

**Rights and Resources Initiative**  
**2010 Independent Monitor's Report**

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March 2011

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## **RIGHTS AND RESOURCES INITIATIVE 2010 INDEPENDENT MONITOR'S REPORT**

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

In keeping with the strong commitment to organizational learning outlined in its Framework Proposal (FP), RRI sponsored its third Independent Monitoring Exercise between August and December 2010. As in the case of the 2009 exercise, Kevin Murray Strategic Consulting assembled a team to carry out the research and prepare this report.

Four primary influences shaped the 2010 exercise. The first is the nature of the RRI program, with its global reach, in geographic terms, and its combination of Country and Regional Initiatives driven by local planning teams, and Global Programs, coordinated by RRG. In addition, the learning promoted by RRG Senior Management greatly influenced the monitoring outcomes. RRG chose the Independent Monitor (IM), approved other team members, facilitated all country visits by KMSC researchers and proposed a set of sources for KMSC to interview for this report. In addition, the experience of the 2009 monitoring exercise greatly influenced the IM's activities in 2010. Finally, the decision taken by RRG to press forward with the refinement of its Internal Monitoring System established a logic of assessment within RRI that provided a much clearer definition of how the Monitoring Team ought to be focusing its efforts.

These forces generated a monitoring exercise built around five primary activities:

*Review of RRI's response to the recommendations of the 2009 Independent Monitoring Report (IMR):* By examining what actions RRG took in response to the 2009 IM Report, the IM provides follow-up to the 2009 exercise and establishes continuity in a multi-year monitoring process. The response to the previous year's report also helped the Independent Monitor orient the framing of the 2010 recommendations.

*Assessment of progress on RRI's Strategic Outcomes:* In revising the RRI Logical Framework (LF) during 2010, RRI refined the five high level Strategic Outcomes (SOs) it had established for its work over the five-year period covered by the Framework Proposal. RRG staff collected data confirming progress toward these outcomes and the Independent Monitor reviewed that data and assessed whether or not RRI is on track to achieve its SOs.

*Selective Validation of Program-Level Annual Monitoring:* As part of the RRI Internal Monitoring System, program-level planning teams monitor their progress toward identified outcomes on an annual basis as part of their annual planning process. The Independent Monitoring Team selectively reviewed the results of that monitoring work in 2010 to assess the program planning process and confirm/validate the monitoring conclusions by triangulating them with other sources of information. RRG chose the Country Programs and Global Programs to be reviewed in this way. Review of Country Programs included a visit by a member of the Monitoring Team to those countries.

*Assessment of RRI's Implementation of its Internal Monitoring System:* Since this was the first year of formal implementation of RRI's Internal Monitoring System, the IM reviewed the launch of this effort. The purpose of the review was to confirm the extent to which the agreed upon monitoring process was, in fact, carried out, rather than to assess the quality or appropriateness of the particular monitoring outputs. The Independent Monitor plays no substantive role in relation to two elements of RRI's Internal Monitoring system: the due diligence monitoring of contractually stipulated activities carried out by other organizations and the establishment of Annual Organizational Priorities by Senior Management and the review of those priorities by the RRG Board.

*Based on the results of the Independent Monitoring exercise, offer RRI recommended actions designed to further the achievement of its mission:* Each of the above monitoring actions includes targeted recommendations related to that area. In addition, the IM offers a set of general recommendations for corrective actions at a strategic or organizational level.

The current report is organized along the lines of these five primary monitoring actions.

In November 2010, RRG presented a report to the Independent Monitor (Appendix Three) detailing how RRG Senior Management had responded to each of the strategic recommendation contained in the 2009 IMR. The care taken by RRG in the preparation of that report showed that it shares the IM's concern that there be follow-up on the key recommendations of each IM report and continuity between the various Independent Monitoring exercises. The report notes significant progress in some areas—such as the recommendation to refine RRI's Internal Monitoring system—and less progress in others—such as the recommendation to explore how

RRI might address the need to be more agile in its responses to perceived opportunities to influence tenure reform processes at the national level. In some cases, RRG did not fully agree with the recommended course of action, and they justify that response in the report, as well. In general, the Monitoring Team felt that RRG took seriously its recommendations, and took decisive steps in those areas it deemed appropriate.

Indicators developed by RRG committed the Coalition to measurable achievements related to each of its Strategic Outcomes. In mid-2010, RRG staff began to gather data to confirm the Coalition's claims of achievement in each Strategic Outcome. Benchmarks established by RRI for 2010 suggested that the Coalition should be able to demonstrate concrete progress in 20 distinct areas by the end of this year. By November 2010, RRG had presented Data Monitoring Reports detailing concrete progress in ten such distinct areas, including, for example, RRI's contribution to the massive tenure reform in China, and the Coalition's timely support of the community forestry sector in Brazil through a 2007 workshop in Acre and the subsequent follow up.

Each of these data presentations validates what RRG considers to be a substantive advance toward one of its Strategic Outcomes during the first three years of the Framework Proposal.<sup>1</sup> After a "catch up" year in 2010, data developed by RRG should pertain only to achievements completed during the specific year under review. The full IMR contains the IM's assessment of each of these presentations and the Indicators and Strategic Outcomes to which they refer. Since this was the first time that RRG presented such data, and the Strategic Outcomes vary significantly in scope and specificity, the data presentations also vary quite a bit. The Monitoring Team offers specific observations on the data presented in each of the ten areas, but generally felt that these met the standard established in RRI's Strategic Outcomes and Indicators of Achievement.

The review of this data also provided an excellent vantage point from which to reflect on the quality, for learning purposes, of the Strategic Outcomes and Indicators included in the revised Logical Framework. These observations are presented with an eye toward a new RRI Framework Proposal rather than as a means of stimulating another revision of the current Logical Framework.

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<sup>1</sup> RRG's Communications and Coalition Manager is organizing this material in a way that will be accessible to the RRI community.

Since RRI's 2010 benchmarks suggested that it should be able to demonstrate progress in 20 specific areas by the end of this year, the IM has yet to receive sufficient data to confirm that implementation is on the track established by RRI for its own progress. We believe that this has more to do with the time RRG staff had to collect and present data than it does with the scope of the Coalition's successful implementation to date. RRG has agreed to present data on achievement in additional areas by February 15, 2011. Given the time conditions under which staff members were preparing data for presentation to the IM, this is a perfectly acceptable resolution from our perspective. It means, however, that we are not currently able to confirm whether or not RRI is on track to achieve what it set out for itself over the five-year period of the Framework Proposal.

The selective validation of program-level monitoring was the most challenging aspect of this monitoring exercise. While all program planning teams had been setting annual outcomes and then reviewing annual achievements, changes decided by RRG this year required that those teams do this work in a more formal way, beginning in 2010. There was not time to fully discuss these changes with the planning teams, especially the country-level planning teams, before the beginning of the planning process in which the monitoring was to take place. As a result, the monitoring discussions were of uneven quality, as was the ability of the Monitoring Team to assess the outputs of those discussions.

RRG identified Bolivia, Mali and Indonesia as the country programs that would be selectively monitored in 2010. The Monitoring Team conducted research visits to each country, and the results of those visits are included in the report. The achievements of the country programs vary, predictably, according to the nature of the RRI partnership in each country and the "ripeness" of the tenure reform process there. In general, the planning teams set desired outcomes for themselves at the beginning of 2010 that were difficult to attain in the course of the year. Part of this is a timing issue, as, in many cases, contracts were not approved and funds disbursed until April and the monitoring review was taking place in August or September.

These findings led the Monitoring Team back to the question raised in 2009 concerning the limitations imposed by the conception of the workplan of RRI Country Initiatives as the set of activities that the Coalition can support via its financial transfers. Another cross-cutting finding that emerged more strongly in 2010 than in 2009 concerns the need expressed by local Partners and Collaborators for more intentional facilitation of communication and coordination among them, between RRI planning meetings, if they are to function as a local coalition working

on a common set of issues, rather than a group of distinct organizations receiving support from a common external source. Addressing this need for national facilitation will require very different responses in different countries, but it is critical to the progress of at least these three country programs. We also noted that legislative actions likely to take place in 2011 make this coming year a critical one for tenure reform in Bolivia. Furthermore, given the importance of Indonesia in the global forestry sector and the key RRI events taking place there in 2011, it is important that RRG direct special attention, in the short term, to building its own expertise on Indonesia and supporting its local coalition there.

RRI Global Programs are planned and implemented very differently than are its Country and Regional Initiatives, and the approach of the Monitoring Team to validating the achievements of that implementation also varied considerably from the monitoring of country programs. RRG decided that, in 2010, the IM would focus on the Strategic Analysis and Network Support programs.

In 2010, in the wake of the frustrating COP in Copenhagen, RRG saw a great opportunity to advance the RRI mission by focusing resources on the facilitation of global and regional multi-stakeholder dialogues on climate change. RRG demonstrated the agile nature of its structure by shifting resources and attention toward this perceived opportunity. The general level of quality of the seven dialogues that resulted is not a matter of debate for the Monitoring Team, but the adjustment meant that the Coalition delivered much more than expected in that area and less than expected in other areas of work, especially other areas of Strategic Analysis.

RRG's core analysis work was focused on supporting the dialogues and other analysis projects received less attention. In addition, this adaptation focused resources on the Rights and Climate Change theme, with accompanying opportunity costs to implementation in the Realizing Rights and ATEMs themes. Sources consulted by the Monitoring Team that possess the information necessary to comment on this situation believe that this was, on balance, an appropriate, even necessary, adjustment, so long as it does not permanently reorient RRI's focus. As admirers of the ability of organizations to shift focus in response to opportunity, we agree, but our reflection on this experience stimulates several of the Strategic Recommendation in this report. Obviously, the focus on dialogues did not over-determine all that happened in Global Programs in 2010, and this report addresses the full range of implementation in the Strategic Analysis and Network Support

programs. This broader reflection leads us to an additional recommendation on how RRI generally conceives of its programs.

In one short year, RRG attempted to design an Internal Monitoring System for RRI and implement that system across a diverse and extraordinary complex field of action. Predictably, that effort encountered areas where there was not time to gather the necessary data or to prepare people who need to play key roles in the process (both staff and Partner/Collaborators). We draw particular attention to the need to discuss further, with all program-level planning teams, the rationale for the monitoring process at that level and RRG hopes for the team's participation in that monitoring work. Going forward, program level monitoring should be based on a clear agreement between the planning team and RRG management as to why and how program monitoring will take place. That said, in the context of everything else it was doing, RRI implemented all elements of its Internal Monitoring System in 2010 and appears to have taken lessons from that process that will help improve future monitoring work. We are not clear that the monitoring commitment has yet found that balance between what would be ideal to achieve and what is possible given the culture, resources and commitments of RRG and its colleagues throughout the Coalition.

While the scope and intensity of the Monitoring Team's engagement with RRI allowed it an appreciation of the Coalition's many significant accomplishments, the engagement also uncovered what we would consider to be "areas of vulnerability" within the coalition. These are not external obstacles to the achievement of RRI's mission, which are many and of great significance. We speak here of areas in which the internal competencies, structures and relationships of the Coalition may not be fully appropriate to the task of addressing the complex context in which RRI operates. In our view, the existence of these vulnerabilities, at moments, impedes RRI from operating "on all cylinders." This notion of operating on all cylinders must be distinguished from the idea of operating "at high velocity," which RRI seems to do consistently, as a cultural pattern. Since these perceived vulnerabilities are internal in nature, they might prove more responsive to corrective action by RRI.

For purposes of this report, we choose to draw attention to these perceived vulnerabilities within RRI:

1. The relative lack of "national facilitation" or organizational support that RRI is able to provide to its country level programs, as they attempt to coordinate their efforts for maximum effect;



2. RRI's planning process, which has improved steadily over the last period, but still absorbs enormous amounts of energy and does not always yield optimal results;
3. The relative lack of internal expertise in RRI concerning one critical country, Indonesia;
4. The tendency of Partner and Collaborator engagement with RRI to mimic patterns of donor and "partner" relations in the field of international philanthropy; and
5. The limits in RRG's management capacity in the face of the challenges of managing a complex, multi-dimensional global network, especially when Senior Managers are also expected to lead multiple lines of program implementation.

### **STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS:**

Our Strategic Recommendations emerge as a list of corrective actions designed to address these vulnerabilities. Some of these are relatively straightforward actions that are elevated to this level of consideration by our sense of their importance. Others are more complex recommendations suggesting an organized review by RRI or the alteration of a major RRI system or structure. In one case, we have chosen to provide a slightly more detailed description of the recommendation, but most recommendations are presented here schematically, as only the broad outline of an idea. We are open, of course, to further discussion of any of these recommendations. The recommendations are not presented in order of importance.

1. **MANAGEMENT CAPACITY:** In view of the exponential increase in demands for process and product management skills within RRG, the time has come for an external assessment of current management resources and approach, as well as an effort to project the likely requirements of successfully managing RRI's continued growth over the next period. Such a study should result in a proposed plan for management training/capacity building over the next period. While this report was being assembled, RRG Senior Management contacted the Monitoring Team to discuss precisely this sort of management review. It is clear, therefore, that a variant of this idea is already on the RRG agenda for 2011. The recommendation persists to highlight the importance of the exercise and to suggest that it needs to address questions of both capacity/resources and approach.
2. **PROGRAM DESIGN:** RRI currently organizes its programs along geographic lines (Country and Regional Initiatives) and functional lines (Global

Programs). We believe that RRI's impact could be enhanced and planning processes rationalized and simplified by a re-conceptualization of at least the Global Programs along thematic lines. RRI has already identified three Strategic Analysis themes that could easily be adapted for this purpose, by releasing those themes from the Strategic Analysis container. In this case, there would be a Rights and Climate Change program, instead of a Rights and Climate Change "theme" within the confines of a Strategic Analysis program. Similarly, RRI would have a Realizing Rights Program and an Alternative Tenure and Enterprise Models program. Strategic Analysis would remain as a "Core Strategy" of RRI, or one of the lines of activity through which RRI attempts to deliver its strategic outcomes (Social communications, Advocacy, Network-Building, Capacity-Building and Resource Transfer might be others). A team of RRG staff would be accountable to develop a program plan and deliver agreed outcomes within each thematic program. This need not lead to any change in the way RRG develops or manages its budget, although over time it might well lead to an alteration of financial control mechanisms.

3. **NATIONAL FACILITATION:** All of the national programs engaged by the Monitoring Team remarked on the limitation to their progress posed by the lack of national facilitation. That is, RRI members felt the need for more direct facilitation of communications and coordination of implementation among coalition members if RRI is to become more than a collection of grantees with a common donor in each country. RRG staff is more able to provide such facilitation in countries where the Regional Facilitator is resident, but other models need to be considered in the majority of countries. RRG should conduct an internal analysis of national facilitation needs and resources during 2011, and the 2012 country and regional planning process should include a discussion of national facilitation options in each country.
4. **PARTNER ASSEMBLY:** Like the reconceptualization of the role of RRG management, a change in the terms of engagement of Partners with the Coalition will require a number of concerted, intentional actions, carried out over a period of time. This recommendation is addressed to one such action that the Monitoring Team believes will move the entire system decidedly in the right direction.

"Partner Meetings" have become a feature of all RRI Coalition meetings. The structure, agenda and objectives of these meetings are not always clear and there is no formal Partner leadership to direct them. As a result of unclear expectations of what these meetings will contribute, they contribute less than

they might. The informality of these meetings reflects a general lack of clarity regarding the role of Partners within the Coalition. This lack of clarity clouds decision-making roles and complicates relationships among Partners and between Partners and RRG. The question is one of Coalition roles, more than meeting process.

We believe that there is much to be gained by formalizing a structure known as a "Partner Assembly." That Assembly would elect its own leadership and develop and facilitate its own agendas (in full coordination with RRG, of course). It might have three main roles:

1. To promote information exchange among Partners and maximize Partner contribution to the mission of RRI.
2. To discuss issues arising in the life of the coalition and, where possible and appropriate, to communicate a Partner perspective on those issues to the RRG Board (this role of informing governance is clear and strong in the IBA).
3. To consider nominations (through a Nominating Committee) of new RRI Partners.

RRG would retain its current decision-making and implementation responsibilities, and the RRG board would continue to govern the overall enterprise. However, this structure would give Partners an important power/responsibility (that of naming new Partners, in consultation, of course, with RRG and its Board). There is no reason for this decision-making power to lie with either RRG or its Board. As now, either a Partner or RRG could put forward a potential Partner. If the Assembly existed, its Nominating Committee (which might include two Assembly members, one RRG rep and someone from the RRG board) would vet proposals according to the existing criteria and make recommendations to the Assembly.

5. **INDONESIA EXPERTISE:** RRG staff possesses very significant expertise on many of the countries in which the Coalition works, but it does not and cannot have high levels of expertise on every country in which the Coalition works. In some cases, however, the presence or absence of specific country expertise can determine program outcomes in the short term.

2011 will be, in some ways, the "year of Indonesia" for RRI. Not only is Indonesia an extremely important country in the international effort to control carbon emissions, but the government has recently reached a path-breaking agreement with the Government of Norway and the World Bank to take

decisive steps to control those emissions. That same Indonesian government will host the next meeting of Megaflorestais (possibly alongside an RRI conference similar to the one in China). In addition, RRI will co-sponsor, with ITTO, an important international forest tenure conference in the archipelago, later in the year. These are important events that will test the strength and the capacity of the local RRI coalition in Indonesia and RRG's ability to manage the complex internal context of the tenure debate in that country.

The findings of the Monitoring Team suggest that, although RRI has more Partners active in Indonesia than in almost any other country, the national coalition faces important developmental challenges there. In addition, while the RRG team certainly includes multiple individuals with knowledge of Indonesia, the Secretariat's level of expertise on Indonesia may not approach what exists in relation to other countries. Given these circumstances, and the important Coalition events planned for Indonesia in 2011, RRG should, on a relatively short timeline, develop a plan to supplement its existing expertise on Indonesia by either engaging a consultant or creating a partnership with an organization that can advise the Secretariat on the positioning, the composition and the design of the upcoming events. RRI has already taken the highly astute step of engaging a highly-recommended Indonesian NGO to support the design and implementation of the ITTO conference. One option would be to deepen the engagement with that NGO to a broader programmatic consultation regarding RRI's work in Indonesia.

- 6. PLANNING TIMELINE:** RRI currently operates on a one-year planning timeline. This requires that RRI facilitate a massive annual planning process that is often assessing results only 3-4 months after the real initiation of the year's activities. It also requires that all contracts be for implementation of activities over a single year. This timeline creates significant time pressure at various points in the process, multiplies transaction costs of all sorts and decreases the value of all assessment and learning activities. A recent, board-led study of the RRI contracting process indicated that any change in the grant-making cycle would cause "other difficulties" that are too daunting to consider. We suggest that a change to a two-year planning cycle (with every other year being a full planning moment and the off-year a mid-term plan review) could bring considerable benefits to all aspects of the Coalition's work (not just administrative transaction costs). It holds out the possibility of a decrease in the overall planning burden on staff, opens up the possibility of two-year contracts and could allow for more substantive, strategic thinking in both the planning and monitoring phases of the work. RRI should seriously

explore the possibility of instituting a two-year planning cycle through its next framework proposal.

## **RIGHTS & RESOURCES INITIATIVE COMPLETE 2010 INDEPENDENT MONITOR'S REPORT**

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

The Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI) is a diverse coalition of organizations that has come together behind a mission of promoting greater global commitment to forest policy and market reforms that increase local household and community ownership, control, and benefits from forests and trees. In addition to the eleven coalition members (Partners), RRI also relies upon the active participation of a large number of organizational and individual Collaborators as well as a core group of committed and knowledgeable donors.

RRI arose from collaborative work beginning over a decade ago among prominent international forest organizations and donor institutions supporting them. In 2005, key leaders within those organizations began to commission and produce strategically relevant work, using a collaborative approach that increased understanding of how to impact forest tenure reform. An interest in building upon this experience led those involved to set up a modest “coordinating mechanism.” That mechanism, which later became the Rights and Resources Group (RRG), had the dual function of strengthening the collaboration among their organizations, and of helping to build a commitment to work on forest tenure within each of those organizations. Very quickly, it became clear that the visionary commitments of those individual leaders—whose relationships to their organizations naturally shifted over time—could not sustain the collaboration. Furthermore, none of the participating organizations had the staff or the time to follow up on collective activities, so the “coordinating mechanism” provided that follow-up on an ad hoc basis. It became evident to all the players that a more formal structure of organizational commitment and implementation would be necessary.

In October 2007, eight organizations came together to execute a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) defining the nature of their collaboration to advance forest tenure reform. They came together as organizations, not as a group of influential leaders of organizations. The common understanding reflected in the MOU established a coalition, called RRI and formalized the already existing coordination mechanism, called RRG, as a nonprofit organization based in Washington, DC. RRG's original Board of Directors was made up primarily of Partner representatives. The RRG Board has evolved into a combination of Partner representatives and independent directors who assume overall governance responsibility for RRG. The

Institutional Business Arrangements (IBA)—another of RRI's foundational documents—outlines the authority and responsibility of the RRG Board of Directors.

At the same time that they executed the MOU, those present agreed on a set of Institutional Business Arrangements (IBA) that defined how the coalition would do its work, and, in particular, the operational modalities of RRG. It is the IBA that establishes RRI's essential value proposition that, “with a limited incremental investment in improved coherence and coordination, existing organizations can dramatically increase their contribution to the rights, dignity and development of forest dependent people globally as well as to forest conservation and more equitable economic and social development.”

The IBA was to be reviewed and revised on a regular basis, as necessary, while the MOU would be revisited periodically and revised by a more formal process. With the institutional basis of the coalition established, RRG then led the process to conceptualize and draft a five-year Framework Proposal (FP) that became the basis of fruitful discussions between the coalition and the funding community concerning possible support for RRI's tenure reform agenda.

In this Framework Proposal, RRI's monitoring and evaluation commitments are first made explicit. According to the FP, RRG was to establish both an internal monitoring information system and engage an Independent Monitoring Team to work over the course of the project to monitor progress. The FP also commits RRI to mid-term evaluation of the coalition's achievement of its desired strategic outcomes. The clearest statement of the role of the Independent Monitoring Team is that, “In collaboration with RRI, the monitoring agency will develop a set of indicators and measurements to monitor the progress and ensure learning by all involved.”

In late 2008, RRG contracted Philanthropy Support Services, Inc. to act as RRI's Independent Monitor for the duration of the five-year period of the Framework Proposal. In February 2009, Philanthropy Support Services, Inc. (PSS) presented the first Independent Monitoring Report of RRI activities. Given time and resource constraints, it was decided that the first monitoring exercise would be a desk review, based on analysis of key internal and external documents and interviews with selected stakeholders. PSS was to conduct a more rigorous monitoring exercise in 2009, including monitoring visits to countries in which RRI was involved in country-level work.

During the preparation period for the 2009 independent monitoring exercise, it became clear that internal conditions within PSS would make it impossible for the organization to monitor the coalition's 2009 activities. In October 2009, RRG contracted Kevin Murray Strategic Consulting (KMSC) to act as the independent monitor of RRI's 2009 activities.

KMSC carried out the 2009 monitoring exercise, as planned, and presented a draft report for review at the annual meetings of RRI's Partners and donors in January 2010. Based on input from those meetings KMSC filed a final 2009 Independent Monitoring Report in February 2010.

During late 2009 and early 2010, RRI carried out the required comprehensive review of its Memorandum of Understanding. As a result of that review, the coalition approved a number of amendments to the MOU. Ten of the twelve original signatories of the MOU agreed to the amended MOU and continued to participate in the coalition as RRI Partners. The other two organizations agreed to continue to support RRI's work as Collaborators of the coalition.

After the submission of the 2009 Independent Monitoring Report, RRG reviewed the performance of the KMSC team that performed the monitoring exercise and decided to engage KMSC to perform the 2010 Independent Monitoring Exercise and, in addition, to work with RRG staff to provide more definition to the coalition's independent monitoring system, and to support the implementation of that system.

The current report is a primary product of that engagement.



## **II. METHODOLOGY**

The Terms of Reference agreed to by RRG and KMSC for the 2010 monitoring exercise establish the outlines of a project to take place over a period of July 2009-February 2010. In practice, intensive activity began with attendance at the Indonesia planning meeting at the end of August. As in the case of the 2009 exercise, RRG designed the 2010 effort to focus on determining whether or not RRI is having the impact necessary to achieve its ambitious Strategic Outcomes.

Three important elements of this process distinguish it from the 2009 exercise. In 2009, the monitoring exercise took place alongside an effort commissioned by the RRG Board to review the coalition's Memorandum of Understanding. Since that latter review was focused on the internal operations of the coalition, KMSC was directed not to take internal operations into account in its work. In 2010, this somewhat artificial distinction between internal operations and external impact was removed and KMSC was instructed to take into account the internal life of the coalition to the extent that it had an effect on the observable outcomes achieved by the coalition.

In addition, during the period between the completion of the 2009 Independent Monitor's report and the initiation of the 2010 monitoring exercise, KMSC worked with RRG staff to formalize RRG's internal monitoring system. By defining the internal monitoring commitment of RRI and the relationship between internal and independent monitoring, that work gave a clearer shape to the work of the Independent Monitor. In 2010, the Independent Monitoring work took place in a way that was more clearly complementary to RRI's own monitoring work.

Finally, the 2009 exercise was KMSC's first interaction with RRI and its work. The 2010 exercise benefitted from the significant economies of continuity that result from the knowledge and relationships established during the 2009 monitoring work. These economies of continuity emerge in all aspects of the process and should increase the usefulness of the 2010 Independent Monitoring report to RRG and all of the other RRI stakeholders making use of it.

In view of its own commitments related to internal monitoring, RRG defined the primary elements of the Independent Monitor's role in 2010 as follows:

- Provide an external assessment of progress on the coalition's highest level strategic outcomes;

- Identify obstacles to RRI's overall progress, offer RRG's senior management recommendations on actions to overcome those obstacles and monitor organizational response to those recommendations;
- Selectively validate the RRI's own program-level self-assessments;
- Monitor and report on RRG's actions in response to the 2009 Independent Monitoring report; and
- Prepare an annual Independent Monitoring Report for RRG, the coalition Partners and the RRG Board of Directors

In addition, since the implementation of RRI's internal monitoring system had such an impact on this year's independent monitoring work, the current report contains a brief assessment of RRI's efforts to make its internal monitoring more systematic. This assessment will not be a permanent feature of the IM's work.

To successfully carry out its charge, the Independent Monitor (IM) carried out a set of monitoring activities very similar to those carried out in 2009. These included:

1. Review of all relevant internal RRI documents and select externally produced documents on relevant themes;
2. Review of RRI publications and other communications products;
3. Monitoring trips to RRI country programs recommended by RRG (Bolivia, Indonesia and Mali);<sup>2</sup>
4. Attendance at the November 2010 RRI Global Planning meeting and RRG Board Meeting;
5. In-depth interviews with RRG staff board members, as well as RRI Partner representatives, Collaborators, and financial supporters (See Appendix One).
6. Interviews with a list of external actors deemed by RRG to be in a position to provide a valuable perspective on the coalition's work (Also included in Appendix One).

The primary difference between the 2009 and 2010 activities was that the documents provided by RRI included a number of internal documents prepared specifically as monitoring inputs in keeping with the internal monitoring system being implemented by RRG for the first time. These inputs greatly increased the quantity and the quality of the monitoring information available to the IM.

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<sup>2</sup> As in the case of 2009, these monitoring visits implied the formation of a small independent monitoring team, with one member carrying out the monitoring visit to Indonesia and another doing the same in Mali.

KMSC evaluated and analyzed the database resulting from its investigation using the insights of a number of evaluation methods including Logical Framework Analysis, the Composite Logic Model<sup>3</sup>, Outcome Mapping<sup>4</sup>, Participatory Learning<sup>5</sup> and Capacity-Building Systems. In practice, however, the most useful methodological input came from a review of Real Time Evaluation (RTE) methodology, as employed by UNDP and a variety of other governmental and nongovernmental actors.<sup>6</sup> RTE challenges the traditional view of monitoring as simply an information-gathering activity to provide the basis for an evaluation to take place at a later stage. RTE methodology suggests that it is possible, in a very compressed timeframe, to both monitor performance on short-term outcomes and identify “bottlenecks” and “red flags” that threaten future implementation. While stopping short of a general assessment of the effectiveness of core strategies or progress against global outcomes, RTE can provide useful information concerning progress toward annual outcomes and the efficacy of strategies used to achieve them. Most importantly, RTE recommendations can provide board and management with the basis for mid-term course corrections that can dramatically improve global outcomes. To date, RTE has been used primarily in the review of humanitarian operations, but its insights can also be applied with positive result to the rapid assessment of longer-term projects, including those with an advocacy, or policy change, focus.

The nature of this exercise made it extremely important that KMSC have unencumbered access to large amounts of information, including many internal documents. Deborah Barry, Director of Country Programs and the Project Manager for this engagement, and Jenna DiPaolo, Manager for Coalition and Communications, worked wonders to make this information available, and to address any issue that arose for the Monitoring Team. They both did this while attending to a wide range of other activities. The rest of the members of RRG’s Senior Management team made themselves fully available to the Monitoring Team, as did the other members of the RRG staff. Partners and Collaborators cooperated fully with KMSC field researchers and, where field visits coincided with important local planning activities, coordinators of those activities invited the active observation of KMSC researchers, without limitation. Finally, external actors almost always responded enthusiastically to an opportunity to talk about RRI. They shared freely their excitement about the work of the coalition as well as their sense of the

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<sup>3</sup> See [http://www.innonet.org/index.php?section\\_id=6&content\\_id=637](http://www.innonet.org/index.php?section_id=6&content_id=637) for an application of the Composite Logic Model to the challenges of evaluating advocacy projects.

<sup>4</sup> For a short summary of the Outcome Mapping Approach, see <https://www.comminit.com/en/node/306114>.

<sup>5</sup> This article deals with a variety of approaches under the rubric of participatory learning evaluation. <http://learningforsustainability.net/evaluation/approaches.php>

<sup>6</sup> For a review of the value of RTE in the assessment and strengthening of humanitarian operations, see <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2772>.

challenges before it. The willingness of external stakeholders to reflect on the organization and the enthusiasm with which they offered their opinions provide important “intangible” data to any monitoring process.

