Tenure and Investment in Africa

Comparative Analysis of Key Trends and Contextual Factors

This document provides an empirical picture of the causes and effects of tenure-related disputes between private sector actors and local peoples across different sub-regions and countries in Africa. It details statistical evidence of key trends in tenure-related disputes, including their causes as well as the prevalence of violence, work stoppages, and regulatory interventions.

These key trends are based on an analysis of 32 case studies evenly spread across East, West, and Southern Africa. These "new cases" are compared with a global average derived from the IAN Case Study Database's 281 cases outside Africa. In addition, we have completed a temporal analysis of some of the key trends to determine how conflicts have changed over the last few decades.

The high-level view provided here is complemented by separate examinations of the three African sub-regions, each of which profiles the case studies in depth and provides a more nuanced view of how tenure-related disputes develop and how they can be resolved.

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The views presented here are not necessarily shared by the agencies that have generously supported this work, or all of the Partners and Affiliated Networks of the RRI Coalition.

Overview

This document qualitatively and quantitatively assesses tenure disputes in East, West, and Southern Africa, and compares them with tenure disputes in the rest of the world. It provides hard evidence about trends and factors that are often treated anecdotally, such as the causes and financial consequences of tenure disputes. It also builds on a substantial body of work to quantify and better understand the costs and risks associated with operating or investing in areas where local tenure is insecure or unclear.[1] This work has produced a more granular understanding of tenure risk and is designed to help companies, investors, and governments avoid and remediate disputes effectively.

Our analysis builds on information from the IAN Case Study Database,[2] which was compiled by TMP Systems to inform the development of risk assessment and due diligence tools for tenure risk. It contains data on 362 tenure conflicts from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and represents the most significant available body of quantitative evidence on tenure disputes.

For this analysis, we combined desk research, interviews with experts, and field work to update our set of cases for Africa. We identified an additional 32 cases to complement the 81 African cases represented in the IAN Case Study Database. These "new cases" span East, West, and Southern Africa and date from 1983 (although most date from 2008, and all involve conflict events in the last ten years). Though the existing IAN dataset on Africa is sizeable, the cases date from as far back as 1990. For the purposes of this analysis, we use the 'new cases' as our basis for comparison as we feel that these cases give the most representative picture of tenure risk in Africa today.

The report investigates the reasons for local opposition to land-based investments and attempts to establish whether there are any pre-existing conditions—such as elements of the social or environmental context—that increase the risk of disputes. In addition, we have analyzed the impacts of dispute, from violence to work stoppages and regulatory intervention. This research

[1] See, for example, TMP Systems. 2012. The Financial Risks of Insecure Tenure: An Investment View. Available at: http://rightsandresources.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/doc_5715.pdf; TMP Systems; 2013. Global Capital, Local Concessions: A data-driven examination of land tenure risk and industrial concessions in emerging market economies. Available at: rightsandresources.org/en/publication/global-capital-local-concessions/#.WG-7wVMrLIU; TMP Systems. 2014. Communities as Counterparties: Preliminary review of concessions and conflict in emerging and frontier market concessions. Available at: rightsandresources.org/wp-content/uploads/Communities-as-Counterparties-FINAL_Oct-211.pdf; TMP Systems. 2016. IAN: Managing Tenure Risk. Available at: rightsandresources.org/en/publication/ian-managing-tenure-risk/#.WG-84VMrLIU.

[2] IAN is a risk and due diligence platform developed by TMP Systems. Its current beta release covers "tenure risk" and has two complementary tools: IAN Risk, a database which uses high-resolution geospatial data to generate a profile of a site, area, or supply chain; and IAN Diligence, which provides practical, implementation-ready processes that help companies and investors to counter tenure risk at each stage of the project lifecycle based on a business-oriented analysis of hundreds of problematic case studies in emerging and frontier markets (the IAN Case Study Database). More information is available at:www.tmpsystems.net/ian

therefore underlines the problems that companies and investors face when making investment decisions with limited information.

