possibility to meet regionally during the planning at regional level the potential for synergy at that level has not yet been realised.

On a more practical note, the dominant use of English is seen as an impediment especially for future expansion in the Congo Basin region; there is also a feeling of Anglo Saxon dominance and the regional coordination should perhaps rotate between Anglophone and francophone countries.

Conclusion

This evaluation attempted to measure relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. From the interviews carried out in Cameroon it seems that there is no doubt that RRI is relevant and that RRI is generating positive and encouraging results at the right levels of bureaucracy and policy making. The main challenges for RRI seem to be of an organisational nature. Can the work needed be carried out in the long term with limited funding? Can all Partners sustain involvement in the coalition given the current economic context? Can RRI establish a more visible synergy at the regional or global level?

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Annex 4: China Country Report[106]

RRI in China with Partners and Collaborators
Kirsten Ewers Andersen

Background of Chinese forest tenure reform and RRI support to the reform process

China's collectively owned forest areas of 100 million hectares made up 58% of China's forest area or 27 million hectares by 2003. These forest areas were singled out for reform in the beginning of the 2000s, a reform that allows the collectives to hand over forest management to private households, partnerships, private contractors, or maintain communal tenure at village or community level (so-called cluster level). The goal was to increase forestry sector outputs, raise rural incomes, and protect critical forest ecosystem. With the reform process 70% of collective forests were in the hands of households by 2006. Households would now manage forests themselves, primarily for timber, and sell the produce to make an income.

Historically collectives constitute an arrangement of state-like institutions established by China's Communist Party after the founding of New China in the 1950s.[107] Increasingly collectives were centralized into large production teams aimed at rapid industrialization, an arrangement that left China's forests seriously degraded.[108] But after start of the 2000s Fujian province has been in the forefront with forest tenure reform and also in other provinces the hand-over was taking place. The on-the-ground reforms were later followed by policy changes. A RRI-funded study by Xu Jintao of Peking University[109] (an RRI Collaborator) has shown that the policy reform became the consolidation of existing ongoing processes.

The support to the process of forest tenure reform also came from international agencies working in China such as Ford Foundation and Forest Trends (FT). The FT co-organized the first large conference on forest tenure and poverty alleviation with the Chinese Forestry Administration (SFA) in 2000. This created a foundation for international support to China forest reform. Forest Trends later became an RRI partner when RRI was established in 2006. By then RRI helped organize a major conference co-organized by Peking University, the State Forestry Administration, and the World Bank to debate the reform process. A second conference to follow up was organized in 2008 in Fujian, the birthplace of forest tenure reform. Like the previous conference this had strong impact in China as it created a platform for spreading the message and telling of the

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[106] The report was prepared by Kirsten Ewers Andersen. Gabriel Campbell accompanied Kirsten to China.
[107] It is not the same as customary communal tenure at village level found among ethnic minorities in the south
[108] Horst Weyerhaeuser, Fredrich Kahrl, and Su Yufang: Ensuring a future for collective forestry in China's southwest:
Adding human and social capital to policy reforms. *Forest Policy and Economics* 8 (2006) 375– 385 www.elsevier.com/locate/forpol
[109] Jintao Xu, Andy White and Uma Lele, *China's Forest Tenure Reforms Impacts and implications for choice, conservation, and climate change.* 2010 Rights and Resources Initiative.

RRI Mid-Term Evaluation: Final DRAFT September 2011　　**The Mountain Institute**

benefits of reform. The 2008 conference reviewed the preliminary findings of the research that had been carried out on the impact. It gave birth then to a national policy to fully promote collectives' forest reform and introduce sustainable forest management. Subsequently, in 2010 an Asia Regional Conference on tenure reforms took place in September facilitated by Peking University under contract with RRI. Here 16 different countries took part as well as different sectors in China and local foresters and farmers. This conference brought many forest professionals from the region to China to learn about forest tenure reform there. The 2010 conference presented and highlighted a number of issues from the region and gave forest administrations of various countries a chance to interact and learn together. It also gave the State Forestry Administration of China encouragement that the China forest reform could inspire other countries.

The conference also gave room to recognize the gaps in the Chinese reform. These relate to the need for setting up mechanisms for forest grievance redress, mainstreaming gender and clarification of a number of legal frameworks. One incomplete legal framework relates to the government's attempts at forest conservation by zoning forests as conservation forests combined with a logging ban. Around 2-3 million hectare of the collectives' forests were zoned as protected forest ecosystems.[110] Here revenue from timber could no longer be generated by farmers, while the environment would be improved. To cater to this perceived loss by farmers, the government introduced a forest ecosystem compensation payment, a kind of PES for lost opportunities. This scheme is not yet fully implemented and many farmers have not been paid. In some conservation forest areas more than 80 percent of zoned conservation forest is found inside the collectives' forest areas. This has created conflicts and resentment.

Besides the RRI sponsored conferences a number of studies carried out by Partners and Collaborators have been funded by RRI. One such study demonstrated that the spread of the individual household tenure modality correlated with areas where forestry makes up *less* of local government revenue, while institutionalizing village communal tenure modalities (called cluster forestry) were more likely to occur where there was higher social capital and higher revenue from forestry, e.g. among ethnic minority areas in Yunnan. It is a noteworthy finding that "high rates of village revenue from forest tended to decrease chances for individualized tenure and increase the likelihood of the village (cluster) type".[111] In line with this finding an ICRAF study analyzed how in areas where collectives' forests have been allocated to individual households, the costs and complexity of both managing forests and regulating forestry were likely to increase as average size of plots decreases and economies of scale in management are lost.

As said, a number of problems were identified through the studies such as the lack of grievance and redress mechanisms and the way some community

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[110] A number of provinces decided to include the collectives' forest areas in the conservation and logging ban areas in order to obtain more funding from the central government.
[111] Jintao Xu, Andy White and Uma Lele, China's Forest Tenure Reforms Impacts and implications for choice, conservation, and climate change. © 2010 Rights and Resources Initiative

decisions were influenced by local government bodies. Thus, with market forces gaining strength there was a risk that powerful actors at local level would control land allocations for own benefits. Also there was a highly variable community participation in decision making. In some areas of Yunnan, for instance, village choices were controlled by township governments and there was lack of clarity and no transparency in the roles and responsibilities of the village Party Secretary, Village Committee Director, and local government agencies. Corrupt practices were also revealed in an RRI funded study by the China chapter of the Rural Development Institute (RDI) which undertook a major study of the Swedish-Finnish timber firm Stora Enso. RDI had observed irregularities already back in 2006. The study conducted 2009-2010 by RDI revealed irregularities due to middlemen's influence which were not controlled by Stora Enso. This created a shady image internationally of a company that subscribes to corporate social responsibility seeking FSC certification of its work[112]. The study showed how individualization of forestland rights to be implemented by intermediary government bodies can provide foreign companies opportunities to invest in China's forestlands. This constitutes a potential for great social harm if such investments are not implemented with the highest concern for legal and social standards.[113]

In fact, household land rights may by law be transferred to an outside entity only if the transfer is voluntary and with compensation and as a result of non-compulsory consultation and negotiation. If still under collectives' management, rights to land can only be acquired by an entity outside of the village if (1) the land is not suitable for household management; (2) the transfer terms are reached through bidding, an auction, or public negotiation process; (3) public notice is given to the members of the collective in advance of the transaction; and (4) the transaction is approved by two thirds of the villagers and the township government. The results of the study made Enso change its ways in China, no longer acquiring land, but buying timber directly from farmers instead (Li Ping personal communication).

Studies by the RRI partner, ICRAF, in the Southwest have had less international acclamation but are equally important to show that in order to better understand and provide policy guidance on the ongoing implementation of collectives' forest tenure reforms, the government should rely on lessons learnt from case studies by academia, government agencies and research institutes. The research under ICRAF concluded that realizing the goals of forest tenure reform in Southwest China the government needs to adhere to and increase extensive community participation in all stages of the tenure allocation decision-making process; show respect for customary community tenure arrangements, especially among

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[112] Li Ping and Robin Nielsen A *Case Study on Large-Scale Forestland Acquisition in China. The Stora Enso Plantation Project in Hepu County, Guangxi Province* RDI and RRI 2010

[113] Stora Enso has commenced acquiring large areas of collectives' land deceiving or threatening farmers into transfer deals. Stora Enso's dependence on government power took place under the guise of middlemen to acquire collective forestland rights. With headquarters in Hepu County, the Chinese Beihai Forestry Investment Company was established in 2006 by the Beihai Municipal Government solely for the purpose of obtaining rights to forestland land that would then be transferred to Stora Enso. In the single middleman transactions, BHC leases land from a collective's administrative body. BHC then assigns the leased-in land rights to Stora Enso

minority ethnic groups; ensure integration with previous policy provisions on forest tenure; support increased participation of key government staff in the reform process; and give attention to timing and careful management of the tenure transfer process.

It also called special attention to the fact that forest areas that are rich in natural resources are often in low-income areas dominated by ethnic minorities. Because of the socio-economic situation in these areas, forestry resources are of greater importance to these communities than in most other areas and because forests are embedded into the belief systems forests have greater cultural and spiritual significance to many communities in this region relative to the rest of the country. Southwest China has one of the highest proportions of conservation forests and areas are subject to the national logging ban. Government compensation to communities affected by the ban has been low or nonexistent since its introduction and economic costs of conservation have been borne by the local communities, and not the government. The issue of compensation is an area that Landesa is currently researching.

RRI Objectives, Outcomes and Strategic Outcomes – China

China is an RRI Tier 1 country. The objectives of the RRI's work through Partners and Collaborators are embedded in Annual Work Plans. RRI *Strategic* Outcomes for China 2011- 2012[114] comprise the formulation of a new Forest Law, reform of supplementary forest regulatory policies and laws, expansion of reform measures to address state forest, ensuring rights of vulnerable communities including ethnic minorities, improvement of (fairness of) mechanisms of regulatory takings, enhancing viability of SME, and disseminating knowledge about China forest tenure reform in other countries in the region and raising awareness with international donors and development community.

2011 Outcomes	2012 Strategic Outcomes
Support legal reforms through analysis, draft legal text and initiation of dialogue · Development of alternative models of dispute resolution mechanisms helps provide legal redress to local forest-owners · The **gender** dimensions of forest tenure regimes in China is examined. · Options available for reform of state forest areas in different parts of China are identified · Outcomes from experiments with logging quota alternatives in **ethnic minority areas** are analyzed.	Support creation of new Forest Law and other legal reform · Reform state forest areas · Advance pro-poor reforms and ensure rights of vulnerable and ethnic minority communities · Establish reform of supplementary forest regulatory policies and laws · Improve system of regulatory takings · Enhance viability of small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) · Disseminate knowledge about China's forest tenure and regulatory reforms to other countries,

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[114] See RRI Asia: 2011-2012 Work-Plan Summary

· Forest tenure and regulatory reform in **ethnic minority areas** is documented and examined. · Communities' interpretations of forest policy and legal/regulatory structures within **ethnic minority areas** is examined to inform negotiating future reforms · The full range of benefits from collective forest reform in **ethnic minority areas** is documented and compared with non-minority areas	international donors, and the development community

It is noted among the Outcomes for 2011 **ethnic minorities** (and gender) feature strongly, although less so in the Strategic Outcomes. An assessment of the RRG contracts and funding for PKU, RDI and ICRAF for their work in 2011 includes studies on benefits for poor women, community perspectives on policy reforms within Collective Forests, benefits from Collective Forest Reform in Yunnan, and logging quota experiments in Yunnan.

Although ethnic minority outcomes are not mentioned as such, these studies address some of the key issues in ethnic minority areas. This is discussed further below.

RRI Partners and Collaborators in China, their tasks and RRI budget support

RRI Partners in China are Forest Trends and ICRAF as well as RECOFTC at regional level. RRI Collaborators are the State Forestry Administration (SFA), the Peking University (PKU), the Rural Development Institute (RDI or Landesa), IUCN-China, the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, the Yunnan Agricultural University, and through ICRAF the Chinese Academy of Sciences. These agencies receive RRG funding some years, and not in other years. Sometimes there are in work plans but not in budgets and vice versa. The Chinese Academy of Science is an indirect collaborator according to 2011 Budget, but it does not appear in the Work Plan for 2011-12, while IUCN is collaborator according to the same Work Plan, but not found in the budget.

RRG decides on the funding of Partners and Collaborators in China based on an annual planning process where Partners participate. In 2009 the Forest and Peoples Program (FPP) received some funding together with PKU but FPP not since. FPP is a partner in the coalition, but not really seen as a partner in China. At the same time it is an organization which itself has 41 own partners listed, the RRI one among them. RECOTFC is a partner in the region and seen as a partner for the initiatives in China as well. However, the MTE interview with RECOFTC indicated that RECOFTC does very little in China and *there is no mention of RECOFTC in the 2011 China budget or of China for RECOFTC in the RRI 2011 Regional budget*.

Forest Trends has been *the* organization that initially worked with the State Forest Administration on Forest Tenure Reform since start of the 2000s. It worked through a staff of Forest Trends China, who is now with RRI as director (Andy White). Thus, to the State Forest Administration in China "RRI" often means "Andy White". It was clear in the interview with SFA that a special relationship has been established long ago that benefits RRI's high status in the eyes of the SFA. The SFA is considered an RRI collaborator, but it has never been funded by RRG directly, but indirectly through the major important conferences held in China.