### **III. RRG'S RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS OF 2009 INDEPENDENT MONITORING REPORT**

As in the case of the current report, the Independent Monitor's 2009 report contained a wide range of observation and suggested actions to be considered by RRG. These occurred at the program level, the thematic level and at the level of the entire coalition. In summarizing the report, the IM chose to highlight six of these observations as formal "Recommendations" to RRG, its Partners and the Donor Consortium. These included:

**Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning System:** Consistent with the coalition's foundational commitments, RRI must complete the work of putting in place a fully functional MEL system (during the first half of 2010). At a minimum, that requires a revision of the indicators in the existing log-frame and the establishment of information gathering systems consistent with the needs of monitoring progress on those indicators. The 2010 Independent Monitoring Exercise must be able to use the updated indicators and the information that supports them. The establishment of a working MEL system should also include an analysis of the extent to which these log-frame indicators fully meet RRI's learning needs, and, as necessary, the consideration of alternative MEL approaches that might complement log-frame analysis in maximizing RRI's learning about what works and what doesn't work in its strategic approach. A decision to embrace complementary approaches would also imply additional work to integrate all approaches into a single, coherent system.

**Coalition Strengthening:** RRI should review existing internal communications procedures with the goal of establishing fluid communications that deepen the relationships among coalition members, while keeping those members fully informed of relevant coalition activities. In addition, RRG should carefully analyze its efforts to maximize synergies among Partner actions, especially at the global program level. Articulation between Country and Regional Initiatives and RRI Global Programs is certainly important, but the integration of Partners into the design, planning and execution of RRI Global Program is a separate, and equally important, issue. Where existing capacity is insufficient to achieve such integration, RRG should consider developing that capacity.

**Country Priorities:** RRI should establish a method to annually review its choices regarding priority countries for Country and Regional Initiatives with an eye toward consistently targeting interventions in locations of maximum opportunity for progress on tenure reform. Given that RRI cannot infinitely expand the number of

countries in which it is working, agility and responsiveness will require more discussion of the issue of program transition away from countries that no longer offer real possibilities for the sorts of tenure reform sought by the coalition.

**Contracting System:** In light of Partner comments on the impact of RRG's contracting system on implementation, RRI should review that system with an eye toward capturing efficiencies, identifying potential bottlenecks and shortening the overall length of the process. This recommendation is closely linked to the one on operational capacity described below.

**Communications Capacity:** RRG should seriously consider adding a dedicated communications staff position to be filled by a communications professional with skills and experiences consistent with RRI's communications strategy. That strategy should be reviewed with an eye toward expanding the network of users of RRI's publications and analysis and exploring the use of new media to expand public awareness of RRI's perspective and use of RRI materials. A carefully-designed survey of current users of RRI communications products would provide indispensable grounding for any review of communications strategy, as would an effort to activate the impressive communications capabilities of many RRI Partners behind the coalition's communications objectives.

**Operational Capacity:** RRG should assess its operational capacity based on projected needs over the next three years and make a plan to create operational capacity in line with those needs. Contracting additional permanent staff is only one way to build such capacity. In the short-term, however, an additional financial/administrative person to focus attention on the contracting process and related activities seems like an urgent necessity.

Over the course of 2010, the IM was in ongoing communication with RRG in relation to these recommendations, beginning with a conversation in the immediate aftermath of the presentation of the report to clarify the meaning of these recommendations. When RRG and the IM agreed on the list of RRG inputs to the 2010 Independent Monitoring exercise, the IM requested that those include a short document in which RRG details its response to the 2009 recommendation, including actions taken by RRG in response to the recommendations. RRG complied with that request, and the document is included as Appendix Six to this report.

The report repeats the IM's recommendations and then details how RRG has responded to each. We offer here a few brief observations on that report.

*Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning System:* We provide a deeper reflection on RRG's refinement and implementation of its internal monitoring system in the next section of this report. Suffice it to say here that strengthening of its internal monitoring and evaluation system was clearly a priority for RRG in 2010. It had been closely monitoring its work since the coalition's inception, but the work in 2010 gave that monitoring effort a more systematic character and integrated internal monitoring with the efforts of the coalition's Independent Monitor. RRG took the bold decision to implement its internal monitoring system in the context of also addressing myriad other priorities in 2010. The decision resulted in some organizational strain, but also has put the organization in a stronger position regarding monitoring than it was at the end of 2009.

*Coalition Strengthening:* RRG identifies five steps that it took to strengthen the organizational basis of RRI during 2010. The Independent Monitor affirms that these steps took place and that they each represent a positive step in the direction of a stronger, more vibrant coalition. It should also be acknowledged that, in light of one of those steps (the MOU review), two coalition Partners decided to change their relationships with RRI to one of ongoing collaboration, rather than partnership. While this action may have consolidated the unity of the coalition (and, hence, its strength), losing Partners of the size, quality and influence of IUCN and CIFOR certainly also weakens the coalition in some ways. Any network like RRI will always face extremely strong centripetal forces, and effectively countering those forces will require that RRG make the care and feeding of RRI an ongoing priority. To that end, we include additional suggestions regarding coalition strengthening later in this report.

*Country Priorities:* RRI sees the importance of strategic thinking about how it can balance the dual expectations/requirements of building strong country-level relationships based on a sense of trust and mutual commitment and being opportunistic in the application of its resources to those situations where there are realistic possibilities of advances in tenure reform. While informal discussions on the theme take place constantly, RRG did not find or create an adequate venue for a strategic reflection on this theme involving all key stakeholders. This will most certainly be on the agenda in 2011, as RRI conducts a Mid-term Evaluation of its work and begins to look seriously at how to position RRI in the next period.

*Contracting System:* Aware of the complexity of RRG's contracting system and the challenges it poses for Partners, Collaborators and RRG staff alike, in 2010 RRG

commissioned a study of the contracting system its Board Chair, John Hudson. In the resulting report to RRG, Hudson explores some of the most important problems of the system and recommends solutions. Actions taken by RRG regarding staffing of the Accounting and Finance function seem to respond directly to the Hudson findings. These are positive steps that should make the contracting aspect of RRG's work more pleasant and efficient for all involved.

Despite these positive steps, it remains unclear to the Monitoring Team how RRG decides that the activities relating to a given are sufficiently complete and that the contract is, therefore, formally closed. Surely, there is an important role for the regional (Facilitators and Coordinators) staff that are closest to the work of Partners and Collaborators, but these staff are often so pressured by other program tasks that they cannot devote attention to contract-related documentation. This is also closely related to the nature of the documentation required by RRG to satisfy contractual due diligence.

Actions taken by RRG in 2010 may well improve the contracting process in the short run, but there remain issues to be addressed concerning the place of the contracting process in RRI's overall mission, and the relationship to that process of RRI Partners and Collaborators, as well as RRG non-financial staff.

*Communications Capacity:* RRG Senior Management has opted not to implement the core recommendation of the IM regarding increased communications capacity—to position a dedicated communications director/manager at the center of its communications strategy. They considered the recommendation seriously and concluded that their communications needs would best be served by another configuration. This is all that can be expected in response to any external recommendation. We expect that the question of communications strategy will be revisited as part of the strategic reflection following the completion of the Mid-Term review.

RRG details a number of steps it has taken during 2010 to increase communications capacity, including the hiring of a Coalition and Communications Manager with strong professional experience in the area of communication. In addition, RRG has created a number of new communications products and undertaken a major redesign of the website that will go live in the next few months. Perhaps the most impressive communications results continue to emerge in the area of positioning RRI and its message in the mainstream and alternative press. The collaboration with Burness Communications continues to bear fruit. We continue to believe that RRI still



has unrealized communications potential, but it is difficult to argue with the impressive outcomes of RRG's current communications program.

*Operations Capacity:* As in the case of communications capacity, RRG details a number of steps that it is taking in response to its own sense of the need for additional administrative capacity. These are all appropriate steps that respond to some of the most obvious and immediate necessities. Taken together, however, these steps will not allow the organization to "get ahead of" the growing operational demands it faces. These growing demands are entirely a function of the rapid growth of RRI and the strategic conception of RRG's role that underlies that growth. An adequate response to these institutional demands will require a deeper strategic reflection on where RRI intends to go over the next period, what sort of Secretariat those desires imply, and what institutional resources will be necessary to support that vision. It is just that sort of reflection that RRI seems to be planning to initiate following the completion of the Mid-term Evaluation in late 2011.

We note, with respect and appreciation, the rigor with which RRG addressed the recommendations of the 2009 Internal Monitor's report. We see this as indicative of a commitment to reflective praxis that characterizes much of what the organization does. We further hope that the process has been useful to all coalition stakeholders as they seek to position the coalition and prioritize among the dizzying array of possibilities before it.

## **IV. ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS ON RRI'S STRATEGIC OUTCOMES**

As part of its effort to make its internal monitoring more systematic, RRG Senior Management led a revision of the Logical Framework summarizing the coalition's strategic intent, theory of change and key indicators of progress. The original logical framework had emerged from discussions involving key actors in the creation of RRI and potential financial supporters of the project in 2007.

The revision of RRI's Logical Framework (LF) had three principal objectives:

1. To make sure that the statements in the LF were current in the sense of reflecting the current reality of the coalition and its external allies;
2. To make RRI's highest level statements of intent more specific and more clearly aligned with the project's overall purpose; and
3. To update existing indicators of achievement to make them consistent with the amended statements of intent and more amenable to measurement via accessible and practical data-gathering strategies.

The revised LF is included here as Appendix Two to this report.

In revising its LF, RRI retained the highest level planning categories of the original LF. Those are: "Development Objective/Goal" and "Project Objective/Purpose." As in the original LF, no indicators are presented to measure progress toward the overall Goal, but there are indicators presented in relation to the Purpose. The revised Log-Frame changes these indicators to read as follows:

- Track and disseminate global progress on statutory tenure reform in developing countries
- Mobilize a global effort through the creation of a coalition

The original Log-Frame positioned tenure tracking in this prominent way because the Coalition posed a specific statistical change in local ownership as a primary measure indicating that RRI was achieving its purpose. It positioned the measurement of poverty in the forest in the same way because RRI also viewed a specific change in levels of poverty in the forest as a second statistical key indicator of progress. This has changed, on both counts, in the revised Log-Frame, and represents the major conceptual change reflected in the revised LF. The revised

indicators do not tie RRI's conception of its own success to specific changes in either local forest ownership or poverty in the forest. The Monitoring Team believes that this change reflects an appropriate clarification of the way RRI conceives of its success.

For the Monitoring Team, the first of these indicators treats the activity of producing tenure trend data as a measure that RRI is achieving the Purpose for which it was intended. While the gathering and presentation of this data is extremely important to RRI, and represents an important contribution of the Coalition to the global movement for tenure reform, this is better positioned as a critical activity of Strategic Analysis, rather than an indicator that the Coalition is achieving its purpose. If it is to be retained as an indicator in this way, then the language should become more specific and it should be stated so that progress is measurable, in some way.

The second indicator above suggests that the creation of a large, effective coalition in support of tenure reform is central to the purpose of RRI. The only issue with this indicator is that, as stated, the creation of a global coalition, regardless of how large or effective, would mean that the indicator had been fully achieved. This may be sufficient, if the Strategic Outcomes that complement the Goal and Purpose are understood as providing the basis for determining whether or not the coalition is, indeed, effective.

RRI introduced the category of **Strategic Outcome (SO)** through the revision of the LF. In RRI's judgment, these outcomes define the Coalition's highest-level priorities. They include:

- SO1--Complementary global, national, regional and local organizations effectively synergize to achieve significant breakthroughs in tenure reform processes.
- SO2--A select set of strategic networks are better-informed, more active and effective in promoting reform nationally, regionally and/or globally.
- SO3--Key strategic actors at the global level are committed and engaged in promoting major reforms in existing tenure, regulatory and governance arrangements.
- SO4--Changes in tenure legislation and regulatory or policy framework in favor of local communities occur in a subset of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
- SO5--More equitable forest governance, enterprise and conservation models are identified and disseminated and/or more broadly supported as a viable approach to support social and economic development.

RRI identified an indicator that could be used to measure progress toward the realization of each outcome, but, in recognition of the limits of its own capacity to gather data to validate quantitative indicators, it decided to highlight a single indicator of progress on each outcome. Having identified a strong indicator for each SO, RRI devised a strategy to gather information related to each indicator. Finally, RRG completed an exercise of setting 2010 benchmarks suggesting where the coalition should be by the end of 2010 in the achievement of each of its SOs.

The Independent Monitor receives information from RRG in describing achievements related to each SO. This information comes in the form of Monitoring Data Reports prepared by the RRG staff most closely associated with the work being described. The IM then assesses this information based on three criteria:

1. Is the information corroborated by other sources of information available to the IM?
2. Does the information sustain RRI's claim of achievement in this area?
3. More generally, to what extent is RRI's collective achievement as of the end of 2010 consistent with the benchmarks that it has established?

Before presenting the assessment of the data provided to the IM, it seems important to note that the SOs and indicators in question were only established in June 2010. While RRG staff certainly had collected a huge amount of information related to their achievements through 2010, that data was not in a form that could be readily applied to the specific indicators included in the revised Logical Framework. Consequently, in a period of four months, RRG staff had to create the database supporting measureable claims of achievement since the inception of the project in 2008. The relevant staff did create a significant and impressive body of data, but they were not able to provide data related to all of the achievements during this period. Senior Management made the IM aware of this issue prior to the deadline for submitting monitoring data and an agreement was reached that RRG would provide the data supporting roughly half of the outcome-related achievements it is claiming for the period, 2008-10, and would also develop a reasonable timetable for the preparation and presentation of the additional data. Given the circumstances, this arrangement was entirely acceptable to the IM.

The ten, currently available Monitoring Data Reports are not included with this report, but they will be available to RRI stakeholders on the Internet.

**STRATEGIC OUTCOME 1 (SO1)--Complementary global, national, regional and local organizations effectively synergize to achieve significant breakthroughs in tenure reform processes.**

This outcome speaks to the direct impact of the formation of the RRI coalition. It suggests that the synergy created by the coming together of the Partners and Collaborators that make up RRI will lead to forest tenure “breakthroughs.” The indicator chosen to measure progress on this outcome is:

*Facilitate at least twenty new, value-added joint actions and activities between Partners and Collaborators with a demonstrable effect on the other strategic outcomes.*

This indicator suggests that the impact of the coalition can be measured by incidents of RRI Partners and Collaborators working together on actions that (1) would not have happened in the absence of RRI and (2) can be shown to affect other outcomes. The intent here is to highlight the ability of RRI-facilitated formations at all levels to carry out coordinated activities that can be shown to impact tenure reform processes.

RRI reports on three achievements related to this outcome:

1. The formation of a national forestry alliance in Guatemala that brings together highland and lowland forest communities in increasingly effective policy analysis and advocacy work at the national level;
2. The emergence of a strong national coalition in Cameroon that has effectively engaged with government to raise the profile of community forestry in the country. This has increased the chances that the national Forestry Law will be re-written so as to favor the rights of forest-dependent communities;
3. The organization of a series of global and regional dialogues on Rights, Forests and Climate Change placed tenure reform and rights safeguards squarely on the REDD agenda;
4. The consolidation of a national coalition RRI in Bolivia capable of adding value to the separate efforts of the member organizations;
5. The identification of a number of strategic “tenure champions” in Burkina Faso capable of acting together to influence tenure reform there;
6. The formation of the NRM Confederation in Nepal to more effectively advance a pro-poor tenure agenda there and the resulting impact of NRM on national tenure debates;

7. The collaboration resulting in the Yaoundé Conference on Tenure Reform in Africa helped re-cast the debate on tenure reform in Central and West Africa and created interesting opportunities for advancing progressive tenure reforms in the region.

**GUATEMALA:** The formation and subsequent functioning of the National Alliance of Community Forestry was observed and confirmed during the 2009 Independent Monitoring visit to that country. The importance of such an alliance, in the historical context of divisions between highland and lowland forest communities in Guatemala, cannot be overstated. That the Alliance has become a key participant in national debates on tenure reform is well-established in the data presented by RRI and corroborated by information provided by other interviewees.

RRI did not play a direct role in the formation of the Alliance, but two of the founding organizations were RRI Collaborators. More importantly, RRI's work during the first two years of its existence in Guatemala paved the way for the formation of the Alliance in a variety of ways. Individuals directly involved in the promotion of the Alliance have acknowledged this fact in conversations with the Monitoring Team.

While the creation of the Alliance has certainly strengthened the community forestry sector in Guatemala and increased its leverage with relevant policy-making bodies, the concrete policy outcomes of that strengthened position are not yet fully apparent to our team. We acknowledge the importance of the establishment of the Alliance and the relationships it has subsequently developed with governmental and other key institutions, but this work will more strongly evidence the kind of change envisioned in SO1 when it achieves demonstrable gains on its primary policy objectives.

**CAMEROON:** Similarly, the coming together of the RRI coalition in Cameroon represents an important alteration in the balance of forces in that nation's forest sector. While not without its challenges, the coordination represents an unusual level of collaboration between international organizations operating in Cameroon and the national NGOs involved in the community sector.

Organized in May 2009 with major RRI involvement, the Yaoundé Conference represented both the maturation of RRI as a regional coordination and the emergence of the national coalition as a group that the government would have to take into account in its consideration of forest policy. Key government forest officials attended the conference and affirmed the government's desire to amend the

National Forestry Law, taking into account the customary rights of forest communities. The conference ended with the Yaoundé Declaration, which stands as a blueprint for forest tenure reform in Cameroon and throughout the West Africa region.

While RRI Collaborators did successfully negotiate with the government the disposition of certain strategic tracts of forest land, the broader discussion of the Forestry Law has moved forward slowly. The national coalition retains the commitment to coordinate its activities around shared advocacy goals, but tensions between the national and international members of the coalition on positioning in relation to the government of Cameroon on legal tenure reforms are becoming more pronounced. Specifically, some of the national NGOs in Cameroon feel that larger, international RRI Partners are preventing the coalition from the more aggressive positioning in the internal tenure debate necessary to achieve the Coalition's goals. As in the case of Guatemala, the formation of the RRI coalition has changed the profile of the community forestry sector, but has not yet led to the policy breakthrough once thought to be imminent.

**DIALOGUES ON RIGHTS, FORESTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE:** RRI's reporting of results on SO1 through the promotion of a series of international and regional dialogues is different from the data gathered on the previous two achievements. These dialogues point to the impact of coalition activities on global and regional levels, rather than the national level. They also represent a set of activities in which the contribution of RRI, and particularly that of RRG, was more clearly determinative. Finally, RRI documents multiple changes in policy—some quite significant—that can be traced, at least in part, to these dialogues.

The Independent Monitoring Team did not attend any of the dialogues, which was probably a methodological oversight in 2010, given the importance of these dialogues to RRI's overall program during that year. We did, however, interview a variety of external and internal actors who attended and/or actively organized the dialogues. Within RRI circles, there was some questioning of whether or not the outcomes of the dialogues justified the extraordinary RRG investment in them (again, especially in 2010). There was, however, a remarkable level of agreement on the important results of the dialogues.

In its own data presentation, RRI highlights the outcomes in terms of establishing the centrality of tenure reform within the REDD and, especially, the REDD+ processes, and in getting key institutions to recognize the critical importance of rights

safeguards to a successful implementation of REDD. Other participants confirm the importance of the dialogues in these areas, but also give more attention to two other areas. At least two observers—one from government and another from civil society—insisted that the key result of at least two of the dialogues was the promotion of direct civil society participation in the REDD+ partnership launched by the Norwegian government. This participation is still not accepted in practice by all members of the partnership, but the dialogues in early 2010 raised this question in a direct way and resulted in some important concrete steps in this direction. Other participants point to the same dialogues in early 2010 as one of many factors in the re-establishment of global negotiating momentum in the wake of the deflating experience of COP 16 in Copenhagen. If the recently-concluded meetings in Cancún yield important steps forward in the REDD process, these actors will credit the RRI dialogues with creating some of the momentum for these results. There will be, of course, many other factors in such a result, some of them with a great deal more significance than the RRI dialogues, but the contribution of the dialogues seems clear.

In addition, the dialogues helped RRI efforts to build its identity as an organization that combines unique analytical capabilities with an ability to convene diverse stakeholders to openly dialogue around issues related to forest tenure. The consolidation of this identity will likely prove to have great value for RRI's overall mission, but, given the Secretariat's severe resource constraints, the investment in dialogues also implies high, short-term opportunity costs. RRI will continue to build upon the experience of these dialogues, but will attempt to shift the work of coordination and logistical support away from RRG to coalition Partners and Collaborators, as well as allied organizations.

**BOLIVIA:** In this case, RRI suggests that the emergence of a consolidated country team in Bolivia represents a milestone on the path to the achievement of SO1. Someone outside of this process could more easily assess this report if the Outcome and Indicator references clearly reflected the outcome and indicator in the RRI Logical Framework to which the report is connected. The 2010 independent monitoring exercise included a trip to Bolivia, during which the IM interviewed all members of the Bolivia country team. It was clear that the members of the team are aware of RRI's objectives and are, together, planning RRI work on an annual basis. While the current coalition is probably adding value to the separate activities of member organizations, the country coalition members unanimously observed that they had not yet been able to achieve the synergy among the efforts of individual efforts necessary to have a determinant impact on national debates on tenure



reform. A more compelling claim regarding a milestone toward SO1 in Bolivia might have been documentation of a joint effort by Bolivian member organizations that had a demonstrable impact on the debate occurring in 2010 on the autonomy law in Bolivia. That RRI is having an impact in Bolivia is beyond question. Whether or not work done to date on the consolidation of the national program represents “value-added joint activities between Partners/Collaborators with a demonstrable effect on other strategic outcomes” is debatable. We will return to this question in the summary of this section.

**BURKINA FASO:** Beyond any question, the work of RRI has been absolutely indispensable to the process of identifying the members of a first-of-its-kind coalition of “tenure champions” in Burkina Faso. In addition to identifying these organizations, RRI has convened these organizations into a functional body quite capable of doing joint strategic analysis and planning. Once, again, there is no question that this has been a valuable contribution to tenure reform in Burkina Faso. There is, however, reason to wonder whether or not this represents a milestone on the path to achieving SO1.

**MALI:** Very much as in the case of Burkina Faso, RRI reports that the establishment of a “tenure champions platform” in Mali represents demonstrable progress toward the achievement of SO1. Our assessment of this claim follows closely our considerations in relation to Burkina Faso. It may very well be that the establishment of the platform described in this report establishes the preconditions for the sorts of joint actions or activities implied by this indicator. The indicator, however, seems to be suggesting that progress toward SO1 will be measured by documenting actions or activities that occur once these preconditions have been established.

**NRM Confederation:** Here RRI's report points to the coalition's role (through its national Partner, FECOFUN) in establishing and supporting a broader confederation of forest-user groups in Nepal. In this case, the claim is not only that the confederation was formed, but that its members took actions on several tenure-related issues, including efforts by the national government to roll back existing tenure rights and to establish new protected areas that would conflict with the rights of forest communities. The report includes links to press releases and other supporting data describing the actions of this confederation. The formation of NRM has certainly resulted in concrete actions that have had an impact on forest tenure. It is less clear that the emergence of NRM is the result of “value-added synergy” among RRI Partners and Collaborators (rather than a supported initiative of

FECOFUN), but this is, nonetheless, a clear example of the sort of results that RRI meant to use to demonstrate progress toward the achievement of SO1.

**Yaoundé Tenure Reform Conference:** The Yaoundé Conference held in May 2009 seems to represent a very good example of the kind of joints actions by which RRI wants to measure progress on SO1. It was the outcome of synergy of RRI efforts at the global, regional and national levels. That collaboration resulted in a concrete joint action and that joint action is shown to have had multiple effects on tenure debates throughout the region. Those impacts have not included the “tenure breakthroughs” sought in other RRI strategic outcomes, but the data attached to this report clearly document the multi-faceted impacts of the conference.

**SUMMARY:** SO1 focuses RRI's attention on changes in the behavior of pro-tenure organizations operating at all levels. It suggests that RRI will contribute to:

1. Such organizations taking concrete steps to increase the level of coordination among them;
2. That coordination bearing fruits in the form of concrete joint actions that impact tenure reform processes in demonstrable ways.

In addition, this outcome points specifically to the added value of the RRI coalition, itself. SO2, by contrast, points to the outcome achieved by RRI by affecting other external networks. The indicator chosen to show progress on this outcome relates directly to the second of these two aspects of the outcome, the concrete joint actions. By naming a number of joint activities to be carried out, the indicator leads RRI to monitor activities. This almost irresistible urge can take the focus off of the desired outcome.

In gathering data related to this outcome, RRI chose to highlight at least four instances in which the main achievement was to facilitate the formation of some sort of platform, coalition or alliance. As we noted above, this work may well have established the preconditions for the realization of the outcome, but these were probably not the sort of outputs envisioned when the key indicator was established. In general, we sense that RRI has done a very good job of increasing coordination of pro-tenure organizations around shared objectives consistent with RRI's vision, but the concrete outcomes of that enhanced coordination have been uneven so far, especially at the country and regional levels.

**STRATEGIC OUTCOME 2 (SO2)--A select set of strategic networks are better-informed, more active and effective in promoting reform nationally, regionally and/or globally.**

This outcome expresses a second way in which RRI wishes to impact tenure debates: by influencing the orientation of networks of organizations outside of RRI that work on issues related to forest tenure. RRI understands that working to strengthen external civil society networks increases the effect of the Coalition's advocacy and strategic analysis work. In some cases, it has formed networks to broaden its own influence within a particular policy space. In other cases, it has invested its resources in strengthening existing networks that it believes could play a more important role on a given issue. As part of its annual planning process, RRI identifies the networks upon which it will focus its attention in the coming year, and makes conscious decisions concerning allocation of resources to those relationships. Staff at all levels, including Senior Management, invest time and energy in relations with external networks. This level of strategic intentionality regarding relations with external networks is rare in our experience of advocacy and research organizations. The indicator chosen to measure progress on this outcome is:

*At least 6 existing or new networks increase their capacity to influence policy related to forest tenure at all levels.*

This indicator is, in some ways, less demanding than the one established for SO1. It does quantify a target number of networks to be positively engaged over the term of the Framework Proposal, but it requires only that these networks increase their power to influence tenure-related policy. Such an increase says little about whether or not meaningful influence actually occurred. Also unspoken here is a clear sense that RRI will not measure its progress through just any influence on the capacity of external networks. Clearly RRI intends to increase the capacity of networks to influence policy in a direction with RRI's overall strategy.

**MEGAFLORESTAIS:** Senior forestry officials from five countries attended a conference co-organized by RRI in Beijing in 2005. Seeing possible opportunity in the coincidence, RRI convened the five forest leaders in a separate session and Megaflorestais was born. The network, for which RRI was immediately invited to provide coordination, has evolved to become an informal discussion space for forestry officials of many of the world's most forested countries. These same officials

come together often in other, more formal settings, but the informality and flexibility of Megaflorestais (MF) seems to fill an important void.

RRI's reporting on MF connects the existence of the network to a variety of important results in participating countries. Interviews with MF participants and others from participating countries allow the Independent Monitoring Team to corroborate many, if not all of these claims. This is another case in which each of these results clearly had multiple causal factors, but the existence of the relationships facilitated by MF is certainly one of those causal factors. Our interviews certainly support the overall claim that Megaflorestais has been a very important venue for the sharing of tenure reform practices across national experiences. Direct exchanges of personnel sparked by MF contacts are only the most obvious examples of the sharing of experiences in governance reform. RRI's careful documentation of this experience also allows us to supplement our interview materials with personal statements by MF participants speaking to the value of the experience.

Since the participants in MF are most often policymakers at the highest level of forest governance, the question of policy influence takes on a different meaning than it does with almost any other network. Precisely because of the discretion and informality that characterize its interactions, the network enables the Brazilian Forestry Ministry to influence Chinese policy and vice-versa. Most importantly, RRI's positioning in MF gives it direct and influential access to key policymakers, provided that it uses that access judiciously. MF's insistence that RRI continue to organize and facilitate its meetings suggest that RRI has managed its access well, to date.

That RRI's work with MF meets the standard for improving the influence capacity of networks is not in question. The only question we've encountered concerning the work with MF is how it fits with the coalition's overall tenure reform mission. The Partners and Collaborators of RRI are virtually all civil society organizations and networks that embody a wide range of relationships with government. This positioning means that, in many cases, the relationships established by RRI with senior government officials via MF may be very different than the relationship the coalition enjoys via its Partners in the country.

The vast majority of stakeholders in the RRI coalition sees the importance of varied strategies for influencing policymakers on forest tenure issues, and supports the coalition's work with MF from that perspective. Clearly, RRI has only scratched the surface of the potential leverage to be achieved on national reform processes

through relationships with the national level officials participating in MF. Managing the webs of relationships implied by such leverage is, however, a serious challenge for RRG Senior Management and is likely to become more so as both the coalition and MF mature. The major events planned in Indonesia for 2011 will provide a case study in relation to this management challenge. RRG already faced one such challenge in Cameroon in 2009, and appears to have handled that one quite well.

**REFACOF:** RRI's reporting on this achievement confirms that the Africa Women's Network for Community Management of Forests (REFACOF) was founded at the Yaoundé conference in May 2009. In the words of the network's founding members, the network was founded to "redress the general lack of organization in women's forest management, in community forest enterprise and in the African context specifically."

REFACOF was the product of the development of relationships among women forest leaders from various African countries. RRI sponsored, or was involved in, a number of the events that helped strengthen those relationships. RRI also facilitated the participation of many of the 45 women who were present in Yaoundé for the launch. After the founding of the network, RRI continued to provide multiple forms of support, including facilitating actions that provide REFACOF with access to important policy arenas and providing small amounts of resources to make possible direct interactions among network participants.

RRI's close relationship with REFACOF has continued as the network has defined its strategy around a mission to advocate for the recognition of women's forest rights at all levels. Since 2009, the network has expanded to additional countries, and members have appeared at a variety of international events, including some of the RRI Climate Change dialogues.

RRI's work with REFACOF has definitely led to an increase in the advocacy capacity of the participating organizations, and we expect that the presence of the network will continue to lead to a higher profile for women's rights within African forest tenure debates.