The first part of this document describes the trends we have examined and gives a summary of our results. This summary compares trends between sub-regions of Africa, and between these sub-regions and other regions of the world, including Asia and Latin America. In the second part of the document, we provide interpretation and recommendations based on the following key findings:

1) There are distinct differences between tenure dispute in Africa and the rest of the world and between sub-regions in Africa.
2) Displacement is the main cause of dispute, but it plays a less significant role in East Africa than other sub-regions. This suggests that the customary rights of local people are often being ignored or that these people are not being adequately informed about the impacts of projects.
3) Compensation is more important in Africa, and particularly East Africa, than other regions of the world, but is still only a primary driver of 19% of disputes in the region. In other words, money is rarely the key issue; instead, local people seek reassurance on a wide range of social and environmental issues.
4) A larger proportion of African cases face financially significant consequences—such as work stoppages or legal action—than in other regions. This suggests that disputes in Africa are much more likely to be materially significant for project backers than in other parts of the world. But the sub-regional perspective again reveals considerable differences, with disputes in East and Southern Africa more likely to face these impacts than West African cases.
5) The majority of disputes start before operations begin, indicating that companies and investors face problems either because they are not handling the consultation process well, or because local people are opposed to investment of any kind. A minority of cases start in direct response to the impacts of an operation.
6) Disputes are more likely to occur in areas where poverty is high, where land use is predominantly open forest or mosaic rather than cropland, where access to public infrastructure is low, and where there is a history of conflict. These factors can help companies and investors to determine where risk of dispute is higher.
7) Perhaps the most notable contextual factor was that disputes are particularly likely to occur near national boarders, with the average conflict case just 61 kilometers away. This indicates that local people will create issues for companies that are not applying high standards on tenure even if legal accountability is low.

8) Water stress is low across the cases but so is access to drinking water. This suggests that water can be a serious issue in tenure dispute even in areas where water risk is not typically considered to be a major problem by companies and investors.

9) Contrary to prevailing assumptions, the rate of violence in African tenure disputes is lower than in other regions in the world. However, rates of violence are very high in Southern Africa. This is in contrast to East Africa, where violence is relatively rare and legal opposition is more common. This suggests that local people will resort to direct action if legal tools are unavailable.

What We Looked At: Case Study Characteristics

Understanding what causes disputes, when they occur, and what impact they have can help companies and investors to pre-empt and remediate them. The factors listed below are designed to provide evidence-based comparative insights into tenure-driven disputes across different sub-regions of Africa.[3] Where possible, we have also looked at how these factors have changed over time.

1) **Drivers of dispute:** Most disputes are caused by a complex lattice of factors but identifying the primary drivers can help in the identification and management of tenure-related risks. We disaggregated primary and secondary drivers of dispute into broad categories that are useful for comparison (e.g. displacement, environmental damage, and compensation).

2) **Work stoppage:** Precise information on disputes is hard to come by but delays provide a useful proxy for financial loss. Examining work stoppages and legal interventions can therefore help us to understand how prevalent and serious tenure-related risks can be.

3) **Stage of investment:** The timing of disputes helps to reveal what has and has not been done to address the issue. For example, if most disputes emerge after operations start, it may suggest that little was done to seek consent from local peoples. Please see Appendix II for a full schema of these stages.

4) **Violence:** Violence can escalate rapidly, racing out of the control of project managers and creating considerable reputational and financial risks. In addition, violence is more likely to attract the attention of regulators, politicians, and CSOs, whose reactions can be hard to predict.

5) **Minorities and Indigenous Peoples:** These groups are less likely to be adequately protected by governments but more likely to win the support of CSOs and international

[3] A more detailed discussion of these factors may be found in TMP Systems. 2014. Communities as Counterparties. Available at: http://rightsandresources.org/wp-content/uploads/Communities-as-Counterparties-FINAL_Oct-211.pdf

campaigns. High involvement may indicate problems with the host government as a counterparty and may also reflect increased reputational risk.

There are some limitations imposed on this analysis due to the way disputes between local peoples and private sector actors are typically reported. Even though we have looked for recent cases, few have sufficient data in the public domain to merit robust analysis. This reporting issue may obscure issues such as the role of local elites. Particularly where civil society and independent media are weak, land acquisition by local buyers tends to get much less coverage than acquisition by international operators. They therefore have much lower exposure to reputational risk and less incentive to improve practice than public-facing international brands.

We also looked into another set of factors that are less amenable to strict quantitative or ranking classifications. This information is currently only available for the new African cases so we are not in a position to provide comparative analysis. The additional factors include:

1) **Proximity to borders:** Border areas are notoriously difficult from a governance perspective. Accountability in these areas is often relatively low, as is the interest of local people in national economic priorities. These are characteristics that we would typically associate with increased tenure risk.

2) **Employment:** The provision of jobs can be an important factor in how local peoples perceive a project. We looked at whether there were disputes over the provision of jobs, whether they went to local peoples, and whether there had been strikes over working conditions.