Comparing China budget allocations 2008-2011 it seems that RDI, a collaborator, received almost 300,000 over the four year period 2008-2011, a good deal more than others. The RDI (now renamed Landesa), which is a Seattle based organization with a China branch has received the main share of funds over the four year period. It may be because RDI has an excellent Chinese lawyer, Li Ping who, besides writing in Chinese and English, did the study on Stora Enso as well as a number of other studies of good quality. RDI has good relations to the State Forestry Administration. For some studies the RDI contributes own funding. The Forest Trends that is an RRI partner received 100,000 USD in 2008 but almost nothing since. Forest Trends is not mentioned in any of the country initiatives for Asia in 2011. ICRAF, a partner, got nothing in 2008, but 77,000 USD in 2009, 20,000 in 2010 and 30,000 in 2011. PKU, an important collaborator, got 40,000 in 2008, a bit in 2009 to share with RECOFTC, and in 2010 a tiny bit to share with ICRAF, and nothing for PKU in the 2011 regular budget. However, a separate contract (81.000 USD) with PKU was entered to organize the Sep 2010 international conference and for 2011 the PKU with the esteemed researcher Xu Jintao received funds in the form of a Strategic Response Mechanism (SRM) of 48,723 USD for *Second Round of Survey and Analyses on China's Collective Forest Tenure Reform October 2010 – March 2011.* It is not clear why this second round of survey is a "strategic response". It is clearly a continuation of work previously funded under the ordinary funding mechanisms.

It is noted that in the first couple of years of the period 2008-2011, the contract holders are listed alone and individually in budgets. From 2010 the budget plans show one main contract holder as well as in brackets other Partners and Collaborators for the task at hand. It seems these other agencies are mentioned in the budget line in order mentally to forge or construe a warranted relationship among Partners and Collaborators operating in the country thus indirectly pledging a synergy. The contracts proper, though, are only with one organization and the contracts as such do not – in contrast to work plans – mention the names of others and the synergies with other agencies in the 'scope of work' outlined in contract. Thus, the RDI project of 50.000 USD for the Legal Education Centre (LEAC) in Chongqing signed in November 2010 for 2011 mentions RECOFTC in brackets in the China Work Plan as the agency working in synergy with RDI, but the contract proper with RDI does not mention RECOFTC and seemingly RECOFTC is not involved in the support to the LEAC in Chongqing. This underlines the observation by MTE that there is little mutual in-country

interaction among Partners and Collaborators in China. Putting the organizations together in the Work Plan is not enough to forge this interaction.

It is noted too that **ethnic minorities/indigenous peoples** feature high the RRI Progress Report 2010, which highlights the international "subtle shift in power in favor of communities and Indigenous Peoples (IPs), whether in the form of protest or constructive engagement in global governance, is due to a convergence of forces: growing pressures on Indigenous Peoples and community lands and forests by outsiders". However, as mentioned above there is no funding for this work. As noted a variety of activities related to minority areas have been funded, but the budget line for 2011 termed "Resistance, resilience and reconstruction of forest tenure in ethnic minority areas of Southwest China in response to collective forest reform" *has not been given a direct funding and awaits possible outside resources*. So presumably it will not be carried out. *And the Outcomes will be diminished.*

Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact

The MTE team interviewed Collaborators and Partners during a three day visit to Beijing by end April 2011 and later in Washington DC. The effectiveness, efficiency and impact assessment by Partners and Collaborators (naturally) differs as to their own mandate and who they are. The national State Forestry Administration (a collaborator) is primarily concerned about issues that pertain to the nation of China as such, also in the eyes of the world, while the international partner NGOs are equally focused on RRI's impact on the global debate plus of course also on what happens at policy level in the country where they work. In China Partners also have their own programs, which ideally would match the RRI objectives. However for own programs not funded by RRG the concerned agencies will focus on their own mandate. These organizations have their own constituency, funders and local Partners. To them the RRI is a funder *and* an important and indispensable partner to operate at the policy level, where they themselves alone would have problems making a dent.

All Partners and Collaborators believe that RRI/RRG is able to work at a higher policy level to feed that level with the results of studies in a manner that is conducive to national policy change and therefore it is indispensable to other Partners in the country. RRI has been instrumental in sponsoring influential studies and influential international conferences regularly with the specific goal to present and discuss results of studies undertaken by RRI-supported Chinese academics and government officers and to engage forestry officials from provinces and neighboring countries in the same conferences. In this way Chinese academics have become positively involved in the political process of forest tenure reform, they have been accepted by SFA and SFA has been able to shine as a progressive administration to the neighboring countries.

The RRI has progressed towards its stated <u>objective</u> as the 'sustainability of forest management has increased' by SFA pushing for further reforms and consolidating existing results. While the objective's results primarily cover the collectives' forests, several RRI-funded initiatives by Xu Jintao of PKU have

focused on state forests.   Collectives' forests only make up a bit more than half of China's forests so forest reform of state forests still remains. In forest tenure reform for the collectives' forests there are still gaps in implementation at local level due to corruption, lack of grievance mechanisms, possible disadvantages to women, plus a systemic lack of compensation to households whose forests have been gazetted as eco-system forests. Thus, there is still some way to go until full sustainability at local level is ensured, but it has *increased*. The forest tenure reform is the work of the SFA. No one else can do it. Therefore, so long as SFA publicly praises RRI for its support, and so long the SFA moves in the right direction, the support by RRI has created very important sustainable results at policy level.

The "improved livelihood" aspect of forest tenure reform has been documented in studies (not necessarily funded by RRI) how the income of households has increased, but this is an indirect result of the RRI support to the policy level. RRI has not supported any forest development projects targeting some particular rural areas and households.

The specific objectives of having "strengthened policies and legal and institutional frameworks for the reform of forest tenure in China's collective forests and shared knowledge and experiences on forest tenure reform within China and with other countries, and regular information exchange and networking on forest tenure reform within China and with other countries" has been accomplished successfully. Shared knowledge and experience can be gleaned from the RRI web page, where studies are posted regularly, and the international conferences and the SFA participation in Mega Florestais have created a valuable exchange among forest administrations in Asia and the world. The SFA may not have been able to move the tenure reform forward as unwaveringly as it did if no such highly visible interactive conferences had been held.

As stated the role and function of RRI differs according to the specific mandate of pertinent partner institutions and Collaborators, and therefore the views of these organizations also differ as they would emphasize different aspects that are of importance to them. The specific views of the SFA are rendered below and a summary of Partners' and Collaborators' assessment of effectiveness, efficiency and impact is subsequently provided.

Views of the State Forestry Administration (SFA)

SFA highly appreciates RRI for a number of reasons: the long history of the relationship through its origin in its fruitful relationship with Forest Trends back ten years ago through Andy White, then with FT, now with RRI, and later after establishment of RRI the international China conferences that have had high visibility. The conferences allowed China to show to the world or to the region its accomplishments and the conferences allowed Chinese academics/researcher analysts to come forward with their findings presented in a way compatible with Chinese appropriate fashion of respect combined with a call for changes. RRI has given space effectively and efficiently for these different forces to come

together, allowing Chinese leadership in State Forestry Administration to listen to Peking University academics of high standing as well as the other presentations by Collaborators, Partners and provinces.

The appreciation of RRI by SFA meant the MTE team was very well received. Mr. Huang Jianxing who was instrumental in Fujian's forest administration in 2000 is now Deputy Head of the Leading Group of Forest Tenure Reform in the SFA, Beijing. He gave a presentation of the history of forestry reform in China to the MTE expressing his special (*guanxi)* relationship with Andy White saying 'Andy White' half the times he meant RRI. [115] Mr. Huang Jianxing said back in time there was no clear idea in the central government that this reform was possible, but Fujian led the way applying four principles:
- Clarify ownership
- Establish management rights
- Allocate disposal rights of products
- Ensure rights of famers to get an income

RRI in the eyes of SFA has helped to make the reform a scientific one, "so we shall not make mistakes". RRI has been helpful with building confidence and direction. In discussion of the four principles they also had opportunity with RRI support to learn from Nepal, but when Nepal presented community forestry in a conference the Chinese wondered about clarity of ownership "the Chinese thought it unclear as no ownership of forest was established". This view may be caused by a perception that nowadays ownership must be private to be successful.

SFA implied that it had met many international organizations, but RRI is "the best as it combines theory and practice and focus to disseminate knowledge. They don't draw any conclusions before field visit which is good and they are keen to disseminate knowledge and invite colleagues to come along." Huang said he discussed with Mme Zhang Lei, the head of tenure reform department the night before the MTE meeting to request the MTE team to ask the RRI to come and do an evaluation of the forest tenure reform in China to evaluate what has happened over the last 6 years. They want (international) experts to come and would cover some of the costs. This is by MTE seen as a strong acknowledgement of RRI's role in China at the level of SFA. Ms Li made the point that when compared to WWF, the RRI is young in China but did have more impact and was very effective. The SFA found the informal get together of Mega Florestais foresters to be very good for an exchange of lessons learnt. The Mega Florestais meeting agenda (*Forest Governance in Transition*) during the September 2010 meeting in Fujian shows an inter-active agenda between high-level government forestry staff of China, US Forest Service, Brazil, Canada,

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[115] The persons met in SFA were
Mr Huang Jianxing, Deputy Head of the Leading Group of Forest Tenure Reform of the SFA
Ms Li Shuxin, Policy Division Chief
Mr Li Jinru, Dep DG, Department of Rural Forestry Reform
Ms Xing Hong, Administrative Division Chief, Dept of Rural Forestry Reform and Development
Mr Guo YuFu, Division Chief, International Cooperation Centre
Mr Huang Dong, Division Chief, Department of Rural Forestry Reform

Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo and Indonesia discussing key issues, challenges and opportunities for forest agencies.

In the future the SFA wishes for more profound (scientific) research as follow up on reforms, in particular they would appreciate research on establishment of cooperatives to service the forest owning households. SFA wishes to have research on forest protection, tenure sustainability, forest owner /cooperative and what role government should play, and compensation for ecological benefits (PES).

With the SFA being the main player in forest tenure reform in China **it must be concluded that RRI has had a high impact on promoting and supporting forest tenure reform** by *facilitating* and creating the frameworks at the right time where debate and learning could take place preparing the ground for further policy and implementation measures by the SFA.

While SFA is outward looking when inviting other countries to China, its focus is clearly China and its own work. It will read the RRI sponsored studies in China, which laudably are translated into Chinese if first written in English. The SFA's own internal distribution of studies down to provinces, though, is not clear. The MTE team asked SFA about the role of publications, but no real reply came forward. There seems in the eyes of the MTE to be a need for RRI to find a way to strengthen communication and dissemination of study results to a wider audience in provinces.

Asked about RRI country program planning, the SFA said attending a planning meeting is not enough. All research must be connected to practical problems. They want joint research activities with RRI and want to establish a mechanism "SFA-RRI" (only these two) for activities to be undertaken jointly: study tours to other countries to see cooperatives as service providers for forest farmers, going to Japan or to Finland.

Views of Partners and Collaborators

Partners and Collaborators have participated over the years since 2006 in the RRI work in China. They have received dissimilar amounts of funding from the RRG and obviously their ability to talk about results of the work funded by RRG differs. Some Partners and Collaborators have Chinese staff that is clearly highly tuned in to the needs for policy changes in China and RRI's access to the policy level through good relations with SFA is indispensable for Partners and Collaborators.

The highest value, besides own studies funded by RRG, accrues in the eyes of Collaborators and Partners to the policy impact RRI has had, in particular through the international conferences it has sponsored, because these conferences provide a forum for the Partners, Collaborators, government, regional institutions, regional governments and even global Partners to present results of studies, meet and discuss. It is clear to Partners and Collaborators that RRI is not involved in development work but policy work. Development is done

by Partners and they will continue to do what they are already doing. They do need RRI to be the global voice that is stronger than any voice they can have themselves and they find that RRG has been effective and efficient in this endeavor. But they would like to sustain and increase this impact by having a physical RRG/RRI presence in the country beyond themselves.

Partners and Collaborators expressed concern for the lack of effectiveness of in country Partners' and Collaborators' collaboration. RRI/RRG has not been effective in making Partners and Collaborators work together on China issues *on a day to day basis*. There are no real joint contracts with RRG and Partners and Collaborators cannot plan to do things together as funding is uncertain, both timing and amount. There is need of continuity to be fully effective. The limit of funding to one year is too short. Activities are meant to be done in partnership but it's difficult in practice.   Studies and writing papers can be done in partnership, but not the rest it was found. However, there is a wish for more collaboration and a recommendation from all Partners and Collaborators including SFA is that <u>RRI/RRG needs to be more visible on the ground and have a presence in China</u>, meaning to have higher RRG presence to forge the warranted in country collaboration within the coalition itself *and* have increased policy level impact daily. Partners and Collaborators have more interaction with RRG in Washington than with each other. A partner's relationship is seen as a one to one relationship with RRG rather than with fellow Partners in the same country. An RRG representative presence would in the eyes of Partners increase impact at policy level. It is important for the nurturing of access to forest policy makers in China and to improve livelihoods of poor farmers.

Partners and Collaborators are aware of the RRI / RRG global programs but the RRG effectiveness in linking the global programs to the local in-country programs is not clear. Some of the local Collaborators tend to see RRI /RRG as a funding agency and have no capacity in their day to day work to analyze and prepare strategic country, regional or global objectives before they ask for funding.