**GLOBAL ALLIANCE OF COMMUNITY FORESTRY:** RRI has been less directly involved with the growth and strengthening of GACF than it has with other networks, such as Megaflorestais, but it has still played an important role. After the 2008 decision of GACF to build a stronger Asian network, RRI became involved in supporting the growth of the Asian component of the network. Despite the fact that GACF continues

to face significant challenges as a network, the data provided show that, through a variety of interventions, both financial and institutional, RRI has helped the Asian network reach a point where it both contributes to the overall impact of the network and to concrete advocacy results across the continent. Since RRI Partners and Collaborators (such as FECOFUN) have played an important role in GACF-Asia, the network has grown with an orientation very consistent with that of RRI. This is clearly an example of the sort of impact RRI sought to have on external networks.

Civil Society Advisory Group/ITTO: Nowhere is RRI's influence on an existing external network clearer than in the case of the network formed to provide a platform for the input of community and smallholder producer organizations. RRI participated actively in the network prior to 2008, but in that year took a decision to put energy into CASG in hopes of making it a more effective networking and advocacy formation. The report provides excellent data establishing the increasing coherence and effectiveness of the network and clearly showing the important contributions of RRI to this evolution. Less clear are two aspects of this process: (1) the concrete results of the improvements of this network in shifts in forest tenure policy and (2) the extent to which the improvements in the network are sustainable in the absence of RRI's considerable input of energy and expertise. Notwithstanding these considerations, the work with CSAG/ITTO certainly demonstrates the sort of achievement projected by RRI.

SUMMARY: RRI evidently sees the potential of furthering its forest tenure mission through support for and collaboration with networks of predominantly civil society organizations (Megaflorestais being the exception). The reporting on the four cases highlighted by RRI for this outcome suggests that RRI's work with these four networks is well aligned with the coalition's mission, although some members express uncertainty in the case of MF. RRI might look at the indicator associated with this outcome to determine if it fully expresses the expectations of the coalition for its work with networks. Through its other monitoring work with RRI, the Monitoring Team has encountered much more activity with networks than what RRI has currently reported.

We share RRI's sense of the potential multiplier effect of working with networks. As in the case of all of its activities, RRI management must constantly evaluate the mission value of this work vis a vis the resources required to carry it out. In some cases, RRG essentially serves as the Secretariat of a network that might not exist without its inputs. This strains the traditional definition of "working with networks." Given the demands of serving as the Secretariat for RRI, the network would have to

be of high strategic value to justify RRI playing that role over anything longer than the short term.

**STRATEGIC OUTCOME 3 (SO3)--Key strategic actors at the global level are committed and engaged in promoting major reforms in existing tenure, regulatory and governance arrangements.**

While the language of this Strategic Outcome does not specify to what “actors” it is referring, it is clear from the supporting documentation that RRI is talking here about its work to influence the key global institutions involved in the business of forest governance. RRI’s theory of change acknowledges that the positioning and the policy of institutions such as ITTO and the UN-REDD Policy Board directly affect the prospects of forest-dependent communities around the world. Not content to influence specific policy debates, RRI identifies institutions that it deems to be strategic and seeks to develop relationships with those institutions that will, over time, affect its perspective, positioning and policies on forest tenure issues.

The indicator used to measure progress on this outcome reads as follows:

*At least five inter-governmental and multilateral institutions (multilateral banks, ITTO, and other UN institutions) alter their position on forest tenure and actively support tenure and related reforms in their narrative and portfolios.*

Since a change in the positioning of an organization such as the ITTO can never be attributed to a single external or internal factor, there is no question of attributing such a shift to RRI, but careful documentation of the relationship can demonstrate RRI’s contribution to such changes.

In both the cases documented by RRI for this outcome, the coalition is working in support of a network that, in turn, influences a major institution. We assume that RRI also has a direct relationship with the institution (in addition to the relationship mediated by the network in question), but the documentation focuses much more on influence via the network. The convergence of these two outcomes in a single RRI strategy highlights the fact that the outcomes of an organization like RRI are not distinct realities separated by clear boundaries. The work documented in this section clearly furthers both SO2 and SO3, but, since the documentation references SO3, we assess the progress it represents from that perspective.

**CIVIL SOCIETY ADVISORY GROUP (CSAG)/INTERNATIONAL TROPICAL TIMBER ORGANIZATION (ITTO):** The fact that Africa's timber exporting countries look to the ITTO for guidance on forest and timber trade policy gives that institution prominence among those that RRI seeks to influence. CSAG existed prior to the formation of RRI, essentially as an instrument for the influence of large conservation organizations over ITTO. The joint work of a number of organizations that later became RRI transformed CSAG into a means of promoting an awareness of community forestry within ITTO. In that sense, CSAG served as a sort of incubator for RRI as a concept.

After RRI came into existence, the coalition continued to actively promote CSAG and its goals related to ITTO. CSAG achieved a broader mandate within the ITTO structure, and was eventually asked to help put together a 2007 conference in Brazil on community enterprise and tenure reform. The positive outcomes of that event created momentum that led to the concept of the Yaoundé conference in 2009, which, in turn, stimulated thinking about a similar event in Indonesia this coming year.

These important events are not the only fruits of the work of CSAG within ITTO. Ongoing consultation has resulted in significant CSAG inputs to ITTO workplans, including the gender program included in the 2010/11 biennial plan. ITTO has also invited CSAG to participate in a variety of panels and presentations regarding community forestry and forest tenure. During the period of the RRI Framework Proposal, ITTO has spent over \$700,000 on a series of studies and initiatives recommended by CSAG. Through this entire period, RRI has continued to play a pivotal role in CSAG, which has strengthened RRI's own relationship with ITTO. A representative of ITTO participated in a two-day, RRI pre-meeting at ADF and co-chaired the final session with RRI Coordinator, Andy White. In addition, ITTO officially adopted RRI forest tenure in its own publications.

All of these achievements are documented in the information presented by RRI and have been corroborated in interviews with other sources. RRI has clearly played an important role in re-focusing and strengthening CSAG, and through that strategy, has contributed to a heightened awareness in ITTO concerning community forestry and forest tenure. That heightened awareness has translated into action that, on balance, favors the sort of tenure reform that stands at the center of the RRI mission.

**UN-REDD PROGRAM AND THE INDEPENDENT ADVISORY GROUP ON FORESTS, RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE (IAG):** Upon its establishment in 2008, the UN-



REDD Programme immediately established a Policy Board to provide overall policy direction to member states on questions of REDD implementation. That board, made up of representatives of UN agencies and representatives of national governments showed limited ability to seriously critique UN-REDD's orientation or to provide strategic support to program development. Furthermore, there existed little clarity on mechanisms through which civil society and other UN-REDD stakeholders could provide input for consideration by the Board.

Along with the Rainforest Foundation Norway (RFN), RRI organized a timely conference on Rights, Forests and Climate Change in Oslo in October 2008. At that conference, RRI raised the idea of an Advisory Group to the UN-REDD Policy Board, which was positively received by several of the organizations present. Having established a group of civil society organizations interested in playing that role, RRI led a process of advocacy with the Policy Board that resulted in terms of reference seating a formal representative of the Independent Advisory Group. As is its habit, RRI became the Secretariat for the IAG and assumed most of the responsibility for coordinating its actions and presentations before the Policy Board.

In this case, RRI documents the ways in which its work through the IAG fit into a larger strategy for influence of the UN-REDD Programme. RRI also carried out quite intentional direct interactions with Policy Board members, and invited the participation of board members in various of the dialogues it organized on Forests and Climate Change

The cumulative effect of these interventions has been significant. The documentation provided by RRI presents a very complete record of the inputs of IAG to the Policy Board and the evolution of the Board's perspective, especially in regard to REDD and Rights, during that same period. The data similarly documents the work of IAG to secure positions for other Indigenous and Civil Society representatives to the Board. Correspondence with one member of the Board credits IAG (and RRI, in particular) for significant changes in the outlook of the entire board. This sequence of events is generally corroborated by the observations of other members of IAG interviewed by the Monitoring Team.

That the UN-REDD Programme is very different than it was at the time of the Oslo conference is beyond question. RRI makes a very good case that its actions (along with those of its allies in IAG) contributed powerfully to that shift. The influence of RRI and the IAG is palpable in the language of the UN-REDD Programme Strategy, 2010-2015, which is full of language about "stakeholder participation," "safeguards"

and “opportunity costs.” That said, it is still a matter for debate whether or not the institution “*actively support tenure and related reforms in their narrative and portfolios*” in the words of the indicator fashioned by RRI to measure progress on toward SO3. Unlike the language on networks, this wording sets quite a high bar for success in this area, but this may be more a question of language in indicators than it is a question of the quality of the coalition’s interventions.

**SUMMARY:** The data provided by RRI related to this Strategic Outcome show two good examples of how the coalition identifies institutions it deems to be strategic and then proceeds to methodically create the basis for its influence on institutional policies and practices, over time. The data emphasize the strategy of RRI creating networks that are broader than itself and working through those networks to influence institutional practices. One could easily take from this information that, absent such a network, RRI is unable to effectively advocate for new institutional positioning on tenure issues. Our overall monitoring experience suggests that this is not the case, but monitoring data provided by RRI have yet to highlight a case in which the network strategy was not central.

RRI demonstrates clear changes in institutional positioning in both of the cases provided here. It likewise shows the ways in which the coalition contributed to those changes. These are significant changes that would fulfill the expectations for change of most advocacy organizations. But, as we have seen, RRI’s essential value proposition and its strategic outcomes set a very high bar for its own success.

What is less clear to us is how the changes RRI has helped bring about in institutions such as ITTO and the UN-REDD program have been *decisive* in the sense of materially influencing the most important results of an institution’s operation. For example, it would be possible for the ITTO to engage a CSAG on policy questions and support activities recommended by civil society without fundamentally changing the way it provides advice to African governments on timber export strategies. If ITTO was “actively supporting tenure reform” that support for tenure reform would change the sorts of counsel it was providing to African governments. That may well be happening through events such as the Yaoundé conference, but the data presented to the Monitoring Team by RRG do not fully sustain that interpretation. Again, that level of institutional transformation does not typically occur over a five-year period in institutions such as ITTO without a serious rupture in “business as usual,” usually caused by an external change that threatens the institution’s ability to reproduce itself.

Finally, there is endless debate in advocacy circles about the relative value of so-called “inside” and “outside” strategies of institutional change. RRG clearly opts for a combination of inside and outside approaches that eschews some of the external pressure approaches favored by many advocacy organizations. Interestingly, some members of the RRI coalition, especially national level advocacy NGOs, tend to favor a mix weighted slightly more toward pressure tactics from the outside. This diversity of approaches is one of RRI’s great strengths, but that diversity is also an important challenge to the coalition. Our monitoring interviews this year surfaced a number of observations—from Collaborators and close allies of the coalition—that bordered on mild critiques of RRG for its emphasis on creating comfortable spaces of dialogue with holders of institutional power on the assumption that RRI’s access to those spaces can allow it to change the nature of how that power is exercised from within. RRI’s work with Megaflorestais, ITTO and the UN-REDD Programme exemplifies very clearly that approach. RRG sees the role of RRI as one of opening spaces of influence. Once those spaces are available other civil society organizations may use them as they wish, with or without RRI. There is evidence of this happening in Asia and Africa, but the Monitoring Team did not gain enough of a perspective on this issue to confirm that this is the case. What was clear from our interviews was that different theories of change have found ways to coexist within RRI. From our perspective, that such tensions exist within the coalition speak to the strengths of the way RRI has been constructed. How those tensions are managed over the next period will speak with equal force to the coalition’s ability to fulfill its ambitious mission.

**STRATEGIC OUTCOME 4 (SO4)--Changes in tenure legislation and regulatory or policy framework in favor of local communities occur in a subset of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.**

SO4 is conceptually different than the first three Strategic Outcomes identified by RRI. Whereas the first three SOs identify the actor whose actions RRI seeks to transform, and points to the ways in which the change will take place, SO4 highlights the result of the change. An outcome stated in this way will tend to focus attention on the result (the legislative or regulatory change), rather than the process of changing the actions of a social actor that underlies the change. Clearly, RRI seeks through this outcome to highlight its influence on national-level policymakers in the countries in which it works.

RRI’s theory of change emphasizes that meaningful tenure reform will not result solely from changes in the positioning of large global institutions. At least as

important will be changes in legislation and institutional policies at the national level. This realization gives rise to the program area of National and Regional Programs, and it also supports the identification of outcomes 4 and 5 in RRI's Logical Framework.

The indicator chosen to measure progress on this outcome reads as follows:

*In six countries where RRI is active, structural tenure reforms (legal, regulatory, policy) are adopted/advanced.*

This indicator is among those that do not set a high expectation for progress. It correctly suggests that any structural reform affecting tenure relations applies to this outcome, but then is not very specific in characterizing what sort of progress needs to be made on the reform in order for it to be considered an RRI achievement toward SO4. By saying that a reform need be "adopted/advanced" suggests that virtually any movement on a reform would qualify as a milestone on the road to achieving this outcome.

SO4 focuses the coalition's attention on changes in national policy and regulation that alter tenure relations in the forest. For RRI, the national recognition of the tenure rights of forest-dependent communities (especially indigenous communities) is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition of justice in the forest. To achieve this recognition where it does not yet exist, RRI helps form and then supports the work of national coalitions favoring forest tenure reform. The majority of RRI's resources are dedicated to this work at the national level.

The current data provided by RRI examine the coalition's contribution to tenure reforms in three countries, China, Brazil and Nepal.

**STRATEGIC OUTCOME 4 (SO4): BRAZIL**—Given the massive recognition of the rights of indigenous groups living in the forest, Brazil holds extraordinary importance for the global movement for forest tenure reform. As of 2007, however, there was not a clear Federal structure in place for the support of the community forestry efforts underway to make real the rights that communities had acquired.

Around 2006, awareness began to build within the Brazilian government and, especially, within the Brazilian Forest Service of the importance of some structure of support and articulation of community forestry activities throughout the country. In recognition of that gathering momentum, RRI, the ITTO, and the Global Alliance of

Community Forestry (GACF) decided to organize a conference in Río Branco, Brazil in collaboration with RRI Partner, The World Conservation Union (IUCN). The State Government of Acre hosted the event with the full support of the Brazilian Forest Service. The conference (The International Conference of Community Forest Management and Community Forest Enterprises) promoted a highly productive exchange of community forest enterprise experiences from a variety of national settings. More importantly, for purposes of this discussion, it created tremendous momentum around a proposal that the Brazilian Forest Service sponsor a national program to support community forestry and, specifically, nascent community enterprises in the forest. Less than one year after the Río Branco conference, President Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva signed a decree creating the Federal Program of Family and Community Forests (PMCF).

Given the rapidity with which the bureaucracy moved on this issue, there were certainly a variety of forces at play in the creation of this program (not the least, the demands of Brazil's thousands of community forest activists). The data presented by RRI, however, make a convincing case that RRI and its allies played an important role in catalyzing action to create this program.

From RRI's perspective, while implementation of the hastily-launched program has not been without its difficulties, the creation of PMCF marks an important step forward for community forestry in Brazil. While Brazil is not a Tier One priority country for RRI operations, the coalition has continued to maintain close contact with organized community foresters in Brazil and, through Megaflorestais, with the Brazilian Forestry Service. Through MF, RRI was able to facilitate contacts between the Brazilian and Mexican forestry services so that the Brazilians could learn from Mexican experience in the support of community forestry.

The RRI data provide a very complete perspective on the process leading to the decree creating PMCF. That information, along with the documentation of the RRI role in the process, more than justify the claim that this experience is evidence of progress on SO4. At the same time, it would be interesting to know more about the actual impact of PMCF on the prospects of community forestry. Many of the Federal programs created by the Workers' Party government over the past dozen years have been shown to have strong, positive impacts on the intended beneficiaries, while, naturally, other such programs have fallen far short of expectations. A full assessment of the impact of RRI's obvious contribution to the creation of this program would require some assessment of the program's achievements. Such as

assessment is well beyond the mandate of an annual monitoring exercise, but might be relevant to an evaluation of RRI practice over a longer period.

**STRATEGIC OUTCOME 4 (SO4): CHINA**—As in the case of Brazil, an extraordinarily important tenure reform has taken place in China in the recent period, and RRI has been very much a part of that reform. Forest Trends, an RRI Partner, has been engaged in the discussion of tenure reform in China for well over a decade and sponsored the first international conference on the Chinese reform in 2000. The reform did not gain traction with China's State Forestry Administration (SFA) until 2003, again, with the participation of Forest Trends. Some of the Forest Trends staff who were most involved in the China work eventually participated in the first discussions of RRI and left Forest Trends to put the dream of an RRI into practice.

Once RRI was formally launched, China was a natural focus for the coalition's work, and relationships built during the previous period served the coalition well as it continued to advise and encourage the SFA and other Chinese government officials regarding reform. The work of this period also built on a close collaboration with researchers at Peking University, whose analytical work helped solidify the evidence basis for the reform. A 2008 conference co-sponsored by Peking University, RRI and the SFA is credited by Chinese forestry officials with "saving" the reform. Later that year, the reform launched as a series of pilot programs in 2003 became a matter of national policy and the government announced dramatic nationwide investments in land delimitation and other tenure reform-related programs.

Chinese forestry officials have been active participants in Megaflorestais since its inception, and the SFA hosted the 2009 network meeting in Beijing. RRI helped convene an Asian Regional Conference of Forest Tenure reform. The prominence of RRI's participation in the event, and the extent to which statements by Chinese officials reflect earlier pro-reform interventions by RRI and its allies suggest the significance of RRI's contribution to the reform process.

The particularity of the Chinese situation is well known and applies to the forestry context as much as it does to any other aspect of society. If the theory of change that guides RRI sees the activation of forest communities and their civil society allies around rights issues as central to the reform process, that theory of change does not apply cleanly in China, where tenure reform has been very much a top down affair. One reason that the mobilization of civil society and other support for a reform is deemed important is that such mobilization can help to ensure that any reform implemented will be implemented in ways that help realize recognized tenure

rights. It will be interesting to see the impact of the current reform, over time, on the rights of forest communities in China.

The Monitoring Team has not conducted a monitoring trip to China, and has not interviewed Chinese participants in the tenure reform there during either of its monitoring exercises. This makes it difficult to fully evaluate the data presented by RRI to support its claim of significant achievement in relation to China. On the other hand, the available data include a wide variety of papers, statements and correspondence concerning the reform authored by Chinese officials and researchers. These leave little doubt concerning the importance of the reform or the role of RRI in it. Our team does not go quite so far as those who say that RRI's role in a reform that is impacting as much land and as many people as the Chinese reform would, alone, justify support for the coalition. We do, however, recognize the magnitude of this achievement, even taking into account the fact that RRI's contribution was only one of many that created the necessary momentum for forest tenure reform in China.

**STRATEGIC OUTCOME 4 (SO4): NEPAL**—This report is quite different from the other two reports used by RRI to indicate progress on this outcome. In this case, RRI presents an impressive set of evidence to show that it has contributed to the efforts of Nepal's community forest user groups to resist efforts by government officials to roll back rights recognized through the country's progressive reforms of the mid-1990s. Specifically, in 2009 and 2010 the government initiated attempts to both create new conservation areas and promote other reforms that would have had the effect of proscribing community forest rights. The local RRI coalition, with support from RRG, acted decisively against those threats to tenure rights, and has so far been able to block their implementation. In this case, the supporting data provided by RRI is more extensive and specific than in relation to many of the other mileposts mentioned here.

Strategic Outcome 4 clearly commits RRI to contributing to progressive reform efforts and does not mention the prevention of regressive legislation as a desired outcome of the coalition. The Monitoring Team, however, accepts RRI's contention that, at certain moments, this sort of preventative work is as important to the tenure reform process as the proposal and advance of positive reforms. If all of the mileposts related to this outcome related to cases of preventing attacks on rights, that would be an important statement about the state of the global movement for tenure reform, but to highlight a single case of this among RRI's achievements is entirely appropriate.

The fact that the RRI coalition in Nepal must engage in these defensive battles does not bode well for the larger goal of RRI work in Nepal—the inclusion of specific reference to community tenure rights in the new Nepalese constitution—but the results of that broader effort remain to be seen.

**SUMMARY:** Forest tenure reform stands at the center of RRI's purpose. If it could not show that it was advancing reform through its actions, the essential value proposition of the coalition would be in doubt. Over the past decade, two of the most important tenure reform experiments in the world have taken place in China and Brazil. Through the data presented in relation to its SO4, RRI clearly demonstrates its contribution to both of those reform processes. In China, RRI has worked closely with political and academic elites to push forward a reform that may eventually affect the lives of over 300 million people and 100 million hectares of land. Any contribution to a process of this magnitude would be a huge achievement, but RRI was able to position itself to bring its analytical perspective to key decision makers at critical moments. The entire experience also demonstrates how RRI has been able to capitalize on experience in global work on forest tenure that long predates its own formation.

In Brazil, the data presented point to less influence, as RRI, and the actual genesis of the reform, but important interventions on internal policy debates on how to consolidate the rights granted to indigenous groups during the previous period. All elements of the 2007 Acre conference—the timing, the partnerships with ITTO and the Brazilian Forest Service, the choice of topic, the composition of the group convened, the follow-up—illustrate RRI's uncommon ability to identify key moments and move with agility to take advantage of them. The data presented show that RRI's intervention coincided with strong popular demands that the government do something to support community forest enterprise and the presence in key positions within the Ministry of the Environment of visionary leaders with a perspective on the forest quite consistent with that of RRI.

The achievements in Nepal related more to the defeat of efforts to curtail rights than to successful efforts to extend community tenure rights, but such efforts are every bit as much a part of the tenure reform movement as the dramatic advances in China. SO4 could be more specific in suggesting what sorts of contributions to what sorts of tenure reforms would satisfy the ambitions behind this outcome. That said, RRI's contributions related to the processes in China and Brazil would likely satisfy whatever standard RRI might identify.



**STRATEGIC OUTCOME 5 (SO5)--More equitable forest governance, enterprise and conservation models are identified and disseminated and/or more broadly supported as a viable approach to support social and economic development.**

This outcome speaks to the other external results—in addition to forest tenure change—that RRI's works to bring about it. As such, it gathers quite a wide range of results—better forest governance regimes, viable community forest enterprises and people-oriented conservation models—into a single outcome. In addition, the outcome is a bit vague on the standard of achievement being used by RRI to measure progress on this outcome. All of the above types of results may be “identified, disseminated and/or more broadly supported” in order to satisfy the standard behind this outcome. Of the five SOs identified by RRI, this one is the most difficult to assess.

The indicator identified by RRI as a means of measuring progress on this Strategic Outcome reads as follows:

*In at least five cases, these models lead to an increase in community access to resources and markets.*

To be recognized as a sign of achievement of this outcome, any one of the above sorts of results—governance regimes, community enterprises or conservation schemes—need to demonstrate that they have increased access to resources and markets. Presumably, any increase would meet the standard.

**STRATEGIC OUTCOME 5 (SO5): NEPAL**—Nepal is home to a large and effective community forestry whose basic rights are recognized in progressive forestry regulations that came into being in the mid-1990s. Since that time, the sector has become much more organized and has carried out a wide range of experiments in the area of community forestry enterprise.

At times, it appears that the government has had second thoughts about its support for this increasingly influential sector. On a number of occasions, the government has attempted to reverse existing regulations and undermine the rights of community foresters and the viability of their enterprises. One such effort began in 2009, when government agencies signaled their intent to expand protected areas in

ways that would impinge on the tenure rights of forest user groups, and to increase taxes in way that would be disadvantageous to community producers.

The data presented by RRI suggest that RRI Partner, The Federation of Community Forest Users of Nepal (FECOFUN), has led a national campaign that, until now, has successfully blocked these proposed changes. The data also confirm the fact that RRG provided various forms of support to these efforts. RRI has provided excellent documentation of the activities of FECOFUN in opposition to the government proposals, including correspondence, photographs and media treatments of the activities.

Although we have not been able to directly interview Nepalese Partners or Collaborators to corroborate the information provided by RRI, the information is entirely consistent with what we have gleaned from previous interviews with participants in RRI's work in Nepal. There is little doubt that FECOFUN is carrying out the campaign described by RRI and that, until now, the campaign has succeeded in preventing the rollback of community rights threatened by the government proposals. The question is whether or not the prevention of government action to undermine rights amounts to an "increase in community access to resources and markets." From our perspective, this is certainly the case. Because FECOFUN has prevented the government from implementing its intentions, community access in Nepal will be greater than it otherwise might have been. That said, if all or most of the coalition's achievements related to a given outcome were defensive in this sense, that would make a very strong statement about the current state of the community forestry movement and RRI, specifically, but it is to be expected that a global movement will measure its achievements in some countries by its ability to fend off attacks on tenure rights.

The one overall goal of RRI's work in Nepal has been to ensure that the new Constitution currently being drafted enshrines the rights of the country's community foresters as the law of the land. Good contacts have been made with Nepalese forestry officials on this issue, but the entire constitutional project is now in limbo due to a deep lack of political consensus among political elites. The fact that government officials attempted to take advantage of the political stalemate to act decisively against community forestry rights raises questions about the prospect that the new Constitution (assuming that it can be negotiated) will fully respect forest tenure rights in Nepal.

It is worth noting that this Nepal case is the only one RRI presented in this group of achievements in which direct action or mass organizing was a primary tactic employed by RRI or one of its Partners. Direct action certainly played a role in the genesis of the community forestry program in Brazil, but that action was carried out by community leaders not affiliated with RRI. FECOFUN is somewhat unusual among RRI Partners in that it is a federation of community forestry groups, rather than a research organization, a national NGO or an international NGO.

**Strategic Outcome 5 (SO5)—Research on Tenure Reform and Small-Scale Enterprises in China:** Analysis of existing research and support for original research on tenure reform are key RRI strategies for advancing alternative tenure models. This report suggests that RRI support for such research in China has provided the first credible data on the impact of forest tenure reform on income and livelihoods in forest communities. RRI contends that this research has help shift the attitudes of key Chinese forest officials toward support for the reform process. In addition to providing direct intellectual and financial support to the research, RRI has helped leverage other donor support for the work, and subsequently helped organize conferences where the data could be disseminated and more widely analyzed. Finally, the data reports to complementary market studies conducted by RRI Partner, Forest Trends that have helped the Chinese research.

The data presented clearly document the depth and professionalism of the research and provide convincing evidence of the RRI contribution to the work over a long period. Less clear from the data is support for the contention that this research has had the desired impact in Chinese policy circles. That said, even without the establishment of this important link between the supporter research and policy outcomes, the data suggest that RRI's support for Chinese forest-reform research is a legitimate milestone on the road to the achievement of SO5.

**SUMMARY:** As suggested above, SO5 and its associated indicator do not provide the most precise basis for measuring the progress of the RRI coalition in this area. Furthermore the distinction between SO4 and SO5, while obviously clear to RRI, is not entirely evident to the Monitoring Team. While the work described in the Data Monitoring Reports related to this outcome is certainly mission critical, it remains to be seen how much this strategic outcome will help RRI to orient implementation of its programs or to measure the progress of those programs.

## **SUMMARY: RRI'S PROGRESS ON STRATEGIC OUTCOMES**

In assessing The Rights and Resource Initiative's progress on its five, high-level Strategic Outcomes, we have attempted to examine the details of the coalition's reporting on its most important achievements over the period, 2008-2010. The attention to detail required by this sort of assessment could easily cause one to lose sight of the fact that, while each of the achievements reported is important, in its own right, some are actually seminal occurrences in the world of forest tenure reform. For example, RRI's ongoing relationship to the forces pushing forward tenure reform in China and the coalition's role in the launch of an important national program to support community forest enterprise in Brazil stand as decisive contributions to the advance of tenure reform over the last period. The true importance of those interventions will not be evident until both of those processes have time to more fully unfold, but that they have significant value—and are fully aligned with RRI's purpose—is not in question. Our grasp of this essential take-away from the monitoring work must occupy an analytical space well above any calculation of how many networks RRI is successfully supporting or how many joint actions coalition members have successfully carried out.

RRI has documented nineteen milestone achievements across its five identified Strategic Outcomes, which is certainly adequate compared with the twenty milestones that it suggested would have been reached by the end of the third year of the framework proposal period (2010). In most cases, the data supports the contention that the highlighted case shows progress toward one of RRI's Strategic Outcomes. In a couple of other cases, the Monitoring Team has questioned whether or not the achievement described in the Monitoring Data Report really meets the standard for progress contemplated by the relevant indicator.

The purpose of this element of the monitoring exercise is not, however, to count milestones and compare that count to RRI's projections. The exercise is meant to help RRI become more systematic about gathering data about its achievements and to help the Independent Monitor make observations about the extent to which the coalition is "on track" to achieve its ambitious goals for the period covered by the Framework Proposal.

For an organization that had not previously committed itself to gather this sort of data, RRI did an impressive job of compiling these reports. Since the staff was gathering data related to milestones passed over a three-year period, the burden of

gathering this data was extraordinary, but we hope it will be deemed to have been useful by the staff who gathered and presented the data.

In general, we are pleased to report that RRI has built upon its original Logical Framework to construct a living set of strategic outcomes and associated indicators that rise above the ambitions of any particular program or coalition member to express where the entire organization seeks to go and how it will know if it is getting there. In addition, the Coalition is constructing a culture of collecting information about its work in systematic ways that enable the development and management of knowledge about what works in the protection and advancement of forest tenure rights. These processes of building knowledge across a far-flung network will also need to unfold further for us to know if they will repay the cost of pushing them forward. Nonetheless, the fact that they are happening must be recognized and applauded.

In terms of whether or not RRI is “on track” to fulfill its desired outcomes during the period of the Framework Proposal, a high-level review of the monitoring data certainly confirms the by now commonplace notion that RRI has accomplished a tremendous amount in a short period of time. We honestly wonder if the data presented in relation to these Strategic Outcomes really does justice to all of the most important achievements of RRI during this period. For example, it is not clear that data presented in this way can adequately reflect the importance of RRI’s work to introduce a rights-based discourse into the international deliberations on the role of the world’s forests in the effort to address the threat of climate change. In addition, can the data on the Coalition’s effort to influence the positioning of major global institutions really capture the impact of a piece of analysis like “Seeing the People Through the Trees”? Finally, with RRI’s work in support of tenure reform in China analyzed as one of 19 mileposts of achievement (at the same level with the organization of a regional tenure reform conference in Cameroon), it is questionable whether or not the significance of the former can be fully appreciated. This is a problem related to the way RRI has structured its outcomes and gathered data on its achievements, but it is also a limitation of the sorts of tools used in this review. Such limitations must be taken into account in making sweeping generalizations about work that is, or is not, on track.

