

Produce transported by motorbike in Sumatra, Indonesia. Jacob Maentz, 2022.

Annex 1

Advancing collective rights and livelihoods: a baseline assessment of enabling policy conditions in six countries

A. INDICATOR IDENTIFICATION AND PRIORITIZATION

The indicator framework was developed through a multi-stage process to identify the conditions that national governments can influence to support the self-determined livelihoods of Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant Peoples, and local communities. The research team first reviewed literature on collective action, common-property institutions, community-based resource governance, forest livelihoods, tenure, and public administration. This review was complemented by an online survey of 120 members of the Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI) coalition, which helped identify government-controlled conditions considered important for collective livelihoods beyond formal tenure recognition.

After compiling the factors and conditions identified through the literature review and practitioner survey into a long list of candidate indicators of an enabling policy environment, the research team examined how these conditions could be grouped into broader areas of government action. Five interconnected policy domains emerged: (1) tenure security, covering the recognition and protection of community land and resource rights; (2) institutional autonomy and accountability, addressing communities' ability to govern themselves and engage with accountable public institutions; (3) livelihood development and capacity building, encompassing access to finance, enterprise opportunities, and technical skills; (4) infrastructure and connectivity, covering essential services, communications, and other conditions that facilitate livelihood activities; and (5) inclusive governance and cultural respect, addressing meaningful participation, representation, and recognition of communities' cultural identities.

Within each policy domain, the research team further organized the identified factors and conditions into three dimensions of government performance: de

jure conditions, referring to formal legal recognition and protections; de facto conditions, reflecting the implementation and functioning of policies and institutions in practice; and protection from harm, addressing risks and threats that may undermine community rights and livelihoods. This organization produced 15 categories across the five domains. The team then prioritized candidate indicators within each category, aiming to identify one or two measures based on five criteria: (1) relevance to community self-determination and livelihoods; (2) substantial influence by national governments; (3) availability of comparable data across countries; (4) ease of interpretation; and (5) feasibility of periodic updates. The resulting framework comprises 23 indicators organized into five interconnected policy domains: tenure security; institutional autonomy and accountability; livelihood development and capacity building; infrastructure and connectivity; and inclusive governance and cultural respect. Each domain covers three dimensions of government performance: de jure conditions, de facto conditions, and protection from harm.

The framework was initially tested and refined in Peru and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) before being applied in all six study countries: Brazil, Colombia, the DRC, Indonesia, Nepal, and Peru. The selection of a concise set of indicators reflects an intentional balance between capturing the multidimensional nature of the enabling policy environment and ensuring that individual measures remain interpretable, comparable, and suitable for repeated monitoring. Rather than producing a composite score or an exhaustive assessment, the framework is designed to identify specific strengths and gaps in government performance that may affect communities' ability to pursue their livelihood priorities.

Figure 1. Indicator Framework Development and Application



The concise indicator set balances the multidimensional nature of the enabling policy environment against the need for measures that remain interpretable, comparable across countries, and suitable for repeated monitoring. Source: Technical Annex, Section A.

Source: Authors' elaboration.

B. TECHNICAL NOTE AND HARMONIZATION PROCEDURES

Data Treatment and Analysis

Data. Key-informant interviews were administered in Qualtrics by national partner teams [1-2 per country]. The responses to create a localized estimate (Q1), the acceptability of current government performance (Q2), the national benchmark (Q3), and their level of confidence in their responses (Q4) were selected for each of the 13 quantitative indicators, in addition to the informant's sector and expertise. We removed any entries that interviewers confirmed were incomplete (e.g., training and testing interviews or entries disrupted by technology).

Direction harmonization. Some Q1-type questions were worded in terms of the condition being measured (for example, "how often do communities face eviction"), while several source statistics are expressed in a negative direction (share worried about water, share of firms citing courts as an obstacle, share who paid a bribe, share who do not trust the national congress, share of loan applications rejected, share perceiving insecurity). We applied three data harmonization steps after data collection. First, the national value of each negatively expressed statistic was reversed (100 − x) so that higher values indicate better conditions. Second, some country teams asked the Q1-type question in terms of the source statistic rather than the condition, or had ordered the response options in the opposite direction. In those cases, the response categories were inverted before scoring so that a higher category always indicates better conditions. Third, the national benchmark value (Q3) was reversed (100 − x) where a team had elicited the question in the negative direction. Find detailed information on the treated values and indicators per country in Table A1.