In terms of communication the Partners and Collaborators feel that work that is done by them is primarily owned by them, but they rely on RRI to disseminate the results on its web pages. Partners and Collaborators remarked, though, that this dissemination is not effective in reaching, for instance, Chinese provinces and it is thought that if physically present RRG representative could communicate and improve collaboration among the Partners and Collaborators and with the provinces rather than rely on SFA passing the information down the system. RRI/RRG needs to pay more attention to communication but RRG still does not take this seriously enough.

Work Plans show that RRI/RRG has been efficient in mapping the gaps in the Chinese forest tenure reform and the 2011 Outcomes table presents a list with a number of them. But it cannot yet be concluded by the MTE, though, that RRI/RRG is efficient in addressing all of the gaps. The attention to ethnic minorities/indigenous peoples which looms large in RRI progress report has increased in 2011 but in the view of the MTE not yet adequately addressed .

Some Partners and Collaborators think that the RRI agenda should be more systematic and not only cover mainstream issues. If systematic, it could cover the whole of China, and also put a stronger focus on state forest areas because it was an observation that right now there was a unique situation of forest reform ongoing.

All Partners emphasized that it was difficult to work with one-year funding where funding came late and volume of funding not that big. Sustainability and consolidation were at risk. All wanted multi-year funding.[116] The annual planning sessions also seem to be less effective in the partners' and Collaborators' eyes. Planning is too much a straitjacket and RRI does not seem to have ability to change plans.

Other agencies working on the same issues outside RRI

Looking at forest tenure reform in China the MTE team came across work by other agencies which it thinks should feature as explicit elements of RRG's strategic thinking so that RRI has a stronger programmatic approach to its work in a country. While this is not a call for implementing the Paris Declaration, RRI should, when preparing work plans, pay attention to other initiatives in China and seek synergy. For instance, initiatives by PROFOR of World Bank and perhaps FAO are examples. Undoubtedly, the RRI is aware of these initiatives and interact with the professionals in these institutions but the options for synergies are not mentioned in RRI planning documents.

PROFOR of WB is "supporting the analysis of information collected in two large-scale surveys conducted in 2006-2007 and 2011". This may be continuation of the same survey RRI joined in 2006-2007, *but this 2011 survey is not mentioned by RRI unless it is the SRM funding of PKU which may also receives WB funds*. But the SRM does not mention collaboration with WB.

Results from the PROFOR analysis will be available on the website (**http://www.profor.info/profor/knowledge/impacts-china%E2%80%99s-forest-tenure-reform-implications-policy-makers**) and disseminated via working papers, workshop and conference presentations, and a seminar with policy makers in Beijing. Actor: World Bank's Research Department (Agriculture & Rural Development), under the auspices of the Department of Rural Forest Reform at the State Forestry Administration in China. With PROFOR support, the World Bank's East Asia and Pacific staff will help prepare a roadmap for policy and institutional reforms in key state forest management areas in Northeast China, to promote the transformation of practices toward economic viability, sustainable forest resource management, and local livelihood security.

This WB activity will include:

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[116] In the RRI document "Strategy Development and Planning Process", September 2008, the prescriptions are that global work plans are informed in Nov-Dec by regional plans (Aug-Oct). This global work plan and budget is to be circulated to all Partners prior to the RRI Governance Meetings in January. All work plans are to have a one-year lifespan. Activities are to be prioritized by "activities already identified by RRI as strategic" "that reflect value-added and synergistic principles of RRI collaboration, and involve more than one RRI Partner".

- a review of state forest management reforms in other countries -- including in Russia and Eastern Europe, as captured in the PROFOR publication *Forest Institutions in Transition*
- a historical review of state forest management reforms in the Northeast
- an in-depth analysis of the existing survey data on forest resources and socio-economic conditions
- a critical review of existing pilot reform sites
- The formulation of a practical plan for the transformation of state forest areas into a system of economically viable state and private entities, based on sustainable forest management and clear separation of public and private functions
- The study will coincide with the Government's internal evaluation of the first phase of the Natural Forests Protection Program (1998-2010) and the formulation of the program's second phase.

The MTE finds that RRI should reflect the activities of non partners and non Collaborators in its Work Plan and Progress Report to highlight the synergies warranted.

Besides PROFOR there is also FAO

FAO implements an initiative *Supporting Policy, Legal and Institutional Frameworks for the Reform of Forest Tenure in China's Collective Forests and Promoting Knowledge Exchange* that is implemented by FAO and SFA with financial support from EU.

Annex 5: Latin America Regional and Mexico Report
LATIN AMERICA REGION
MEXICO GLOBAL ACTION
Jorge Recharte

Context (relevance)

Latin America (LA) regional level actions involve stakeholders in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Nicaragua. These are under the responsibility of RRI's Partners IC, Forest Trends, IUCN, ACICAFOC and PRISMA. Interviews covered only IC staff. IC has primary responsibility for regional work in Latin America. IC's involvement in RRI was initiated in the IC Switzerland office that has a team with expertise in natural resources and extensive community forestry experience in Africa. Being a large organization in-country staff has only partial clarity about the overall projections of the agency in terms of future programs and actions in community forestry.(Probably due to the fact that mainly one person, who is a consultant is the principal participant in the RRI related work.

IC's original contribution to RRI was a study on forestry governance in Mali, Nepal and Bolivia in 2009. Prior to IC's participation in RRI the organization had developed in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia community forestry programs, like ECOBONA or PROFAFOR, with a geographic focus on mountain areas and therefore dealing on issues quite different from those in the Amazon. IC values highly RRI's commitment to learning and its investments in strategic studies to influence policies. Through involvement in RRI, IC is gaining the knowledge necessary to build a larger and long term program which design is in fact included in its contracts with RRI.

RRI's baseline analysis of LA notes on the one hand, as a positive trend, unique advances and in tenure reforms, the emergence of indigenous social movements and the affirmation of their rights in general. Yet, on the other hand, it also points to the incompleteness of reforms, to forestry norms discriminating against community forest management or against small and medium size enterprises, and to the overlapping and conflicting claims of powerful extractive industries. All these factors interact to produce a landscape of conflicts, corruption and rural poverty.

The original 2012 outcome of the LA component points to obtain secure community land rights and to deepened these where their recognition is not complete and also protecting right-holders from rollback on reforms. The LA region outcome has a subsequent version that more specifically indicated that 'key indigenous, peasants, traditional communities and other forest dwellers have strengthen their capacity to administer, control and defend their territory'.

The strategy at the level of analysis is to link 'work within country initiatives and regional dialogue' in order to strengthen a community of practice that can influence tenure policies in favor of forest dwellers.

More specifically, capacity building is achieved through a strategy that involves connecting in dialogue national Collaborators and local leaders of grassroots organizations from different ethnic backgrounds an geographies; developing through this learning process narratives on governance of indigenous territories and community forestry; building mechanisms that facilitate access to information; and supporting the capacity of indigenous organizations to communicate their messages to the local and beyond local societies.

In response to this context, the RRI is a model of intervention in which strategic analysis is built up from input obtained from countries and local actors and then the results applied to reinforce policy incidence within countries to secure tenure.

The relevance of regional activities to Collaborators is not totally clear to the extent that they were very unevenly aware of the scope of regional work, some having no information (Peru Collaborators) a few others some knowledge (Bolivia Collaborators). A recent, early June 2011, meeting of Collaborators in Bogota to develop a governance and territory platform has strengthened linkages between regional and national actions and made more clear to them the big picture of RRI.

Collaborators who are more fluent in RRI's regional activities (CEJIS or IPHAE) point to specific actions that should be developed at the regional level more vigorously. Examples included promoting social business responsibility in timber and non timber products (CEJIS), or building an alternative geopolitical vision for the Amazon, a vision that integrates the macro-economic need of the Bolivian economy for gas and oil revenue, to provide basic public services to indigenous peoples, and at the same time defends the strategic importance of protecting forests for climate and food security of Bolivians. **As note below these are huge tasks that appear to be unrealistic in scope given the resources available to the coalition.**

Efficiency (outcomes)

The several regional workshops conveyed by RRI have exposed the immense pressure that indigenous groups feel from external groups that propose and impose management (e.g. REDD) or conservation schemes (e.g. Protected Areas) that are foreign to local organizations. They note that there is need, demand and interest among stakeholders for information on land tenure, governance and indigenous territories. **These issues represent a response to a strongly felt need by the local people involved. RRI in many respects is filling a very important niche in Latin America that almost no one else is responding to in the same way and scale as RRI.**

Based on its institutional learning implementing regional actions in the LA region, IC is now poised and committed to design and seek funding for a larger program in support of governance of indigenous territories and social communication within the RRI framework. **This kind of intermediate impact in the coalition, which is in itself a very important instrument to advance land tenure rights**

in the Amazon region in a sustainable way, should be captured as more realistic indicators of progress in the time period of the current framework agreement. This is an important institutional impact of RRI because it is helping a major organization working in LA translate its commitment onto more comprehensive actions in favor of forest tenure and governance issues.

Communicating tenure and rights issues directly to local communities (and not only the leadership) and increasing the capacities of forest people and their leaderships for action will eventually influence tenure policies in countries and the region. However, as designed in the regional 2011 work plan the strategy must also include connecting forest people's leadership, grass roots groups and communities that have been trained or informed back to indigenous representations (like COICA which is already collaborating with the initiative) or regional entities like the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) among others so that actual policies can be influenced. The 2011work plan calls for exploring which of these regional entities to engage in order to advance RRI's mission. This avenue is clearly complex and it seems that it would require a special strategy, new Collaborators and additional resources to implement it.

Collaborators in Bolivia referred to the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) as a most relevant regional agency because Brazil is a member and it is the policies and positions of this country that will have major weight in how the geopolitics of the Amazon might be in the end defined. The capacity of RRG to access and create incidence with global organizations like this one or the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), the World Bank, government of Norway, FAO and others that could have an influence in Brazil and other UNASUR countries was recognized and demanded.

In spite of the relevance perceived of regional work, it was difficult for IC staff and also Collaborators in Bolivia and Peru interviewed, at least at this point of the process, to point precisely to how regional actions that have brought together national actors are having concrete and direct impacts or consequences in country or regional policies. Impacts on poverty alleviation attributable to RRI actions cannot be identified yet and it is made clear by people interviewed that that level of impact required of more intense incidence with regional initiatives (e.g UNASUR), more resources and longer periods of time.**

Effectiveness (Organizational Management)

National and global activities of RRI are targeting a diversity of governments stakeholders, agencies, legislatures and networks. **The portion of the strategy that calls for articulation of national to regional and these to global studies and to policy incidence is very dependent on the role of RRG as the entity that connects the parts.** The connection of the parts happens through dissemination of information (e.g. RRI Newsletter) but this is not enough to help the coalition mature. Some exercises, such as the mapping of actors in the region or diagnostics, have been completed in order to design a regional strategy

but more analysis is needed. Regional planning is usually focused on the region without enough space to discuss connection to global level actions or institutional aspects of the coalition.

Horizontal cooperation among Partners and Collaborators is also reduced by the fact that there are technical or ideological issues that make cooperation within the group uneven. For instance IC was apparently more able to coordinate actions with Forest Trends, and ACICAFOC with PRISMA. IC indicates that they know little of the Central America experience and this is a gap that needs to be filled. **The result is a large number of actions that are in themselves relevant, yet perceived by Collaborators/Partners as only partially connected. Most people interviewed indicated in different ways that the full picture of how the many RRI actions connect can be only grasped by RRG.**

Regional work conducted by IC is centered on indigenous grass roots organizations. RRI's annual planning frameworks that may be appropriate for policy incidence at the level of governments are not necessarily the most appropriate to plan for capacity building objectives of local groups. The specific strategy of work in LA is to build knowledge by and with forest peoples through participatory action research. This methodology is effective but yields best results in years. It is a slow process that needs longer time than the annual planning framework now used by RRI. **Regional workshops have helped stakeholders identified many ideas for action but these cannot be followed through with the current level of resources in the regional platform**. **Therefore the opportunity for impacts is lost, diluted or delayed. For instance there are no resources to follow through workshops and evaluate their impact.**

The experience of the IC team working at regional level is that its work should support, nurture and be nurtured by actions at the grass roots level and not only at the level of federations. **With quite small resources RRI is targeting very important and complex issues, helping ideas for action come to the foreground and by doing so it creates demands for information and fosters actions. It is assumed by the RRI model that the Partners and Collaborators will be able to respond to these demands of information and further action in a timely and proper manner. However, in fact, members of the coalition cannot do so because staff and other resources are limited. RRI is underestimating the time required by processes that go beyond the specific products that are delivered under contracts.** Each partner or collaborator has its own approaches and interests and will therefore not be able to respond to the needs of forest groups that participate in regional activities.

The suggestion of the partner is that the RRI should devote more attention and resources to study the institutional dimensions of the partnership, estimating the long term programmatic and financial implications of working with indigenous and other forest groups on tenure and rights issues. **It is necessary to have a strategy in place for the growth for the regional coalition.**

MEXICO

The work of RRI in Mexico builds on previous work of the World Bank Forestry Development Project (PROCYMAF) and support from other efforts such as the Ford Foundation, dedicated to support services for community forestry, improve conservation of forest resources, develop new timber and non timber products, and increase benefits to local communities. RRI is familiar with Mexico and is thus able to implement actions and connect Mexico to the RRI strategies in the region.