That said, the Monitoring Team notes the existence of unevenness in RRI’s achievements, as captured in the data provided for this exercise. In particular, it seems that the challenges of building productive coordination to achieve concrete tenure reform results at the national and regional levels have been more difficult

than originally anticipated by RRI. The ability of an international coalition—even one with dynamic leaders, compelling analysis and resources to share—to stimulate effective national collaboration among diverse actors has always been a huge question mark for transnational advocacy efforts everywhere. Wave its wand as it might, RRI has not been able to utter the spell to change this enduring reality.

While there have certainly been results at the regional and national levels, in some cases the primary result observed in the current data covering a three-year period is the creation of national pro-reform coalition poised for future success. In later sections of the report, the Monitoring Team analyzes what it sees as some of the possible explanations for this situation and provides some recommendations for how it might be addressed. If there is an area that needs specific attention by RRI if it is to generate the desired results over the five-year period of the framework period, it is this area of Country and Regional Initiatives.

## **V. ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS ON RRI'S PROGRAM-LEVEL ANNUAL PLANS**

A second element of RRI's internal monitoring system involves the monitoring of the Coalition's Program-Level Annual Plans. These annual program plans are created by the group of people within the network who are most closely engaged with the program. Like RRI's programs, these plans fall into two categories: Global Program Plans and Country and Regional Program Plans.

According to RRI's internal monitoring system, each program planning group will carry out an integrated planning and monitoring exercise on an annual basis. That is, when the group sits down to make a plan for the coming year—2011, for example—it will also dedicate some of its time to an intentional effort to assess its progress over the past year. The result of the monitoring part of that exercise will be an Annual Program Monitoring Report. In that report, the program planning group names its most important achievements over the past year and comments on them with an emphasis on documenting the lessons learned from the work.

Most RRI programs have always included some sort of assessment as part of their planning process. This year, a conscious attempt was made to begin to formalize this step by making it a part of each planning meeting agenda and by working on the creation of this report as a new product of the monitoring discussion. RRG is also working to provide access to all monitoring reports for all network participants as part of its overall knowledge management effort.

For RRI Global Programs, the planning group is generally an RRG staff group. In those cases, the Annual Program Monitoring Report<sup>7</sup> represents the view of RRG staff about the progress of a given program. For Country and Regional Programs, while RRG program staff always plays an active role in planning meetings, the planning group is generally made up local Partners and Collaborators. As a result, the Annual Program Monitoring Report should reflect how Partners and Collaborators (rather than the RRG staff relating to the program) assess their progress.

The charge of the Independent Monitor includes the “selective validation” of the monitoring outputs of program planning groups. Given the large number of planning/monitoring exercises that happen each year within the Network, it would be impossible for the Monitoring Team to engage with each program planning

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<sup>7</sup> The Annual Program Monitoring Reports related to all programs reviewed for this report are presented in Appendix Five to this report.

exercise. Mindful of that reality, RRG chooses 2 Global Programs and 3-4 Country and Regional Programs to serve as the focus of the Monitoring Team's work each year. For 2010, RRG designated **Bolivia, Indonesia and Mali** as the Country and Regional Programs to be assessed and **Strategic Analysis** and **Network Support** as the Global Programs to be considered.

## **A. COUNTRY AND REGIONAL PROGRAMS**

During 2010, a different member of the Monitoring Team led the monitoring work related to each focus country. The monitoring included:

- Coordination with other team members on monitoring goals and process
- Review of Documents
- Country Monitoring Mission
- Preparation of Country Monitoring Report.

In an attempt to achieve consistent monitoring outcomes across each program, each country researcher was asked to:

1. Place the RRI country in the context of the national forestry sector by using material from background documents provided by RRG;
2. (If observing and RRI planning meeting) Assess the results of the country planning process, with a special emphasis on the usefulness of the monitoring part of the process;
3. Reflect on the extent to which planning team conclusions are corroborated by other sources of information;
4. Comment on the alignment of RRI country program achievements with network-wide Strategic outcomes; and
5. Offer conclusions and recommendations, where appropriate.

This year's Country Program Monitors included the Lead Consultant and two KMSC Associates: David Hendrickson (Indonesia) and Nicholas Atampugre (Mali). While Mr. Atampugre was new to the work of RRI, he has long experience working on natural resource issues in West Africa and Mali, in particular. Mr. Hendrickson, who recently completed a PhD in Sustainable Community Development was familiar with RRI based on his participation in the 2009 Independent Monitoring Exercise, when he conducted the monitoring mission to Nepal.



Having completed two rounds of Country Monitoring Missions, it is now clear to the Monitoring Team that the ideal mission includes attendance at the country planning meeting as well as additional time to interview external (to RRI) actors who are in a position to provide an independent perspective on the coalition's in-country activities. Timing and resource constraints make it difficult to put together a trip with both of these elements. In 2010, the missions to Mali and Indonesia coincided with country planning meetings, but neither monitor was able to conduct a significant number of interviews with external sources. Because of his own schedule problems, the country monitor in Bolivia was not present for the country planning meeting, but was able to get quite a bit of context through several interviews with people outside of RRI. The reports reflect the monitor's best efforts to assess the situation of the country program, given available resources and information.

**1. Monitoring Report on RRI Country Program in Bolivia**  
**Based on monitoring mission conducted by Kevin Murray**  
**October 4-10, 2010**

**Introduction and Context**

Bolivia can appear to be a country living in a time capsule. The only question is whether the reality in the time capsule is preserved from the past or the future.

The Rights and Resources Initiative has intensified its involvement in Bolivia at a unique and critical moment in the country's history. For the first time in its "modern" history, a representative of one of the country's indigenous groups (the Aymara) occupies the office of President. The government of Evo Morales came to office with an agenda to fundamentally transform Bolivia, and, for the time being, has politically overwhelmed its primary political opposition that is based in economically privileged sectors of the lowland city of Santa Cruz.

Morales turned his political majority into a call for a Constitutional Assembly that succeeded in drafting and gaining approval for a new Constitution. Based on the last round of legislative elections, Morales now has the legislative super-majority needed to enact laws bringing the country's legal system into line with the new Constitution. That process began in 2009, with the passage of five important laws, including an Autonomy Law recognizing a series of legitimate autonomies in Bolivia, including indigenous autonomy.

Indigenous autonomy is as complex in Bolivia as the composition of the country's indigenous population. That population includes the numerically predominant Aymara and Quechua groups of the Andes, as well as a diverse set of lowland indigenous groups that make their home in the Bolivian sector of the Amazon Basin. These two grand groups of indigenous Bolivians have radically different cultures and histories. Historic tensions between the country's lowland and highland populations have been reflected, to an extent, in relations among Bolivia's indigenous peoples. These tensions can be expected to manifest themselves in new ways now that the numerically and politically dominant of those groups (the Aymara) has access to a major share of state power.

The differences between highland and lowland indigenous populations reflect and are, in turn, reflected by their relationships with the nation's forests. While there are environmentally critical extensions of forested land occupied by and traditionally

used and managed by indigenous people in the Andes, the bulk of Bolivia's forests occur in the country's lowland region. It comes as no surprise, then, that for most lowland indigenous groups, the ability to live in and from the forest is absolutely central to the group's ability to sustain itself. In Bolivia, therefore, the issues of forest tenure and the recognition of customary rights and uses of the forest are predominantly, though not exclusively, issues of the rights of the country's lowland indigenous groups. It is no coincidence, then, that RRI's program in Bolivia focuses on supporting the efforts of lowland forest-dependent communities, particularly indigenous communities, to gain recognition of their tenure rights. Where those rights have already been formally recognized, RRI seeks to help communities realize those rights through viable governance, enterprise and conservation arrangements that reflect customary uses of the forest.

RRI has arrived on the scene in Bolivia at a moment when its presence really matters. Lowland indigenous groups have been engaged in a centuries-long struggle for recognition of rights implied by their customary relationship with the forest. That struggle reached a new level in the early 1990s, when indigenous mobilization created momentum for an agrarian reform that recognized, for the first time, the legitimate rights of indigenous groups to autonomous control over their ancestral territories.

Not surprisingly, accessing rights was more easily legislated than consummated. The enactment of the land reform of 1996 was only the beginning of a new phase in the process that continues today. Indigenous groups sought and received the support of non-indigenous allies as they sought to realize the rights granted to them in the reform. Among those allies were a group of regional, national and international nongovernmental organizations who recognize the legitimacy and the importance of the indigenous demands and stepped forward to make those demands their own. Some of those same organizations form the core of the RRI presence in Bolivia today.

The accession to power of the Morales administration created hope that an indigenous-led government in La Paz would finally put the rights of lowland indigenous groups (and the sound management of the forest) ahead of the interests of private timber operators and others benefitting from the denial of indigenous rights.

Initially, the new government took some important steps. Morales named a prominent NGO ally of the lowland indigenous groups as his Minister of Autonomies,

a key position in government relations with the lowland communities. More importantly, the government quite quickly approved a series of territorial resource management plans, the review of which had been in process for years. The approval of these plans removed what was, in many cases, the final obstacle to formal indigenous control over large territories. In other areas, however, the government was not nearly as responsive as the lowland groups had hoped. Over time, relations between the lowland communities and the government became strained.

When violent opposition to the Morales government broke out in the Santa Cruz area in 2008, indigenous communities and organizations found themselves in the middle of a conflict between the government in La Paz and powerful economic groups in Santa Cruz. The resulting political crisis was only resolved when members of the lowland indigenous groups massed outside of Santa Cruz and began a militant march toward the city.

Despite their prominent role in the political defeat of the government's arch-adversaries in Santa Cruz, the lowland indigenous groups continued to encounter problems in their efforts to win full recognition of their rights. The lowland indigenous groups are not happy with elements of the Autonomy Law passed in 2009 without what they consider to be adequate consultation with lowland groups about the special nature of autonomies in that region. With large extensions of indigenous territory still in the process of review by land reform authorities, and the ability of indigenous communities to manage territories they allegedly control in line with their customary practices, much depends on the character of laws that will now be passed to regulate natural resource uses in line with the government interpretation of new Constitution. Critical here is *La Ley de la Madre Tierra*, which will integrate five statutes regulating natural resource use into a single law. That law is being constructed and debated as this report is being written.

It is into this highly-charged debate that RRI emerged as an actor in the Bolivian forest reform. In 2008, RRI identified Bolivia as a Tier One Country and began forming a national coalition. A single RRI Partner, InterCooperation, operates in the country, and the coalition has attracted the participation of four Bolivian NGOs as Collaborators in its Bolivian program. Together, they have developed a program that has quickly had an impact on the national tenure debate and seems well-aligned with RRI's overall desired outcomes. The country planning meeting held in September 2010 was the second such meeting, and all Partners and Collaborators with the program were present.

## **Most Important Achievements**

The planning process for 2010 was predicated on the assumption that the Forestry Law would be high on the government's legislative agenda for the year. In fact, that law was not a priority for the government in 2010, resulting in the need for the Bolivian coalition to switch its attention to the so-called Autonomy Law. Time pressures affected the coalition's ability to change direction successfully and orient collective action toward the Autonomy discussion. There is no evidence of collective action by RRI members to influence the drafting of the Autonomy Law. Individual Collaborators did take action, mostly by working to increase the ability of indigenous groups to provide effective input into the government discussion. The speed with which the government drafted and approved the law did not, however, leave much room for consultation with anyone. Where consultation with indigenous groups did occur, those groups feel that their inputs did not affect the eventual final form of the law.

A second area of planned activity in 2010 was the development of critical analysis regarding the state of tenure rights in those territories over which indigenous groups supposedly have gained formal control through government approval of territorial limits and a resource management plan for the approved territory. Confusion regarding the role of the Center For International Forestry Research (CIFOR)<sup>8</sup> role in the coalition frustrated progress in this area, although Collaborators projected some activity for the second half of the year.

A third area of work focused on advances in governance capacity in those same areas of existing indigenous control (TCOs). Most of the reported achievements in this area related to work preparing indigenous groups to negotiate the Autonomy Law. If governance or resource management capacity in the TCOs increased through RRI's interventions, that was not clear from the internal review of achievements conducted as part of the September 2010 country planning meeting.

Finally, RRI Collaborator, IPHAE, committed itself to carry out, in concert with other RRI affiliates, research and analysis of self-management procedures that could influence the regulatory reform underway. IPHAE did carry out some analysis and created space for discussion of self-management models with government, but advances were not in line with the ambitious expectations of the 2009 planning

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<sup>8</sup> CIFOR, one of the original partners in RRI, declined to sign the renegotiated RRI Memorandum of Understanding in 2010, thus deciding to function as a Collaborator of RRI, rather than as a partner. Naturally, this transition caused some difficulty in those countries where CIFOR had played a central role in the Coalition.

process. Coordination among RRI members that was essential to the realization of this outcome did not occur to the extent required.

The achievements highlighted by RRI-Bolivia are consistent with the input received by the Monitoring Team from other sources, particularly reports submitted by RRI-Bolivia members. The outcomes established by RRI Bolivia for 2010 were well aligned with the country strategic plan (2009-2012) and RRI Strategic Outcomes. The coalition's own monitoring suggests, however, that achievements in 2010 represent only modest progress toward realization of their own ambitions for the work in Bolivia.

For the Monitoring Team, this is understandable, given the relatively recent formation of RRI in Bolivia, and the nature of the current situation there regarding forest tenure. Among the lessons learned documented in the 2010 Annual Program Monitoring Report was the need to set annual outcomes that are more achievable in the timeframe of the plan. The Bolivia plan for 2011 represents an effort to apply this lesson. A second lesson noted by RRI-Bolivia points to the need for real collaboration and coordination among RRI members if they are to achieve the ambitious outcomes they desire. This is a much more difficult lesson to put into practice. The Monitoring Team's interviews with RRI-Bolivia members suggest that nearly all of them are aware of the issue and committed to acting to change the situation. Often, this can be a very difficult challenge for entrepreneurial NGOs driven by the exigencies of their own missions.

### **Assessment of Planning Process**

The 2010 RRI country planning meeting took place in Bolivia on September 16-17, 2009 in Santa Cruz. The original monitoring plan included attendance at this meeting, but a medical issue prevented the member of the Monitoring Team assigned to Bolivia from attending the meeting. The limited assessment provided here is based on interviews with participants in the meeting and review of the primary products of the meeting: the *memoria* of the meeting prepared by RRG staff; the Annual Program Monitoring Report; and the 2011 Bolivia Program Plan.

All participants expressed a general feeling of satisfaction with the planning meeting. The only issue raised by more than one member is that of how invitations to the planning are managed. One new organization (LIDEMA) appeared at the meeting and there was some lack of clarity as to how this happened. In addition, another organization that is close to RRI (CIDOB) was present for at least part of the

meeting. No participants mentioned this as questionable or confusing in any way, but it does raise, for the Monitoring Team, the question of how participation in the initiative is defined. Neither of these is an issue with the planning process. Both concern the identity of the coalition and how its participants are chosen.

This was the first RRI event attended by the representative of InterCooperation's Bolivia office, as most of that group's work with RRI has been carried out by a consultant supervised by the regional office in Lima, Peru. The Bolivia office, which will be assuming more responsibility for Bolivia coordination with RRI, has had little connection with the coalition, to date. Most of IC Bolivia's work has been oriented toward the Andean region of the country, and IC's relationships with existing RRI Collaborators are not well-developed. The IC representative felt that she could have been better prepared for the meeting, but that this was as much an internal responsibility as it was the responsibility of RRI. This is the first time our team encountered a national dynamic in which RRI Partners (the organizations who play a central role in RRI as a global coalition) play a reduced role in a national coalition made up mostly of Collaborators (who have relatively more influence in setting the overall direction of RRI). In Guatemala, there were actually no RRI Partners active in the local coalition.

Other participants felt that the meeting was adequately prepared and facilitated, and achieved its essential outcome of creating a plan for the work of RRI-Bolivia in 2011. From this plan, participants will develop the concept notes that will eventually lead to contracts with RRI for the accomplishment of specified activities. Since the Monitoring Team did not attend the meeting, we are unable to comment on the facilitation approach used or the degree of participation by planning team members.

The notes of the planning meeting suggest that the gathering included a long session of in-depth collective analysis of the situation of forest tenure in Bolivia. The session contained both situational analysis by most of the participants as well as significant critical reflection on the work of the coalition. In fact, if the notes are accurate, this is the session included the critical reflection desired by RRG for internal monitoring purposes. Many of the key points raised in analysis are echoed in the terms of the 2011 Bolivia plan.

By comparison, the monitoring discussion, which took place on the second day, was relatively modest in its scope. It was dominated by a somewhat mechanical review of the accomplishments of 2010 in light of the desired outcomes established at the beginning of the year. The material presented in the Annual Program Monitoring

report is much richer and more analytical than what appears in the notes of the monitoring discussion. There could be many reasons for this inconsistency, but the important point is that the monitoring report reflects a richly textured assessment of the work in 2010. We express our hope that this assessment reflects the perspective of the country planning team, as well as that of the relevant RRG staff. In general, the reflection on the 2010 experience conducted by coalition members prior to the development of the 2011 plan seems to have been both thoughtful and honest. Its observations and claims of achievement are quite consistent with the information gleaned by the Monitoring Team from other sources.

### **Obstacles to the Success of RRI in Bolivia**

Conditions for RRI's work in Bolivia are extremely positive for all of the reasons outlined above. At the same time, a small number of important obstacles to the work emerged in the course of the Monitoring Team's research. Some of these, which include internal and external impediments, also surfaced in the discussion of the program's achievements.

**Historical tension between lowland indigenous groups and highlands-dominated government:** While the current government in La Paz has a public discourse that suggests amenability to resolving the rights-based concerns of lowlands indigenous groups, historical tensions still have their effects. The lowlands indigenous groups historically have been among the most marginalized populations in Bolivia, and the election of an indigenous President in La Paz cannot immediately undo this history.

In general, history weighs heavily in discussions of forest tenure in Bolivia. As long as forces external to the forest see value in extractive exploitation of the resource, realization of the legitimate rights of forest communities, especially indigenous communities, will face significant barriers. Those external forces will often have at their disposal forms of leverage on the national government that are not available to indigenous groups and their allies. The recent approval of a huge, Brazilian-supported infrastructure project to build an international highway through areas of high biodiversity in the Bolivian Amazon is a powerful example of how progressive public discourse will yield to a development model driven by power politics. The uncontrolled burning of large swaths of forest land in Pando by a population encouraged to re-locate there by the central government is another. Confronting the power behind such a model is a huge challenge, regardless of how the model is adorned for public consumption.



**Political mandate of the Morales government:** The most recent legislative elections gave the Morales government a legislative super-majority that allows the government to pass its legislative agenda without consultation or negotiation. This increases the possibility that the government will be able to implement significant change initiatives, but it also creates a strong sense within government that it must act decisively to take advantage of this moment. This sense of time pressure acts against the need to consult on important initiatives with the constituencies most affected by those actions. The lowland indigenous groups feel strongly that this dynamic was at play—alongside their historic isolation from the centers of power in La Paz—in the rush to pass autonomy legislation during the past year. The political mandate of the Morales government, therefore, may work against the efforts of any external stakeholder—including RRI-Bolivia—to influence key policy decisions.

**Capacity of lowland indigenous organizations:** The indigenous groups living in the Bolivian lowlands are culturally and linguistically diverse, which can make joint action around common interests difficult to achieve. Indigenous organizations have made great strides over the past two decades, including the creation of an important coordinating mechanism (CIDOB). While the creation of CIDOB has represented a great step forward, the effort to develop a unified voice on tenure and other important issues has faced serious difficulties. Engaging the national government in high-level policy discussions requires a set of competencies that strain the capacities of some indigenous organizations. This highlights the importance of alliances with non-indigenous organizations (like some of those participating in RRI-Bolivia) who can offer certain forms of technical and political support, but it also heightens the urgency of efforts to strengthen the indigenous organizations, themselves, to be able to effectively advocate on their own behalf. It should also be said that non-indigenous organizations like the ones that make up the RRI coalition in Bolivia also face their own capacity challenges, which also influence RRI's ability to achieve its intended outcomes in Bolivia.

**Planning and coordination among RRI members:** Planning and implementing a joint program like the one envisioned by RRI-Bolivia is an extremely challenging enterprise. RRI members are certainly experienced at coordinating with other organizations, but the level of coordination implied by what RRI is attempting to do in Bolivia (and many of its other national programs) asks organizations to work together in unfamiliar ways.

This experiment is still a very new one in Bolivia. Already, organizations have noted a tendency to be overly ambitious in the construction of their desired joint outcomes. The world of international financial cooperation feeds this tendency, almost

universally, and RRI's own internal process creates some of the same incentives. In addition, once plans are designed, RRI members have quite naturally reverted to the patterns of implementation that have given life to their various organizations.

These patterns, while quite natural—and successful—from the point of view of the individual organization, do not always yield the levels of coordination necessary to sustain the sorts of outcomes desired by RRI. The RRI system, as it stands, creates powerful incentives for joint planning, but does not provide the same incentives or support for the coordinated implementation without which joint plans will often show uneven results. That the Bolivian members of RRI have already noted these tendencies and are taking actions to respond to them speaks highly of the coalition.

## **Conclusion**

As suggested above, the Monitoring Team finds that Bolivia is well-chosen as a Tier One, priority intervention, country for RRI. Tenure issues are at play on the national agenda in a way that they are in relatively few countries. The ruling party sees indigenous groups from the lowlands as part of its national coalition and should, therefore, be open to resolving the rights issues that affect the way these groups relate to their ancestral territories. The senior government official dealing with autonomy issues is the former director of one of the members of the RRI coalition. In theory, at least, this should give the coalition extraordinary access to national policy discussions.

In addition, lowland indigenous communities have already gained formal control over millions of hectares of forest land. In those areas, there exist urgent needs to build capacity in the areas of governance and community enterprise development. The RRI coalition includes organizations with the relationships and the capacities to provide important support in these areas. Based on pre-existing relationships in the region, RRI has formed an impressive group of Collaborators into a coordination that sees a positive role for itself in relation to the forest tenure debate.

There are, however, impressive obstacles to the success of the local coalition. As myriad interests come into play at the national level, what should be a very promising policy environment for the lowlands indigenous groups has become vastly more complicated. Given the political mandate achieved by the government in the last legislative elections, the Morales administration is more interested in implementing its program of change than in perfecting it through serious consultations with stakeholders like the lowlands indigenous groups. Rights-based solutions that may work well in the country's highlands communities are not

automatically relevant in the lowlands communities, but this nuance can get lost in the rush to enact a program deemed transformative. Where openings for influence have existed, the indigenous groups and their allies have not always had the capacity to take full advantage of them.

While the RRI coalition is made up of highly effective and experienced organizations, the RRI coalition, itself, is still a relatively new entity. Its members are still learning how best to coordinate their efforts and, as a coalition, how to manage relationships with indigenous and (non-indigenous) *campesino* allies. Unfortunately, the historic moment in which the coalition finds itself will not wait long for the members to perfect mechanisms of planning and coordination.

One issue emerged for the Monitoring Team in relation to the composition of the coalition in Bolivia. All of the members are either Bolivian or international NGOs. All are what might be called technical intermediaries between the international community and forest community associations, themselves. In this case, the relevant forest community associations would be the indigenous community associations, such as CIDOB or CPESC. These associations are certainly close to RRI, and often attend meetings in different capacities, but no indigenous organizations are members.

In other countries, such as Nepal and Guatemala, such associations of forest user groups form part of the coalition. In Nepal, the national federation is an RRI Partner. When asked about this issue, three of the coalition members were quite adamant that the current composition is the one that is correct for Bolivia, although the explanations for their certainty were not particularly satisfying. Given that RRI's work in Bolivia is designed to help lowland indigenous communities advance their tenure rights and consolidate their rights over territory under their control, it seems somewhat odd that community organizations relate closely to RRI, but are not part of the coalition.

The cluster of issues around rights and climate change is particularly complex for RRI in Bolivia. The Morales government, and the President, personally, has staked out a strong position to the effect that, while they welcome financial cooperation around projects to reduce emissions, they are not open to having such projects in Bolivia regulated by market mechanisms. Members of RRI Bolivia insist that this is opportunistic positioning on the part of the government, and that officials are continuing to work to attract REDD-like financing to Bolivia, without referencing market mechanisms. Whether the international position is posturing on the part of the government or not, it is complicating all internal discussions of initiatives aimed

at reducing emissions in Bolivia. RRI-Bolivia, in its 2011 planning, identified the pressing need for more information on rights and climate change in Bolivia, and on REDD, in particular. The coalition has, therefore, committed itself to assemble and disseminate relevant information on this theme within Bolivia. One coalition member was adamant, however, that if it were to perceive RRI as a mechanism for promoting REDD within Bolivia, it would immediately leave the coalition. It will be interesting to see how the coalition manages this issue over the next couple of years.

With these conditions in mind, the Monitoring Team offers just a few recommendations of actions to enhance the impact of coalition efforts in Bolivia. These all flow directly from the monitoring findings outlined above.

### Recommendations

1. **National Facilitation:** The country planning team in Bolivia identified a lack of communication and coordination among the Partners between planning meetings as one reason that they did not make more progress in 2010. RRG should work with RRI-Bolivia to develop a plan for national facilitation in Bolivia, probably to be provided by one of the local Collaborators.
2. **Advocacy Strategy:** While RRI Bolivia placed the influence on deliberations related to the new Forestry Law at the top of its list of priority outcomes for 2011, and has conducted extensive of the positioning of key actors relative to the legal debate, it is not clear that the coalition has developed anything like a joint advocacy strategy related to this law. Absent such a strategy, the outcome of the discussion of the Forestry Law and the entire Law of Mother Earth is likely to mirror what happened with the Autonomy Law last year.
3. **New Coalition Members:** Current RRI Collaborators hold different ideas about the extent to which the coalition should be trying to expand in Bolivia. In addition, there is not complete clarity about how new Collaborators/Partners are chosen or even how people get included in the planning meetings. A clarifying discussion about this set of issues would be very helpful.
4. **REDD & Bolivia:** RRI-Bolivia's 2011 plan speaks to the need to increase the quality and the quantity of information available in the country about the relationship between rights and climate change, and REDD, in particular. Given the delicate nature of the debate within Bolivia, RRG should determine how it can best support the national team in this effort, and prioritize the provision of that support.

## **2. Monitoring Report on RRI Country Program in Indonesia Based on monitoring mission conducted by Mr. David Hendrickson August 24-31, 2010**

Indonesia is a heavily-forested country with a population of 230 million people. Due to the lack of sound forest management policies, the country has, because of deforestation and environmental degradation, surged recently to become the third highest emitter of carbon in the world. (World Bank 2009, *Indonesia and Climate Change: Current Status and Policies*). Extensions of forest land equivalent to 300 football fields are cut down and burned *every hour* to clear land for crops such as palm oil. Indonesian emissions from wildfires and smoldering peat bogs underneath rainforests also contribute to the devastation.

When RRI was first formed, Indonesia was identified as a Tier Two country, or a country of secondary priority for RRI's work, primarily the complexity of the forest sector and the high density of national and international actors obscured the nature of any potential unique contribution by the Coalition. Over time, however, RRI Partners active in Indonesia argued that the country deserved Tier One (high priority) status, both because of its strategic importance and the number of Partners active there. That change was made in ???.

The country-level coalition in Indonesia is an extremely active one, including four Partners and three active Collaborators. The annual RRI Strategy Development and Planning Meeting took place in Bogor, Indonesia on August 26-27. David Hendrickson, a member of the Monitoring Team, attended the planning meeting and then conducted follow-up interviews with participants on August 28-29.

### **Observations on the Planning Process**

There were 17 participants present at the planning meeting including representatives from the following RRI Partners: the Samdhana Institute; ICRAF (World Agroforestry Centre); FPP (Forest Peoples Program); and RECOFTC (The Centre for People and Forests). RRI Collaborators included CIFOR (Centre for Forest Research), HuMa (a community-based legal coordination agency) and Sawit Watch (a think tank that works on human rights and palm oil issues). FPP/Pusaka, PUMA, and Life Mosaic were other local NGO's representing indigenous organizations, but some participants did not stay for the entire meeting.

Two staff members represented RRG at the meeting. Due to health reasons and schedule conflicts, two key Asia staff of RRG (the Regional Director and the Regional Coordinator) were unable to attend. Despite the lack of preparation time, RRG staff fulfilled their traditional role as facilitators of much of the meeting. All RRI Partners and Collaborators were represented at the meeting. Out of the 17 meeting participants, three were women.

The two days were organized into four planning sessions. The first one presented an overview of the planning process. Next, participants conducted an assessment of organizational impacts from 2009 to present, held a discussion of strategic outcomes, were introduced to the monitoring and documentation process, and reviewed related work by Partners and Collaborators. The third session focused on emerging issues, opportunities, and challenges for RRI interventions. Finally, stakeholders reviewed what they accomplished over the past year, summarized key lessons learned, and agreed on seven strategic priority areas for work in the next period.

The strategic areas identified by participants were:

1. Rights' agenda in climate change policy;
2. Private sector accountability and respect for of community rights;
3. Legal and policy reforms, tenure and legal pluralism recognizing "Adat"<sup>9</sup>
4. Negotiated settlement of conflicts;
5. Insertion of rights concerns into the conservation model;
6. Networking and support for social movements; and
7. Livelihoods and poverty alleviation.

RRG, acting in the facilitator role, encouraged participants to make the strategic areas more specific, but only slight adjustments were made through the discussion. Most Partners apparently considered the areas to be an adequate basis for organizing RRI's work. The Partners did, however, add the seventh strategic area, livelihoods and poverty alleviation, for 2010.