3) **Civil society involvement:** The involvement of civil society is often catalytic to the evolution of a conflict. We looked at the level of CSOs involved (local, national, or international), as well as the nature of their involvement (whether helping communities file lawsuits, conducting research and high-profile media campaigns, or facilitating dialogue).

Key Trends

Each of the key factors above has been compared to the global average and to the average from Asian and Latin American cases. The main focus of our investigation, the drivers of dispute, has also been analyzed over time to see what has changed. Summaries of the data included in this analysis are contained in Appendices I and III, respectively.

The key results of our factor analysis are provided below before being discussed in more detail:

1) Displacement is even more significant in Africa than in the rest of the world. East Africa, however, is below the global average.

2) Compensation plays a more significant role in our new African cases. However, the majority of disputes examined were not primarily caused by negotiations over money but rather reflect robust opposition to a project or its impacts.

3) Over two-thirds of the cases involved a significant work stoppage or legal intervention. In East and Southern Africa this rose to almost three-quarters of cases, well above the global average. This demonstrates that tenure disputes are regularly financially significant for project backers.

4) Over half of disputes started before operations began. This may indicate that companies and investors are not handling the consultation and local engagement process effectively. In particular, they are failing to register and respond to local opposition.

5) A relatively low number of cases (41%) involved minorities or Indigenous Peoples. This finding likely reflects the relatively low level of recognition afforded to these groups in Africa as opposed to other emerging markets in Latin America and Southeast Asia. On the on hand, this means that we are not registering some groups that in other contexts would be defined as minorities or indigenous people. On the other, it may suggest that in other regions, the special legal protection afforded these groups helps reduce direct conflicts.

6) The average distance of cases to borders was just 61 kilometers, and even less in Southern Africa. Given that the average size of these countries is quite large—over 500,000 square kilometers—this finding strongly suggests that disputes are more likely in border regions, which often experience lower quality governance on land issues.

These findings generally support anecdotal evidence of tenure dispute in Africa. Collectively, they underline the need for better processes to engage local peoples and avoid costly disputes.

Drivers of Dispute

As noted above, our research confirmed that physical displacement of local peoples is the primary driver of dispute, and found that disagreements over compensation were particularly significant drivers of African disputes. In contrast, we found that environmental damage, cultural infringement, and curtailed access to resources are less significant as primary drivers of dispute in Africa than in other regions of the world.

The results of our driver analysis are provided in the table below. They strongly indicate that companies, investors, and governments need to do more to avoid displacement of local peoples and, where that proves impossible, do more to engage them in the process of creating effective resettlement and compensation plans.

In particular, this analysis of the drivers of dispute supports anecdotal evidence in two ways. First, it suggests that customary rights are often being ignored, driving forced displacement. Second, it demonstrates that local peoples are not being adequately or accurately informed about the impact of the project and how it will affect them.

We recognize, of course, that many disputes are driven by a complex interplay of factors which are not captured through our focus on primary drivers. For example, we know that environmental issues are at play in many of the disputes in West Africa, even though they are not always the principal cause.

Primary Driver	Africa Total 32 cases	Sub-regions (new cases)			Global Comparison		
		East 11 cases	West 10 cases	South 11 cases	Asia	Americas	Global
Displacement	63%	36%	70%	82%	44%	51%	44%
Destruction of environment	9%	18%	0%	9%	17%	32%	26%
Compensation	19%	27%	30%	0%	12%	2%	8%
Cultural offence/abuse	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%	5%	7%
Curtailed resources	9%	18%	0%	9%	18%	9%	14%
Other	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	2%

The regional perspective reveals significant differences between East, West, and Southern Africa. While displacement dominated in Southern Africa, compensation is not the primary driver in any of the cases we studied there.

This contrasts sharply with East Africa, where displacement is less significant and compensation more significant than any other area we analyzed. As noted, we do recognize that most disputes are, in practice, driven by a multitude of interrelated factors. More attention to the secondary and tertiary drivers of dispute, and to their interaction, is provided in discrete reports on each sub-region.

In addition to the above results, we have also conducted temporal analysis to understand how the causes of dispute have changed over time. The results of this analysis are preliminary, but indicate that displacement remains significant in Africa even as it is becoming a less common

driver of conflict. This may be related to the fact that governments in Africa are moving more slowly than others to protect customary rights to land and/or that they are more likely to exercise the right of eminent domain. It also underlines misconceptions held by many companies and investors about the relative abundance of unoccupied land in Africa. Full details can be found in Appendix I.