Mexico has some eighty years of experience consolidating peasant and indigenous tenure rights. More recently, Mexico has also been a pioneer in the region exploring payment for environmental services of forests and participating in the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) for REDD+ implementation. Leveraging on this experience RRI has defined Mexico as learning and networking country.

Since 2007, community forest leaders from Mexico participated in south-south exchanges with other South American leaders sharing their experience with government agencies and mechanisms of payment for environmental services. These actions also consolidated work in the Mesoamerican region although, the context of Mexico is unique because of its economic integration with the US and Canada. Mexico is thus different from Central America that has very limited resources and different to South America with abundant natural resources and pursuing extractive policies.

This case is an example of the high value placed by community forest organizations, like CCMSS, in the technical expertise and the broad regional and global perspectives that RRG brings to the country. RRG participated in discussions during the design of Mexico's National Forest Vision, a document which was presented to the President of the country in preparation for COP16/Cancun. RRI facilitated a joint Mexican government/World Bank presentation of the country experience in community forestry to the Nepali federation of local forestry associations, also in preparation for Cancun.

The Head of CONAFOR, the National Forestry Commission of Mexico, participated in *Megaflorestais* meetings, a highly valued mechanism as a place to obtain broad pictures of best practices in community forestry around the world. While Mexico has a long history of securing the forest tenure rights of communities, the experience of China and Brazil provided them with different scenarios and specific mechanisms to implement actions that increase benefits to local communities and are also proper responses to climate change. Although I explored the question, was unable to see how CONAFOR related to RRI actions in Mexico besides *Megaflorestais.*

RRI's collaborator in the preparation of the booklet "Sustainable Forest Management as A Strategy to Combat Climate Change" about the Mexican experience in community forestry used in the COP16 meetings was CCMSS (the Mexican Civil Society Council for Sustainable Agroforestry). This is a group of 16 NGOs (4 of them formal members). The network considers that the direct use of forests and creation of benefits is the most effective way to create the stimulus necessary to care for the resource. The network   is

101

RRI Mid-Term Evaluation: Final DRAFT September 2011   **The Mountain Institute**

dedicated to promoting this perspective among Mexican policy makers and forest actors in general. CCMSS' participation in the RRI is seen as valuable endorsement of their approach, perceiving during the interview that association with RRI was considered a very positive branding that gave visibility to their efforts.

The added value of RRI is perceived to be in the strategic analysis and information that can be then applied to shape issues and open long term processes by local actors. Referring to this study, the opinion of CCMSS is that it was positive to capture the state of the art of community forestry in Mexico; that the press exposure obtained was unique and this is key to move the community forestry agenda among decision makers [*'parece que los decisores solo entiende a periodicazos'*]. Yet, their opinion is that it is now necessary to analyze in more detail why, in spite of the positive conditions outlined in the paper, improvements in community forestry are so slow in Mexico. 'It is important to also understand the bad news of Mexico' and this requires further research an action.

Annex 6: Mali Country Report

RRI Mid Term Evaluation Mali Country report
Marlene Buchy

Introduction

This report is the result of a short evaluation carried out in Bamako between the 1st and 4th of June 2011 and is part a wider evaluation which included 5 other RRI countries; China and Nepal, Peru and Bolivia, and Cameroon. Thus this report can be a standalone case study but is part of a larger evaluation. The MTE was part of the RRI programme planning document.

This visit coincided with the workshop on 'Pratiques de formulation et d'utilsation des conventions locales au sahel' (practices for formulating and using Local Agreements in the Sahel) hosted Jointly by ICRAF and RRI. This was an opportunity to meet a number of actors as well as to observe first hand a 'typical' RRI event.

The RRI coalition in Mali is made up of 2 core Partners: IC-Sahel and ICRAF, and 2 Collaborators, IUCN and Sahel Eco. The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the relevance, performance, effectiveness and sustainability of the RRI enterprise at the national, regional and global level. This report focuses on the national level of the RRI coalition in Mali and is based on background material as well as 12 interviews with various coalition Partners and actors currently involved in capacity-building in the field of, and advocacy for, rights and resources in Mali and the Sahel Region.

The context

In Mali, the rights and resources issues are intertwined with colonial history and more recent policy changes such as decentralisation which was initiated in the early 1990s with the arrival of a new democratically elected government. The first texts of the decentralisation were voted for in 1993 and 1994 and the first new representatives were elected in 1999. The implementation of decentralisation has so far been a long and slow process with as yet only 15% of the budget being decentralised. At the administrative level the decentralisation resulted in new structures: 703 communes (each gathering a number of villages); 49 circles, made of a number of communes; 8 regions, and the district of Bamako. One of the causes of the slow implementation of decentralisation is the confusion about the *transfer des competences* or transfer of responsibility from the state to the communities; with the uncertainty of what is to be transferred besides budgets. In the context of forests, the forestry department is reluctant to transfer the rights to allow management and control, as forests are a source of regular income for the department (legally 25% of each forestry transaction is apportioned proportionally to the individual officers involved, whilst opportunities for illegal extortion are many). But also it is not clear whether local authorities will have the capacity to assume these new responsibilities and so more strategic thinking is needed to conceptualise how this transfer can actually happen. Also as Coulibaly

reminds us 'the role of territorial collectivities in the process of wealth creation at the local level is not clearly defined. For example, the commune is sometimes the investor, sometimes the contractor and often the procurement agency or even cumulates all these functions.. as far as land is concerned this leads to abuse by municipal teams in the allocation of farm and residential plots'. (2010:3).

These new administrative divisions create some confusion if not tensions, as in rural Sahel it is the village which is recognised by local people as the traditional entity managed by village elders controlling annual land allocation and resource use. Over centuries local communities have developed and managed complex resource systems, combining the needs and constraints of different livelihood systems such as sedentary agriculture, nomadic pastoralism, fisheries and forestry (Ba 2010). The multipurpose trees like the *Parkia* (producing shea butter) and the *Nere* have always been part of the agro-pastoral system and complex tenure rights systems have evolved over time. Traditionally in the Sahel village private property of land, in the European sense of the word, does not exist and all villagers have always had access to land, making 'landlessness' as understood in other parts of the world a very rare occurrence. However, most women depend on their husband to access land for cultivation and it is not uncommon for husbands to claim back for themselves fields after they have been managed and improved by their wives and re-allocate to their wives poorer plots. This maintains a level of insecurity for women and increases their vulnerability to abuse.

The Nouvelle Loi d'Orientation Agricole (new agriculture orientation law- LOA) , was enacted in 2006, and is considered a progressive law by many, though again slow to be implemented fully as many implementation decrees have yet to be written by the government. The preparation of the LOA was the result of a large consultation process amongst farmers and rural communities and many actors, who submitted proposals for the content of the new law. For example ICO, based on work in the region of Sikasso, made a submission. One of the outcomes of the Law is the setting up of the *Haut Conseil des collectivities* (HCC- a chamber made up of local elected representatives).Villages within a commune elect, out of a number of political lists, a council to oversee the commune affairs and the councillors subsequently elect a Maire and the deputies amongst themselves. A number of counsellors from each region will be selected to sit on the HCC. This council has some power to lobby the government and can be a strong ally of communities especially in the field of environment.

Colonisation, which considered most of the land empty based on a misunderstanding of local resource use systems, imposed State ownership over vast areas of land and especially forests transforming overnight users into trespassers. These new tenure rules considerably weakened the role of customary institutions in environmental management, and the forest law remained unchanged until the first revision of the Law in 1995. The new Forest Law from 2010 has tried to take into account decentralisation but it has many shortcomings: it does not incorporate much about the promotion of Local Conventions (see below) and it institutes heavy taxes on non-wood forest products which are essential sources of livelihood for the poor. However as in

most countries colonized by the French administration new laws are developed alongside of the colonial law, and rather than offering drastic new opportunities often create confusing contexts as contradictory rules and regulations are continually added on. This means that local people are often ignorant of the Law and are open to abuse by corrupt officials who themselves often do not know or understand the Law, creating endless conflicts and stress for local people who depend on access to the resource for survival. There are also issues linked to territorial boundaries between villages and between the new communes as well as confusion of roles between local elected representatives and administrative staff working at the local level (Coulibaly 2010).

Globalisation, with the commodification of land, and increased speculation is also adding stress to the system. Around Bamako large areas of land have already been bought in anticipation of increased price of land in the future by local wealthy speculators. International buyers are also entering the market, for example Libya which has recently acquired a 99 year land lease of 100000 ha in the rice production area of the Niger delta. As land is considered state land, local communities are powerless to protect what they see as theirs and more often than not land ownership is transferred without their knowledge.

In the meantime all these disruptions of local institutional arrangements together with increased population pressure and chronic poverty aggravate land and environmental degradation in a global context of climate change. For the last 15 years or so, there have been a number of attempts to engage communities in negotiating to find appropriate solutions. Today, with the decentralisation process, the Local Conventions (LC) aim through a multi-stakeholder negotiation process at the village or commune level to discuss/negotiate an agreement for the management of resources in a given area. These LC can cover the closure of a 4 ha woodlot for conservation, a 500 km transhumance corridor or all the natural resources of two communes together. These discussion/debate processes are long and complex but one of the major problems is that of legitimacy and rights as these LC do not have a clear legal status, essentially because of the land tenure issues . There is also as yet no clear legal procedure to recognise these LC by the authorities (such as the confusion of which authority, the prefect or the maire, has the responsibility or the legal authority to act). So the future of LC as a tool for community level management is closely linked to tenure issue and the clarification of rights and procedures. There have in the past been attempts to set up such conventions which were cancelled by the forest service (Benjaminsen 1998).

So in short the situation for RRI related work is challenging because of:
- The absence of clarity and understanding of the legal tenure system which is creating vulnerability for local populations with limited capacity and powers

- The lack of effective transfer of power from the government to local elected officials in forest resource management. Decentralisation in policy, but not in practice.

- The lack of legal recognition of Local Conventions which guarantee

community tenure rights.

Women's needs and rights have been largely ignored by the LOA. 'though Art 83 of the LOA makes provision for women, youth and vulnerable groups to be given priority for allocation of land in areas developed by the State there is still a need to lobby for an implementation of thelaw and even to build on this progressive law to ask for more ownership rights for women'

- The economic context is creating opportunities for land grabbing which will further destabilise fragile communities and ecosystems

- The LC, an opportunity for locally negotiated solutions, have so far no legal standing. The law on LC is under preparation and there will be an opportunity for civil society and various actors to make proposals regarding the content of the law

- The transfer of responsibility will be a major stake within the LC law, and thus need to be clear and made operational. This transfer can also happen through the adoption of implementation decrees of the transfer of forests to local authorities.

The Results

Is RRI work in Mali relevant?

The context analysis above highlights 3 broad areas in need of attention:
- Women, their roles and rights, and strategies to develop sustainable livelihoods

- The clarification of the legal framework and the need to include provisions for the protection of people rights in the law

- The institutionalisation of the transfer of competency to protect people's rights within the implementation process of the decentralisation through the formalisation of LC (which is also to a great extent part of the legal process)

For all the Partners interviewed, there is a consensus about where intervention is most needed: a) there still is a lot of ignorance and confusion about the decentralisation related issues and building up the capacity of actors is necessary and b) simultaneous advocacy at different levels is needed. There is a sense that though decentralisation is part of the official discourse in reality there are many blocks and resistance to change, especially amongst foresters. Given the power of foresters it is important and necessary to work with institutions and foresters and creating alliances with foresters is a must. But the blocks are also political and therefore intervening at the political level is equally important.
The approach adopted by the RRI coalition in Mali has been to identify the

issues and to roughly divide the remit of work focus amongst the Partners. In this approach each partner has become the lead in one area of activities and the others bring support as and when necessary.

IUCN in the RRI context has two poles of intervention:

- Gender: IUCN has commissioned a study to look into how the land law takes gender into account. IUCN is also a member of REFACOF which was created in Yaoundé in 2009 as one of the outcomes of the Tenure and Rights conference; IUCN works with national rural women's network FENAFER to influence the LOA and the national gender strategy

- Pastoralism and climate change: these are national and regional issues and valorising the contribution of pastoralists is timely and important. However the consideration of the rights of pastoralists in the legal framework is a challenge. IUCN is working at the landscape level (LLS: Landscape Livelihoods strategies) and this stage aims to demonstrate that communities can develop and use resources.

IC has chosen to focus on the CL and especially the transfer of competencies and the dialogue with national level authorities. IC had already worked on CL before collaborating with RRI and knew that at the field level the technicians (ie forestry staff) did not always play their role of technical advisers in the CL processes (ie they did not contribute to the discussions but then they were only too happy to crack down when farmers undertook illegal activities). IC's work was to focus on how to lift these blockages so the first activity was to organise a workshop on CL in 2009 in Sikasso. The outcome of this workshop was the decision to start lobbying the 'commissariat au developpement institutionel' (the state department responsible for overseeing laws preparation as well as all matters of administration) for the recognition of the CL in the texts. So in 2010 advocacy focused on the transfer of competency, which had started in all other Ministries except in the Ministry of Environment and Forests. IC realised that lobbying at the level of law making is tricky because lawmaking procedures follow a time table of their own which is not necessarily the timing planned within a project timeframe. So they changed their tack and started to focus on the *Haut Conseil* as the leverage for advocacy. The *Haut Conseil* has a legitimacy to ask questions about NRM issues and it is written in the law that the government has 2 weeks to reply to a request/question from the *Conseil*.