Scoring and aggregation. Harmonized responses were scored 1 (much lower) to 5 (much higher). For each country and indicator, the harmonized category scores were averaged across informants, omitting missing responses. The mean category score $\bar{x}$ was then converted into a percentage adjustment, rather than con-

verting each informant's category separately before averaging. The percentage adjustment m was obtained by linear interpolation between category midpoints:

$m = -25 + 10(\bar{x} - 1)$ for $1 \le \bar{x} < 2$; $m = -15 + 15(\bar{x} - 2)$ for $2 \le \bar{x} < 3$; $m = 15(\bar{x} - 3)$ for $3 \le \bar{x} < 4$; $m = 15 + 10(\bar{x} - 4)$ for $4 \le \bar{x} \le 5$.

The localized estimate is $B = \min(100, \max(0, A \times (1 + m/100)))$, where A is the national value after direction harmonization. Adjustments are relative (multiplicative), not percentage-point changes. For example, with A = 50 and m = +15, B = 57.5. For indicators with very low national values, the absolute difference A − B is correspondingly small.

Reference levels and gaps. The annex tables introduce the following calculated values:

- National performance benchmark (C) is the Q3 mean across informants for each indicator and country.
- Cross-country benchmark (D) is the unweighted mean of C over Brazil, Colombia, the DRC, Nepal and Peru.
- Localized Gaps: National-to-local Gap (A − B), National Benchmark Gap (C − B), and Cross-country gap (D − B) show the differences between the reality of communities and the national or cross-national values. A negative gap indicates that the localized estimate exceeds the benchmark or reference levels. Where no valid localized estimate could be formed, the corresponding gap cells should be left blank; verify the DRC loan-approval entry against the corrected country tables.

Lethal attacks. The Global Witness count K was divided by 1,000,000, multiplied by (1 + m/100) using the reprisals localized estimate question (Q1), standardized across the six countries ($z = 50 + 10 \times (K' - \text{mean})/\text{SD}$), and reversed ($B = 100 - z$). The national performance benchmark is fixed at 100, indicating that no lethal attacks are acceptable, and the gap is 100 − B. Values indicate their relative positions among the six countries.

Interpretation limits. The five-category response scale limits the adjustment to ±25 percent, even where informants believed conditions differed more; localized estimates are therefore conservative. The estimates are structured expert judgments anchored on the national value, not survey measurements of forest communities.

Table A1. Harmonization of Indicator Directions

This table identifies the indicators and countries for which data were adjusted to ensure that higher values consistently represent more favorable conditions. NV refers to the national statistic, Q1 to key informants' assessments of localized conditions, and Q3 to their assessments of acceptable national performance. An "x" indicates that the value or response was reversed during harmonization; blank cells indicate that no reversal was required.

Indicator	Response	Brazil	Colombia	DRC	Indonesia	Nepal	Peru
Access to safely managed drinking water	NV	x	x		x		x
	Q1	x*	x				
	Q3	x*					
Access to mobile network	NV						
	Q1						
	Q3						
Trust in legal system	NV	x	x	x	x	x	x
	Q1	x*	x		x		
	Q3	x*					
Freedom from violent conflict	NV						x
	Q1						
	Q3						
Perceived business climate	NV						
	Q1	x	x	x	x	x	x
	Q3						

Loan approval rate	NV	x	x	x		x	x
	Q1		x	x		x	
	Q3	x*				x	
Access to capacity building	NV						
	Q1						
	Q3						
Anti-corruption measures	NV						
	Q1						
	Q3						
Trust in political institutions	NV	x	x		x	x	x
	Q1	x*	x				
	Q3	x*					
Reported level of corruption in government	NV	x	x	x	x	x	x
	Q1		x				
	Q3	x*				x	
Lethal attacks on community activists	NV	x	x	x	x	x	x
	Q1	x	x	x	x	x	x
	Q3						
Rural marginalization or exclusion from decision-making	NV						
	Q1	x		x			x
	Q3						
Protection of property rights	NV						
	Q1	x		x	x	x	x
	Q3						

* For cells marked with an asterisk, harmonization was required only for responses collected by one interviewer in Brazil, rather than for all responses for that indicator.

C. INDICATOR DOCUMENTATION

The following tables document the 23 indicators across the five policy domains, providing their definitions, rationale for inclusion, data sources, and key considerations for interpreting the results.