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<sup>9</sup> Adat can refer to custom, tradition, ritual, appropriate behavior, and rules or practices of social life. Indonesia's Basic Forestry Law (No. 41/1999) recognizes and understands "adat" and provides possibilities for the "adat" community to manage and use "adat" forest. The "adat" community can only obtain rights to use and manage "adat" land or forest if the state acknowledges their existence. They are not able to own land. (See Takano, S. n.d. The Concept of Adat and Adat Revivalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia. Retrieved from [http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:DCGJPGEdq14J:scholar.google.com/&hl=en&as\\_sdt=2000](http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:DCGJPGEdq14J:scholar.google.com/&hl=en&as_sdt=2000))

Some of the discussions among RRI participants on the first day were thought-provoking and consisted of meaningful discussions, exchanges, and reflections. Many participants remarked later in follow-up interviews that they learned a lot about activities occurring in Indonesia and within Southeast Asia that they were unaware of prior to the meeting.

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the planning process was limited by an apparent lack of preparation and planning by RRG staff. Last-minute staffing changes certainly affected preparation. Given that local participants had ceded the organization of the meeting to RRG, this lack of planning greatly affected meeting outcomes. Once the meeting began, shifting agenda items and planning priorities caused confusion among participants. In the absence of a clear agenda, debates emerged concerning strategic planning terminology (e.g. strategic areas, goals, objectives, outputs, and outcomes) focusing attention on process and terminology, rather than discussions about program issues. The facilitation approach adopted was one of consensus-building, which led to efforts to please everyone, rather than setting a course of action with a clear purpose and intended output for each session. Ultimately, this style in this circumstance led to an ineffective planning process that fell short in collective synthesis and analysis.

### **Group Dynamics**

Dynamics among the various members of the coalition became more difficult on the second day, verging at times on collective dysfunction. Progress on the meeting's pre-determined outcomes slowed to a crawl and some members of the group began to question the usefulness of the session. The mechanism of rotating facilitation worked quite well, however, and a switch in facilitators led to a final session that arrived as some of its desired outputs. It was important that the gathering ended on this generally positive note. Acknowledging that some of the meeting's primary planning goals had not been accomplished, participants chose a date in late September for an additional meeting to complete the planning work for 2011. That all participants readily made such a commitment after a less-than-productive gathering speaks to their sense of the importance of the RRI mission in Indonesia.

The three main Partners' primary achievements during 2009 were derived from the planning meeting, follow-up interviews, and a review of planning documents. A few participants remarked that late August was much too early to assess the impact of RRI's 2009 achievements in Indonesia. This same sentiment also emerged in several of the follow-up interviews.

FPP achievements included ongoing dialogue with the International Finance Corporation around concerns related to the rights and the environmental impact of palm oil production. They remain uncertain, however, about the extent to which the World Bank and its associated institutions are willing to re-think their current attitude toward rights' based approaches. Effective work in this area will also require more research by local organizations to track the management of supply chains in the palm oil sector. Other notable areas of achievement for FPP include:

- Bringing rights considerations into spatial planning exercises (to influence the distribution of people and activities in spaces such as land use);
- Developing a platform for legal reform;
- Continuing work to understand and seek reform in key elements of Indonesia's Freedom of Privacy Information Act;
- Using case research and regional gatherings of legal activists to rekindle interest in work on legal pluralism;
- Influencing discussion related to two bills under consideration in the legislature to reform laws affecting the rights of indigenous people;
- Conducting regional studies and workshops highlighting rights concerns related to palm oil production.

In terms of its achievements to date, ICRAF emphasized two key areas:

- Using a series of district and national workshops to embed considerations of climate change and slash and burn dangers into efforts to resolve land conflicts; and
- Gaining access to information necessary to address the relationship between climate change and rights at the community level. This area included research and other work on a Letter of Intent (LOI) between NORAD (The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation), the World Bank, and Indonesia to support work on climate change, community-based rights, and land tenure. The LOI is critical policy to advance Indonesian land tenure because it should help establish a pathway to recognition with rights for local Partners.

RECOFTC's achievements centered on two key areas:

- A rights-based agenda on climate change policy, with additional emphasis on adaptation to climate change (rather than solely mitigation); and
- Strengthening of community-based rights' and land tenure networks closely articulated with grassroots social movements within the country.



The Samdhana Institute did not present on their organizational achievements, but local organizations--such as FKMM and Life Mosaic—did comment on activities that they have undertaken during the past year in conjunction with Samdhana.

Participants then discussed RRI interventions, emerging issues, opportunities and challenges in Indonesia. A discussion chaired by FPP Director, Marcus Colchester, organized these observations into key areas of consideration. Subsequent discussions attempted to prioritize and then re-group the areas into clusters before arriving at a total of 11 areas by the end of the second day. Those areas follow, along with some of the potential threats and opportunities identified in the discussion of each area.

**Clarifying commitments and operational steps regarding the LOI between the government, NORAD and the World Bank.** The LOI sets compensation agreements for carbon emissions in Indonesia with NORAD and the World Bank. This was perceived by some Partners as a major opportunity to reduce the shocking level of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and to create permanent shifts in the country's institutional landscape. Language addressing indigenous peoples was also inserted into the LOI along with a moratorium that will restrict conversions of peat bogs and natural forests into forest plantations. While the negotiations will not be easy, they hold out the possibility that rural development strategies can be reframed in a way that refocuses them on traditional, diversified, collective resource development in Indonesia.

**A New Approach to Forestry.** The implied recognition of the role of community forestry and forest-based enterprises in the LOI holds out the possibility that there could be a new approach to forestry at the national level that would resolve longstanding land conflicts. RRI could provide indispensable applied research to help envision how such a new approach might operate, concretely, at the local level.

**The Merauke Integrated Food Estate (MIFEE).** RRI members believe that the Indonesian government is engaged in a huge "land grab" in West Papua, against the will and the rights of indigenous people there. Spatial planning related to this program in the region may provide an opportunity to assert the tenure rights of the local population, but, on balance, the project is seen as a major threat.

**Revision of legislation.** Several important pieces of forestry-related legislation could be up for consideration or revision in the coming year by the Indonesian House of Representatives, making the legislature an important arena of activity for RRI-Indonesia. One of these, a bill addressing jurisdictional issues related to the

Indonesian Supreme Court, could be critical to RRI's efforts to improve local land tenure policies.

**Palm oil advocacy.** Coalition members expressed a growing interest in expanding palm oil advocacy and education in Southeast Asia. This work should highlight the implications of rapidly expanding palm oil production on efforts to advance and consolidate forest tenure rights.

**Strategic weaknesses in capacity, links to social movements, and advocacy.**

RRI's advocacy on behalf of local tenure rights is often not sufficiently connected to local social movements. National advocacy work can be compartmentalized and distant from those who might benefit from it. Many Indonesians have formal tenure rights, but are not sufficiently informed of those rights to take advantage of them. Closer connections between national advocacy efforts and local and regional social movements could help address this problem.

**Focus greater attention on the paper and pulp industry.** Partners felt they should expand their focus to include the paper and pulp industries, which are playing a more prominent role in Indonesian forestry as industrial plantations expand in number.

**A critique of BAU (Business As Usual).** Innovative approaches provide new opportunities for local and alternative livelihood systems that emphasize resilience of forest communities. The proposed ITTO (The International Tropical Timber Organization) Conference on tenure reform to be co-hosted with the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry and RRI in 2011 can help highlight the resilience of forest communities in Indonesia when it comes to tenure reform options.

**The growing influence of civil society.** RRI notes that efforts to advance indigenous rights are becoming more prominent in Indonesia. Indigenous groups will, likewise, be integral to expanding efforts at spatial planning using community mapping technology.

**Tenure conference.** The planned international conference on land tenure and rights-based approaches offers RRI-Indonesia the opportunity to link its activities and concepts to REDD and adaptation to climate change. Such efforts might also provide an opening to strengthen work with the Indonesian legislature to secure local land rights.

**Influence spatial planning.** Participants in the meeting saw value in developing a specific emphasis on spatial planning at the local level, with a thematic orientation toward planning for climate change adaptation.

### **Obstacles to the Advance of RRI's Program**

Interviews with participants surfaced several obstacles (both internal and external) that Partners and Collaborators consider to be impediments to the advance of RRI's work in Indonesia.

**Planning preparation:** RRI recognizes the importance of strategic planning to effective programs, but RRI does not always use a facilitation approach that increases group cohesion and helps the group achieve its intended planning outcomes. In particular, more advanced thinking about the agenda and increase use of participatory methods that actively involve participants should be promoted.

**Partner communication and collaboration:** Since RRI Indonesia has only had 2-3 coalition meetings to date, there remains uncertainty about the work activities in which various stakeholders are involved. RRI should communicate more regularly with Partners/Collaborators to create a more consistent presence in Indonesia. For example, participants voiced the desire for the Asia Regional Facilitator to physically visit Indonesia more often and meet with Partners/Collaborators and other Indonesian stakeholders. Also, one of the national Partners or Collaborators could take on a more active role facilitating communication among coalition members.

**Partner dynamics:** While all Partners have respect for each other, some friction exists among the strong personalities leading RRI Partners in Indonesia. Some of this friction surfaces during group interactions like the planning meeting. More consistent and regular interaction among RRI Indonesian Partners and Collaborators might help build greater levels of trust, and stronger facilitation of meetings might help address these issues when they arise in meetings. Participants also mentioned the importance of informal networking, but acknowledged that this is often dependent on chance and availability.

**Collaboration with local Partners:** The number of international donors present in Indonesia, and their sharply contrasting priorities have led to a piecemeal approach to development in the country. RRI does not exist entirely outside of this dynamic, but is in a position to build a stronger collaborative identity with and among its local Partners. Specifically, an effort to diversify RRI Collaborators in Indonesia to

increase indigenous participation could open up the possibility of a truly unique collaboration.

**Lack of knowledge about REDD and carbon rights.** Limited knowledge about REDD and carbon rights is becoming a real barrier to RRI Partners/Collaborators doing effective work, particularly advocacy work. Members of the coalition require access to additional analysis and training on the relationship between REDD and forest tenure in Indonesia.

**Adaptation to Climate Change:** As the impacts of climate change begin to become more evident, RRI needs to place increased emphasis on programs that address the need to adapt to climate change. At the moment, farmers and community foresters are asking the questions, but few groups focus on adaptation.

**Poor governance and intransigence within the Ministry of Forestry:** Indonesia suffers from poor governance, corruption, and weak policy formation throughout government. The Ministry of Forestry is no exception. One RRI member remarked that the Ministry is expert only at, “protecting their hegemony with religious zeal.” Land leasing issues “operate within a box” with little foresight or flexibility to consider rights-based approaches. Today, forestry continues to be primarily equated to logging and paper production. Institutional reform from higher levels of government should focus more accountability and transparency alongside efforts to develop a culture oriented toward promoting integrated resource management approaches.

## **Review of 2010 Achievements**

Because of time pressures, the part of the meeting when the country planning team reviewed the program's 2010 accomplishments and created the basis for the Annual Program Monitoring Report was extremely limited. Participants focused on this activity—reviewing progress on strategic and annual outcomes—for a 10-15 minute period during the second day of the meeting.

RRG's call to include a more systematic monitoring analysis in the Country and Regional planning had not been previously presented to the Indonesia Partners and Collaborators. When this concept was presented at the planning meeting, the basic expectation was communicated, but the presentation made the exercise seem more like something required by the Secretariat, rather than an opportunity for the country team to learn, together, from its experience and share its perspective with the entire organization.

Predictably, reactions from the Partners to what appeared to be a new requirement for their participation were generally negative. Two Partners mentioned the onerous transaction costs in attending RRI meetings and applying for funding. Participants felt that this format was being imposed by RRG and the Partners did not understand how it would improve their work at the country level.

Despite these problems with the monitoring exercise, it seems that the discussion of 2010 achievements did take place at the August meeting. The results of that discussion are summarized in the 2010 Program Monitoring Report.<sup>10</sup>

The findings of that report triangulate quite nicely with other sources of information available concerning the Indonesia program (internal documents, interviews, meeting observation). The assessment of achievements seems quite honest in the sense that the coalition members were open about the fact that the desired outcomes for the year had certainly not been attained in all areas. Additionally, the content of the "Lessons Learned" section of the report suggests that RRI's desire to stimulate coalition members to undertake a thoughtful reflection on the year's achievements was at least partly fulfilled. It would be interesting to know to what extent the "Lessons Learned" were consciously incorporated into the development of annual outcomes for 2011 at the second part of the country planning exercise in late September. It is also not clear to us if there was any reflection on the Annual Monitoring Report at that second meeting.

Partners also wanted longer planning cycles, stating that one year plans were too short. According to one Partner, "Last time we submitted concept notes in February and didn't get them back from RRG until June. I encourage us to streamline the process instead of adding layers of bureaucracy."

RRG representation explained that a concept note will be needed by RRG for each of the seven strategic priority areas that had been identified in country planning. For example, 3-4 organizations collaborating on one strategic priority area would need only a single concept note, which should help streamline the process. That single concept note would then lead to a contract related to the activities to be carried out under that strategic priority.

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<sup>10</sup> RRG's Communication and Coalition is also making Program Monitoring Reports for all programs (Country and Regional, as well as Global) available to the RRI community via the Internet.

Recommendations from the Partners were divided into two primary areas: a) How to improve the planning process; and b) How RRG can help improve the work of the coalition by focusing on stimulating collaboration among coalition members to advance the coalition's overall mission.

Based on review of the program-related documents provided by RRG, our observation of the planning meeting and interviews with meeting participants, we offer the following recommended actions to strengthen the program in Indonesia. They include adjustments to the planning process and steps that might strengthen the country collaboration in Indonesia.

## **Recommendations**

### **Planning Process**

- **Preparation:** Ensure adequate preparation is provided to Partners and Collaborators before the annual planning meeting, including consulting the agenda participants before the planning meeting. The agenda should include the meeting outcomes and outline the methods that will be used to achieve those outcomes.
- **Networking:** Start the planning meeting session the evening prior to the formal start with a dinner for more informal networking and relationship building.
- **Facilitation:** Engage an external professional with the requisite skills to facilitate planning meetings and involve her/him in all pre-meeting preparation.
- **Participation:** Utilize participatory planning methods to ensure the maximum involvement of all participants in the planning process.
- **Monitoring Rationale:** Engage Partners in a deeper discussion of the rationale for involving them in RRI's internal monitoring system. If RRI is committed to implementing this system, then it is important enough to discuss carefully with coalition participants in each country. If members in a country program don't see value in it for them, then it would probably be better not to use the process in that country.

### **Coalition Effectiveness**

- **Emphasize the value-added approach to RRI.** Some Partners and Collaborators expressed a sense of being compartmentalized in Indonesia's current funding landscape. Some also viewed their interactions with RRI as primarily a donor-recipient relationship in which the Partner applied for funding from RRI rather than as an effort to create synergy among organizations working within a coalition. RRI

could place more emphasis on strengthening the national coalitions. A stronger coalition could better achieve its outcomes and also leverage existing funding opportunities.

- **Expand regional initiatives.** RRI can be a mechanism for Partners and Collaborators to help elevate their issue to a regional plane, leveraging other research and advocacy networks. Palm oil issues could be a good candidate for a test of this regional potential.

- **Coalition expansion:** Pursuing a tenure reform agenda in Indonesia requires a deeper engagement with the nation's legal framework and much more participation of indigenous networks in the coalition's interventions. Efforts should be made to involve such organizations in the near future.

- **Internal Communication and Coordination:** Strengthening RRI in Indonesia requires stronger communication among national coalition members, and better facilitation of collaborative work in all priority areas. This national facilitation could be provided by RRG's Regional Facilitator and/or by a coalition member who assumes basic coordination tasks related to the coalition.

- **Host an international conference.** Partners/Collaborators viewed the proposed 2011 ITTO conference hosted in Indonesia as just the sort of activity that can leverage RRI's network and help galvanize support for tenure rights and market reform.

While there are still growing pains associated with RRI's work in Indonesia, there are also opportunities to strengthen the coalition and support indigenous organizations to play a more prominent role in tenure reform. Expected funding from NORAD and the World Bank will raise RRI Indonesia's profile regionally and globally while forging a pathway to examine the legality of carbon rights for local Partners. RRI staff, Partners and Collaborators will require more frequent and substantial interactions in the coming months to solidify coalition efforts and plan the 2011 ITTO meeting.

### **3. Monitoring Report on RRI Country Program in Mali Based on Monitoring Mission Conducted by Mr. Nicholas Atampugre October 4-10, 2010**

#### **Introduction**

This is a report of a monitoring visit to RRI-Mali carried out on behalf of Kevin Murray Strategic Consulting. It begins with an overview of the community forestry sector in Mali. The purpose is to situate the work of the RRI-Mali coalition in its appropriate context and by so doing highlight the challenges to be overcome and the implications for RRI in terms of the achievement of its strategic goals. This is followed by a narrative account of the 2010 review and planning meeting. The aim is to provide a feel for how the meeting was conducted. We then provide our own independent assessment of the meeting. We follow this with an assessment of the likelihood of RRI-Mali achieving its strategic objectives as set out in the 2009-2012 Strategic Plan. Our conclusions and recommendations bring the report to a close.

#### **Land Community Forestry in Mali – An overview**

To understand the community forestry sector in Mali, it is important to situate it within the broader context of the livelihood strategies of rural dwellers. Malian agriculture is based on individual and family farm holdings as well as gender differentiated economic activities. For example, there are specific agricultural activities, such as the gathering, processing and sale of shea nuts, which are dominated by women just as there are male dominated agricultural activities.

While access to land and tenure rights are largely individual, land and its resources are generally described as communally “owned”. To secure their livelihoods, rural dwellers in Mali have traditionally relied on local customs, practices and conventions to regulate access to and use of renewable natural resources. Local communities have seen their forestry sector as a source of fuel wood, fodder and medicinal herbs, and have relied on traditional norms and conventions to govern their interaction with the forestry sector. A critical element underpinning these norms, customs, rules and regulations is the notion of usufruct rights as against “ownership” rights. In Mali just as in many parts of West Africa, all people are deemed to have a right to a livelihood, and by implication rights of access to renewable natural resources which are normally granted by the “owners” of the land and its resources. It is for this reason that local customs and conventions



generally require token or symbolic payments to “owners” to gain access to and use of natural resources.

The concept of ownership used here refers more to the right to regulate access to and use of these resources as against the power to alienate in perpetuity land and its resources for private or individual gain. Consequently, while there are boundaries between renewable natural resources of different communities, families and individuals, a demarcation of clear boundaries between communities as well as their forestry resources has traditionally not been seen as a priority. Nevertheless, there is usually an understanding between communities as to where the boundaries lie. Peasants have historically operated on the basis of consensus, a practice that was a lot easier when renewable natural resources were abundant. With increased pressure on land, conflicts over access to and use of natural resources have become frequent. Land demarcation has had a tendency to create conflict as different communities and socio-economic groups struggle over scarce land resources. Land-related conflicts have become equally serious in peri-urban areas where land values have risen astronomically due to an increasing desire of the urban elite to own their own homes.

Community Forestry in the Malian context often refers to the relationship of communities to protected forests as well as to individual, village or community tree plantations or woodlots that have been established as part of efforts to hold back desertification. The latter have often evolved into village forests and many such initiatives have involved NGOs working in partnership with communities as well as between state, NGOs and communities or individual farmers.

The colonial state and its post-colonial successors have usurped rights over all Malian land and passed laws to regulate access to and use of renewable natural resources. The state recognises the existence and prevalence of traditional resource management practices and regulations. It has been compelled to accept that a “legal ownership” of land does not translate easily into effective control and management of renewable natural resources. As a result, it regularly passes new legislation and policies to regulate usage. Such laws are often translated into the local languages but the limited reading culture in communities has meant that few people are aware of the content of forestry laws. Recent laws that have attempted to provide a comprehensive framework for managing forest resources include: law No. 96-050 passed on the 16<sup>th</sup> of October 1996; decree No. 0027/P-RM (22 March 2000) modified and ratified by law No. 02-008 of 12<sup>th</sup> February 2002. These laws govern access to forests and to the use of land for agricultural purposes.

Currently, there is momentum towards decentralization generally and community management of natural resources, in particular, largely propelled by two forces: a realization that the state (and its functionaries) have no capacity to effectively control and manage the use of these resources; and pressure from communities to have greater access to and usage rights over environmental resources they deem to be theirs. In theory, government has begun the process of decentralising forestry management and handing over some aspects to communities. Yet the decentralisation process still has a long way to go in terms of transferring legal power to communities to manage their resources based on local customs, practices and conventions. To a large extent, there is more talk than specific actions taken to bring about effective decentralisation and deconcentration. The state structure set up to promote decentralisation and deconcentration (CADD) is so severely under-resourced that it is only able to pay its staff and attend workshops organized by NGOs.

Resistance to effective decentralization and to the transfer of power to local communities is rooted in the economic benefits that accrue to the state (and to its functionaries) from control over land and its resources. For example, a new forestry code has just been passed without effective consultation with stakeholders. The new law is establishing a new tax regime which will penalize poor rural women and small livestock raisers for gaining access to and making use of some forest resources (e.g. fodder) to earn some income. The forestry code also forbids farmers from cutting down specific trees on their farmland. The above highlights the often contradictory legal position between forestry and agro-forestry on the one hand and customary usufruct rights on the other.

The above situation has clear implications for RRI and the achievement of its overall goal of reducing poverty, enhancing well-being and strengthening democratic governance in Mali. While there are opportunities for deepening the reform process, there are also significant challenges as the passage of the new law without adequate consultation shows. There is currently some momentum behind the transfer of power to communities to manage their resources. This has partly been the result of alliances being forged with policy makers by the RRI coalition in Mali. The focus so far has been on policy makers and state institutions at the national level and indeed, national level policy advocacy is critical for promoting reform at community level. However, progress will be faster if national level advocacy is underwritten by a broad-based social movement that has legitimacy among the majority in rural Mali.

That said, there are challenges at the community level which need to be overcome. There is a tendency to refer to communities as if they are undifferentiated groups of people who are unanimous about what is in their best interests. All communities are undergoing social differentiation, with some segments within the community benefiting more from the status quo than others. It will be important to understand, in each context, the specific obstacles to the development of a broad base of support for pro-poor community forestry management. Until there is a broad-based social movement, galvanized around the reform agenda, policy makers and the political class will make only the concessions they need to make in order to keep themselves in power. It is against this backdrop that RRI Mali's 2010 planning meeting took place.

### **RRI Mali 2010 Planning Meeting – Process and Outcomes**

The 2010 planning meeting is the second formal attempt by RRI to review its work for the year and set annual targets. This year's planning meeting included, as observers, resource persons familiar with themes of interest to the coalition<sup>11</sup>. The main engagement, however was among the RRI Mali coalition members – Inter Cooperation (IC), IUCN, Sahel Eco and the World Agro-Forestry Centre (ICRAF). The initiative to invite resource persons, it appears, was taken largely by IC. The planning meeting agenda circulated earlier did not suggest that resource persons would be called upon to provide any specific inputs. In addition to the resource persons, Mr. Kadare Traore was hired to facilitate the planning session. There was also a *rapporteur* – Ndiaye - who took down notes of the meeting. The latter was also backed up by Idrissa Gana of Regreening the Sahel (an affiliate of SahelEco) who documented progress made by each member of the coalition directly onto his laptop. Unfortunately, he became ill near the end of the first day of the planning meeting.

There were 7 components to the programme of the planning meeting:

- i. an introduction by Solange;
- ii. a brief presentation, by each coalition member, of the activities it undertook during the year and the results emanating from each activity, the factors that facilitated the achievements made and the difficulties encountered;
- iii. the key results/impact of RRI Mali for the year, highlighting in particular the challenges and facilitating factors;
- iv. an evaluation of the results achieved since the last planning meeting, focusing on whether expectations were met, and if not why; where there has been only

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<sup>11</sup> See field notes for the full list of participants at the planning meeting.

partial progress or significant results have been achieved including unexpected critical results;

- v. a mid-term review of results achieved, since 2009, of the 2012 strategy;
- vi. an update (of the 2009 document) on the context in Mali with a focus on emerging national level forestry and land-related issues and drawing attention to current major problems, challenges and opportunities; and
- vii. a discussion leading to a strategy and plan of action for 2011.

Because some of the resource persons present were not familiar with RRI, an introduction to RRI was deemed necessary to enable the resource persons to better appreciate the context of the meeting. Consequently, Solange made a presentation on RRI highlighting the importance of forging alliances for advocacy purposes in order to move forward the three broad strategic reform objectives: transfer of power to communities to manage their resources (including trees on farmlands); giving legal recognition and backing to local conventions on the management of renewable natural resources; and promoting gender (as well as other marginalized groups) equity in terms of access to and control over natural resources. She also outlined the process to be used to review the work carried out in 2010 and define new targets for the work to be carried out in 2011. Rokiya of IUCN explained to the resource persons the process of collective planning where priorities to be achieved during the year are agreed upon by members of the coalition with each member taking the lead on a specific objective and related area of work. The remainder of the meeting followed the agenda laid out above, with Solange leading the process of establishing the progress made, by each member of the coalition, on each member's area of responsibility.

In the activity area **A1**<sup>12</sup> led by IC, terms of reference have been developed, an expert with the required expertise recruited, a draft report/technical note is ready but is yet to be presented to the advocacy group. To that extent the indicator for that activity has been achieved although the expected results are yet to be fully realized. The technical note (in the form of arguments) is meant to counter the view that a transfer of local management authority to communities is illegal. Activities **A2 & A3** – led by ICRAF have not yet commenced due to contractual delays, attributed to ICRAF's (global office) internal bureaucracy. Activity areas **A4 to A6** led by IC are still a work in progress. An advocacy strategy has been developed and there has been a collation of documents. The aspect of "interpellation" (promoting the enforcement of implementation) has not yet been done. Challenges faced in this area of work have included:

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<sup>12</sup> Refer to RRI Mali: Strategy 2009-2012 –Action Plan 2010 for details

- how to bring together the multiplicity of actors especially when some of them do not have a tradition of working together;
- the slow pace of adoption of laws in the renewable natural resource sector although attempts are being made to implement them as a way of identifying challenges;
- the lack of political will to implement reform.

Regarding activities **A7 to A10**, led by Sahel Eco, the planned workshop was held a day earlier and a report is available. However, the sub-regional dimension was not addressed. The indicator on decrees concerning trees on farmland and agro-forestry in general has also not been addressed. There is, however, increased awareness on the above issue and there is recognition that a legal vacuum exists. A collaborative agreement between Sahel Eco and CNOP exists and the HCCT is engaged with these issues. There is also a reflection group on the subject matter. Factors that have contributed to these positive outcomes include:

- the synergy between – Greening the Sahel and RRI - the former has advocacy capacity while the latter has facilitated national level advocacy;
- the HCCT has prioritized effective decentralization i.e. transfer of management responsibility to decentralized structures, and;
- the experience of the National Coordinating structure for peasant organizations (CNOP) in advocacy.

Challenges have included the clandestine development of the new forestry law which has dimensions likely to impoverish the poor. The workshop on farmland trees held a day before the review and planning meeting had been delayed due to the ill health of the main person in Sahel Eco.

The activities led by IUCN **A11-A13** have yet to deliver the results expected in this area, although some progress has been made in terms of analysis on land tenure, developing an outline advocacy strategy and making recommendations on changes to the legal framework to take care of women's interests. For example an attempt will be made to suggest an increase from 10% to 25% percentage of irrigated land to be allocated to women. In terms of activity **A14**, not much progress has been made. IUCN has identified 9 consultants, but they have yet to submit their proposals. Challenges have included the short time frame and an inability to meet the consultants' fee rate. The consultants nevertheless carried out the assignment and submitted their report.

A review of the results expected for 2010, as stated in the Action Plan show the following:

- **Ra**<sup>13</sup> – achieved but it is unclear to what extent it has contributed or will contribute to achieving objective 1 as stated in the RRI Mali 2009-2012 strategic plan;
- **Rb** – not achieved – but a consultant has been recruited;
- **Rc** – not achieved but the arguments are in place to achieve the objective – the advocacy strategy is available;
- **Rd** – not achieved but some progress has been made in the sense that a national reflection group exists, an advocacy strategy and key actors have been identified;
- **Re** – not achieved – and appears rather too ambitious. The major challenge of gender is at the community level – the focus of advocacy should aim to tackle traditional structures. There is a need for raising awareness at the grassroots level and many women at this level are often not keen. There is, however, a favorable disposition at the national level towards gender issues.
- **Rf** – not achieved.

Overall, although the RRG staff member was expected to play a more background role to enable the facilitator guide the process, it was clear that the facilitator deferred to the RRG staff member for guidance. It created a situation whereby the meeting appeared to be geared more towards the management requirements of the RRG than a review by coalition members, themselves. The facilitation could have been more effective if the facilitator had taken charge of the process and designed it with a view to enabling RRI-Mali coalition members take stock of where they are at currently and what they need to do achieve the objectives of the coalition by the target dates. An open and interactive process could have brought out important unintended effects/outcomes relevant to the work of the RRI-Mali coalition.

In response to our question on the basis of optimism within the coalition that the objectives of the 2009-2012 strategy and workplan will be achieved by 2012, despite the fact that, to date, only **Ra** has been achieved so far, participants attributed their optimism to the following:

- RRI issues are “owned” by the major stakeholders and there is a sense of urgency at the grassroots level;

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<sup>13</sup> Refer to RRI Mali: Strategy 2009-2012 –Action Plan 2010 for details

- there are emerging opportunities to engage on gender issues capable of leading to a realization of the objective; and
- there is a national political will – driven by the Prime Minister – to move the agenda forward;

The above sense of optimism is understandable given some of the actors that RRI-Mali has brought into the network. One notable member of the parliament – Umar Mariko – was mentioned as championing the RRI cause. Mariko emerged a national hero in 1991 when as a student leader he played a pivotal role in the downfall of the dictatorship of Moussa Traore. He has since formed a political party and is reported to be operating a number of radio stations in Mali. An attempt was made to have an interview with Mariko but he was at the time out of the country. It was also not possible to interview other political actors due to the short duration of the trip. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that RRI Mali is adding value to the decentralization process, especially as it relates to community management of renewable natural resources.

Some of the outcomes of RRI Mali initiatives for the year 2010 that were identified at the meeting include:

- Strategic partnership with different actors forged;
- Increased knowledge and exchange of experiences;
- Awareness raised in different Partners;
- An increased engagement by different Partners with policy makers;
- Opportunities for advocacy and social mobilization have emerged and there are reflection groups in 3 regions of Mali;
- Legal gaps/inadequacies have been identified and there are suggestions for improvement;
- The existence of the coalition – although it is still nascent and no regular or periodic (e.g. quarterly) review of progress of work of the coalition has yet taken place.