Work Stoppage/Legal Action

Local opposition to a project is regularly committed enough to induce work stoppages or attract the attention of regulators. Both direct action—such as site invasion or picket lines—and legal action can significantly delay a project. Over two-thirds of the projects analyzed (69%) experienced these delays. This is well above the global average of 56%, the Asian average of 59%, and the Latin American average of 55%, suggesting that disputes in Africa are much more likely to be materially significant for project backers than in other parts of the world.[4]

Sub-regional comparisons show that East and Southern African cases are especially exposed. 73 percent of cases in each sub-region experienced stoppage or legal action, in contrast to 60 percent in West Africa. This is a significant finding given that East Africa is seen as a relatively attractive target for international investment.

These delays provide the best proxies for operational impacts over a large sample of cases. The results of our analysis reinforce the finding that a majority of reported disputes are financially significant for the companies and investors involved. Further information on this issue can be found in previous TMP analyses, which indicate that delays can increase project costs significantly and impair the value of concessions.[5]

Stage of Investment

The majority of disputes we analyzed started before operations began, suggesting either that consultation processes are not being handled effectively, or that local people are strongly opposed to external investment of any kind (see table below for a breakdown of results). More than a quarter of cases started during operations, which indicates that many companies, investors, and governments are not doing enough to seek informed consent from local peoples. This finding is supported by anecdotal evidence of communities only learning of a project's existence once work starts.

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[4] We have developed proxies to quantify the concept of "materiality," which include: situations where valuable property or equipment is damaged or destroyed by arson and violent invasions; interruptions lasting five days or more; and fines costing above US$500,000,

[5] TMP Systems. 2012. The Financial Risks of Insecure Tenure: An Investment View. Available at: http://rightsandresources.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/doc_5715.pdf; TMP Systems. 2014. Global Capital, Local Concessions. Available at: http://rightsandresources.org/wp-content/uploads/Global-Capital-Local-Concessions-FINAL-Sep-17-2-pm-est.pdf

Like the global, Asian, and American averages, disputes are spread across the investment process. This underlines the importance of effective diligence and local engagement from the start of a project to its conclusion. The social license to operate must, in many cases, be earned and then re-earned successively. This is reflected in anecdotal evidence of projects that were initially popular with local peoples but later became the focus of committed opposition.

Stage	New African Cases 32 cases	African sub-regions			Global Comparison		
		East 11 cases	West 10 cases	South 11 cases	Asia	Americas	Global
Identification	6%	9%	0%	9%	13%	17%	14%
Preparation	34%	36%	20%	45%	31%	34%	30%
Establishment	16%	18%	20%	9%	22%	11%	16%
Operation	28%	9%	50%	27%	28%	23%	28%
Expansion	16%	27%	10%	9%	4%	13%	10%
Decommissioning	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	2%

Violence

Contrary to prevailing conceptions, our analysis found a lower rate of violence in African cases (44%) than the global average (47%). It is notable that the global average is largely driven by the high prevalence in Asian cases (57%), and that the African results are higher than Latin American counterparts (38%).

Sub-regional comparisons indicate some striking differences. We found instances of violent conflict in 27% of East African cases and 30% of West African cases. However, 73% of cases in Southern Africa were violent. The East Africa result is particularly notable given that 73% of cases there saw work stoppages or legal action. This may indicate the relative importance and availability of legal tools for people opposing projects in East Africa.

It is striking that a large minority of cases experienced violent conflict. These events are naturally hard to control, and reaching a negotiated solution after the outbreak of violence is often challenging. In addition, violence is more likely to attract CSO censure and international advocacy campaigning. It can therefore be problematic on both operational and reputational levels.

Minorities and Indigenous Peoples

The involvement of minorities and Indigenous Peoples in tenure disputes is lower in Africa than in other parts of the world. These groups are still involved in over 41% of cases but this is considerably less than the global average of 70%, the Asian average of 72%, and the Latin American average of 73%. They play a greater role in West Africa (50% of cases) than in Southern and East Africa (27% and 45% of cases, respectively).

The relatively low involvement of these groups in tenure dispute reflects the fact that they are rarely officially recognized or afforded special legal protection in Africa. As a result they may not have been adequately captured in analysis or disputes involving these groups have been more effectively suppressed.