So for IC the strategy is to first develop the institutions and then support the implementation.

ICRAF works in general by focusing on improving the quality of plots by planting trees but what happens for example when farmers can't cut the trees? Understanding the legal constraints has become increasingly relevant for the scientific and technical work and thus ICRAF is focussing on preparing the contribution of the coalition to the preparatory process of the Law on CL. Through RRI, ICRAF has contributed to the preparation of the guide for the preparation of CL which will be published shortly. This will then quick-start the national consultation process for the preparation of the law. GIZ is also now

107

involved through the PACT project and though GIZ is not a RRI partner they do a lot of work with RRI.

Sahel Eco (SE) has its feet deeply rooted on the ground and for a long time the role of Sahel Eco (formerly SOS Sahel) has been to work on the rural trees (*l'arbrechampetre*) and to organise lobbying at the national level for the definition of the legal status of the trees in the fields. In Mali trees in the fields and in the forest are in practice considered by the state in the same way even though the law makes some distinctions. This official attitude is a disincentive for local people. The field is part of the private space and the law even states that when a field is left fallow for up to 10 years it remains a field and the forest department cannot manage it. So the aim is to prepare a law which will clarify these differences, and thus this is SE's main focus in the RRI collaboration.

The three aspects of clarifying the law, addressing women's interests and addressing the formalisation of the CL and the implementation of the transfer of responsibility as part of implementing decentralisation are all central issues in Mali at the moment. The success of the implementation of decentralisation – which potentially will have some positive outcomes for the livelihoods of millions of farmers, depends to a large extent on the outcome of current and future legal and advocacy work. There is therefore no doubt that the focus of RRI work in Mali is relevant to the context.

Is RRI work in Mali effective?

If there is no doubt that RRI work is necessary, the next question is whether RRI Mali is achieving what it sets itself out to do? In this section we consider some of the results identified by respondents during the interviews as well as consider whether the strategy followed by the coalition is the best way to be effective.
The work strategy of RRI Mali has been broadly focused on gathering some information through the documentation of small case studies, the organisation of multi-actor workshops and advocacy activities. The idea is that the information gathered feeds into the workshops to generate debates and discussions and that the workshops result in clear agendas for advocacy actions.

This strategy has been successfully followed, for example in the case of the work on gender led by IUCN. As a result of a gendered analysis of the Nouvelle LoiAgricole, which highlighted how much has been ignored, IUCN is lobbying for a formalisation of local practices and wants to negotiate with the state to introduce the idea of a land quota for women. This idea of the quota is a direct result of the workshop on tenure and gender organised by IUCN as lead partner in 2009. IUCN also hopes to work with the Federation Nationale de l'Association des Femmes Rurales (FENAFER, National Federation of the Associations of Rural Women) for lobbying the state. A training workshop in advocacy for these women is planned for June, so that rural women will increase their capacity to lobby at higher levels.

The same can be said about the *Cellule d'appui à la décentralisationet la déconcentration forestière* (support cell to forestry decentralisation) which is the

partly the result of lobbying by IC and RRI Partners. Though the idea of this cell emerged in 2008 it was only created in 2010 'on paper' and nothing was done for months to staff it. Then ministry staff were allocated but no building was found and so it took more than a year to be in place. IC's strategy has been to target the cell as one of the strategic entry points, and the first supportive activity was a training on decentralisation for the staff, since these highlevel bureaucrats did not fully understand the stakes of decentralisation and the transfer of competency. RRI/IC also supported the development of the tri annual plan to elaborate the vision of the transfer of competency for the cell. IC also pushed for the clarification and inclusion of a number of indicators in the vision to confirm the Ministry's endorsement of the vision. Initially it seems the cell Head did not want to hear about CL, but IC organised a field visit where some Prefects (these are high level bureaucrats - a legacy from colonisation) who had signed some of the CL highlighted how important and useful these CL are for decentralisation. This apparently convinced the Head of the cell who is now a supporter of the process of transfer of competency. This is a huge improvement because in Mali the pattern seems to be to develop Laws but never to think through their implementation. Resources are often not allocated but also there is no effort to develop a vision or understanding about what a new law or policy may mean. This reduces the scope of the law and slows down change.

ICRAF through RRI has contributed to the preparation of the guidelines for the preparation of CL which will be published shortly. This would then quick-start the consultation process for the preparation of the law. This work was also partly funded by GIZ which is not a partner but collaborates with the coalition.

At a different level the facilitation work promoted through different RRI related interventions also has results of a more process nature. For example, in Segou ICRAF has involved some forest department staff in the sensitisation/extension team of ICRAF staff and thus as the foresters have met the farmers who have planted some trees, they have informally agreed that when the time comes to cut the trees these will not need a permit, but simply will need to inform the office. This is seen as a positive result of the process, which facilitates the relationship between actors who did not previously have a dialogue . Of course this situation is not ideal, as when the foresters are transferred insecurity will return. However even though the formalisation of the legal framework is the priority, developing other ways of relating and collaboration between actors in the field is also a positive result. RRI is seen by many of the respondents as a force to create a space for exchange between actors who historically have been locked into dysfunctional relationships. Another such space is the creation of an agroforestry reflection group which meets 3 times per year to discuss agroforestry related issues and which was set up by SE. The group has met this year to define the vision and the mission of the group partly with RRI funding.

Strategically one of the RRI results is to bring some legitimacy to the work of the RRI Partners. This is particularly valid for Sahel Eco, a small NGO whose ideas were until recently just brushed away as 'SE's idea, SE's agenda and mandate'. Now, as part of a bigger coalition, SE's focus on trees in the private space has gradually come to be seen as a generic issue in Mali. As part of the coalition, but

also in collaboration with the *Réseau de la réussite* de la decentralisation (Network for the success of decentralisation) et du *Haut Conseil des collectivités locales,* the advocacy message has had more weight. One other concrete result is that SE has been able to liaise with one of the *Conseil* members who became a focal point for environmental issues which helped to create awareness amongst *Counseil* members in general. A number of councillors and elected representatives are now sensitised and have taken ownership of the issue.

But Partners are influenced by the coalition too. Respondents see that one of the advantages of RRI is to belong to a core group with Partners who each also have their own network which can then be accessed when needed. This also creates a strength for lobbying and adds to the legitimacy of these organisations working on sensitive issues. For example IC as a foreign NGO cannot hold the government to account; however through its partnership with the *Haut Conseil*, RRI manages to advocate at a high level of government. At a more practical level being part of RRI also makes it easier to develop working relationships between Partners, as now people may be more likely to contact one another to work on some issues.

RRI has also managed to develop a reputation for being different and supportive. As one actor put it 'RRI helps us to feels less alone in this battle', but also RRI does not have an agenda or conditionality. RRi is perceived as a facilitator which provides support for thinking and developing ideas: '*accompagner les nationauxdans un processus de reflexion'* (walk along local actors to support them in a reflection process). Though this is an intangible result it cannot be discounted lightly: working in a genuine supportive way along local actors in the development process of their countries is something donors have not been good at and yet this is exactly what is needed. RRI which does not operate as a project is flexible and offers a channel for small but powerful interventions. For example IC leadership thinks that RRI has allowed channelling small funding to work directly with the Cell for forestry deforestation within a short time and to provide support to a small number of targeted activities. To intervene as IC through IC, protocol and planning procedures would have taken more time which would have been too costly in proportion to the amount required to do the work.

In conclusion, the interviews show a number of results:
The strategy of gathering information through case studies, sharing the information through a capacity building workshop and identifying an advocacy agenda has resulted in a number of concrete actions at different strategic levels of policy and law making in Mali. Some of these actions have had tangible results (such as the guidelines for the preparation of CL for example)
The strategy of creating a coalition of actors with common interests and complementary approaches and field of intervention has created a positive momentum: Partners feel energised and supported and to some extent empowered to tackle sensitive issues at higher levels of bureaucracy and politics.

Does RRI work have Impact?

By the very nature of the work undertaken by the coalition it is very difficult to measure tangible impact. As we know from the historical context in Mali, having more progressive laws does not always result in change on the ground, as the implementation of new policies is often very slow and under-resourced. Even in the ideal scenario where everything was suddenly perfect it would take some time for impacts to be visible. So here we can only report on perceived impact as respondents have described them even though these are not measurable and often very subjective.

At the moment there seems to be anecdotal evidence that one important impact is attitude or perception change. For example one senior bureaucrat reported that after attending a conference in Ethiopia with RRI funding he started to understand the issues related to tenure and rights and started to change his mind on the topic. In his case this change of perception has already lead to a greater commitment in making decentralisation a success through an appropriate transfer of responsibility to local authorities.

Is RRI strategy sustainable?

During the interviews, respondents have raised a number of issues which in their mind might threaten the future RRI related work.
A) The bureaucracy and the funding
Whilst RRI was not set up as a donor organisation, in practice RRI has provided much of the funding used by Partners for RRI related activities. This is an area where there seems to be a tension between the concept of a facilitating structure such as RRI which does provide small funding as part of the facilitation process, and the reality of undertaking actions in the field which need to be supported by guaranteed funding. All the Partners have commented on the limited funds available and this was also noted in the independent monitor's report 2010. Somehow Partners have not yet changed their attitude in this regard and rather than seek their own funding for RRI related activities they still tend to expect RRI to provide this funding. This can perhaps be partly explained by, or is a symptom of, some confusion about the hybrid nature of RRI, partly a funding structure with bureaucratic demands, partly a supportive structure offering technical and management support in the form of RRG. Some Partners feel that to some extent RRI is 'demanding' that Partners perform certain tasks and therefore Partners feels that RRI should pay for these. In practice the annual planning is also a reflection of this hybrid nature. Whilst Partners feel that they are completely free to plan the work of the coalition at the national level and that RRG provides during this planning process valuable input as a true facilitator would, during the bureaucratic side of the planning RRG behaves like a donor agency: taking months for feedback and requesting adjustment/turn over within two weeks. This tension can also be seen in the auditing process; some of the partner organisations have their own independent auditing process and consider that their RRI related activities are therefore being audited as part of this process. However RRI also requires that each RRI activity is being separately independently audited, but RRI provides insufficient funds to cover the costs of auditing. So here is an example of confusion: is RRI a donor with specific procedures and requirements, the costs of which are covered by project funds,

or is RRI a partner which can accept the reliability of the administrative systems of each of its Partners?

Some Partners also argue that if Partners started to raise their own funds for RRI related activity then RRI would have no rights to control how the funds are spent. This may then complicate matters.

The fact that RRI does not agree to cover staff time is a sore point for some Partners who find it harder and harder to justify their contribution at the national level to their international headquarters. Though everyone is very committed to the RRI work agenda, the reality of working for organisations is that staff have to be able to write off their time against some budget lines, and so some feel they partly work overtime for free on RRI issues.

B) Coalition visibility, scope and linkages

Many respondents have commented that one of the RRI's challenges in Mali is to increase its visibility and scope. This could be done through opening the partnership to a wider number of organisations in order to increase the scope and access more resources. There is a lot of work to do and some Partners feel there is scope for others to share some of the workload, but it is not clear to them how an enlargement would be possible. Coalition members are very busy (outside the RRI agenda) and are not always able to respond to opportunities. For example this year there was a request from RRG to work on climate change issues. The coalition however was not able to take this up and some feel that perhaps enlarging the coalition as new issues emerge might be a way forward.

Consolidating links between the national, regional and global programmes would be welcome as for Partners it is not fully clear what is happening beyond the national boundaries. This was reflected in the interviews as Partners were not able to comment on the regional or global programmes.

Many respondents feel that RRI also needs to become more visible at the level of State institutions, especially those implicated in the legal sphere, such as for example the National Assembly. Someone suggested for example that perhaps RRI organise a debate at the National Assembly. Though the workshop on CL was jointly organised by ICRAF and RRI, many of the people spoken to did not really know what RRI was even though a lot of the work they are involved in is partly funded by RRI.

C) Can there be national RRI Mali coalition without RRI?

One of the premises of setting up RRI was that once the work was done, RRI would no longer need to exist as local coalitions of Partners would be in a position to carry on work together or not depending on their needs and the issues at stake. The issues of land, rights and resources are issues the RRI coalition Partners have been dealing with before RRI and will continue to work on, independently of RRI. So in this sense the work done by the coalition will continue whatever happens to the coalition itself. Though Partners have

commented that one of the Coalition's strength is that it has brought different organisations together at the same time, Partners have not yet been able (willing? interested?) in developing closer links outside the RRI frame. Perhaps there would be merit for RRI to strategically facilitate stronger ties within the coalitions. One of the advantages of the coalition is indeed that it is a loose network of organisations which come together to join forces and capitalise on synergies to achieve a common goal. But the down side is that Partners do not really exchange on other topics or areas of their work, whilst there could be other common goals which might benefit from a coalition of Partners. So one of RRI's legacies in the future could be to institutionalise the model of working in loose coalitions by capitalising on the RRI model.