Since 2010 is also mid-way through the planned 2009-2012 strategic plan, a preliminary mid-term review was carried out. The review suggested the following outcomes:

- **R1 - R2**<sup>14</sup>-There is increased penetration of agro-business at the same time as there is increased interest within local communities on issues of land use; it is

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<sup>14</sup> Refer to RRI Mali: Strategy 2009-2012 –Action Plan 2010 for details

evident that peasants are most unlikely to obtain title to their land; the land issues are complex especially the conflict between usufruct rights and legal title to land;

- **R3** – There is a problem of formulation and it needs to be reformulated;
- **R4** – Important elements for achieving this by 2012 are in place;
- **R5** – Gender strategy is in place, (i.e. agriculture law is taking gender into account);
- **R6** – Will be achieved by 2012 –a regional theme has been identified
- **R7** – A new section on climate change is to be added under a new objective 5.

The review also included an analysis of changes in the environment or context since the last planning meeting. The most significant ones include the introduction of a new forestry law and the undemocratic way in which it was passed. The law was presumably drafted by technical forestry staff as an initiative so secret that even a member of the commission set up to draft the new law was not aware that it had been passed. The law has the potential to produce negative impacts especially on the poor. Other developments include the transfer of 75% of resources in the education sector to decentralized structures; the existence of a pilot initiative on decentralized management of forestry resources (GDEFOR) which is about to take off, and the renaming of the Ministry of Water & Forests. Distinctive elements in the construction of the new Ministry include its new paramilitary image and the insertion of agriculture-related objectives within its mandate.

Two supplementary objectives were also identified during the planning meeting to bring RRI Mali in line with RRI's strategic goals. These cover the issue of land tenure and climate change (and REDD). The most important challenge, in the area of land tenure, is to work for the adoption of a law to clarify the modalities for recognizing customary rights to land. For example, a whole village has reportedly been sold off to entrepreneurs – largely because the land, in a legal sense, belongs to the state. On Climate Change and REDD, the issue of carbon credit is leading to large-scale reforestation and it appears agro-forestry will become a major issue only after 2012.

Based on the above, an attempt was made to set targets for 2011. It was agreed that **R1** was to be reformulated to include acceptance of arguments by decision makers with a link made between acceptance and implementation in the sense that it should lead to policy change. **R3** appears ambitious but participants were nevertheless convinced that community management of forests is achievable by 2012. The absence of Rokiya of IUCN on the second day made a setting of targets for 2011 that



are the responsibility of IUCN unrealistic. It was suggested that this area could be completed later with her input.

It is worth noting the enthusiasm and spirit of cooperation that prevailed among members of the RRI Mali coalition. Throughout the deliberations, there was a collegial atmosphere characterised by two somewhat contradictory trends: one trend expressed the need for greater synergy, coordination and collaboration among coalition members, while another, while recognizing the importance of contributing to the joint RRI agenda, would rather focus on achieving their own areas of responsibility. To some extent, the annual planning process could become an important and effective component of RRI's Internal Monitoring and Evaluation System if a number of changes are made to the process. The next section further explains this view.

### **Independent Assessment of the Planning Meeting**

It is important to put the planning meeting and this report in context. RRI Mali is a very young coalition and this is only the second planning meeting since its formation.<sup>15</sup> The issues RRI Mali is grappling with are challenging in the sense that they are the heart of the development challenges facing Mali as a nation. It is therefore important to be measured in our expectations of what is achievable. Nonetheless, it is useful to explore ways by which RRI could get greater mileage out of an annual process designed to feed into an RRI-wide planning process. It is also important to shift the focus and momentum away from fulfilling an annual management requirement and towards generating space for critical self-reflection by Partners. After all, they are expected to "own" the RRI agenda in Mali since they contributed to it. Consequently, it should not appear as if they are organizations financed to undertake activities by an external body whose interests happen to coincide with its country Partners.

#### **The annual review and planning process**

The design of the planning process, in terms of what was to be achieved, reflected what needs to be addressed during an annual planning process. However, it is the process leading up to the annual planning meeting and the process used during the planning meeting that deserve more scrutiny. The planning meeting seemed geared more to meeting a management requirement than a critical reflection on the past

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<sup>15</sup> It is important to note that the Mali Coalition has held occasional assessment meetings on its own, without RRG staff or an outside facilitator. In this sense, the national group has been more self-directed toward RRI goals than many other country programs.

year by participants actively engaged with an agenda that is at the heart of their work as individual organizations and members of the RRI coalition. Although participants engaged with passion, the process used could have been designed to generate more critical insights into experiences of the year under review. Such a reflection would then inform the work planned for the forthcoming year in the sense that it would necessarily focus on what is achievable.

While the two days allocated for the planning meeting seem adequate given Partners' other commitments, the process leading up to the meeting as well as the actual conduct of the meeting could have been better facilitated to produce greater depth in the analysis of the various activity and result areas.

For example, before coming to the meeting each member of the coalition could have prepared (in bullet form to be transferred onto colored cards at the meeting), their assessment of progress against the agreed workplan. The purpose of such preparation would be to facilitate some sort of gallery walk, through the year, of key activities, achievements, and lessons learned, rather than a formal presentation in plenary. An interactive session that allows the meeting to have a graphic view of the progress made during the year would stimulate greater depth in the discussions on factors that made the achievements possible and the challenges that were faced. Such a process would make it easier to go beyond an activity-centric annual review to a more holistic and critical reflection on progress towards the achievement of RRI's strategic outcomes.

A more interactive annual review and planning process would require a different type of facilitation. It would require all participants to participate actively. The role of the facilitator in such a process is to ensure that there is sufficient depth of analysis and an effective synthesis of key conclusions. In such a context, resource persons would be guided to seed discussions and analysis with ideas and suggestions that are more likely to help move the RRI agenda forward more quickly. That way, RRI Mali's annual review and planning meeting would benefit from their wealth of knowledge and experience.

It was not clear what added value the resource persons were meant to bring into the meeting and how their inputs would help enliven the discussions. Although there was a facilitator for the meeting, it was obvious that his role was ambiguous. He sometimes appeared as a note taker, on flip chart, carrying out a task similar to what the hired *rapporteur* was doing.

## **The Results and Outcomes**

It was refreshing to find participants assessing themselves and declaring some areas of work as not having been achieved without being unduly defensive. Although the review and planning meeting took place in October, three months before the end of the year, it was clear that what was expected to be achieved would not be attained during the remaining months of the calendar year. Despite the fact that, as per the expected results for this year, not much had been achieved, participants were optimistic that the targets set for 2012 remained achievable.

The forthcoming election of 2012 and the event's potential impact on the prospect of the Mali program was not discussed. While opportunities to push forward certain policy agendas would open up as different political actors seek votes, there is unlikely to be significant space for policy work when most policy makers are preoccupied with retaining power. The reasons given for the optimism were not convincing because the factors affecting RRI's programmatic achievements are largely beyond the control and influence of members of the coalition. Absent a strategy for such influence, it is unrealistic to expect to achieve the results outlined in the 2009-12 plan.

Furthermore, the claims of results to date were difficult to measure and the indicators referenced referred more to activities than to effects, results and outcomes. The use of documents produced as evidence of achievement only proves that some activities have been carried out. The production of a document is not sufficient evidence of the success of the activity or of the change desired except when such documents refer to specific policy outcomes that are already in the public domain.

The strategic import of a partnership is difficult to determine unless it is directly linked to specific policy outcomes and can demonstrate success in achieving those outcomes. Opportunities for advocacy and social mobilization are only opportunities if there is an accompanying set of advocacy goals and an action plan for achieving them. Increased knowledge and an identification of legal gaps can only be measured through the desired change that is expected as a result of such knowledge and consequent plugging of legal loopholes. While it is understandable that these changes will happen in the long-term, it is important to be specific and realistic about what can be achieved within the time frame under discussion.

## **RRI's 2009 – 2012 Strategic Plan – Prospects and Challenges**

RRI Mali is beginning to reach out to government services; parliamentarians, local/national networks; and peasant organizations. The RRI coalition in Mali asserts that RRI is now a household name among policy makers especially as the coalition is engaged in addressing pertinent but difficult issues – decentralization and tenure rights. They suggest, too, that there is local ownership of the RRI agenda by Malian institutions. RRI Mali has managed to carry along some members of parliament who have taken up the RRI agenda and are championing it as their own. It is therefore not surprising that there is now a national debate, involving the national assembly and the High Council of Collectivities, on community rights and decentralization. There are hopeful signs that a social movement could be nurtured around the issue of community rights, land tenure and access to/usage of renewable natural resources. Within RRI Mali, a framework for collaboration among agencies with similar or complementary agencies exists. Collaboration is taking place sometimes through joint planning, taking responsibility for specific objectives, providing feedback on terms of reference and collaborating in planning some workshops. Coalition Partners meet and share information with each other on their meetings, as necessary.

Despite the above, there are significant challenges to the realization of RRI's objectives in Mali. These are rooted in the political economy of local livelihood struggles of the people of Mali. Conflicting interest groups have different views on how to promote joint management and these differences could hinder grassroots mobilization. Conflicting interests affect how local resource management conventions/practices are captured and accepted as applicable at a national level. Some of these challenges are rooted in the perceived risks to the interests of the socio-political classes associated with decentralization and a transfer of power to communities to manage their natural resources. Despite engaging national political discourse on the transfer of power, the critical area is fiscal decentralization especially as 80% of locally generated revenue still goes to the State. While it has been possible for significant resources to be transferred to decentralized structures in the education and health sectors, there are powerful and conflicting vested interests regarding renewable natural resources at all levels of society.

It is therefore not surprising that the new forestry law was passed in secrecy and with a marked sense of urgency. Furthermore, there exist a multiplicity of institutions

(HCCT, Association of Municipalities, Association of Cercles and Regions) associated with governance in Mali, and many of these are struggling to carve spheres of influence for themselves. It is tempting to dismiss some of them as being marginal to an achievement of RRI's objectives in Mali. Yet their very existence suggests that they are likely to have or create spheres of influence, however limited, that are capable of influencing an achievement of transfer of power to communities. The challenge here is how to broaden the scope of engagement<sup>16</sup>, raise awareness of Renewal Natural Resource management issues and ensure that appropriate policies are implemented based on a critical scrutiny by elected officials as well as relevant technical staff.

There are also challenges associated with the coalition itself and its capacity to meet agreed objectives for the period 2009-2012. The most obvious one is the perception of RRI as a donor. Interactions with some members of the coalition as well as some of its strategic Partners highlighted the inadequacy of the resources available to them and the expectation that RRI would provide additional resources to support their work. Yet it is clear that RRI's financial capacity to respond to demands for increased support is limited. The issue here is not just about resource deficits but the sense of ownership and responsibility for mobilizing additional resources. The way the expectations were articulated created the impression that some actors see RRI and RRG as primarily responsible for bringing resources to this project. It suggests that the nature of the relationship between RRI and its coalition Partners in Mali may have been constructed around resource flows to support an externally determined agenda rather than a participatory determination of national and regional priorities.

Implicit in the above is the challenge of understanding the structure and function of the RRI coalition. The framework proposal anticipates that its work will involve the strengthening of a social movement, a harmonization and implementation of laws on forests, land and decentralization more generally, as well as leveraging research into policy. To achieve these requires a sustained engagement involving social mobilization, forging of broad-based coalitions and ensuring evidence-based policy making. However, RRI-Mali is perceived by some members as a loose association of member organizations who have agreed to pull together their efforts to achieve a common agenda with each organization taking the lead on specific theme areas. The initiatives appear dispersed with Partners often acting autonomously based on the responsibility they have for undertaking specific activities using resources provided by RRI. Others see it as a catalyst of a genuine social movement leading the process of transfer of power to communities and working to reduce poverty. The coalition is

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<sup>16</sup> While successfully managing contestations for leadership and influence as tends to happen

therefore perceived as a structure for coordinating the different initiatives being undertaken by different Partners and Collaborators. The decision of Sahel Eco's representative to volunteer as a facilitator of the coalition in Mali reflects the yearning for more coherence and co-ordination within the coalition. There is therefore a case of an undetermined identity with limited clarity concerning who can become a member and how RRI Mali is to grow in response to the challenges to be faced and the need to generate and sustain the momentum for change.

## **Conclusions**

At a more general level, the criteria used by to determine its geographic priorities,<sup>17</sup> especially the link between the extension of forested land; the threat to existing forest cover and the state of community forestry are becoming increasingly questionable. The focus should be more on opportunities for significant policy change (nationally and regionally) in favor of resource poor households, the degree to which it is possible to nurture and sustain broad-based coalitions for change, and the extent of engagement of RRI Partners.

The issues that RRI Mali is engaged with are important but challenging. Issues of access to, use and management of renewable natural resources by resource poor communities are at the heart of poverty reduction challenges in Mali. Yet they are the very issues which are a focal point of the contestation for power at the national level. The state is more likely to pay lip service to the transfer of power to communities than to actively promote it. There is, therefore, a need for RRI Mali to nurture a social movement that draws its base of support from community groups and associations. This should form part of an advocacy strategy developed around opportunities for engagement that are likely to emerge closer to the elections of April and July 2012.

The governance context in general and the specific challenges of community forestry in Mali confirm the need to pursue the RRI mandate to its logical conclusion. There is evidence that RRI Mali's goals are quite consistent with the mandates and priorities of coalition members. Discussions with leaders from each member organisation, individually and, together, during the planning meeting, show a commitment to a shared agenda and a desire to achieve the results expected. Nevertheless, this year's annual review and planning meeting came across as an activity undertaken to fulfill RRG's management needs. There was inadequate prior

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<sup>17</sup> Mali is characterized as a Tier 2 country

preparation and insufficient depth in the discussions largely because of the amount of time allocated for this annual review and planning process.

There is ambiguity around the character of the coalition and its *modus operandi*. While there is a feeling of a shared identity and a commitment to shared objectives by members of the coalition, there is no common understanding as to how RRI-Mali should operate between annual planning meetings, or what forms collaboration should take beyond coordination around contracted activities. With these strengths and challenges of the coalition in mind, a number of recommendations are appropriate.

## **Recommendations**

### **1. Planning Process and Timing:**

- i. There should be prior discussion with RRI Mali to determine how to deepen the annual review and planning process. That same discussion should arrive at an agreement regarding the timing and duration of the exercise. The more the planning process can synchronize to the planning cycles of RRI-Mali participants, and occur in a form that is useful to them, the greater will be their sense of ownership over and commitment to the process;
- ii. Even a moderate strengthening of the preparation of the planning meeting could greatly enrich the experience and allow it to better address strategic issues directly relevant to achieving the coalition's mandate;
- iii. Effective facilitation – using interactive and participatory processes – is essential if the planning is to go beyond fulfilling an annual review and planning ritual.

### **2. Redefine the coalition and strengthen it:**

- i. It is recommended that RRI Mali meet, more regularly, between planning meetings to better define the coalition, clarify its *modus operandi* and enhance inter-organisational communication, co-ordination and synergy.
- ii. To achieve the above, a member of RRI-Mali should take responsibility for facilitating better internal communication/coordination and/or occasional meetings of coalition members with or without RRG participation.
- iii. There is a need to expand the membership of the coalition and bring on board a few more strategic Partners. The criteria for expansion should include the contribution that such a Partner can make to enable RRI Mali take advantage of emerging policy opportunities.

- iv. To address the issue of resource constraints, the coalition should assume primary responsibility and develop a national resource mobilization strategy in collaboration with RRI and RRG.



#### **4. SUMMARY: 2010 Monitoring of RRI'S Country and Regional Initiatives**

The findings of the country-level monitoring visits echo and, in turn, are echoed by, the findings of the review of the data gathered in relation to RRI's strategic outcomes. RRI has successfully stimulated the formation of national groups of organizations and individuals engaged in joint work on forest tenure reform in their respective countries (Bolivia, Mali and Indonesia are certainly examples). Uniformly, participants in these coordination efforts insist that the quality and content of RRI's analysis and the Initiative's global projection drive their participation. Most acknowledge that the financial transfers that have accompanied their participation in RRI further stimulate their interest, but would not, on their own, be sufficient to justify their commitment. These national coalitions plan their interventions together, but, in at least the cases under study in 2010, struggle to coordinate implementation in ways necessary to impact tenure reform policy at the national level.

RRI's theory of change clearly sees the central importance of this action on the national [and regional] level, and the initiative invests considerable resources in supporting Country and Regional Programs. These investments include roughly 60% of the resources coming into the Initiative, which are processed as transfers to national Partners and Collaborators to support the implementation of contracted activities related to national and regional plans. RRI's commitment to the annual Country and Regional planning process is massive (to the point of being of questionable sustainability), given its own staff and administrative resources.

When asked what more they desire of RRI, Collaborators (as opposed to Partners) in the initiative invariably say that more resources would be nice, but that what they really hope to get through this initiative is more analysis (especially related to climate change) and more meaningful connections with actors working elsewhere on tenure issues. RRI certainly provides both as core facets of its "business," but is still somehow not meeting the demand. Developing more vigorous country-level programs will require that RRI somehow quench these thirsts.

Nearly all Country and Regional programs include national organizations and international NGOs with ongoing presence in country. In every case, this is a facilitation challenge of considerable magnitude. When RRI can successfully promote synergy among national and international actors, the results are notable and of high importance to national struggles for tenure reform.

Predictably, results from RRI's investments in Country and Regional programs vary widely. Local balance of forces for or against tenure reform and other opportunity factors beyond the control of local RRI actors always influence these results. RRI has proven itself to be adept at identifying strategic opportunities for tenure reform at the national level, but it has not been easy for RRI to adjust its commitments to Country and Regional programs in response to perceived shifts in opportunity factors. Senior Management continues to reflect on how it might respond to this paradox.

Internal factors in the Country and Regional Programs also influence program results. Under even the most favorable situations, success in achieving lasting tenure reform usually requires coordinated actions by a variety of actors over an extended period. RRI has been able to identify key actors in many countries and has been able to involve those actors in joint planning of strategic actions designed to favor tenure reform. As suggested above, stimulating ongoing coordination of implementation among participant organizations between planning moments has been a challenge in some countries. Given the nature of the organizations involved in national-level RRI programs, this ongoing coordination requires a level of national facilitation that is often beyond the capacity of RRI to provide. Some country programs have identified this necessity and are taking steps to provide this national facilitation from their own ranks. Even the most organic, synergistic groupings of social actors could not "make a purse out of a sow's ear" if the conditions for tenure reform are not present. That said, there are national programs in which stronger national facilitation could yield more results for RRI and its Partners. The question is whether or not RRI can or should provide such facilitation.

RRI sees the Country and Regional programs as spaces driven strategically by local actors. It also sees the importance of the strategic contributions of Country and Regional programs to the global mission of promoting tenure reform that drives all RRI actions. Stimulating strong national-level programs that are "owned" by local actors, but also contribute directly to the success of a global mission is one of the great challenges of the entire project. This is, of course, the riddle of transnational advocacy in a globalizing world...a riddle for which we have so far only unearthed partial solutions. Creating a Senior Management position to manage Country and Regional programs has been a great step forward in the regard, and fully staffing the Coordinator and Facilitator positions has likewise allowed RRI to make progress on building the impact of Country and Regional programs. The RRI response to this existential challenge remains, however, a work in progress.

In the universe of analysis and action that is RRI, Country and Regional programs rest alongside the so-called Global Program. The relationship between those two grand programs is one great potential source of strength for both. Since the team of jugglers that call the Secretariat home are fully immersed in both program areas, a level of coordination between the two is assured. RRI has also taken a number of actions, including the structuring of annual Global Program planning meetings, to further the cause of articulation between these two grand areas of activity. RRI has also carried out certain Global Program activities (like the “Demand-Driven Technical Assistance” interventions) designed very specifically to strengthen Country and Regional Programs in concrete ways that are palpable to the participants in those programs. Such actions have an effect well beyond their immediate and measureable impact and, as such, deserve special attention.

Those who see the national level as “where the action is” in the global discussion of forest tenure reform can rest assured that RRI has taken this view to heart in the design of their program. Viable and important programs have been established in a wide range of countries. But getting the desired results from these programs, even in countries where the balance of forces favors tenure reform, requires a great deal more than assembling a coordination of the right organization and providing them with good analysis and a small amount of resources to carry out contracted actions. More aware of this fact than anyone, RRI continues to experiment with ways to strengthen what is arguably the heart of its program.

## **B. GLOBAL PROGRAMS**

The Monitoring Team's selective engagement with RRI's work at the program level also extends to the Coalition's Global Program. The original Framework Proposal outlined four major program areas: Strategic Analysis; Country Level Initiatives; Network Support; and Global Campaign and Coordination. Over time, RRG has made a stronger distinction between the so-called Global Programs and the Country and Regional Initiatives. The former are distinguished by the fact that the Secretariat drives the planning and implementation, while, in theory, it is the country and regional planning groups that drive both the planning and the implementation of the Country and Regional Initiatives.

In the most recent Global Programs planning meeting in November 2010, Global programs were treated in three distinct categories:

1. Strategic Analysis
2. Network Support
3. Communications and Outreach

We note in passing that this amounts to a **functional** categorization of RRI's Global Programs, rather than a geographic or thematic one.

In keeping with the idea of selective validation of program-level accomplishments by the Independent Monitor, RRG suggested that the IM engage with the Network Support and Strategic Analysis programs this year. This report focuses on those two programs, which, by any measure make up the bulk of Global Program work.

The fact that the genesis of the Global Programs lies primarily in the Secretariat has led to some other important differences between those programs and the Country and Regional Initiatives. In general, Global Program activities are only supported on the basis of contracts when an outside (of RRG) actor takes responsibility for the activity. Since annual planning does not need to feed concept papers and the contracting process, planning tends to be slightly less formal than in the country-level programs.

During the earlier stages of the implementation of the Framework Proposal, RRG planned the Global Programs. Over the past two years, the Secretariat has taken steps to involve Partners more actively in that process, holding a Global Program planning meeting each year in November. While that planning remains a work in progress, the participation of Partners in that planning has enriched the analysis

behind planning choices and improved alignment among all of the Coalition's programs.

## **1. Strategic Analysis Program**

While it is difficult to speak of the “core business” of a network involved in as many things as RRI, strategic analysis is certainly one of the Coalition’s core competencies. This capacity involves selectively reviewing the most relevant current research in the fields of forestry—especially community forestry—political economy and international relations, and interpreting that research from the perspective of how the work reflects on tenure relations and the prospects of tenure reform, globally and in specific national contexts. This capacity exists, in varying forms and degrees, within all of the Partners and Collaborators of RRI. Part of the founding idea of RRI was to create, in RRG, a center for strategic analysis that could strengthen, synthesize and build upon all of those disparate efforts in establishing a global foundation for evidence-based advocacy related to forest tenure reform. Where it finds critical gaps in the existing research, RRG will commission research by RRI Partners, Collaborators or other researchers in an attempt to fill in those gaps. In rare cases, RRG carries out original research, itself, but it has not been structured to function as a research center.

RRI has identified two sets of data points that it believes indicate a great deal about the state of the forest from the perspective of tenure reform. One data set concerns the percentage of forested land under local ownership and administration, while the other focuses on levels of poverty among the inhabitants of forest communities. In its Framework Proposal, RRI commits itself to track these two data sets and publish regular updates on each.

Faced with a vast range of potential analytical commitments in its fields of interests, RRI has identified certain “themes” that help organize its analytical work and make choices concerning the use of scarce analytical resources. Upon initiating its work, RRI identified four such themes:

1. Rights and Climate Change;
2. Realizing Rights;
3. Alternative Tenure and Enterprise Models; and
4. Tenure Reform and Social Conflict.

For a variety of reasons, attention to the fourth theme has been deferred and the analysis work taking place within the Coalition has focused on the first three themes.

These themes provide an excellent overall agenda for the analysis work within RRI. As we will discuss further in the Conclusions and Recommendations sections of this report, the Monitoring Team believes that these are actually programmatic themes

whose effectiveness is somewhat stifled by the Coalition's use of them only as a structure for ordering its analysis work.

### **Major Achievements in 2010**

The 2010 strategic analysis plan emerged from the November 2009 Global Program planning meeting in Washington as a set of desired outcomes for the year. The Annual Program Monitoring Report for Strategic Analysis (included in Appendix Five) details these outcomes. These, in turn, generated planned activities for which provision was made in the 2010 RRI budget.

The Monitoring Report makes clear that the most important strategic analysis outcomes for 2010 were a series of four global and three regional dialogues on tenure rights and climate change. These ended up absorbing even more of the energy of RRG staff and, in some cases, the staff of Partners and Collaborators, than was originally anticipated. Each one became out to be a major undertaking, in its own right.

In addition, RRI published a number of analysis pieces in the course of the year. These included pieces on:

1. REDD-related opportunity costs;
2. REDD safeguards
3. Drivers of Deforestation; and
4. Lessons from Restoration.

RRG also contributed to an important Transparency International global report on corruption with an analysis on trends in the use of REDD financing, and published a Tenure Briefs on Mozambique.

The Secretariat continued to refine its methodology for tracking and reporting on global tenure reform, and published updated information on concessions and the state of tenure reform, internationally.

RRI also carried out additional analysis work for which there was no specific or tangible output in 2010. The work laying the groundwork for RRI involvement in select community mapping projects falls into this category, as does the work done in preparation for a regional Tenure Brief on Latin America.

A number of other activities were also carried out under the heading of "Strategic Analysis" including a series of "Demand-driven technical assistance" interventions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Liberia and Nepal. RRG also organized trainings to build the capacity of Mexican organizations to effectively

project their climate change-related messages through the media in the context of COP 16 in Cancún. The initiation of work in support of strategic community mapping exercises also took place under this category of work.

Several of the activities projected for 2010 were deferred until 2011.

### **Validation of RRI Internal Monitoring**

The interviews conducted by the Monitoring Team generally validate RRG's reporting, in terms of the outcomes achieved through activities taking place in the category of Strategic Analysis. Assessing the effects of these activities is a more complex enterprise, both because of the qualitative nature of many of the perceived effects and the fact that some of these effects can only be confirmed over a period of time longer than a single year.

While RRG reports strategic analysis activity in a number of areas, it is clear that the great bulk of work connected to strategic analysis took place in relation to the dialogues. The effort required in this area turned out to be much greater than was originally planned, and it, frankly, dwarfed the investment in other analysis areas. This implied the concentration of RRG's eggs in a single strategic basket—the convening and influence of multi-stakeholder dialogues on rights and climate change—and, by extension, it implied the concentration of RRG efforts in one of its three thematic focus areas, Rights and Climate Change. Since we have noted the risk of dispersion of resources over the wide variety of activities consistent with RRI's mission, we applaud an effort, however unplanned, to focus the Coalition's efforts. The question is whether or not this was an appropriate area of focus and whether this particular allocation of resources achieved the delicate balance between focus and dispersion of resources.

Interviews with a range of participants in the various dialogues strongly confirm RRG's contention that the dialogues played a very important role. Among other things, the dialogues:

- Provided a platform for semi-formal discussion of key REDD-related issues by important actors in the process that needed such a platform;
- Contributed to the reinvigoration of dialogue and discussion in the wake of the disappointing results of the meeting in Cancún;
- Provided important impetus to the REDD+ Partnership initiated by the Norwegian government in the wake of Copenhagen;
- Helped facilitate increased civil society participation (both in quality and quantity) in the REDD+ partnership;



- Created a context in which RRG could help heighten the awareness, among key actors, of issues such as safeguards and opportunity costs related to REDD; and
- Established the ability to convene productive multi-stakeholder dialogues on rights and climate change as a core competency of RRG and an important aspect of its identity in the international network addressing climate change issues.

No external actors interviewed in relation to the dialogues (all people suggested by RRI) offered any serious critique of their implementation, focusing, instead, on the importance of the gatherings to one or another area of work. Most seemed to recognize that RRI was using the dialogues as a way to present some of its own critique/analysis of certain trends in REDD implementation, but people felt that the dialogues did much more for the identity of RRI as “able convener”, rather than for the image of RRI as “perceptive analyst”. This may be a function of the subtlety with which RRI injected its own analysis into the dialogues. Of course, the set of people who attended one or more of the dialogues is a somewhat biased sample of opinions related to them. Naturally, people in the RRI network not directly connected to the dialogues had little information upon which to base an opinion of them.

When participants in the dialogues were asked about the extent to which a focus on those events had the effect of highlighting the climate change aspect of RRI's mandate, people spoke with unanimity to the importance of RRI not allowing itself to be reduced to an alliance promoting a rights-based approach to REDD and climate change. That said, those same observers tended to defend RRI's turn toward the multi-stakeholder dialogues in 2010 as a thoughtful response to a strategic need. One interviewee summarized this line of thinking, as follows:

*In 2010, REDD was like an insect that had just molted, and was, therefore, very vulnerable to predation. While I believe that RRI should not get overly focused on its climate change work, I see that special vulnerability as a good justification for a focus on promoting dialogue on climate change in 2010.*

The Monitoring Team has come to share a version of this argument. Each dialogue was, in some way, its own story, with its own challenges and accomplishments. Taken together, they helped inject concerns about rights and tenure into REDD+ discussions and they enhanced RRI's positioning as a network with unique capacity to convene key actors to productive discussions. Cognizant of at least some of the opportunity costs resulting from the focus on dialogues, we believe that this was an appropriate adaptive response by RRG, provided that it does not result in a

permanent change in strategic priorities that sees RRI essentially abandoning the rest of its mission in favor of an exclusive focus on tenure rights and climate change.

RRI published a few important papers in 2010, mostly as inputs to the sponsored dialogues. Many other activities did take place under the heading of Strategic Analysis. It is safe to say that all of these got less attention because of the focus on the dialogues.

RRI reports on its work in the area of monitoring global tenure trends under Strategic Analysis area, even though there is an indicator related to this outcome at the level of the Purpose in the Log-Frame. RRI continued to publish very good information using a data-gathering and reporting methodology that it has developed over time. The publication of this data is an important result of RRI's work, and one that significantly enhances the credibility of RRI among key constituencies. A number of academics and key institutions have begun to use the RRI tracking data in their own reporting. RRI has also begun working with Partners and Collaborators who are gathering tenure data on their own to explore the possibilities of integrating those efforts with what RRI is already doing in this area.