Proximity to borders

The average distance of cases to borders was just 61 kilometers and was even lower in Southern Africa. This finding is remarkable given that the average size of relevant African countries is over 500,000 square kilometers. Although our sample is relatively small, and so precludes much comparison, this result is significant.

Border areas are often poorly served by public infrastructure and are rarely high in the government's priorities aside from security considerations. Both public and private actors operating in these regions often have low accountability. It is therefore unsurprising that disputes are prevalent in border regions. But, to our knowledge, this is the first time that quantitative evidence of the trend has been published.

Employment

In some cases, the potential for employment is warmly welcomed, even sought. In others, peoples' attachment to their land is paramount in any consideration of the benefits or drawbacks of a project.

50% of cases featured either an employment dispute or no offer of employment for local peoples. Interestingly, compensation did not factor as a primary or secondary driver in these cases. This suggests that employment is a prevalent issue in tenure dispute but that it is often secondary to other issues, such as displacement. Affected communities disputed resettlement in the four cases where no employment was offered to local peoples, compared to just two-thirds of instances where employment was offered.

This reinforces the above point that employment is seen as part of a package of issues by local people. This is one area where private companies have considerable room to maneuver relative to resettlement practice, and it is therefore a potential means of addressing tenure risk, but it may be insufficient on its own. Employment must be woven into a wider set of credible benefits and reassurances.

Civil Society Involvement

In 26 of the 32 cases, civil society played a significant role in the dispute. In 16 of these cases, significant financial damage has followed for the company, normally as a result of legal cases or direct action. In addition, concerted action on the part of international NGOs is almost always (in 13 of 15 cases) accompanied by international media attention. These findings underline the importance of civil society in determining operational and reputational risk related to tenure.

What We Found: Contextual Analysis

In addition to the causes and impacts of tenure-related dispute, we have examined prevailing social and environmental conditions in the area around the case study sites. The purpose of this investigation is to establish pre-existing conditions that can be used to identify sites where tenure-related risk is high and where diligence should therefore be more thorough. Full results are provided in Annex I.

This quantitative analysis was conducted using IAN Risk, which is a free geospatial database that provides companies and investors with a catalogue of useful information on tenure. We have compared average indicator values from a 50 kilometer radius around the site of each dispute. This approach helps to capture relevant issues like proximate conflict and population pressure while mitigating the risk that the location of a dispute is not precise.

Environmental Factors: The most obvious finding from our analysis of environmental factors is that, although natural water availability is almost uniformly high, access to clean drinking water is extremely limited. This indicates that ensuring access to drinking water is a key factor in managing tenure risk. It also suggests that the locations in question are poorly served by public infrastructure and that interventions by companies and investors to improve access can have considerable social benefits.

It also appears that most disputes are surrounded by natural or mosaic land use types. They are rarely surrounded by converted landscapes like croplands or urban environments. This finding reinforces anecdotal evidence suggesting that attempts to change land use patterns create local dissatisfaction unless engagement strategies are well designed.

Social Factors: Our analysis of social factors revealed that the areas around dispute sites are relatively densely populated. Social welfare data suggests that poverty rates are high, particularly rates of severe poverty. Access to basic services like electricity and adequate nutrition is relatively low. Also unsurprising is the fact that many disputes are proximate to previous instances of violence or conflict.

Governance Factors: Our assessment of national-level governance data suggests that conflict cases are not exposed to noticeably lower quality governance conditions than our global average. However, this may reflect weaknesses in available governance data more than any other factor.

Overall, our contextual analysis suggests that there are distinctive social and environmental factors that companies and investors can use to identify areas where projects are especially exposed disputes over tenure rights. So where poverty is high, access to public services is low, and conflict is relatively common, particularly thorough diligence of land rights issues is required.

Key Lessons

The evidence collected in this paper suggests that tenure-related disputes vary distinctly between regions and between sub-regions of Africa. But it also suggests that there are common ways to identify and manage these disputes more effectively:

- Better diligence is required, particularly in deprived areas with low infrastructure and a history of conflict but not of significant deforestation or other land use change.
- Differences in the drivers of tenure related disputes across regions implies that due diligence approaches may be meaningfully adjusted to respond to varying contexts.
- Improved consultation processes may reduce the number of disputes that companies and investors are exposed to, particularly before capital is committed.
- There are financial arguments for avoiding displacement and, where this is not possible, for providing adequate compensation.
- African governments can help by doing more to recognize customary rights and the interests of minority groups.