Conclusion

This evaluation attempted to measure relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. From the interviews carried out in Bamako it seems that there is no doubt that RRI is relevant and that RRI is generating positive and encouraging results at the right levels of bureaucracy and policy making. It is still difficult and too early to see tangible impacts but anecdotal evidence shows promising perception and attitudinal changes amongst high-level bureaucrats. The main challenges for RRI seem to be of an organisational nature. RRI aims to be different and work differently from conventional donors in order to stay relevant, respond quickly and be flexible. This in practice is a challenge because partner organisations operate also within a conventional model of development management and though RRI helps them to do things differently Partners very quickly hit structural constraints. This, it seems, also puts pressure on RRI structures, which may or not consider how to accommodate its Partners' constraints within its own organisational structure and culture.

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Annex 7: Nepal Country Report

FINDINGS FROM NEPAL[117]
J. Gabriel Campbell

CONTEXT

Nepal's most valuable forests used to cover much of the lowland Terai region. Dominant *Shorea robusta* or *sal* trees provide a high canopy slow-growing hardwood tree highly valued for its timber, and widely exported for railway sleepers, while a variety of other key species and wetlands helped harbor unusually rich biodiversity and famous tiger hunting grounds for the royalty of Nepal, India and Great Britain. Initially allocated by hereditary rulers to themselves or to senior officials in lieu of wages (*birta, jagir)*, these forests were nationalized in 1957 along with others throughout Nepal. Before and after this date they were subject to legal and illegal settlement, agricultural conversion, and illegal logging – although these reportedly increased after nationalization.

From the early 1970s large tracts of Terai forests were converted into national parks and guarded by army posts with resultant tensions with local people over loss of forest resources and wildlife depredation. While progressive legislation creating buffer zones, revenue sharing provisions and the partial extension of community forestry and collaborative forest management into these Terai forests has helped to alleviate some of these tensions and somewhat alter the tenure structure, Terai forests are once again subject to increased illegal logging with corrupt political support and long term tenure solutions still not clear. The huge Indian market across the open border and logging bans in India and China create tempting incentives for continuing illegal deforestation.

In contrast, the forests in the hills and mid-mountains of Nepal have mostly not been susceptible to large-scale commercial exploitation. Exposed to roads only in the last few decades, these forests are much more interspersed with agricultural communities and were much more integrated into rural economies for fuelwood, small-scale household timber requirements, and non-timber forest products. Most of these forests were also under the nominal ownership of the ruling classes and feudal lords until their nationalization in 1957. However, their remoteness and lack of high commercial value resulted in much greater *de facto* community use and, in some areas, actual proactive management.

Following nationalization and the increasing realization that the State might appropriate local forest resources for themselves, the level of overuse through grazing (and inhibition of regeneration) and fuelwood collection increased. The continuing deforestation that was increasingly evident led to dire predictions in the early 1980s that the forests would disappear within 25 years.[118] These

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[117] In addition to interviews carried out in Nepal for this RRI MTE, this country report draws on the authors work in the preceding months to synthesize DFID and SDC funded community project experience. *Synthesis of Learning from SDC and DFID Funded Community Forestry Projects.* J. Gabriel Campbell, Report submitted to SDC, July 2011.
[118] Eric Eckholm, *Losing Ground: Environmental Stress and World Food Prospects*, W.W.Norton and Company, 1976.

alarmist predictions fortunately helped provoke the introduction of community forestry that reversed the fortunes of these hill forests and the communities given management responsibility and increasing tenurial control.

The high altitude forests, some containing very valuable old growth hemlock, spruce, pine and walnut species have remained much the same, with gradual degradation, over the last century. Where roads are beginning to penetrate from the Chinese side in Tibet or in pockets of intense mountaineering and tourism pressure, degradation has accelerated. Elsewhere, nominal state ownership, with some scattered community forestry, and low population pressure has resulted in forests mostly used for rare medicinal and aromatic plants and characterized by a general lack of management.

The long and sustained history of community forestry in Nepal, from 1978 to the present, has justifiably become one of the most celebrated success stories of community management and supporting policies and programs. Sustained donor support buttressed community driven initiatives and helped to create important legislative benchmarks in each decade that gave increasing tenurial rights of forest management and use to local communities.[119] Currently, approximately 22 % of the forest estate, covering approximately 1.23 million hectares of forests and 8.5 million people (approximately 39% of the population) is managed through community forestry.[120] The evidence is overwhelming that in the middle hills where community forestry has thrived, deforestation has been reversed, livelihoods improved, and biodiversity enhanced.[121]

Nepal's community forestry success provides tangible evidence in support of RRI's theory of change. Increased community rights to manage and harvest their local forests, along with supportive capacity building and technical assistance in forest management and governance, has led to increased forest cover, increased local investment in forest management, increased forest ecosystem values, and improved livelihoods. A seminal impact study of just five years of community forestry support between 2003 and 2008 by DFID through its Livelihoods and Forestry Program, documented:

- Increased household incomes of 61%

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[119] Initial bilateral support from Australia and a major World Bank project led to donor support from 8 bilateral donors and 3 multilaterals, including Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland, U.K., Germany, Japan, USA, EU, UNDP, IFAD, and INGOs CARE, WWF, TMI.

[120] *Forest Tenure Reform in Nepal: Experience from Community Forestry.* Keshav Kanel, RRI Bejing Conference, 2010. http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/doc_1765.pdf

[121] LFP, *Forest Resource Assessment of Nepal;s mid-hills 1994-2008.* DFID Nepal; Bharat Pokharel, Peter Branney, Michael Nurse and Yam Malla, *Community Forestry: Sustaining Forests, Livelihoods and Democracy.*in Ohja et. al.(eds.) *Communities, Forests and Governance: Policy and Institutional Innovations from Nepal.* 2008, Adroit Publishers, New Delhi. K.R. Kanel, *Twenty Five Years of Community Forestry: Contributions to the Millennium Development Goals*, Proceedings of the Fourth National Workshop on Community Forestry, 2004. P. Branney and K.P. Yadav, *Changes in Community Forests Condition and Management 1194-1998,* 1998, NUKCFP; Bharat Pokharel and Anupama Mahat, *Kathmandu to Jiri: A Photo Journey*, 2009?, NSCFP; Susma Shrestha, *Spatial Analysis on Forest Cover Change in Dolakha District.* NSCFP Internal Report 4/010; Mary Hobley, Jagdish Baral, Marendra Rasaily and Bihari Shrestha, *Nepal Swiss Community Forestry Project – External Review.* 2007; *Community Forestry in Nepal, Improving Livelihoods through Forest Resources.* 2008 Asia Brief: Partnership Results. The Nepal Swiss Community Forestry Project End of Phase Report 1991 – 2011 reports that canopy cover increased from 11% to 23%, timber 19%, fuelwwod 18%, and grasses 9%. p. 3.

- Decreased level of poverty from 65% of the households to 28%
- Contribution of community forestry and LFP program as 25% of this change (the highest contribution was from remittances at 54% of change)
- Increased availability of forest products, and
- Increased equity and inclusion in local governance.

Surprisingly, at least to the proponents of state managed forest concessions, the total revenue to the government from community forestry royalties was higher than the total revenue received from the much larger area of forest still nominally managed by the government.[122]

The long history of legislative initiatives and implementation has allowed Nepal to learn from its own initiatives. Perhaps the key policy change that was made from the initial legislation was to change the unit of management and tenure rights from the administrative village unit[123] to the self-defined User Group. Along with important changes in the legal policies in the 1980s and 1990s that transferred the control of revenue to the User Group and increased its management authority, these changes in the bundle of tenure rights vastly increased the motivation of village communities to claim forests that they traditionally used and take management responsibility for them. Instead of having to solicit applications from villages to convert them into community forests, district forest officials were overwhelmed by applications coming from almost every village in the hills and mountains of Nepal.[124]

With the rampant success of community forestry in restocking these hill forests and the spread of user groups to manage them under Forest Department supervision, attention shifted to second-generation issues. These included introducing a pro-poor bias and gender perspective that would increase social inclusion of all groups, including women, marginalized indigenous ethnic groups and Dalits.[125]

An extraordinarily successful federation of community forestry user groups was established in 1995 with support from the Ford Foundation and a locally based international organization.[126] This federation successfully attracted and mobilized local community forestry user groups around the country, and with additional co-financing from donors such as Danida, DFID, and SDC now has over 15,000 user group members, comprising 1.6 million households and covering 1.3 million

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[122] Dinesh Magar Thapa, Jane Carter, Brahma Dhoj Gurung, *Addressing poverty through forest-based enterprises: NSCFP experiences.* 2010; Nepal Economic Forum, *The potential and approach for enhancing private sector initiatives in Nepal's forestry sector.* (for LFP) 2011. B.K. Pokharel, D. Poudel, P. Branney, D.B. Khatri, *Reconstructing the Concept of Forest Based Enterprise in Nepal: Towards a Pro-Poor Approach.* 2005.
[123] Originally defined as the Panchayat, after the democratic movement of 1991, the nominclature was changed to Village Development Committee (VDC). RRG senior director Augusta Molnar was influential in identifying and promoting this critical change.
[124] In Nepal, Hills denotes the belt of land from the Terai up to the high mountains, or very roughly 500 meters to 2,500 meters. (CHECK)
[125] The Dalits, comprising approximately 14% of Nepal's population are made up of castes that were formerly considered untouchable. See also: *Nepal Swiss Community Forestry Project-External Review* Mary Hobley, Jagdish Baral, Narendra Rasaily and Bihari Shrestha. 2007.
[126] The International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD).

hectares of forest. Since 2008 it has been the first grassroots organization to become an RRI partner.[127]

This period also saw an increased focus on improving livelihoods. This entailed moving beyond subsistence forest management systems that focused on basic household needs for fuel, fodder, small timber, and locally used non-timber forest products, to exploring potentials for greater local timber harvest and enterprise development. Studies by SDC funded forestry projects showed that only a small percentage of the conservatively estimated allowable cut were included in user group management plans, and that of that only a smaller percent was ever harvested. Even with this meager harvest, more revenue was generated for the state, than from the much larger government managed forests – including the high value Terai forests.

From the end of the 1990s, Nepal's Maoist insurgency grew rapidly to violently challenge the state in armed conflict until the ceasefire of 2006. During the insurgency, the Maoist removed all government agents from rural areas and used community forests as both their hiding places and as a source of taxation. Remarkably, the institution of community forestry user groups and FECOFUN were almost the only local and federated forms of governance that continued to survive this tumultuous period with blessings from both the government and insurgents. Donors adapted their programs to working with local NGOs and with their increased emphasis on social inclusion, were also able to continue improving livelihoods and governance at a time when most development programs were severely curtailed.

The development of new kinds of more community oriented Protected Areas also placed Nepal on the forefront of pro-people forest management. Conservation Areas were established under NGO and local community management[128], buffer zones were established around more traditional national parks, and new national parks were established without the traditional army protection. These approaches included legislative provisions for revenue sharing from visitors with local communities and provided motivation for increased local community participation. However, management remains much more firmly in the Forest Department's control and some of the recent government and donor/NGO strategies for expanding PAs and conservation landscapes are seen as attempts to reduce community rights in favor of the central government.[129]

RELEVANCE

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[127] www.fecofun.org

[128] The Nepal Trust for Nature Conservation (then King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation) and WWF established the Annapurna Conservation area and supported buffer zone development; The Mountain Institute helped established the new Makalu-Barun National Park without the army along with the contiguous Qomolangma National Nature Preserve around Mt. Everest in the Tibet Autonomous Region of China.

[129] The WWF, Care Nepal and now World Bank and USAID are looking to expand landscape conservation approaches, especially in the Terai regions that are tiger and elephant habitat. RRI supported FECOFUN to halt the establishment of new protected areas without consultation.

The recent experience with community forestry in Nepal[130] has demonstrated that despite its thirty-year history and extraordinary resilience through a civil war, the gains made need to be defended and the learning renewed with new generations. The progressive community forestry legislation culminating in the 1993 and 1995 legislation providing for financial autonomy has been under attack from politicians and government officials looking to gain greater control and money. Some advocates of extreme federalism and implementation of ILO 169 (in whose understanding forests would become the property of the indigenous ethnic groups, even though other communities have often lived there millennia longer) are also seeking to undermine community forestry gains. On the opportunity side, the continuing dialogue around the development of a new national constitution provides the opportunity for transforming community management rights into stronger property rights.

At the same time, Terai forest tenure reform and management remains stymied by the lack of proven strategies and consensus.   While FECOFUN has advocated for extension of the community forestry model with adjustments for the Terai, there is resistance from political parties, distant user, and government. The demographic history, in which the oldest residents reside the furthest from the forests and new newest hill migrants are those that legally and illegally settled in the forest areas complicates the dialogue. Allocating shares of high value timber and maintaining high biodiversity are pending issues that even new models of collaborative forest management have not been able to solve. Market pressures from across the border in India, where there are logging bans on old growth forests, add complications that are not dissimilar to many high forest frontier areas of the world.

Old growth high mountain forests are starting to face similar pressures as roads proliferate and China's market demand also skyrockets. Hemlocks and firs with recorded ages over 1,100 years have been recorded in Eastern Nepal.[131] and the value of a variety of products such as the medicinal plant *yarsa gumba* (*cordyceps sinesis*) is so high that migrant workers are willing to risk death for its collection.[132] As with Terai forests, no widely accepted management model for high altitude forests is available and the question of tenure for distantly settled local people is unclear.

Bilateral donors, especially DFID, SDC and Finland, have joined together to try and develop a ten year community forestry program for the hills and terai with funding of approximately $150 million. The World Bank, USAID, and Norad are working separately on climate related and biodiversity conservation projects.