Table A2. Infrastructure & Connectivity

Indicator	Definition	Rationale	Source notes	Interpretation / limitations
Constitutional right to water [de jure]	Binary variable measuring whether the right to water is recognized at the constitutional or national level.	Water is a basic service within the physical and social foundations needed for communities to plan and invest.	1, 21, 29, 36	The report distinguishes legal provisions (de jure) from implementation (de facto). Legal recognition does not establish implementation or security in practice.
Access to safely managed drinking water [de facto]	Proportion of people surveyed who believe their drinking water is safe.	Access to safe water is part of the basic service infrastructure that affects health, time available for productive activities, and community enterprise viability.	2	Perceived drinking-water harm, not a direct measurement of safely managed drinking-water services. Source years differ by country. The report cautions that national statistics can mask forest-territory conditions. Localized estimates are informed judgments, not direct household surveys.
Access to mobile network [de facto]	Percentage of people surveyed who have a mobile phone for personal calls.	Mobile connectivity supports producer coordination, buyer communication, and access to price information, helping overcome geographic isolation.	2	National statistics may not reflect mobile phone access in forest communities. Localized estimates are based on informed judgments rather than household surveys.

Trust in legal system [de facto]	Percentage of surveyed firms that feel confident in the reliability and fairness of the courts.	Accessible dispute-resolution systems matter for enforcing agreements, addressing disputes fairly, and reducing uncertainty for forest producer organizations.	3, 15, 22, 25, 30, 37	This indicator reflects firms' perceptions of the functioning of courts and may not capture the experiences of forest-dependent communities.
Freedom from Violent Conflict [protection from harm]	1. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism. 2.Population perceptions of public security over the last 12 months.	Violence and insecurity increase investment risk, transaction costs, and the difficulty of sustaining community enterprises.	4, 16	The two measures capture different aspects of security: broader political stability and people's perceptions of public safety. Neither necessarily reflects conditions in remote forest communities.

Table A3. Livelihood Development & Capacity Building

Indicator	Definition/construction	Rationale	Source notes	Interpretation/ limitations
Ability to use collective title as collateral [de jure]	Whether community tenure laws allow collective land titles to be used as collateral or transferred to others.	The ability to use collective land rights as collateral can help communities access financing and invest in livelihood activities.	5	Legal permission to use collective titles as collateral does not necessarily mean communities can obtain loans in practice.

Perceived business climate [de facto]	Percentage of surveyed entrepreneurs who believed their country is a good place to start a business.	Rules and practical barriers to starting and operating enterprises shape opportunities for forest-based businesses.	2	National perceptions of the business environment may not reflect the specific challenges faced by forest-based enterprises. Localized estimates are based on informed judgments, rather than household surveys.
Loan approval rate [de facto]	Percentage of surveyed firms whose loan applications were approved.	Access to finance affects working capital, investment in processing, and the ability to manage seasonal income gaps.	3, 14, 22, 25, 31, 37	Loan approval rates among surveyed firms may not reflect access to financing for forest-dependent communities.
Access to capacity building (adult and vocational training) [de facto]	Percentage of youth and adults (25-64 years old) who participated in adult education and vocational training programs in the last 12 months.	Education and vocational training help communities develop skills, improve their enterprises, and navigate business requirements.	6	National participation rates may not reflect access to education and training in forest communities. Localized estimates are based on informed judgments rather than household surveys.

Table A4. Institutional Autonomy & Accountability

Indicator	Definition	Rationale	Source notes	Interpretation/ limitations
Legal recognition of self-rule and customary governance [de jure]	Whether national laws recognize communities' rights to self-governance and customary governance systems under collective tenure arrangements.	Recognized self-rule and customary governance enable communities to make collective decisions, manage internal disputes, and represent their interests.	5	Legal recognition does not necessarily mean communities can exercise self-governance in practice.
Laws that mention the existence of ombudsman and grievance mechanisms [de jure]	Whether laws mention the existence of ombudsman and grievance mechanisms.	Grievance and ombudsman mechanisms provide formal channels for addressing complaints, seeking redress and protecting of rights.	7, 17, 23, 26, 32, 38	Legal recognition alone does not necessarily mean these mechanisms are accessible, effective, or used by forest communities.
Anti-corruption measures [protection from harm]	Assessment of how effectively government success in contains corruption.	Corruption can increase the costs of accessing public services, permits, and enforcement mechanisms, while undermining institutional accountability and limiting communities' ability to pursue sustainable livelihoods.	8	This national governance assessment may not reflect corruption experienced by forest communities. Localized estimates are based on informed judgments rather than direct surveys.