These lessons are well-supported by anecdotal evidence but are derived from a representative sample of cases and quantitative analysis of contextual factors. This picture is high-level, yet it is important for tenure-related disputes to be analyzed at the local level as well.

This local perspective is supplied in companion publications that look in-depth at each of the sub-regions. These reports explore specific case studies as well as other facets of this analysis, such as the prevalence of disputes related to the power sector in East Africa, to sugar and mining in Southern Africa, and to oil palm in West Africa.

This document represents the start of a robust process to better understand the causes and impacts of tenure disputes, as well as the solutions to the problems they pose for companies and investors. We hope that it has provided clearer insight into how these problems may relate to your work.

Appendix I: Temporal Analysis of Primary Drivers

Years	Primary non-Africa Drivers (as % of cases that period)					
	Displacement	Compensation	Destruction of the Environment	Curtailed Resources	Cultural Infringement	Other
2014 to 2016	29%	17%	34%	17%	3%	0%
2011 to 2013	38%	5%	32%	13%	9%	4%
2008 to 2010	51%	3%	20%	14%	8%	3%
2005 to 2007	39%	8%	27%	12%	12%	2%
2002 to 2004	41%	0%	36%	14%	9%	0%
1999 to 2001	44%	6%	25%	25%	0%	0%
1996 to 1998	58%	17%	17%	0%	8%	0%
1993 to 1995	80%	10%	10%	0%	0%	0%
1990 to 1992	0%	67%	33%	0%	0%	0%
Before 1990	59%	14%	9%	18%	0%	0%
Indeterminate	50%	0%	0%	50%	0%	0%
Average	44%	13%	22%	15%	5%	1%
Years	All cases - (IAN + New) Primary Drivers (as % of cases that period)					
	Displacement	Compensation	Destruction of the Environment	Curtailed Resources	Cultural Infringement	Other
2014 to 2016	29%	18%	0%	12%	0%	41%
2011 to 2013	27%	14%	23%	0%	0%	36%
2008 to 2010	29%	17%	38%	0%	0%	17%
2005 to 2007	23%	20%	53%	0%	0%	3%
2002 to 2004	44%	11%	44%	0%	0%	0%
1999 to 2001	44%	22%	11%	0%	0%	22%
1996 to 1998	33%	33%	33%	0%	0%	0%
1993 to 1995	17%	33%	50%	0%	0%	0%
1990 to 1992	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%
Before 1990	29%	44%	24%	3%	0%	0%
Indeterminate	0%	50%	0%	0%	0%	50%
Average	25%	24%	34%	1%	0%	15%

Appendix II: Stages of Investment



Appendix III: Case Study Data Summary

East Africa

Agriculture

Product / commodity involved	Location / Country	Parties involved	Start year[6]	Stage of Operations	Primary driver of conflict	Secondary drivers of conflict	Violence[7]	Minorities[8]	Stoppage[9]	Border (km)[10]
Palm oil	Kalangala, Bugala Island, Uganda	Oil Palm Uganda Limited, International Fund for Agricultural Development, Bidco, Wilmar International, Kalangala District government	2011	Expansion	Compensation	Displacement	N	N	Y	69
Sugar cane, ethanol	Razaba farm, Bagamoyo, Tanzania	SEKAB, African Development Bank Group, Government of Tanzania, AgroEcoEnergy, ActionAid	2013	Preparation	Displacement	Destruction of the environment	N	Y	Y	6
Rice, cattle, vegetables, banana, fish	Yala Swamp, Nyanza province, Kenya	Dominion Farms / Holdings, residents of Siaya and Bondo Districts, Friends of Yala Swamp Network	2004	Expansion	Destruction of the environment	Displacement	N	N	Y	13
Coffee	Lipokela village, Songea District, Ruvuma	Olam (took over operations, served as testimony in the dispute process), Misereor	2011	Expansion	Displacement	Shortage of Resources	N	N	Y	80

[6] What year did the dispute start?
[7] Was the dispute violent?
[8] Were there minority peoples and/or Indigenous Peoples involved in the dispute?
[9] Did the project face a stoppage of work due to direct action and/or legal and regulatory review?
[10] What is the distance to the nearest national or border or coastline?