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[130] Campbell evaluation, forthcoming, SDC/LFP 2011.
[131] "Asian Monsoon Failure and Megadrought During the Last Millennium." Edward Cook, Paul Krusic et. al. *Science.* April 23, 2010.
[132] Poor lower altitude residents ascend to over 3,500 meter to crawl on their hands a knees in search of this "winter worm summer plant" (cordyseps mushroom that colonizes a catepillar) that has proven blood thinning, anti-cholesterol, and erectile function enhancement capacities. Local trader prices are in excess of $ 6,000 per kilo. In 2010 three students were killed. In 2009 7 migrant laborers were murdered by the villagers of Nar, Manang for exploiting their resources. http://merolinks.com/nepal-news/63-manang-locals-held-in-connection-with-murder-of-seven-yarsagumba-pickers/ Others die from high altitude and hyperthermia.

The former have been in the forefront of increasing and defending tenure rights to forest; the latter's portfolios pay relatively less attention to this concern.

Government interest in the potentials of REDD, FCPF, and regaining central government control over the sector that was partially ceded during the insurgency to multi-agency bodies is also a major factor facing Nepal's forest future. So far, there is little clarity on how REDD+ can be cost-effectively used with community forestry or to strengthen forest rights. The question of how current pilot projects can be expanded to scale is moot. Still, climate change mitigation and adaptation dialogues continue to dominate government and donor narratives.

In addition, Nepal still serves as very effective model for successful community forestry and has learned numerous lessons of value regionally and globally.

For all these reasons, interviewed stakeholders were in agreement that the RRI agenda is needed for:

- Protecting and deepening existing rights,
- Expanding community and individual rights in enterprise,
- Developing and helping adoption of effective forestry governance for Terai and high mountains with appropriate community rights,
- Integrating issues of indigenous peoples and
- Learning from success of community forestry, community federations, and inclusive governance,
- And for dealing with climate change and REDD.

These issues create a strong case for RRI attention and support in areas of core RRI competence. The national understanding should be expanded to unbundle forest tenure rights and incorporate associated responsibilities, risks, investments, commitments and opportunities for both collective and individual rights.

RRI PROGRAM RESULTS AND EFFECTIVENESS

RRI Partners and Collaborators in Nepal include:

- FECOFUN (P)– grassroots federation for advocacy
- Intercooperation (P) – implementing CF in 3 districts
- Forest Action – national research NGO
- HIMAWANTI – grassroots women's NRM network
- NRM Confederation – recently convened local CS network for land, forest and water that includes other NGOs, including INSAB,
- GACF – Chair is from Nepal and active regionally through
- RECOFT (P) – regional CF NGO based in Thailand
- IUCN (P) & ICRAF (P) both have programs in Nepal, especially IUCN with an office and staff, but neither have been much involved in RRI.

Likewise ICIMOD, WWF, and TMI are not involved with RRI despite overlap of

work on issues of forests, climate change, Convention on Biodiversity rights, shifting cultivation tenures and other convergences

RRI's strategy in Nepal as set out in its previous work plan has been to:

1) Support advocacy to build community property rights and Community Forestry and natural resource rights into the new Constitution currently being drafted;

2) Deepen Community Forestry management reforms, including inclusion and gender, and

3) Extend community based management to the Terai and high mountains.

RRI and some of its Partners and Collaborators cite the defense of existing rights as among its major accomplishments. The Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation had attempted to reverse gains in tenure rights and autonomy of Community Forestry (especially the hallmark legislation of 1993) and exercise more direct control over forests through introducing new legislation in parliament to curtail rights and increase government revenue. The reasons cited by the Ministry were the increase in illegal logging in the Terai, including in some community forestry areas.

The Ministry had also attempted to legally establish new Protected Areas. In both cases, these legislative attempts were taken without consultation or consensus, despite the fact that multi-stakeholder forums had been established with the Ministry and civil society that included RRI Partners and Collaborators.

Partner FECOFUN through rallies, publicity marches, news articles and personal interactions spearheaded RRI's advocacy. It was supported by collaborator Forest Action's timely research on the new legislation and its defects from the point of view of community forestry.[133] In both cases, legislative progress in the Constituent Assembly (Parliament) was stalled, and very recently, the Ministry withdrew the proposed legislation.[134]

These were important defenses of existing rights. However, there are questions as to why there was not more effective policy advocacy that would have prevented these policy threats from emerging in the first place. The lack of empirical research to counter the inaccurate accusations of the Government and news media on illegal logging was, and is, a gap in the case for defending existing rights.[135] Also, it is evident that major donors and projects such as LFP

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[133] *Protected Areas and Rights Movements: The Inadequacies of Nepal's Participatory Conservation*, Naya Paudel, Sudeep Jana, Jailab Rai. Forest Action, Dec. 2010.
[134] News article of July 9, 2011. *Forest Act: Forest Ministry withdraws Amendment Bill.* http://www.ekantipur.com/2011/07/09/national/forest-act-forest-ministry-withdraws-amendment-bill/337055.html The changing coalition Governments, and long periods of suspension, were reportedly the reason that the Ministry wished to push through this legislation without much discussion – but probably also contributed to the ultimate lack of action.
[135] Informed experts concur in stating that most of the deforestation is in government managed forests with direct support from political forces and that community forests have been the best protected of the various forest tenure categories.

and NSCFP (DFID and SDC) have been critical players that have been somewhat left out of RRI interventions and planning.[136] Poor relationships by some Partners with the government forestry establishment may have been exacerbated by some of the rhetoric, RRI advocacy and current donor strategies.[137]

The withdrawal of the current legislative initiatives does provide a short-term defensive victory. However, the forces that started these initiatives are only dormant. Without more proactive changes in key policy maker mindsets, the eventual outcomes in the event of another similar legislative onslaught are still uncertain.

Building increased community forestry rights into the new Constitution are an on-going process. RRI's enhanced advocacy with members of parliament (for community property and NRM rights have taken place with some success. The issues are much better understood by some of the key actors in government and the Constituent Assembly than before. It is noteworthy that the finance ministry has issued a White Paper with three paragraphs on forests that mention FECOFUN. However, the current draft of the Parliamentary NRM Committee does not contain community property rights and its language on natural resource rights is vague.[138] Some observers criticize the current RRI approach for not being more politically astute in building a larger constituency for continuing tenure reform.

The RRI has also supported the development of a NRM federation. This has been lauded for bringing actors in land, water and forest together in a common forum. However, the philosophical conflicts within the NRM federation over issues such as individual land rights vs. collective rights, and lack of a clear common agenda undermines its effectiveness. The existence of the federation is not widely known outside of the direct participants.

Difficulties in dealing with new ethnic claims emerging from Nepal becoming a signatory to ILO 169 and the complex ethnic politics of Nepal along with lack of clarity on issues of NRM and federalism are hotly contested issues that are not currently being addressed by RRI's work. This avoidance of divisive issues is understandable. But given the fact that RRI has the credibility and mandate to deal with key tenure issues, and includes indigenous peoples in its mission statements, it may be unfortunate that it has not helped to give space and greater clarity where others have also feared to tread. Either of these issues has the potential to usher in major conflicts on tenure issues depending on how they are addressed in the constitution.

RRI partner FECOFUN's approach in the Terai primarily relies on the hill CF model, with some modifications for distant users. This is challenged by Terai

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[136] Livelihoods and Forest Program of DFID and Nepal Swiss Community Forestry Project. In the latter there has been active collaboration through the staff from Inter-cooperation.
[137] Donor efforts to keep a multi-stakeholder governance and project structures with increased decentralization and off-government budget (redbook) funding channels have met stiff resistance from some elements in the Ministry.
[138] As of end July 2011. This is naturally subject to change as drafting continues.

political parties and some RRI Partners and Collaborators as being inappropriate for Terai forest–people complexities. Outcomes on the management of these large forest areas are still highly uncertain and no coherent or empirically focused strategy for addressing the issues and building consensus is yet evident.

The use of the CF model as a learning basis for the RRI supported network, the Global Association of Community Forestry (GACF) in the region and elsewhere has been acclaimed. It has helped spread acceptance of the effectiveness of CF as a better means of forest management than government fiat/policing and a more effective means of improving livelihoods. Recent advances in social inclusion in CF governance, modeled by FECOFUN (whose membership is 50% women) and Intercooperation/SDC are powerful demonstrations of more inclusive and equitable governance and its positive impacts on poverty.

Stakeholders in Nepal have suggested that these advances in learning be followed up and deepened by sponsoring more in depth empirical research. Suggested priority subjects include: rights and poverty reduction, old growth high value forest management options, value of enterprise development vis-a-vis potential REDD options, Indigenous Peoples, ILO 169 and forest rights issues.

So far, RRI has not been very active in ATEMs or enterprise development issues in Nepal.[139] Regulatory hurdles and under-developed markets along with lack of attention to small-scale enterprise technology options are all constraining the huge potential for livelihood improvement that this sector could bring.[140] Most observers agree that influencing the development of enterprises with community forestry would require a much bigger effort to involve private sector actors.

In the arena of capacity building of local Partners and Collaborators, RRI is given high marks. The analytical publications and the opportunities to collaborate internationally as well as nationally are highly valued by participants. Participation in RRI supported international networks and conferences have also helped build local credibility and given local Partners and Collaborators increased access, self-confidence and ability to advocate nationally and globally for increased tenure rights. RRI's contribution to global knowledge and consistent focus on forest rights has enabled this issue to be better understood among a variety of stakeholders and reportedly increased the opportunities for positive future policy reform.

EFFICIENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY

The RRI's programs have capitalized effectively on the achievements of local community forestry user groups and the long time investment of a number of donors in Nepal. As a coalition, RRI is praised by its Partners and Collaborators

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[139] One commentator who otherwise praises RRI's analytical work described RRI's outputs on enterprise as mere "peanuts".
[140] LFP commissioned study on enterprises, Nepal Economic Forum, *The potential and approach for enhancing private sector initiatives in Nepal's forestry sector.* 2010.

for its open annual planning approach. However, important donor and government actors are left out of planning process and are critical of the opportunities for collaboration that they feel have been missed. Some are also critical of the short term fly-in and out approach, and think that this limits RRI's ability to be more proactive, rather than reactive.

As noted above, RRI's comparative strengths in supporting in-depth research to buttress policy choices are not being mobilized to deal with some sensitive and critical issues related to: tenure and livelihoods (documenting impacts), IPs and local community rights, governance options for large old growth forests such as Terai, enterprise regulatory hurdles. While these would be larger agendas than RRI's budget could encompass, there are concerns expressed that funding choices are influenced by dominant NGO agendas and financial needs and could be better prioritized.

RRI is called to address institutional capacity building and long-term advocacy on rights within the framework of short-term interventions and one year agreements. This is recognized as both a source of some strategic strength while posing organizational and financial strains on Partners and Collaborators who work on longer donor funding horizons. An alternative suggested for RRI is to help Partners and Collaborators mobilize the high potential for direct fund raising within Nepal. This would relieve pressures on RRI's budget and enable longer-term commitments to key research and advocacy agendas.

Partners and Collaborators value the communications with RRG through emails, conferences, and exchanges. However, many professionals, politicians, and grassroots groups are hardly touched. Aside from some FECOFUN advocacy news articles and some RECOFT local language publications there has been limited outreach to government officials and rural groups.[141] This creates a gap in the last link needed for effective policy change and suggests an opportunity to increase efficiency by incorporating more communications outreach in future program agreements.

There were mixed views expressed on the whether or not to expand the local RRI network. In general, stakeholders desired local expansion of the number of Collaborators while curtailing global RRG or partnership expansion. This opinion on RRG's growth was somewhat contradicted by the widely expressed appreciation for RRI's global knowledge creation and advocacy. Overall, stakeholders in Nepal are hoping for continued and expanded support and opportunities to participate in RRI's international agenda.

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[141] Despite being a country in which English is widely used as the medium for higher education, readership of Nepalese language newspapers and magazines vastly outstrips those published in English.

RRI Mid-Term Evaluation: Final DRAFT September 2011   **The Mountain Institute**

Annex 8: Peru Strategic Response Mechanism

PERU: Example of Strategic Response Mechanism (SRM) Action
Jorge Recharte

There are approximately 7.7 million hectares of indigenous land not yet recognized and threatened by external interests. RRI's Strategic Response Mechanism was applied in Peru to support AIDESEP's[142] to initiate the registration of native community land claims (a process essential for future titling, if an agreement is reached with the government). The SRM helped AIDESEP to influence the debate process of approval of Forestry Law at the governmental level and in the consultation process implemented by the Agrarian commission, specifically to change the provision of the law that affected IPs tenure rights over forest resources. The SRM hosted workshops included discussions about the need to advance on the recognition of IP land rights before implementing REDD+ initiatives.

The action will be implemented by AIDESEP's Center for Information and territorial Planning (CIPTA), In order to implement this action in a short period of time, IDESEP's SRM grant concept indicates that CIPTA will seek support from Partners with technical expertise like the Peruvian NGO IBC that has extensive experience and technical expertise. IBC has been a close allied of AIDESEP and has in the past provided it with copies of its data bases . However, for the SRM task CIPTA is apparently implementing this action independently, through its own staff.