Trust in political institutions [de facto]	1.Percentage of surveyed citizens who express trust in the national congress. 2.Whether Civil rights are guaranteed and protected and citizens can seek redress 3.Respondents trust the effectiveness of the public service commission.	Trust in political institutions, protection of civil rights, and access to redress are important dimensions of accountable governance. They can influence communities' confidence in public authorities and their ability to engage with institutions responsible for protecting their rights and supporting sustainable livelihoods.	9, 8, 27, 33	The indicator uses different measures across countries, including trust in the national congress, civil-rights protection, and trust in the public service commission. These measures capture different aspects of institutional performance and are not directly comparable. National measures may not reflect the experiences of forest communities.
Reported level of corruption in government [protection from harm]	Percentage of surveyed public-service users who did not pay a bribe when accessing public services in the past 12 months.	Corruption can raise compliance costs, delay services, distort benefit-sharing, and deter investment by community enterprises.	10, 18, 24, 28, 34, 39	This indicator captures reported bribery among public-service users, not other forms of corruption or institutional accountability. It may not reflect the experiences of forest-dependent communities.

Table A5. Inclusive Governance & Cultural Respect

Indicator	Definition	Rationale	Source notes	Interpretation/ limitations
FPIC standards acknowledged in national legislation [de jure]	Whether Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) standards are recognized in national legislation and under community-based tenure regimes.	FPIC is part of meaningful participation in decisions affecting community lands and livelihoods.	5	Legal recognition of FPIC standards does not necessarily mean communities are consulted or able to exercise their right to consent in practice.

Non-colonial languages recognized as official languages [de jure]	Whether non-colonial languages are recognized as official languages.	Recognition of Indigenous and other non-colonial languages supports culturally respectful participation and access to public decision-making.	11, 19, 21, 26, 35, 36	Official recognition does not necessarily ensure that these languages are used in public services or that speakers can effectively participate in government decision-making.
Lethal attacks on community activists [protection from harm]	Number of environmental defenders killed from 2012 to 2024.	Protecting community activists from violence is essential to ensuring that forest-dependent communities can defend their rights, participate in decision-making, and express dissent safely. Lethal attacks represent the most severe form of violence against environmental and community defenders and may indicate broader risks of intimidation and reprisals.	12	The standardized result indicates relative position among the six study countries; it is not a literal percentage or observed local death rate.
Rural marginalization or exclusion from decision-making [protection from harm]	1.Urban-rural distribution of political power. 2.Districts have a joint municipal development plan with civil society participation.	Exclusion and discrimination can prevent marginalized rural groups from influencing decisions or receiving benefits of forest-based programs.	13, 20	The urban–rural political power measure captures the geographic distribution of political influence, while the municipal development planning measure captures formal opportunities for civil society participation. Neither directly establishes whether forest-dependent communities meaningfully influence decisions. The use of different country-specific proxies limits direct comparability.

Table A6. Tenure Security

Indicator	Definition	Rationale	Source notes	Interpretation/ limitations
Legal recognition of land and forest rights [de jure]	Whether land and forest rights of Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant Peoples, and local communities are legally recognized.	Recognition of collective land and forest rights is foundational to community governance and the ability to plan for long-term livelihoods.	5	Legal recognition does not necessarily mean that communities can exercise their land and forest rights in practice or that these rights are effectively protected.
Completeness of the bundle of rights [de jure]	Completeness of the bundle of rights under each community-based tenure regime.	The extent of rights to use and manage forests matters beyond the simple existence of legal recognition.	5	The completeness of legally recognized rights may vary across community-based tenure regimes and does not establish whether communities can exercise those rights in practice.
Share of formally recognized community forests (% of total forest land) [de facto]	Area designated for and owned by Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant Peoples, and local communities as a percentage of total forest land.	The formal recognition of community forests indicates how far collective tenure rights have been translated into legally recognized territorial rights. Formal recognition can strengthen communities' ability to manage natural resources, protect their territories, and pursue sustainable livelihoods.	14	This indicator captures formally recognized community forest areas, excluding forests held or managed under unrecognized customary arrangements. It does not measure the strength or enforcement of tenure rights, and national percentages may conceal geographic disparities.

Share of formally recognized community land (% of total land) [de facto]	Area designated for and owned by Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant Peoples, and local communities as a percentage of total land.	Formal recognition of community land rights is an important dimension of tenure security; it provides a legal foundation for communities to manage natural resources, protect their territories, and make long-term investments in sustainable livelihoods.	40	Measures the extent of formal recognition of community land rights, rather than the full extent of customary landholdings. It does not capture unrecognized customary lands, differences in the strength of legally recognized rights, or their effective implementation and protection. National percentages may also conceal geographic disparities in recognition.
Protection of property rights [protection from harm]	Property rights security.	Clear, enforceable property rights and protection against arbitrary withdrawal matter for long-term investment, reduced conflict, and community control.	13	This country-level indicator captures general property-rights security rather than the specific protection of collective land and forest tenure. National scores may not reflect conditions experienced by forest-dependent communities.

Notes

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