	Region, Tanzania									

Energy

Energy source	Location / Country	Parties involved	Start year	Stage of Operations	Primary driver of conflict	Secondary drivers of conflict	Violence	Minorities	Stoppage	Border (km)
Wind power	Lake Turkana - Loyangalani district, Marsabit County, Kenya	Lake Turkana Wind Power Project (various British, Dutch, Norwegian and Danish companies), Sarima Indigenous Peoples' Land Forum, Wangira Okoba and Company Advocates, County Council of Marsabit	2014	Establishment	Displacement	Cultural infringement	N	Y	Y	183
Hydro-power	Karuma Falls, Kiryadongo District, Bunyoro sub-region, Western Region, Uganda	SinoHydro Corp Ltd, government	2013	Preparation	Compensation	Displacement	N	N	Y	105
Coal	Kwasasi in Lamu country, Kenya	Lamu Coal Project, Amu Power Consortium, Power Construction Coporation (PowerChina), National Land Commission	2014	Preparation	Destruction of the environment	Displacement	N	Y	N	2
Natural Gas	Hilala and Calub gas fields, Ogaden Basin, Ethiopia	Ogaden Liberation Army, POLY-GCL Petroleum Group Holdings Limited, Petronas, PetroTrans, Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau, Sinopec	2007	Identification	Shortage of Resources	Destruction of the environment	Y	Y	Y	327

Wind power	Kinangop, Nyandarua, Kenya	African Infrastructure Investment Managers (Macquarie Group and Old Mutual Investment Group joint venture), Africa Infrastructure Investment Fund II, Standard Bank Group, Power Africa, General Electric, Aeolus Kenya, CFC Stanbic Bank	2014	Establishment	Displacement	Compensation	Y	N	Y	153
Wind power	Esilanke area, Kiserian Division, Kajiado County, Kenya	Kipeto Energy Limited, GE, China National Machinery Industry Corp (Sinomach), US Overseas Private Investment Corp, Maasai community	2014	Preparation	Shortage of Resources	Compensation	N	Y	N	80

Mining

Commodity	Location / Country	Parties involved	Start year	Stage of Operations	Primary driver of conflict	Secondary drivers of conflict	Violence	Minorities	Stoppage	Border (km)
Gold	Tarime, Nyamongo, Mara, Tanzania	North Mara Mine (Acacia), local government, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Barrick	2002	Operation	Compensation	Shortage of Resources	Y	N	N	19

South Africa

Agriculture

Product / commodity involved	Location / Country	Parties involved	Start year	Stage of Operations	Primary driver of conflict	Secondary drivers of conflict	Violence	Minorities	Stoppage	Border (km)
Mango, Bananas	Nsanje, Nsanje District, Malawi	Nyasa Limited, Senior Chief Malemia	2016	Identification	Displacement	Cultural infringement	N	N	N	3
Rice	Xai-xai, Gaza province, Mozambique	Hubei Lianfeng, Wanbao Grain and Oil Investment Ltd., local NGOs (FONGA), local farmers	2011	Expansion	Displacement	Destruction of the environment	Y	Y	Y	11
Sugar cane	1) Dwangwa Estate, Central Malawi, 2) Nchalo Estate, South Malawi, Malawi	Illovo Sugar Ltd, Lonhro	1983	Operation	Shortage of Resources	Compensation	Y	N	Y	32
Sugar	Ngowe, Chikwawa District, Malawi	Chancellor College, Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation, Centre for the Development of People	2011	Preparation	Displacement	Shortage of Resources, Cultural infringement	N	N	Y	40
Sugar	Morondava, western coast, Madagascar	Complant, Sucoma, local politicians	2009	Operation	Displacement	Compensation	Y	N	Y	1
Sugar	Nkhunga and Kazilila Dambo, Nkhotakota District, Malawi	Dwangwa Cane Growers Limited (DCGL), Dwangwa Cane Growers Trust (DCGT)	2006	Preparation	Displacement	Compensation	Y	N	Y	29