The most salient aspect of the SRM applied in Peru is that it assumes that the issue could be resolved quickly and simply. Rather, it seems that in this example it was necessary to invest more time and resources to define the scope of work, the strategies to follow and facilitate cooperation of AIDESEP with key Partners like IBC.

After the Bagua clash, the support provided to ADIESEP by bilateral cooperation was terminated. AIDESEP continued to receive support from agencies such as Amazon Watch, Rain Forest Foundation Norway and OXFAM America to defend indigenous territories threatened by extractive industries (oil, gas and industrial production of biofuels and industrial crops) and from REDD programs.
Affinity of approaches seems an important element of SRM. AIDESEP sees RRI strategy as consistent with their own approach to securing forest rights through the affirmation of indigenous rights to the territory of original peoples. RRI is seen as unique for its specific focus on connecting rights to resources. RRI is seen as 'people-centered, an approach different than that of most organizations working in the Amazon whose perspective is forest-centric.'

RRI support came to AIDESEP at a time when other international cooperation had withdrawn and it responded to an strategic need. In this sense RRI rapid

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[142] The Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest (Spanish: Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana - AIDESEP)

response was recognized as having unique value not only by AIEDESP but IBC, DAR staff interviewed in Peru.

RRI's SRM grant was valued highly by AIDESEP because it allowed them to negotiate with the Ministry of Environment inclusion in the R-PP proposal of Peru one million dollars to support land titling of indigenous community lands by Amazonian regional governments. RRI support was also crucial to promote grass roots discussion groups of REDD and Forestry Law issues tat have informed IDESEP's policy incidence.

AIDESEP staff notes that communicating with their own social bases in the vast Amazon region is a huge challenge. Communities have been always difficult to reach out. AIDESEP is embarked on a long term processes to build its relationships with their grass roots bases. Support from RRI or Forest People is helping develop relationships with AIDESEP's constituency. AIDESEP notes that the SRM grant received from RRI has resulted in the identification of 404 communities ('and that the number is still growing') that need to be titled.

Although this point needs to be clarified further, AIDESEP's SRM project has focused in identifying the largest possible number of communities, raising the question of whether this is carried out adequately, as part of a more comprehensive strategy or to build its constituency. The CIPTA unit that is carrying out the task has been in operation on-off over the years and it seems that a due diligence assessment of capacities could have been part of the SRM.

IBC and DAR are two organizations with a history of cooperation with AIDESEP. IDESEP assumed in the SRM that technical cooperation from both organizations would somehow follow to support its tasks, but the steps necessary were not taken.

At the time of the agreement between AIDESEP and RRI to implement the SRM project, DAR (Peru) staff indicated that they knew of RRI through incidental contacts. RRI was perceived more of a donor supporting short-term interventions and research on forest tenure actions. Only recently they have gained better understanding of the nature of RRI through the forest Governance Platform workshop convened in Bogota, Colombia (June 2011).

IBC was only partly aware of RRI's depth of work and resources, even though they had implemented a specific training action to disseminate knowledge of ILO 169 agreement among indigenous grass roots groups. The design of the SRM assumed that it was possible to quickly close the titling gap when in fact there are complex on the ground technical and political issues concerning this process. Reiterating the recommendation captured in the interviews, investing in AIDESEP's need was important in principle, but it required more careful analysis of the institutional context, of it partnerships and AIDESEP's technical needs.

Annex 9: TMI Team Members

J. Gabriel Campbell, MTE Team Leader, *Senior Fellow, The Mountain Institute*, is based in Kathmandu, Nepal and during the summer in Michigan, USA. Gabriel received his Ph.D. and M.Phil. in Anthropology and South Asian Studies from Columbia University in 1978; his M.A. and B.A. from Wesleyan University, Connecticut and Certificate in Executive Management from Harvard Business School in 2000. Throughout his career as a researcher, practitioner and manager, Gabriel has worked to enable local communities to manage their natural resources. From 1978 through 1989, Gabriel worked on community forestry and watershed management in Nepal and India with USAID, FAO, and the World Bank. Gabriel worked as TMI's Director of Asian programs for ten years helping establish grassroots community based protected areas in China, Nepal and India. Following this, Gabriel served as the Director General of the Integrated Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) for two terms from 2000 to 2007. Here he was responsible for managing the independent inter-governmental organization's research, capacity building, and policy support work with a large diversity of agencies and organizations in the Hindu-Kush Himalayan region. As Chairman of the Mountain Forum, he helped lead this network of networks in regional and global advocacy.

Gabriel has been responsible for developing and carrying out or overseeing monitoring and evaluation systems for a number of projects, programs, and organizations. He served as leader of the joint World Bank – USAID Mid-Term Evaluation of the National Social Forestry Project in India (1989). He has published three monographs on monitoring and evaluation of community and social forestry projects, one on the use and misuse of social science evaluation research methods (reprint in press), and has recently taken assignments with the World Bank's internal Quality Assurance Group (QAG) and Independent Evaluation Group. He is currently being engaged by the SDC to assess lessons learned from the forestry projects funded by DFIC, SDC and Government of Finland in preparation for a new $130m multi-stakeholders forestry program for Nepal. gcampbell@mountain.org

Robert Davis, MTE Team Administrator and Organization Specialist, *Chief Operating Officer*, *The Mountain Institute,* holds an M.S. in organization development from American University, and an M.A. in religious studies from Yale University. He is skilled in the areas of project administration, financial management, personnel management, program logistics, conservation area project design and appraisal, organizational development and management, and facilitation. Having joined TMI in 1979, Bob has worked in many of the organization's programs and regional projects. He has extensive international conservation and development experience from his fifteen years of involvement in the Himalayan Program. Bob is a long time resident of Pendleton County, West Virginia and held the position of Appalachian Program Director from September, 2001 to June 2003. Bob also serves on the board of directors of a number of non-profit organizations, consults on organizational issues, and has taught university courses in organizational development and management. bdavis@mountain.org

Kirsten Ewers Andersen, MTE Team Member and Asia Specialist is a Danish anthropologist with 20 years of South and SE Asia experience in land and forest projects, often working within a rights-based approach on indigenous peoples' issues in NRM projects including a recent contribution to the Readiness Preparation Proposal for REDD+ in Lao PDR under WB Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Besides, a major study in Cambodia on communal tenure for WB, managing the inception phase of a GEF Sustainable Land Management Project in Cambodia and designing a GEF Sustainable Forestry Project in Cambodia Her dissertation for the University of Copenhagen was on the Karen people of Thailand (1976). Kirsten has primarily worked since then on research and development projects in design, M&E systems and evaluations, dealing with natural resource governance in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, India, Nepal, Vietnam, and Ethiopia. Currently based in Laos, Kirsten recently served as team leader for a Mid-term Evaluation of a Swiss funded project on Poverty Alleviation for Remote Upland Areas and has worked throughout much of the year as an advisor on a Laos PDR/World Bank/Government of Finland project on Sustainable Forestry for Rural Development . She has recently prepared a paper on "Communal Land Tenure in Asia" for FAO's Land Tenure Series to be published 2011 and has numerous papers and publications on forestry governance, rights, and tenure. kirsten.ewers@gmail.com

Jorge Recharte, MTE Team Member and Latin America Specialist, *Director of the South America Programs*, *The Mountain Institute,* is based in Huaraz and Lima, Peru, and holds a Ph.D. in Anthropology from Cornell University, 1989. Jorge joined TMI in 1997 after spending three years in Ecuador working for the Latin American Social Science Faculty (FLACSO), designing and heading the graduate education and research program in Mountain Societies and Sustainable Development. Between 1980-1981 and 1990-1993, Jorge was an associate researcher at the International Potato Center, where he worked developing participatory research methodologies in agriculture. His current responsibilities with TMI include management of a multidisciplinary team conducting participatory conservation and natural resource management activities in multiple locations in Peru and with Partners in several Andean countries; networking with private and public organizations, nationally and internationally; implementing ecosystem management projects associated with water and biodiversity objectives; and public awareness and policy oriented activities to promote conservation and sustainable development of high-altitude Andean mountain ecosystems and communities. He currently serves on the Board of The Common Good Institute and the Institute for Water Management. jrecharte@mountain.org

Marlene Buchy, MTE Team Member and Africa Specialist, is a Fellow in International Development, University of Bath International Development Group. She has also been Lecturer in the Australia National University, worked at the Institute of Social Studies in the Hague and the School of Agriculture and Forest Sciences, Bangor, UK. Dr. Buchy has conducted research and served as a consultant for DFID in the fields of forest and natural resource management, gender and social equity, policy research, and tenure studies. She has

considerable experience with monitoring and evaluation, program development and management, and governance issues. She earned her Ph.D in Development Studies from Paris VII University with a thesis on *Evolution of forest management and its ecological, economic and social impacts: a case study in the Western Ghats (India)*. Her MSc was in Tropical Forestry from ESAT-ENGREF, Monpellier and BA in History from Strasbourg University. She is fluent in French, English and German and holds both French and Australian citizenship. buchy.marlene@googlemail.com

Annex 10: List of Partners and Donors

Partners

ACICAFOC, Coordinating Association of Indigenous and Agroforestry Communities of Central America

CED, Centre for Development and Environment, Cameroon

Civic Response

FECOFUN, Federation of Community Forest Users Nepal

FPCD, Foundation for People and Community Development

FPP, Forest Peoples Programme

FT, Forest Trends

Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation

IFRI, International Forestry Resources and Institutions

PRISMA, Salvadoran Research Program on Development and Environment

ICRAF, World Agroforestry Centre

The Samdhana Institute

TEBTEBBA Foundation, (Indigenous People's International Centre for Policy Research and Education)

RRI Donor support group

Acacia Group

DfID, Department for International Development, United Kingdom

The Ford Foundation

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherland

Norad, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

SDC, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

Sida, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

ANNEX 11: RRI Logical Framework	Intervention logic	Objectively measurable and verifiable indicators	Sources of verifications	Who is responsible
Development objectives/ Goal Contribute to reducing poverty and enhancing well-being by strengthening tenure reform and democratic governance and development in forest areas of developing countries.	The dominant models of forest governance, industry and conservation have often exacerbated poverty, precluded pro-poor economic growth, and motivated social conflict. Chronic extreme poverty, continued abuse of human rights, violent civil conflicts, booming demand for energy and the growing threat of climate change are widespread global challenges that bring new urgency to strengthening justice and democratic governance in forest areas.			
Project objective/ Purpose: Encourage greater global commitment to and action for the establishment of more equitable forest tenure and related policies in priority developing countries. This in turn would lead to reduced poverty and violent conflict in forest areas, advancement of human rights and civil rights, increase contribution of industry and markets to social and economic development, and strengthen conditions for restoring the ecological integrity of forests, and mitigation and adaptation to climate change.	Strong local human, civil and property rights are linked to meeting Millennium Development Goals, reducing deforestation and degradation, preventing millions from displacement in the coming decades. Lack of rights is the fundamental reason for forest communities´ inability to use forest assets for livelihood and well-being benefits. The global community lacks simple indicators of progress on these global goals of tenure and governance. And, there is a lack of effective strategic collaboration that focuses on increasing the collective impact on tenure and governance reform.	• Track and disseminate global progress on statutory tenure reform in developing countries. • Mobilize a global effort through the creation of a coalition of Partners and Collaborators to foster strategic collective action to advance project objectives	• RRG tenure tracking updates • Annual program and financial reports and independent monitoring of impact	

Strategic Outcomes	Objectively measurable and verifiable indicators	Sources of verifications	Who is responsible
1. Complementary global, national, regional and local organizations effectively synergize to achieve significant breakthroughs in tenure reform processes.	Facilitate at least twenty new, value-added joint actions and activities between Partners/Collaborators with a demonstrable effect on the other strategic outcomes.	Ongoing internal documentation of results of collaborative actions by RRI Partners/Collaborators.	Facilitators at National & Regional level. Global Programs Managers at global level.
2. A select set of strategic networks are better-informed, more active and effective in promoting reform nationally, regionally and/or globally.	At least six existing or new networks increase their capacity to influence policy related to forest tenure at all levels.	Ongoing analysis of work with priority networks, identifying most significant changes in network capacity.	Senior Management, with Partner/Collaborator support, will gather data and transfer it to central collection point.

4. Changes in tenure legislation and regulatory or policy framework in favor of local communities in a subset of countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.	In six countries where RRI is active, structural tenure reforms (legal, regulatory, policy) are adopted or advanced.	Systematization of ongoing information & analysis of the progress of tenure reform legislation and regulations in target countries.	Regional Coordinators and Facilitators provide information to central gathering and collection point.
3. Key strategic actors at the global level are committed and engaged in promoting major reforms in existing tenure, regulatory and governance arrangements.	At least five inter-governmental and multilateral institutions (multilateral banks, ITTO, and other UN institutions) alter their position on forest tenure and actively support tenure and related reforms in their narrative and portfolios.	Careful ongoing analysis of the development of RRI relations with key institutions. Documentation of demonstrable shifts in those relationships and the institutional positions that indicate desired internal changes.	Senior Management and RRI Partners knowledgeable about the institutions will to provide much of the information to a central person collecting and organizing it.

5. More equitable forest governance, enterprise and conservation models are identified and disseminated and/or more broadly supported as a viable approach to support social and economic development.	In at least five cases, these models lead to an increase in community access to resources and markets.	Research studies produced by RRI partners and Collaborators or other reputable sources.	Senior Management, with support of Regional Partners/Coordinators, will gather information and deliver it to central collection point.