The Monitoring Team did not conduct extensive interviews or document review connected to 2010 RRI's "Demand-Driven Technical Assistance" interventions, but the input we did receive on this work drew our attention to it. Presumably, these projects originated from an observation by a Partner or an RRG regional staff member that input from someone with very specific technical skills could move forward a key process related to the desired outcomes of a country program. The one we are most familiar with was a technical consultation addressing a number of questions related to the land registration process currently underway in Guatemala.

The work was done by an RRI contact experienced in similar processes, especially in Africa. In a concentrated intervention, he was able to make a number of observations to Guatemalan government officials about how they might proceed in implementing their land registration process. Because this work was done in very close coordination with the RRG Regional Facilitator, it also resulted in some concrete suggestion about how the local coalition might both respond to regulations and identify other important spaces in which to influence the government's approach to land registration and administrations. This seems like a good example of a technical initiative of RRI Global Programs implemented in close collaboration with a country program with the explicit purpose of helping that country program achieve its desired outcomes. While we have not closely reviewed the outcomes of

these exercises, they seem like an interesting model of articulating Country and Global outcomes in a way that strengthens both.

### **Obstacles to the achievement of desired Strategic Analysis outcomes**

**The Challenges of Managing Functional Diversity:** In its planning, budgeting and implementation processes, RRI groups a great variety of outputs and outcomes under the heading of Strategic Analysis. The lack of capacity to manage that variety of outputs is, itself, one obstacle to the achievement of this set of outcomes.

Focusing the attention of the Coalition (and, hence, the Secretariat) on fewer outcomes, more strategically chosen would be one to the strain on RRG's capacity. However, the Monitoring Team notes little tendency within RRG to move in that direction. Instead, RRG operates on the assumption that its broad mission and the extraordinary demands of the moment require the Coalition to embrace functional diversity on a scale that would be daunting to many organizations. RRG attempts to manage this diversity through a combination of a gradual expansion of its own staff capacity and efforts to leverage the capacities of external actors toward the desired outcomes of Global Program Activities. The effort to involve more Partners in the coordination of global and regional dialogues is only one example of this trend. The immediate establishment of a small internal-external Reference Group to advance RRG's thinking about the relevance of mapping exercises to tenure reform efforts is another.

**Resource Limitations:** While RRG possesses tremendous analytical capacity, both within the Secretariat and in many of its Partners and Collaborators, the resources available to RRG place a limit on its capacity to carry out good analysis and disseminate the results of that work.

RRG remains committed to a flexible structure with minimum bureaucracy. As a result, the scale of resources available to the Secretariat is not likely to expand significantly. Here, again, the trend is for RRG to seek more efficient use of its resources through refinement of internal systems and external Partnerships. RRG also demands a very high level of mission identification and engagement from its staff.

**Partnership Model:** A closely-related obstacle relates to the need to create the foundations for the cutting-edge analysis work that constituents have come to expect from RRI by commissioning research targeted to the specific needs of the Coalition's analytical efforts. RRG is explicitly not constructed as a research institution, so

resource limitations, again, require that RRG create research partnerships with a wide variety of actors. Many such partnerships have born valuable fruit for RRI, but others have fallen short of their expected results. Under the best of circumstances, managing research partnerships is a demanding task, be they with members of the RRI network or with researchers external to the network.

Some Partners advance the view that RRG often overlooks one part to productive research partnerships by paying insufficient attention to leveraging Partner research capacities. That is, it turns to external research Partners rather than consulting first with RRI Partners and/or Collaborators who might be able to contribute to a given project. This observation refers not only to research/analysis projects, but to all aspects of Global Programs implementation.

RRG counters that resource limitations drive it to always seek the most capable partner for any project, which may mean opting for external partners over a capable RRI Partner, in some cases. Ironically, those same resource limitations are clearly driving RRG to involve RRI Partners more actively in some aspects of Strategic Analysis work, such as the Global and Regional Dialogues. The Monitoring Team does not have enough information to draw a conclusion concerning this persistent tension related to Global Program implementation. We believe, however, that clarification of the internal RRI partnership model as it relates to Global Program implementation is part of the solution to the persistent resource problems that face those programs.

**Planning Model:** The Monitoring Team believes that the model of planning Global Program implementation by functional category (Strategic Analysis, Network Support, etc.) has the counterintuitive effect of acting as an obstacle to the achievement of its desired outcomes in those areas. More importantly, the imprisonment of RRI's grand programmatic themes within the Strategic Analysis "program" inhibits program management that achieves balanced outcomes across those thematic priorities.

RRG has explicitly acknowledged the need to place its impressive achievements in the "Rights and Climate Change" theme in right relationship to outcomes in its other thematic areas. The Global Program planning process in November 2010 did not, however, occur in a form that will easily lead to such a balance.

## **Recommendations**

The recommendations that flow from the Monitoring Team's engagement with the Strategic Analysis Program are of a more general nature and we will return to them when we address the overall recommendations of this exercise.

## **2. Network Support Program**

RRI's theory of change emphasizes the importance of multiplying RRI's power to influence key actors through work with networks. RRG is the primary protagonist of these efforts. As a result, the Coalition has invested considerable resources in building up networks that increase influencing opportunities with what the Coalition considers to be a key actor in tenure reform. In some cases—such as RRI support for the African Women's Network for Community Management of Forests (REFACOF)—one of those important actors to be influenced might be RRI's own Country and Regional Initiatives. In other cases—such as Megaflorestais—the network may include the very actors that RRI wishes to influence. RRI does not see inherent good in networks. It engages with networks as a means to its strategic ends.

RRI gains influence with networks, on the one hand, because the Coalition has access to resources that can help support the functioning of the network. The viability of some of the networks that RRI works with would be questionable, were it not for the resources provided by the Coalition. But that resource lever would only take the relationship so far. Influence with the network turns into influence with a strategic actor because of the other capacities that RRI brings to its work: analysis; organization; logistics; and the capacity to convene important actors on almost any tenure-related theme.

As originally conceived, the Network Support program was designed to stimulate support for a variety of networks including networks of civil society organizations, government officials and policy makers. In practice, the work has been strongly oriented toward civil society organizations, with Megaflorestais being the main exception. This reflects the assumption that RRI Partners best with other civil society actors to influence actors outside of civil society. Megaflorestais is a fascinating case in which RRG's unique positioning as network facilitator allows it to play a pivotal role in a network made up of actors (senior national-level forestry officials) that RRI and its civil society Partners seek to influence. This offers RRG opportunities to influence those actors (and be influenced by them), but it also creates some contradictions with Coalition Partners and Collaborators, who may have very different relationships with some of those same actors in their national contexts. That is, RRG's global networking role may put it in a different position vis a vis a national process than that which the Coalition (RRI) has achieved through the national coordination represented by its country program. This often-overlooked "relationship gap" is common to global networks and can have powerful positive and negative effects. It must be acknowledged and effectively managed if RRI is to remain effective.

Closely related to the relationship gap is the fact that RRG always combines influence via networks with the construction and maintenance of its own, independent relationship with any strategic actor. It believes that the network influence always enhances, and is enhanced by, the leverage it achieves through its bilateral relationship. This assumption makes perfect sense, but is very difficult to confirm, since it is impossible to know what influence RRG would/could have with the UN-REDD Policy Committee in the absence of its connection with C-SAG. The thesis of increased influence via networks becomes even more difficult to assess if we take into account the cost (including the opportunity cost) of network influence.

Regardless of the difficulty of proving the point, RRG firmly believes in the value of its work sustaining networks. Each year, it identifies a few networks upon which it will focus its efforts and plans, budgets and implements a set of activities related to those networks. The main question for the Monitoring Team, as in the case of Strategic Analysis, is whether this is best understood as a “program” of RRI, or as a core strategy of the organization, through which it attempts to achieve tactical and strategic outcomes. We will address this question more fully in the Conclusion and Recommendations sections of this report.

Under the general heading of “Network Support,” RRI also includes the exchange experiences that it facilitates among Coalition participants and/or government officials working in different countries. For example, the visit of Nepalese community foresters to Mexico to learn from the governance and community management experiences there is part of this program. These are usually planned to include RRI’s civil society counterparts and government officials, who might have much to learn from seeing governance approaches in other contexts. Unfortunately, few of the government participants are able to follow through on their commitments to participate. When country-level participants are asked what they would like to see RRI do more of, they invariably mention these sort of exchange experiences, which have not been particularly numerous, to date. It is reasonable to ask why these exchanges are planned, implemented and assessed alongside RRI’s support for the UN-REDD Civil Society Advisory Group, but there is no doubt that this important activity is highly valued by RRI’s “base”.

These sorts of exchanges are difficult to implement efficiently on an opportunistic, ad hoc basis. RRI and/or RRG should definitively decide if this is part of the Coalition’s program and, if so, how they will be planned and implemented in the most efficient possible way. If not, the Coalition might explore the possibility of partnerships with organizations better positioned to facilitate such exchanges.

## **Major Achievements of 2010**

Implementation here closely mirrors much of that reported and validated in relation to Strategic Outcome 2, above. Highlights of the year included:

- the Megaflorestais meeting and companion conference in China;
- the “Rethinking Regulations” exchange that brought Megaflorestais participants and others to the U.S. State of Montana;
- the continued development of The African Women’s Network for the Community Management of Forests (REFACOF);
- the consolidation of the agreement with the ITTO to jointly-sponsor a conference in 2011 in Indonesia; and
- the exchange visit of Nepali community foresters (FECOFUN) to Mexico.

The civil society networks through which RRI seeks to influence a particular strategic actor (ITTO, UN-REDD) continued to function and do important work, but only do so based on sustaining inputs from RRI.

REFACOF stands out as a gender-based network operating in an environment in which women’s real and potential contributions are not always recognized. The network continues to develop based on the desire of African women to be in relationship with each other and to have a stronger impact on African tenure reform and forest management debates. It continues to develop with a relatively small investment of resources and time from RRI. The Coalition certainly provides important support to REFACOF, but the relationship is noticeably different than the one that exists with ITTO-CSAG or IAG/UN-REDD. RRI reports that the existence of REFACOF has already had an impact on RRI Country and Regional programs in Africa. To date, the Monitoring Team has not been able to explore this very interesting and important observation through its research.

## **Obstacles to the achievement of RRI’s desired network support outcomes**

The planning process orienting RRI’s 2010 work in the area of Network Support identified only a single “priority outcome” for the year:

*Existing networks strengthened and strong linkages established with emerging networks, particularly of communities.*



While this outcome may not clearly signal specific desired outcomes for the year, it does serve to break the work down into two main areas: Strengthening existing networks and develop strong linkages with new networks, especially community networks. Neither of these aspects provides the basis of strong planning or monitoring in the area of facilitating exchange experiences.

Building linkages with emerging networks is a slightly less-demanding undertaking for a network like RRI with a global Web of connections and relationships. While RRI certainly builds linkages with many networks, it does little reporting on this aspect of the work unless the connection develops into a more strategic relationship. This probably reflects that this is not viewed, in practice, as a priority outcome of the work, which is a view shared by the Monitoring Team.

Obstacles to the achievement of these outcomes identified by the Monitoring Team include:

**Required Investment and Opportunity Cost:** In the case of new networks, where the members seek RRI's help out of a strong sense that they have something to gain by forming a network, the costs of strengthening the network are relatively small. In cases where RRI is the main driver of the network, and must supply many of the inputs, in terms of resources and organizing effort, the cost of network strengthening (including opportunity cost) can be quite high. This is particularly true when the network is committed to a set of concrete outputs based on an institutional or other calendar.

**Civil Society Fragmentation:** A key factor in the cost of strengthening networks is the degree of fragmentation in civil society structures of all types. Patterns of financing civil society reinforce certain social norms and help create strong incentives for competition among civil society entities. In the same way that this creates internal difficulties for RRI, these forces challenge its efforts to build networks. Civil society groups often rise above these concerns and embrace collaboration as the only means of influencing powerful institutions, but building sustainable networks is always a demanding task.

## **Recommendations**

Our exploration of the Network Strengthening Program takes us back to the more general question of how RRI conceives of its program. Our recommendations, in this regard, are overall recommendations that occur in the Conclusions and Recommendations section of this report. There are, however, two recommendations

in relation to networks that were so widely observed in our interviews that it is documented here.

1. **Review Network Commitments:** RRG is constantly considering and re-considering its commitments to the networks that it supports. Our interviews suggest that the cost of relating to some networks have gradually reached a point where they outweigh the benefits of the involvement. This is difficult to sustain, given that both costs and benefits are difficult to measure, necessitating a judgment call by RRG leadership. The cost-benefit equation would certainly change if other network participants were willing/able to assume more of the costs of maintaining the network, but these are precisely the situations in which others are not stepping forward to do so. RRG should take a serious look at its options in those cases.
2. **Evaluate Exchange Programs:** There seems to be a considerable gap between the extent to which RRI Partners and Collaborators value facilitated, cross-border exchange programs and the ability of the Coalition to provide this service. We assume that the dimensions of this gap are the product of a cost-benefit calculation by RRG leadership. RRG should organize a rigorous internal review of these programs, including an *ex post facto* consideration of the real contributions of past exchanges to the mission of RRI. To date, the planning of these exchanges has felt slightly ad hoc and internal assessment of the experiences has been less than systematic. That said, the experiences that have happened have created a constituency for these exchanges within the Coalition. A rigorous internal review would allow RRG to establish a replicable method for serious internal program review, and would respond to what is a very concrete aspiration for the Coalition on the part of its base.

## **VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF RRI'S INDEPENDENT MONITORING SYSTEM**

While it was not deeply addressed in RRI's 2009 Global Programs planning process, the refinement and implementation of the Coalition's Internal Monitoring System became an important 2010 priority for RRG. The higher profile accorded this work resulted in part from encouragement from some members of the RRI Donor Consortium that the Secretariat advance toward the achievement of this important outcome, but it was also a natural result of RRG's own assessment commitments. Under far less than ideal circumstances, key stakeholders within RRI made important progress toward creating the foundations for evidence-based assessment of its progress.

For the first trimester of 2010, the Independent Monitor worked closely with a member of RRG Senior Management on the revision of the RRI Logical Framework and in building out the design of an internal monitoring system that would be:

1. Viabile in that its requirements would be within the possibility of busy RRI stakeholders to achieve;
2. Effective in that it would produce data that would (1) provide RRI with the basis for assessing its progress in something like real time and, therefore, make positive mid-course corrections, as necessary; and (2) serve to facilitate comprehensive mid-term and final evaluations of the Coalition's progress;
3. Participatory in that it would provide all of the key RRI stakeholders with a context for careful reflection on the progress of the Coalition; and
4. Complementary in the sense that it creates a logic of assessment that can also help define and strengthen the learning interventions of others, such as the Independent Monitor.

Other RRG Senior Managers participated, as required, in this phase of the process, particularly at moments of decision. The monitoring system that emerged from these discussions is described in Appendix Seven to this report.

During the second trimester, RRG Senior Management introduced the proposed Internal Monitoring System to key staff, even as the data-gathering instruments to be used in the process were being refined. This included training exercises held at the DC office of RRI and a presentation on the system at the RRG staff retreat held in June at Osprey Point.

RRI implemented the new system in the third trimester. The system had four basic elements:

1. Monitoring of progress on Five-Year Strategic Outcomes, with RRG program staff as the primary monitors and the Independent Monitor assessing progress against identified indicators;
2. Monitoring of progress on annual program-level outcomes, with the program planning group acting as the monitor;
3. Monitoring of fulfillment of contracted activities, with RRG program staff doing the monitoring; and
4. Monitoring of progress on Annual Organizational priorities, with RRG Senior Management acting as the primary monitors and the RRG Board reviewing and commenting on monitoring outputs.

In October, the Independent Monitor began to receive the data gathered by staff to confirm progress on Strategic Outcomes. As of this writing, the IM has received 10 of those reports and those are reviewed in detail in Section III of this report.

Approximately ten more of those reports are in process and will be delivered to the IM by 2/15/2010, which is a reasonable timetable for monitoring reports including 2010 implementation.

Beginning at the end of August, RRG staff launched a planning process that included a first attempt to formalize program-level monitoring exercises in each program. This was definitely the most challenging aspect of the internal monitoring system, as it required that program level planning teams assume primary responsibility for monitoring program achievements. We have commented elsewhere on some of the difficulties encountered during these program level discussions. The Independent Monitor received Annual Program Monitoring Reports for each of the programs being reviewed for this report, and RRG has reported that reports are available for all programs, and that all of these reports will be made available to Coalition participants via the RRI intranet.

While we have conducted interviews related to the monitoring of the completion of contracted activities, we are still not certain how this process takes place. Specifically, it is not clear who reviews Partner and Collaborator reports to confirm that the contracted activities have taken place, and how that review is translated into a formal closure of the contract. We know that the contracting process continues to advance, so there is definitely some process that allows for closure of one set of contracts so that another set can be executed, but the Monitoring Team is not yet aware of the specifics of that process.

RRG reports that the Senior Management has completed its monitoring of progress on 2010 Annual Outcomes and has distributed its report on that monitoring to the RRG Board with the Program Book prepared for the January Board Meeting. Management will entertain comments and discussion on the Annual Priorities from the RRG Board at the January board meeting.

The IM has received the majority of the data that RRG was scheduled to deliver. The exceptions are some of the Monitoring Data Reports that support RRG's the Secretariat's claims of progress on the Coalition's Strategic Outcomes and the data that accompany the Senior Management monitoring exercise that assesses progress on the 2010 Organizational Priorities and establishes similar priorities for 2011.<sup>18</sup>

RRG's definition of its Internal Monitoring System established a "logic of assessment" within the Coalition, and, in particular, within RRG. That logic served to define much more concretely the role for the Independent Monitor. The two processes (internal and independent monitoring) have certainly fit together much better this year than in 2009, but the extent to which that results in a more useful Independent Monitoring intervention remains to be seen. In theory, the consolidation of the Internal Monitoring System (along with a clarification of the role and practice of an External Evaluator) should presage an imminent diminution in the role of the Independent Monitor.

Predictably, the quality of this first set of monitoring data is uneven. This is due, in large part, to the fact that there was very little time to introduce the system to the staff responsible for gathering data and facilitating monitoring exercises. Even more importantly, there was little time to introduce the system to the country and regional planning teams that play a very important role in program level monitoring of Country and Regional Initiatives. RRG insists that all Partners participating in planning meetings were informed of the introduction of the new system well in advance, while some Partners insist that the first time they heard about the new monitoring approach was at the planning meeting. Since both statements are likely true, internal communications procedures require review. The key point is that, without sufficient preparation, some Partners and Collaborators experienced the introduction of a more formal monitoring process more as an RRG management requirement rather than as an opportunity to reflect on their own progress and inject the results of that progress into a coalition-wide planning process.

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<sup>18</sup> Senior Management does not conduct any formal data gathering exercise around its review of Annual Priorities, which are viewed more as a management tool than an organizational learning mechanism. They do, however, document their collective sense of progress on previous-year priorities and, when they set priorities for the coming year, they document some basis by which they will know that progress was made on those priorities.

In addition to challenges related to preparation, a conceptual issue also complicated the monitoring exercises. There is not a common, coalition-wide understanding of what constitutes an “outcome” for RRI, and why RRI’s monitoring process attempts to focus on such outcomes, rather than the activities that a program might carry out in pursuit of its desired outcomes. In that context, planning groups will often identify activities that they wish to carry out, rather than outcomes that they wish to achieve, and they will then proceed to monitor the completion of these activities. This is particularly true when the planning process leads directly to contracts based on the identification of activities to be carried with specified financial support. The focus on planning and monitoring activities is entirely understandable, but it is very difficult for activity-based monitoring to determine if a program is achieving the changes in the world for which it was established (as opposed to completing activities).

This is an extremely difficult challenge for a network such as RRI, and one that will need to be addressed over a period of time. It is simply much more feasible to construct a planning process in which diverse stakeholders say what they will do, and then meet later to reflect on whether or not those activities have, in fact, taken place.

There is, therefore, room for improvement in the implementation of RRI’s Internal Monitoring System. The recommendations at the end of this section address some specific actions that RRG might consider in relation to the Internal Monitoring system. In addition, one of our general recommendations for RRI actions to be taken in 2011 also addresses precisely this possibility of improvement.

That said, given the extreme time pressure on this year’s internal monitoring exercise and the limited support that many key contributors had in carrying out their role within the process, the results of the exercise deserve recognition. The following products emerged directly from that work:

- Revised RRI Logical Framework;
- Monitoring Data Reports (10);
- Annual Program Monitoring Reports (all programs); and
- RRI Response to the Recommendations of the Independent Monitor.

There always exists the temptation to ascribe such accomplishments to the need to respond to some external imperative. We can certainly see the force of external imperative in the results of the RRI’s first formal internal monitoring exercise, but we can also see at work the desire of RRI participants to reflect on and learn from their work. The presence of this desire is one of the aspects of RRI’s culture that leaves the Monitoring Team most hopeful about the future of the coalition.

## Recommendations for building upon the 2010 internal monitoring experience

1. Follow through on the completion of outstanding 2010 monitoring actions and documentation;
2. Follow through on the commitment to make all RRG monitoring outputs (Revised RRG Logical Framework, Monitoring Data Reports, Annual Program Monitoring Reports, RRG Response to 2009 Independent Monitor Recommendations, Senior Management reflection on progress on 2010 Annual Priorities) available to all Coalition participants in user-friendly manner via intranet (When ready, RRG should also communicate the existence of this database to Coalition participants);
3. Design a discussion to clarify the difference between “activities” and “outcomes” for RRI and define the relevance of each to RRI’s planning, monitoring and evaluation efforts;
4. Prior to the next planning process, find a way to have a discussion, with each country planning group, of RRG’s proposed approach to monitoring Country and Regional Initiatives. This need not involve a face-to-face meeting. There should be agreement between RRG staff and the planning group on the monitoring approach to be followed.
5. Early in 2011, all RRG staff responsible for collecting data for 2011 monitoring of progress on RRI Strategic Outcomes should receive information/training on “real time” data collection methods.
6. Early in 2011, RRG Senior Management should use guidance from 2011 program plans to establish 2011 benchmarks for progress on RRG Strategic Outcomes.
7. Review RRG reporting requirements regarding contracted activities.
8. Document closure/release process for RRG contracts, as required for new contractual disbursements.

## VII. **CONCLUSION**

RRI makes things happen. Just a glance at pages 13-17 of the book provided to participants in the Coalition's upcoming January 2011 meetings provides eloquent testimony to the range of activities undertaken in the name of RRI during 2010. The Monitoring Team's engagement with RRI does not allow us to validate the entire range of what is described in those pages, but this report provides monitoring data and reflections on much of that body of work.

This catalogue of accomplishment suggests that 2010 was, indeed, the year in which RRI consolidated its identity as a convener of productive multi-stakeholder dialogues on climate change issues. It further suggests that RRI came to these dialogues with a careful analysis of the problem(s), and that it found ways to insert this analysis without undermining its convener/facilitator role. That important government participants in the dialogues ascribe more significance to those events than RRI does, is worthy of note.

While it is difficult to point to specific, country-level "tenure breakthroughs" in 2010, RRI's country programs continued to grow in strength and, in some cases, to put in place the building blocks of future breakthroughs. RRI's terms of engagement with these programs also continued to develop and gain effectiveness. In Bolivia, RRI is positioned to influence the character of a new Forestry Law and four other environmental laws that will, together, condition the nature of tenure reform efforts for the next period. In Nepal, the local RRI coalition helped beat back (at least for the moment), a self-interested initiative by government officials to diminish the economic basis of the country's community forestry sector. In Guatemala, technical assistance provided by an RRI contractor offered valuable advice to government officials regarding their land registration and administration challenges, while helping RRI coalition members identify and analyze additional possible avenues of influence on tenure reform discussions at the national level. These evident advances, notwithstanding, the Monitoring Team finds reason to question whether or not Country and Regional Initiatives have advanced to the degree originally projected by RRI.

The fascinating confluence of forces that led to the Megaflorestais meeting in China, alongside an important international tenure conference co-convened by RRI, speaks to both the continuing relevance of RRI to the world-historical Chinese reform and the emergence of an important network (Megaflorestais) that might not have ever existed without RRI.



With much less fanfare, a determined group of African women grasped the bull by his horns and moved forward to show African governments, key global institutions and even some RRI members that women, indeed, hold up half the forest...at least. While RRI did not create this network, and certainly does not control it, the Coalition's support helped REFACOF get off the ground and take its first slow, steady steps forward. It is, of course, too early to tell what impact the African women's network will eventually have, but the fact that it has formed is historic in the African and global forestry contexts. RRI's embrace of the experiment confirms a commitment to a gender perspective on tenure reform, which is uncommonly audacious in today's community forestry environment.

For a monitoring exercise, the main question is the extent to which this truly impressive scope of work is contributing to the achievement of the tenure reform mission for which RRI was created. RRG leadership knows from their accumulated experience that the Coalition is making a difference, and can provide convincing explanations to that effect. Outside observers and casual participants in the world of RRI tend to echo this perception, but they do so based on educated impressions of added-value from those parts of the elephant (RRI's work) that they happen to be able to touch.

During 2010, as it facilitated global dialogues, moved forward national tenure debates, published timely analysis, and won converts to the importance of REDD safeguards, RRI took important steps toward being able to show more convincingly that its actions are taking it where it wants and needs to go. These steps included the implementation of a more formal internal monitoring system. At its core, this system implies a commitment to collect and organize the information that will allow RRI to define a more substantial connection between its scope of activities, tactical outcomes and general strategic intent (assuming that such a connection exists).

Building such connections on the substance provided by real information is a time-consuming and somewhat thankless enterprise, in the short run. It remains to be seen whether an action-oriented group like RRI that makes extraordinary operational demands of its staff will be able to sustain such investments, over time. It is also not clear that other parts of the organization (particularly country planning teams) will see sufficient benefit in doing their part to draw the outline of RRI's complex footprint. In any case, regardless of what the future holds, in 2010 RRI took steps toward more systematic learning from its diverse experience of promoting global tenure reform.

The work of the Independent Monitor (IM) was designed, from the start, as a support and a complement to RRI's own learning commitment. The definition of RRI's internal

monitoring approach in 2010 also helped clarify how the IM could contribute. The 2010 monitoring exercise has used data gathered by RRI and the Independent Monitoring Team to:

1. Assess RRI's organizational response to the 2009 Independent Monitor's recommendations;
2. Assess RRI progress toward its global Strategic Outcomes (SOs);
3. Selectively validate RRI's own monitoring of program-level achievements (both Global Programs and Country and Regional Initiatives);
4. Report on RRI's implementation of its Internal Monitoring System; and
5. Recommend strategic actions to strengthen RRI's overall position.

This report includes targeted recommendations for action by RRI in each of these areas, and these are highlighted in each section of the foregoing report. In addition, the entirety of our interaction with RRI has prompted a more strategic reflection, as well. This strategic reflection departs from the question of whether or not RRI accomplishments are advancing its mission to address the question, "Are there course corrections that would help RRI better achieve its mission in the next period?" The answer to this question is, of course, the springboard to strategic recommendations.

While full reproduction of our reflection on the state of RRI would take us well beyond the intended scope of this report, its general outlines are as follows. Given RRI's decision to place a strong Secretariat at the center of its program model, the nature of relations between RRI Partners and that Secretariat determine, to an important extent, the degree to which the Coalition is able to fulfill its value proposition. While different visions of this set of relationships have created tensions within the Coalition, the impressive accomplishments of RRI suggest that the actors have arrived at a *modus operandi* that allows both Partners and RRG to see the Coalition as a useful and productive vehicle for their work on tenure reform. This arrangement has served RRI and RRG well during the first few years of the Coalition's operation, but the Monitoring Team senses that the Coalition is in the early stages of a critical transition in the way its different parts fit together.

The policy context (at global, regional and national levels) in which the Coalition sits is constantly undergoing massive changes. That environment is virtually unrecognizable today, compared to the policy context in which the first RRI conversations, the ones that would eventually lead to the formation of RRG and, then, RRI, took place. Similarly, each actor within the Coalition is living a process of constant internal transformation that results in changes in funding patterns, key

personnel, programmatic priorities and motivations for participating in collaborative projects such as RRI.

In that context, the vision of RRI that drove a small number of people to launch the project 6-8 years ago may not be entirely relevant today. The notion of “Adaptive Management” as practiced in the field of Natural Resource Management has, for us, a clear application to RRI's current situation.<sup>19</sup>

RRI has made an entirely appropriate—laudable, in fact—commitment to keep RRG a lean Secretariat, relatively free of bureaucratic strictures on its agility. While RRI is certainly not facing a “limits case,” in terms of resource and capacity issues, there is ample evidence that, in the context of the above commitment, the ever-expanding scope of activities being undertaken by RRG is reaching a zone of diminishing returns to scale. While remaining a pro-active and dynamic leadership team, in its own right, RRG is intentionally moving toward a modality of facilitating more Partner and Collaborator action along lines determined by it (RRG) to have strategic benefit to the Coalition's mission. This has always been the focus of Country and Regional Initiatives, but it is now becoming more pronounced in the design of Global Programs, as well. On one level, this is a response to the finite capacity of RRG.

The trend toward prioritizing Global Program actions (by RRG and its associates, consultants, etc.) that directly strengthen Country and Regional Programs—such as the “demand driven technical assistance” exercises in 2010—is entirely consistent with this larger movement of the network. RRG's success in strengthening this facilitation role, without diminishing its own ability to identify and focus resources on strategic actions that mobilize its own core competencies as a team—such as the climate change dialogues in 2010—will greatly affect the Coalition's ability to have the impact it seeks during the next period.

The challenge for RRI is not, therefore, to decide whether RRG is a facilitator of Partner and Collaborator action or a critical strategic leadership and implementation team, itself. For RRI to continue to have the impact it has had in its inaugural period, RRI must allow RRG to play (insist that it play, really) both roles, in nearly perfect balance with each other. This is not the typical challenge of a coalition, per se. It is more in line with recent (over the past fifteen years) work to apply the science of

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<sup>19</sup> Given that the Coalition holds its Annual Meetings on the shore of the Chesapeake Bay, the Chesapeake Adaptive Management Model might be one interesting application of this approach.