Mining

Commodity involved	Location / Country	Parties involved	Start year	Stage of Operations	Primary driver of conflict	Secondary drivers of conflict	Violence	Minorities	Stoppage	Border (km)
Titanium, ilmenite, rutile, zircon	Xolobeni, Pondoland, South Africa	Mineral Commodities Ltd, Transworld Energy and Minerals, Xolco, Amadiba Crisis Committee, Pondo nation, Keysha Investments (Holgoun), Blue Bantry	2003	Preparation	Displacement	Destruction of the environment	Y	Y	Y	0.5
Anthracite	Fuleni, 20km south of Somkhele, near iMfolozi, KwaZuluNatal, South Africa	Ibutho Coal, Mfolozi Community Environmental Justice Organisation, Centre for Civil Society, Ocilwane community, iMfolozi Community and Wilderness Alliance	2014	Preparation	Destruction of the environment	Cultural infringement	N	N	N	50
Coal	Tete, Changara District, Tete Province, Mozambique	RiversdaleVale, Rio Tinto, government	2012	Operation	Displacement	Compensation	Y	Y	N	73
Diamonds	Chiadzwa diamond field, Marange, Zimbabwe	Mbada Diamonds, Anjin Investments	2008	Preparation	Displacement	Compensation	Y	N	Y	49
Copper, nickel	Solwezi District, Northwestern Province, Zambia	Kalumbila Minerals Ltd. (First Quantum Minerals), ActionAid Zambia and Musele Nkisu Taskforce, Chief Musele, Zambia Environmental Management Agency	2013	Establishment	Displacement	Compensation	Y	N	Y	58

West Africa

Agriculture

Product / commodity involved	Location / Country	Parties involved	Start Year	Stage of Operations	Primary driver of conflict	Secondary drivers of conflict	Violence	Minorities	Stoppage	Border (km)
Sugar cane	Magbass complex, near Magburaka, Tonkolili district, Sierra Leone	Complant, Sierra Leone Labour Congress, landowner's committees, political parties, Sierra Leone Network on the Rights to Food	2003	Operation	Compensation	Destruction of the environment	N	N	N	110
Oil palm	Massan Kpaka, Malen chiefdom, Pujehun District, Sierra Leone	MAFFS, Socfin (Bolloré), Malen Land Owners and Users Association, Massan Kpaka, Paramount Chief BVS Kebbie, Green Scenery, FIAN Belgium	2011	Preparation	Displacement	Compensation	Y	N	Y	13
Biofuels, sunflower seeds	Originally Fanaye. Relocated to Ndiael Nature Reserve, St Louis region, Senegal	Senhuile, Senethanol SA, Tampieri Financial Group	2010	Establishment	Displacement	Compensation	Y	Y	Y	27
Palm oil	Biase, Cross River, Nigeria	PZ Wilmar, local government, Friends of the Earth (NGO)	2012	Preparation	Compensation	Destruction of the environment	N	Y	N	77
Rubber, oil palm	Kilombo I, Nyamabandé, Kribi region, Cameroon	HEVECAM, SOCAPALM (Bolloré), Bagyeli hunter-gatherers, GMG Global, Sinochem	2008	Operation	Displacement	Compensation, Destruction of the environment, shortage of resources	N	Y	N	13

Palm oil	Dibombari, Littoral Region, Cameroon	Socapalm, Socfin (Bolloré), Relufa	2011	Expansion	Displacement	Compensation	Y	N	Y	11
Rice, maize, soybeans, cassava	1) Nanga-Eboko, Center Region 2) Ndjore District, 3) Santchou, Western Cameroon, Cameroon	Shaanxi Agriculture Group, Yingkao Agricultural Development Co. Ltd. (aka Sino-Cam IKO), Joseph Embolo Fa'a	2011	Operation	Displacement	Compensation	N	N	Y	232
Rice	1) Aveyime /Mafi Dove, South Tongu District, 2) Agorta / Lolita, Lower Volta Region, Ghana	Prairie Volta Rice Company Ltd (Prairie Texas), Government of Ghana, Ghana Commercial bank), Bakpa Tademe community, Mafi Dove community	2008	Operation	Displacement	Compensation	N	Y	Y	24
Maize, jatropha, vegetables	Kpachaa, Jashe, Tugu, Kpalkore, Joro, Chegu and Tijo, Northern Region, Ghana	Solar Harvest Ltd (formerly Biofuel Africa Ltd), migrant Dagomba people; Yaa Naa or Chief of Yendi (owner of land). Regent of Dagbon in Yendi, Divisional chief of Tijo, village/sub-chiefs, youth leaders and elders	2008	Operation	Displacement	Compensation	N	Y	N	44

Energy

Energy source	Location / Country	Parties involved	Start Year	Stage of Operations	Primary driver of conflict	Secondary drivers of conflict	Violence	Minorities	Stoppage	Border (km)
Hydro-power	Kandadji, Kandadji, Tillabéri Department, Tillabéri Region, Niger	World Bank, African Development Bank, Global Water Initiative	2012	Establishment	Compensation	Displacement	N	N	Y	46