<http://cap.chesapeakebay.net/managementmodel.htm>

“flexible networks” to the challenges of transnational advocacy.<sup>20</sup> Ironically, part of the persistent tension in internal relations within RRI may be due to the mental maps and expectations that immediately result from the reflexive tendency to refer to the network as a “coalition,” when it may have long since moved beyond that form of collaborative interaction.

Should RRI decide to consciously go down this path (that of strategic actor AND facilitator of synergy among Partners and Collaborators), it will be marked, along the way, with many signs of progress. Two key elements of this change will, however, be: (1) a reconceptualization of the role of RRG management; and (2) a decisive shift in the terms of engagement between Partners (and Collaborators) and the overall project.

It is this sort of reflection that has brought to our attention what we consider to be a number of internal “areas of vulnerability” within RRI. In the context of a very complex environment in which powerful forces are arrayed against tenure reform in every arena, even subtle vulnerabilities can mean the difference between success and the inability to push forward a reform agenda. The vulnerabilities that have most attracted our attention include:

1. The relative lack of “national facilitation” or organizational support that RRI is able to provide to its country level programs, as they attempt to coordinate their efforts for maximum effect;
2. RRI’s planning process, which has improved steadily, but still absorbs enormous amounts of energy and does not always yield optimal results;
3. The relative lack of internal expertise in RRI concerning one critical country, Indonesia;
4. The tendency of Partner and Collaborator engagement with RRI to mimic patterns of donor and “partner” relations in the field of international philanthropy; and
5. The limits in RRG’s management capacity in the face of the challenges of managing a complex, multi-dimensional global network, especially when Senior Managers are also expected to lead multiple lines of program implementation.

It is toward addressing these areas of vulnerability that the Strategic Recommendations below are addressed. It is around these recommendations that any specific follow-up with RRG Senior Management will occur. The recommendations are not presented in order of importance.

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<sup>20</sup> See one of hundreds of examples of this thinking at: <http://networkingaction.net/2011/01/game-changer-strategic-mapping-tool-for-networks/>.

## **VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS**

As suggested above, in addition to the program-directed recommendations included in each section of the report, we conclude with a set of recommendations deemed by the Monitoring Team to be more strategic in nature. Some are systemic, while others speak to the need for more focused actions that we believe will have strategic effect..

The recommendations rely heavily on the findings of the monitoring exercises of 2009 and 2010, and the analysis that flows from those findings. They rely at least as heavily on the assumption that the Strategic Outcomes presented in RRI's Revised Logical Framework continue to reflect the network's strategic intent. Those outcomes plainly identify three sets of actors that RRI seeks to influence through its work: (1) Global institutions that make and influence tenure policy across national boundaries; (2) National policy-makers in heavily-forested countries; and (3) Other organizations and networks (especially civil society organizations) working on tenure-related issues. Faced with the challenges of influencing this diverse set of actors, RRI identifies the necessity of integrating the work of a dynamic secretariat with a complex network of Partners and Collaborators that includes both international NGOs and national NGOs and membership organizations committed to working on tenure reform. Within that structure, the effectiveness of that integration determines, to a considerable extent, the overall impact of the network.

All of this final set of recommendations are directed specifically to RRG Senior Management and will be the basis of any future follow-up to this report by the Monitoring Team.

**MANAGEMENT CAPACITY:** In view of the exponential increase in demands for process and product management skills within RRG, the time has come for an external assessment of current management resources and approach, as well as an effort to project the likely requirements of successfully managing RRI's continued growth over the next period. Such a study should result in a proposed plan for management training/capacity building over the next period. While this report was in preparation, RRG Senior Management contacted the Monitoring Team to discuss precisely this sort of management review, so it is clear that a variant of this idea is already on the RRG agenda for 2011. The recommendation persists in order to highlight the importance of the exercise and to suggest that it ought to address questions of both capacity/resources and approach.

**PROGRAM DESIGN:** RRI currently organizes its programs along geographic lines (Country and Regional Initiatives) and functional lines (Global Programs). We believe that RRI's impact could be enhanced and planning processes rationalized and simplified by a re-conception of at least the Global Programs along thematic lines. RRI has already identified three Strategic Analysis themes that could easily be adapted for this purpose. In this case, there would be a Rights and Climate Change program, instead of a Rights and Climate Change "theme" within the confines of a Strategic Analysis program. Similarly, RRI would have a Realizing Rights Program, etc. Strategic Analysis would remain as a "Core Strategy" of RRI, or one of the lines of activity through which RRI attempts to deliver its strategic outcomes (Social communications, Advocacy, Network-Building, Capacity-Building and Resource Transfer might be others). A team of RRG staff would be accountable to develop a program plan and deliver agreed upon outcomes within each thematic program. This need not lead to any change in the way RRG develops or manages its budget, although it might well, over time, lead to an alteration of financial control mechanisms.

**NATIONAL FACILITATION:** All of the national programs engaged by the Monitoring Team remarked on the limitation to their progress posed by the lack of national facilitation. That is, RRI members felt the need for more direct facilitation of communications and coordination of implementation among coalition members if RRI is to become more than a collection of grantees with a common donor in each country. RRG staff is more able to provide such facilitation in countries where the Regional Facilitator is resident, but other models need to be considered in the majority of countries. RRG should conduct an internal analysis of national facilitation needs and resources during 2011, and the 2012 country and regional planning process should include a discussion of national facilitation options in each country.

**PARTNER ASSEMBLY:** Like the reconceptualization of the role of RRG management, a change in the terms of engagement of Partners with the Coalition will require a number of concerted, intentional actions, carried out over a period of time. This recommendation is addressed to one such action that the Monitoring Team believes would move the entire system decidedly in the right direction.

"Partner Meetings" have become a feature of nearly all RRI Coalition meetings. The structure, agenda and objectives of these meetings are not always clear and there is no formal Partner leadership to direct them. In the context of unclear expectations of what these meetings contribute, they often contribute less than they might. At least in the ones we have participated, the focus is on internal Coalition issues, rather than learning across different programmatic experiences or ways in which the Partners can strengthen their programmatic contribution to the Coalition. The informality of

these meetings reflects a larger lack of clarity regarding the role of Partners within the Coalition. This lack of clarity clouds decision-making roles and complicates relationships among Partners and between Partners and RRG.

We believe that there is much to be gained by formalizing a structure known as a "Partner Assembly." That Assembly would elect its own leadership and develop and facilitate its own agendas (in full coordination with RRG, of course). It might have three main roles:

1. To promote information exchange among Partners and maximize Partner contribution to the mission of RRI.
2. To discuss issues arising in the life of the coalition and, where possible and appropriate, to communicate a Partner perspective on those issues to the RRG Board (this role of informing governance is clear and strong in the IBA).
3. To consider nominations (through a Nominating Committee) of new RRI Partners.

RRG would retain its current decision-making and implementation responsibilities, and the RRG board would continue to govern the overall enterprise. This structure would, however, give Partners an important power/responsibility (that of naming new Partners, in consultation, of course, with RRG and its Board). There is no reason for this decision-making power to lie with either RRG or its Board. As now, either a Partner or RRG could put forward a potential Partner. If the Assembly existed, its Nominating Committee (which might include two Assembly members, one RRG rep and someone from the RRG board) would vet proposals according to the existing criteria and make recommendations on them to the Assembly.

**INDONESIA EXPERTISE:** RRG staff contains very significant expertise on many of the countries in which the Coalition works, but it does not and cannot have high levels of expertise on every country in which the Coalition works. In some cases, however, the presence or absence of very specific country expertise can determine program outcomes in the short term.

2011 will be, in some ways, the "year of Indonesia" for RRI. Not only is Indonesia an extremely important country in the international effort to control carbon emissions, but the government has recently reached a path-breaking agreement with the Government of Norway and the World Bank to take decisive steps to control those emissions. That same Indonesian government will host the next meeting of Megaflorestais (possibly alongside an RRI conference similar to the one in China). In addition, RRI will co-sponsor, with ITTO, an important international forest tenure conference in the archipelago, later in the year. These are important events that will

test the strength and the capacity of the local RRI coalition in Indonesia and RRG's ability to manage the complex internal context of the tenure debate in that country.

The findings of the Monitoring Team suggest that, although RRI has more Partners active in Indonesia than in almost any other country, the national coalition faces important developmental challenges there. In addition, while RRG certainly contains multiple people with knowledge of Indonesia, the Secretariat's level of expertise on Indonesia may not approach what exists in relation to other countries. Given these circumstances, and the important Coalition events planned for Indonesia in 2011, RRG should, on a relatively short timeline, develop a plan to supplement its existing expertise on Indonesia by either engaging a consultant or creating a partnership with an organization that can advise the Secretariat on the positioning, the composition and the design of the upcoming events, and on how RRG can most productively interact with the national coalition in a period of intense Global Program activity in the country.

**PLANNING TIMELINE:** RRI currently operates on a one-year planning timeline. This requires that RRI facilitate a massive annual planning process that is often assessing results only 3-4 months after the initiation of the year's activities. It also requires that all contracts be on an annual basis. This timeline creates significant time pressure at various points in the process and minimizes the value of all assessment and learning activities. The recent study of the RRI contracting process indicated that any change in the grant-making cycle would cause "other difficulties" that are too complex to consider. We suggest that a change to a two-year planning cycle (with every other year being a full planning moment and the off-year a mid-term plan review) could bring considerable benefits to all aspects of the Coalition's work. It holds out the possibility of a decrease in the overall planning burden on staff, opens up the possibility of two-year contracts and could allow for more substantive, strategic thinking in both the planning and monitoring phases of the work. RRI should seriously explore the possibility of instituting a two-year planning cycle through its next framework proposal.



## **APPENDIX ONE**

### **SOURCES INTERVIEWED FOR RRI 2010 INDEPENDENT MONITORING REPORT**

<b>#</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>KMSC Interviewer</b>
	Patrick Anderson	Forest Peoples' Programme	Hendrickson
	Ann Dela Apekey	RRG, Africa Facilitator	Murray
	Walter Arteaga	CEDLA	Murray
	Solange Bandiaky-Badji	RRG, Africa Coordinator	Atampugre
	Deborah Barry	RRG, Director of Country and Reg. Prog.	Murray
	Per Bjorkman	Consultant, (SIDA)	Murray
	Omaira Bolaños	RRG, Latin America Coordinator	Murray
	Kerstin Canby	Forest Trends	Murray
	Jane Carter	Inter-Cooperation	Murray
	Marcus Colchester	Forest Peoples' Programme	Hendrickson, Murray
	Sally Collins	RRI Fellow	Murray
	Monica Corona	Consultant (Bolivia)	Murray
	Ganga R. Dahal	RRG, Asia Facilitator	Hendrickson, Murray
	Mamadou Diakité	Sahel Eco	Atampugre
	Konaré Roki Diarra	IUCN, Mali	Atampugre
	Célestin Dembélé	Inter-Cooperation	Atampugre
	Chip Fay	Fellow, Samdhana Institute	Hendrickson
	José Carlos Fernández	CONAFOR (Mexico)	Murray
	John Lief-Fosse	NORAD	Murray
	Gamma Galudra	ICRAF-SEA	Hendrickson
	Javier Gómez	CEDLA	Murray
	Jenny Gruenberger	LIDEMA	Murray
	Rudy Guzmán	CADEOFR (Bolivia)	Murray
	Jeffrey Hatcher	RRG, Manager of Global Programs	Murray
	Kristin Hite	Center for International Env.	Murray
	Kate Homer	Friends of the Earth	Murray
	John Hudson	RRG Board	Murray
	James Johnson	Consultant (Bolivia)	Murray
	Jutta Kill	FERN	Murray
	Oscar Llanque	IPHAE (Bolivia)	Murray
	Alvaro Luna	USAID, Bolivia	Murray
	Nayna Jhaveri	RRG, Asia Coordinator	Murray
	Norman Jiwan	SAWIT WATCH	Hendrickson
	Antoine Kalinganire	ICRAF, West Africa	Atampugre
	Arvind Khare	RRG, Director of Finance and Policy	Murray
	Jose Martínez	ABT (Bolivia)	Murray
	Augusta Molnar	RRG, Director of Global Programs	Murray
	Iliana Monterroso	RRG, Latin America Facilitator	Murray
	Milah Nuh	RECOFTC-Indonesia	Hendrickson
	Kyeretwie Opoku	Civic Response, RRG Board	Atampugre
	Bruno Poitevin	Inter-Cooperation, Bolivia	Murray
	Lincoln Quevedo	CIMAR	Murray

	Peter Riggs	Ford Foundation	Murray
	Myrna Safitri	HUMA	Hendrickson
	Maribel Solano	CPESC (Bolivia)	Murray
	William Sunderlin	CIFOR	Hendrickson
	Leonardo Tamburini	CEJIS	Murray
	Simon Ticehurst	Director OXFAM Bolivia	Murray
	Boubacar Toure	Malian Radio and Television	Atampugre
	Jorge Velazquez	Diakonia, Bolivia	Murray
	Jaime Villanueva	Ex-Director, Bolivian Gov't Climate Change Program	Murray
	Christina Voigt	Government of Norway	Murray
	Andy White	RRG, Coordinator	Hendrickson, Murray

**APPENDIX TWO**  
**REVISED LOGICAL FRAMEWORK, 2008-2012**  
**RIGHTS AND RESOURCES INITIATIVE**

	<b>Intervention logic</b>	<b>Objectively measurable and verifiable indicators</b>	<b>Sources of verifications</b>	<b>Who is responsible</b>
<p><b>Development objectives/ Goal</b></p> <p>Contribute to reducing poverty and enhancing well-being by strengthening tenure reform and democratic governance and development in forest areas of developing countries.</p>	<p>The dominant models of forest governance, industry and conservation have often exacerbated poverty, precluded pro-poor economic growth, and motivated social conflict.</p> <p>Chronic extreme poverty, continued abuse of human rights, violent civil conflicts, booming demand for energy and the growing threat of climate change are widespread global challenges that bring new urgency to strengthening justice and democratic governance in forest areas.</p>			
<p><b>Project objective/ Purpose:</b> Encourage greater global commitment to and action for the establishment of more equitable forest tenure and related policies in priority developing countries. This in turn would lead to reduced poverty and violent conflict in forest areas, advancement of human rights and civil rights, increase contribution of industry and markets to social and economic development, and strengthen conditions for restoring the ecological integrity of forests, and mitigation and adaptation to climate change.</p>	<p>Strong local human, civil and property rights are linked to meeting Millennium Development Goals, reducing deforestation and degradation, preventing millions from displacement in the coming decades. Lack of rights is the fundamental reason for forest communities' inability to use forest assets for livelihood and well-being benefits.</p> <p>The global community lacks simple indicators of progress on these global goals of tenure and governance. And, there is a lack of effective strategic collaboration that focuses on increasing the collective impact on tenure and governance reform.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Track and disseminate global progress on statutory tenure reform in developing countries.</li> <li>Mobilize a global effort through the creation of a coalition</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RRG tenure tracking updates</li> <li>Annual program and financial reports and independent monitoring of impact</li> </ul>	

Strategic Outcomes	<i>Milestones for 2010</i>	Objectively measurable and verifiable indicators	Sources of verifications	Who is responsible
1. Complementary global, national, regional and local organizations effectively synergize to achieve significant breakthroughs in tenure reform processes.	<p><i>Proposal for 2010:</i></p> <p><i>Many of these were created at start of our work. I propose we document as close to 10 as possible that exist by this year. This will leave room for the other 10 over 2011 &amp; 2012.</i></p> <p><i>Total : ( 9-10 )</i></p> <p><i>a) Best country planning teams as novel &amp; clear + value creations: Mali, Bolivia, Nepal, Cameroun</i></p> <p><i>b) Sahel Working group, Guatemala uplands/lowlands forest alliance,</i></p> <p><i>c) Yaounde conference, CC Global and Regional Dialogues</i></p> <p><i>d) Acre,Brazil CFE Conference</i></p>	Facilitate at least twenty new, value-added joint actions and activities between Partners and Collaborators w/ a demonstrable effect on the other strategic outcomes.	Ongoing internal documentation of results of collaborative actions by RRI Partners/Collaborators.	Facilitators at National & Regional level.  Global Programs Managers at global level.  <i>Mali: Solange</i>  <i>Bolivia: Omai</i>  <i>Nepal; Ganga</i>  <i>Cameroun:Sol</i>  <i>Guate: Iliana</i>  <i>Sahel: Solange</i>  <i>Yaounde: Augusta</i>  <i>CC Dialogues: Arvind</i>  <i>Acre CFE: Augusta</i>

<p>2. A select set of strategic networks are better-informed, more active and effective in promoting reform nationally, regionally and/or globally.</p>	<p><i>Here there are two defining differences from above: must clearly be networks and we need a way to show they are better informed, active and effective</i></p> <p><i>Total (4 in 2010)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>a) MegaFlorestais</i></li> <li><i>b) GACF-Asia</i></li> <li><i>c) CSAG-ITTO</i></li> <li><i>d) Africa: Women 's network</i></li> </ul>	<p>At least six existing or new networks increase their capacity to influence policy related to forest tenure at all levels.</p>	<p>Ongoing analysis of work with priority networks, identifying most significant changes in network capacity.</p>	<p>Senior Management with Partner/Collaborator support will gather data and transfer it to central collection point.</p> <p><i>Mega: Andy</i></p> <p><i>GACF: Nayna</i></p> <p><i>If Csag: ITTO</i></p> <p><i>Augusta</i></p> <p><i>Africa Women: Solange</i></p>
<p>3. Key strategic actors at the global level are committed and engaged in promoting major reforms in existing tenure, regulatory and governance arrangements. (Previous #1)</p>	<p><i>We need to name at least 2 intergovernmental and/or multilateral institutions by 2010.</i></p> <p><i>Total: (2 in 2010)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>a) ITTO- changes in both narrative on tenure and portfolio for community projects.</i></li> <li><i>b) UNREDD</i></li> </ul>	<p>At least five inter-governmental and multilateral institutions (multilateral banks, ITTO, and other UN institutions) alter their position on forest tenure and actively support tenure and related reforms in their narrative and portfolios.</p>	<p>Careful ongoing analysis of the development of RRI relations with key institutions. Documentation of demonstrable shifts in those relationships and the institutional positions that indicate desired internal changes.</p>	<p>Senior Mgrs. And RRG Partners knowledgeable about the institutions would need to provide much of the information to a central person collecting and organizing it.</p> <p>ITTO: Augusta</p> <p>UNRED: Jeff</p>
<p>4. Changes in tenure legislation and regulatory or policy framework in favor of local</p>	<p><i>Total: (3 for 2010)</i></p>	<p>In six countries where RRI is active, structural tenure</p>	<p>Systematization of ongoing</p>	<p>Regional Coordinators</p>

<p>communities in a subset of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. (Previous #2)</p>	<p>a) <i>China</i> b) <i>Nepal</i> c) <i>Liberia</i></p>	<p>reforms (legal, regulatory, policy) are adopted/advanced.</p>	<p>information &amp; analysis of the progress of tenure reform legislation and regulations in target countries.</p>	<p>and Facilitators provide information to central gathering and collection point.  <i>China: Arvind</i> <i>Nepal: Nayna/Ganga</i> <i>Liberia: Solange</i></p>
<p>5. More equitable forest governance, enterprise and conservation models are identified and disseminated and/or more broadly supported as a viable approach to support social and economic development.</p>	<p><i>Putting this SO last indicates maturity of an effort, and thus more likely to find near the end of the 5 year period.</i></p> <p><i>We will need to find the studies with solid evidence that confirm the emergence of these models or their going to scale.</i></p> <p><i>Total: (2 for 2010)</i></p> <p>a) <i>Cameroon (rezoning PA's)</i> b) <i>Nepal (redefining conservation as community option)</i></p>	<p>In at least five cases, these models lead to an increase in community access to resources and markets.</p>	<p>Research studies produced by RRI Partners and Collaborators or other reputable sources.</p>	<p>Senior Management Team with support of Regional Coordinators gather information and deliver it to central collection point.  <i>Cameroon: Aug &amp; Solange</i> <i>Nepal: Nayna &amp; Ganga</i></p>

## **APPENDIX THREE**

### **RRI Response to the 2009 RRI Independent Monitor Recommendations November 2010**

- KMSC Recommendations
- RRI Response

#### **Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning System**

Consistent with the coalition's foundational commitments, RRI must complete the work of putting in place a fully functional MEL system (during the first half of 2010). At a minimum, that requires a revision of the indicators in the existing log-frame and the establishment of information gathering systems consistent with the needs of monitoring progress on those indicators. The 2010 Independent Monitoring Exercise must be able to use the updated indicators and the information that supports them. The establishment of a working MEL system should also include an analysis of the extent to which these log-frame indicators fully meet RRI's learning needs, and, as necessary, the consideration of alternative MEL approaches that might complement log-frame analysis in maximizing RRI's learning about what works and what doesn't work in its strategic approach. A decision to embrace complementary approaches would also imply additional work to integrate all approaches into a single, coherent system.

As part of the Governance and Coordination of the RRI, in 2010 RRG began to refine an internal monitoring and evaluation system as an integral part of its strategic analysis and planning process. There are four major components of the work that is now in place:

- a) The refinement of the logical framework of the Framework Proposal
- b) A more systematic self-evaluation by the planning teams of the work done at the program levels (country, region and global) with written reports.
- c) The independent monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the coalition's activities on an annual basis by an independent consultant
- d) The elaboration of Impact Stories based partially on the information generated from the M & E system and partially from on-the-ground stories provided by Partners, Collaborators or others.

RRG has hired an experienced consultant to carry out the refinement of RRI's internal Monitoring, Evaluation system, as well as conduct the independent monitoring and evaluation of the RRI program. The independent monitor is responsible for the yearly independent evaluation of the RRI program and providing recommendations for adjustments in the strategic approach and/or coalition functioning.

The independent monitor will annually validate the RRI internal monitoring of outcomes (through country visits, participation in events, key interviews, etc.); conduct the independent monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of the implementation of the 2010 work plan and outcomes; monitor RRI response to recommendations from the Independent Monitor's report from 2009. Additionally, the independent monitor will draft, consult and present an annual Independent Monitoring Report that will

- Inform the coalition on how strategic activities are being implemented and make recommendations for adjustments and modifications in processes, content and work programs
- Validate the RRI-generated information from the internal impact assessment and regular reporting of the agreed outcomes in the RRI Framework proposal logical framework.



- Collect feedback from multiple sets of actors and constituents
- Assess that RRI is providing value-addition to the on-going initiatives of Partners and to the actions of other sets of development players in this and related sectors and political spaces
- Evaluate that the Initiative is in the above respect cost-effective and synergistic, and avoiding duplication and free riders in the coalition

The RRI Internal Monitoring & Evaluation System is conceived as an integral part of our strategic analysis and planning process and entails a set of internal processes for tracking implementation and learning among Partners and Collaborators and evaluating the effectiveness of RRI activities, processes, and institutional mechanisms. The self-evaluation of RRI also reflects on whether these interventions are strategic in helping to achieve global, regional and country-level program results/outcomes, and whether these results/outcomes are helping to achieve our mission statement (purpose). RRI also tracks compliance and outputs as indicators of progress at the level of contract activities.

### **Coalition Strengthening**

RRI should review existing internal communications procedures with the goal of establishing fluid communications that deepen the relationships among coalition members, while keeping those members fully informed of relevant coalition activities. In addition, RRG should carefully analyze its efforts to maximize synergies among Partner actions, especially at the global program level. Articulation between Country and Regional Initiatives and RRI Global Programs is certainly important, but the integration of Partners into the design, planning and execution of RRI Global Program is a separate and equally important issue. Where existing capacity is insufficient to achieve such integration, RRG should consider developing that capacity.

RRI has improved the strength of the Coalition in 5 major ways in 2010.

1. RRI completed the revision of the MOU, rededicating Partners to the mission and foundation of RRI until 2015. The RRI Board of Directors unanimously approved the new MOU and 9 Partners signed on, with IUCN and CIFOR becoming Collaborators.
2. RRI has improved the two different types of internal communications that they often deal with (1 internal communications (communications), and (2) internal communications (governance). The November Communications Workshop directly addressed these two types of communications with their respective audiences and has identified Communications Focal Points (CFPs) to act as coordinating internal points of contact within their organization. These individuals travel substantially less than the RRI Partner representatives and have their hand in the programmatic work – allowing for a much quicker response time.
3. The Global Programs process was changed in 2010, at the request of the Partners, to increase the amount of Partner input in the Global Programs planning process; allowing for increased ownership of the activities decided upon at the meeting. This new process of increasing the amount of Partner input was well received in November.
4. RRI hosted a Coalition-Wide Communications Workshop in Washington, DC (originally scheduled for April in Bangkok, but postponed due to local violence) in November 2010, and a Regional Communications Exchange in Africa in October 2010.
5. The Coalition is currently undergoing a revision process around the Institutional Business Arrangements (IBA) associated with the Coalition. **At the November Board Meeting, the Board reviewed the updated IBA, which had been revised to incorporate agreed MOU texts and the Partner proposals. Partners proposed revising the existing text collaboratively in the coming month, assigning certain parts to each Partner, to facilitate better interaction and produce revised text. This input will be considered at**

the January meetings. The Board will make a definitive decision regarding Partner revisions to the IBA in January.

### **Country Priorities**

RRI should establish a method to annually review its choices regarding priority countries for Country and Regional Initiatives with an eye toward consistently targeting interventions in locations of maximum opportunity for progress on tenure reform. Given that RRI cannot infinitely expand the number of countries in which it is working, agility and responsiveness will require more discussion of the issue of program transition away from countries that no longer offer real possibilities for the sorts of tenure reform sought by the coalition.

RRI agrees that this is a very good point and an issue that is well recognized by Partners, RRG, and the Board of Directors. It is regrettable that there was not an appropriate venue or opportunity in 2010 to deal with this issue (as the majority focus has been on the revision of the MOU and IBA). All key stakeholder shave agreed to address this in 2011 as a part of the review and redesign of RRI.

### **Contracting System**

In light of Partner comments on the impact of RRG's contracting system on implementation, RRI should review that system with an eye toward capturing efficiencies, identifying potential bottlenecks and shortening the overall length of the process. This recommendation is closely linked to the one on operational capacity described below.

RRG recognizes the urgent need to expand the capacity of the Finance & Operations team and has taken action to rectify this limitation (new hires are discussed under the operational capacity section below). Additionally, the Chair of the RRI Board of Directors, John Hudson, spent a week reviewing RRI contracting in August 2010 and produced a 4 page report (with recommendations) on the current status of RRI contracting capacity. The RRI Board of Directors unanimously approved the recommendations with some very slight revisions and have already begun to implement them.

### **Communications Capacity**

RRG should seriously consider adding a dedicated communications staff position to be filled by a communications professional with skills and experiences consistent with RRI's communications strategy. That strategy should be reviewed with an eye toward expanding the network of users of RRI's publications and analysis and exploring the use of new media to expand public awareness of RRI's perspective and use of RRI materials. A carefully-designed survey of current users of RRI communications products would provide indispensable grounding for any review of communications strategy, as would an effort to activate the impressive communications capabilities of many RRI Partners behind the coalition's communications objectives.

In July 2010, RRI Ms. Jenna DiPaolo to fill the role of Coalition & Communications Manager and begin to pay more strategic attention to the role of RRI's global communications. Additionally, RRI hosted a Coalition-Wide Communications Workshop in Washington, DC (originally scheduled for April in Bangkok, but postponed due to local violence) in November 2010, and a Regional Communications Exchange in Africa in October 2010. Participants in both groups were surveyed to reflect their knowledge and utilization of current RRI communications tools. While capacity building was not the primary purpose of the November Workshop, it was a component of better understanding where the Coalition "is" regarding communications. Ways to increase capacity (i.e. building workshops into regional planning)

were discussed with the group and a working group of Communication's Focal Points (CFPs) was established to carry forward the ideas generated at the meeting. The meeting focused on:

1. Revising the RRI Communications Strategy to better reflect current and prospective communications opportunities and incorporate the roles, perspectives, ideas, objectives and capacities of Partners
2. Improving communication between Coalition Partners and identifying opportunities for communications synergies
3. Discussing opportunities to strengthen RRI Global Communications and advance Partner and coalition agendas for upcoming events

Regarding new media, RRI launched a Facebook page in coordination with their Third Quarter Email Update. RRI has also been actively reaching out to well-known bloggers on RRI related issues to (re)highlight RRI publications and lay the ground work for building these mutually beneficial relationships. In line with increasing web-based capacity, RRI is in the process of re-launching a new website that is more user friendly, regionally-oriented, and has increased foreign language search capacity. This new website also highlights the work of RRI Collaborators for the first time. Launch is expected by the end of the year.

Off-line RRI has implemented a monthly RRG External Communications Update , which is designed to alert Partners and Collaborators to the external (global) communications activities of the Secretariat (i.e. presentations, press releases), and strengthened the link with experienced international consultant, Burness Communications. In 2010, Burness assisted in hosting Media trainings throughout Mexico on how to effectively engage with media (some of the individuals who attended this training were interviewed for The Economist's Special Report on Forests in September 2010.), press and lead up to COP 16 in Mexico, and the release of RRI's well-received Stora Enso report, which was ultimately picked up by a wide range of influential international media (Associated Press, Agence France Presse, Reuters, BBC, etc.)

### **Operational Capacity**

RRG should assess its operational capacity based on projected needs over the next three years and make a plan to create operational capacity in line with those needs. Contracting additional permanent staff is only one way to build such capacity. In the short-term, however, an additional financial/administrative person to focus attention on the contracting process and related activities seems like an urgent necessity.

RRG recognizes the urgent need to expand the capacity of the Finance & Operations team and has taken action to rectify this limitation. In the summer of 2010 RRG hired a full-time Executive Assistant & Office Manager (Ms. France Francois) and hired a consultant to assist in office administration and contracting. In addition, RRG is currently accepting applications for Assistant Manager, Finance & Administration to replace the consultant who is leaving for graduate school in December. The combination of these positions will cover the administrative and contracting needs of the office, allowing the Manager, Finance & Administration (Mr. James Christopher Miller) to focus his attention on the new financial system and accountability and timeliness of donor reporting